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Abstract: This paper examines the role that surprise played in the Russian annexation of 
Crimea in 2014, particularly for Germany. It finds that the phenomenon of surprise was 
unanimously observed by those scrutinizing Crimea’s annexation, but its role or effect not been 
systematically examined. Rather, surprise was neglected as a possibly decisive factor. Based 
on an analysis of its own data set on the annexation of Crimea in 2014, this research comes to 
the diametric assumption that surprise was decisive for the outcome of the annexation. 
Moreover, the analysis finds that the decisive surprise was planned and contrived by Russia. 
The conditions not by keeping Russia's opponents in the dark about its true intentions, but at 
reassuring them in the false alternative. In attempting to assess the diametrically opposed 
assumptions about the role of surprise in the annexation of Crimea through a recourse to the 
theoretical debate on the role of surprise and deception in strategy, the paper finds that both 
explanations find their expression in the schools of strategic thought. Where you stand on 
surprise depends on where you sit in strategy. While this shoes the continued relevance of 
strategy, it leaves the central question of this research intractable until unambiguous evidence 
on how Russia annexed Crimea is available. The paper argues that the disregard of surprise 
as an element of strategy in the debate about the annexation of Crimea, especially in Germany, 
is a sign of increasing strategy blindness. Against the backdrop of the intra-German debate on 
Germany's international responsibility, which has been ongoing since 2013, the work suggests 
a cross-departmental examination of the phenomenon of surprise, as well as the establishment 
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Unlinked from its strategic results, the significance of surprise is trivialized.1 
              Richard K. Betts 
 
1. Research Interest and Relevance 
This research analyses which role surprise had for the annexation of Crimea 2014 in general, 
and for Germany specifically.  
 
The interest in the subject was raised by co-incidence, during a panel-discussion about 
Germany’s future role in foreign and security policy in the spring of 2014, shortly after Crimea 
had been annexed by Russia. The topic of the discussion was how Germany could assume more 
international responsibility and live up to its economic and political weight in foreign and 
security policy, a theme that has been looming large in the German debate since in 2012. At 
that time, with a view to the upcoming 2013 federal elections, a paper was published authored 
by the who-is-who in Germany’s foreign and security policy of the time with the title ‘New 
Powers, New Responsibility’ was published and gave rise to a debate that is yet to be 
concluded2. The core argument of the paper: The international environment in which Germany 
operates has changed, and so has Germany’s role in it. It has gained new powers, and along 
with these new powers come new international responsibility. This in turn would require 
Germany to become a more strategic actor.  
 
During the discussion, one of the panellists, a member of Germany’s Federal Foreign Office’s 
planning staff, referring to the recent Russian annexation of Crimea, argued that to achieve this, 
Germany would need to improve its ability to cope with surprise.  The statement was the spark 
that ignited the interest in this research. It was the developments that occurred since that 
emphasise the relevance for this endeavour.  
 
 
1 Betts, Richard K.: ‘Surprise, Scholasticism, and Strategy: A Review of Ariel Levite's Intelligence and Strategic 
Surprises’, in:  International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 33, No. 3, 1989, New York, Columbia University Press, pp. 
329-343, p. 334. 
 
2 Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik; German Marshall Fund Berlin (eds.): New Power New Responsibility 
Elements of a German foreign and security policy for a changing world, Berlin, October 2013. 




Considering the unexpected developments that followed, the diplomat almost appears like the 
mythological Pandora: the unexpected rise of ISIS in June 2014, the migration crisis in Europe 
in the summer of 2015, BREXIT, the election of Donald Trump in 2016, and a global pandemic 
bringing the world to a sudden halt in 2020 all mark events that were unexpected but had grave 
impact. The world has come “out of joint”, as Germany’s Foreign Minister Frank-Walter 
Steinmeier observed in February 20163.  
 
The foreign minister and the diplomat were not the only Germans that observed the increased 
prevalence of surprise in the international context. For example, former Ambassador Wolfgang 
Ischinger, Chairman of the Munich Security Conference, in an effort looking at the world writ-
large, observes: „In foreign policy, however it [surprise] is a new – and a considerable – 
problem … we cannot prepare for what is coming, and must permanently be prepared for the 
unexpected.”4   
 
Building on the observation of the increasing prevalence of surprises, but with the optimism 
that the "new normal" can be "managed", numerous efforts have been made in Germany since 
2014 to counter future surprises - from the establishment of special foresight institutions and 
courses of study5, to new methods and means of raising awareness of future developments6, to 
attempts to identify areas where surprises are likely7. What is striking here is that, in contrast to 
the efforts to hedge against future surprises and despite the generally shared observation among 
German politicians, experts and academics about the increasing frequency of surprises, the 
phenomenon itself and the study of its causes hardly received any systematic attention in the 
German debate - neither in general nor in the context of any of the surprise events between 2014 
and 2020. The question of why Germany was surprised seemed less relevant than the question 
of how future surprises could be prevented. While the forward-looking focus is understandable 
given the often-grave consequences of unexpected events, it remains important to understand 
 
3 Steinmeier, Frank-Walter: „Die Welt aus den Fugen – was hält uns zusammen?“, speech held at the 
Bertelsmann Forum 2016, 15.02.2016, online available at: https://www.auswaertiges-
amt.de/de/newsroom/160215-bm-bertelsmann-forum/278660 , last accessed 11.04.2021. 
4 „In der Außenpolitik ist sie aber ein neues - und beträchtliches- Problem....Wir können uns nicht mehr auf das 
vorbereiten, was kommt, und müssen ständig auf Überraschungen gefasst sein. Expect the unexpected - 
Erwarte das Unerwartete!“, see: Ischinger, Wolfgang: Welt in Gefahr, Econ, Berlin 2018, p.37 
5 For example the Free University offers a Masters Program in Futurology, see: https://www.ewi-psy.fu-
berlin.de/v/master-zukunftsforschung/index.html , last accessed 10.04.2021. 
6 For example the Bundeswehr University in Munich undertook a comprehensive research program into 
‘Methods of Future Analysis’, see: https://www.unibw.de/politikwissenschaft/professuren/lehrstuhl-
ip/projekte/weiterentwicklung-der-methoden-der-zukunftsanalyse , last accessed 10.04.2021.  
7 Fischer, Sabine; Klein, Margarete (eds):  Denkbare Überraschungen: Elf Entwicklungen, die Russlands 
Außenpolitik nehmen könnte, SWP-Studie, 2016 S 15, Juli 2016, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Berlin, 2016.  




whether generalisable causes can be identified for the phenomenon and whether there are 
specific causes that have led German policymakers in particular to be repeatedly surprised in 
the recent past.  
 
This is also evident in the German debate in the context of the annexation of Crimea in 2014. 
For example, Hans Kundnani states regarding Crimea that "the annexation of Crimea by Russia 
in March 2014 was a strategic shock for Germany"8. However, although the author assesses 
Germany's Russia policy and whether it changed with the annexation of Crimea, Kudnani does 
not show what exactly the shock was, why it was strategic for Germany, nor does he discuss 
what triggered the shock event or what Putin and Russia might have had to do with it. 
 
Hans Kudnani is no exception to a general observation: the phenomenon of surprise hardly 
plays a role in the German debate on international relations in general and in studies of war, 
international conflicts and crises in particular.  Between Waldemar Erfurth's 1938 work Die 
Überraschung im Kriege 9, which informed much of the Wehrmacht's offensive operations in 
the early days of World War II, and today, only one German-language article on surprise could 
be found, dating from 1988: a two-pager in the journal Europäische Wehrkunde, written by 
former Bundeswehr Major General Hanno Graf von Kielmannsegg10. He argues that even in 
the event of the end of the Cold War, the Soviet Union would still have the inclination to seek 
surprise with a conventional military attack. However, von Kielmannsegg's fears were quickly 
judged obsolete by the surprise end of the Cold War: The Cold War ended peacefully, without 
a decisive military battle between the superpowers. In the absence of ideological rivalry, the 
feeling prevailed that there was no longer any reason to fear a Soviet surprise attack, nuclear or 
conventional.  Thus, German contributions play no role in the debate on the phenomenon of 
surprise, which was particularly lively during the Cold War11.  
 
Much of this can be explained out of German history, but language is also a factor here, as 
publications in German are rarely considered in the international debate.  
 
8 Kundnani, Hans: ‘Leaving the West behind: Germany looks East’, in: Foreign Affairs,Vol. 94 No. 2, p.175.  
March/April 2015 
9 Erfurth, Waldemar: Die Überraschung im Kriege, Mittler & Sohn, Berlin, 1938. 
10 Kielmannsegg, Hanno von: ‚Die vergessene Gefahr der strategischen Überraschung‘, in: Europäische 
Wehrkunde, Vol.4, Issue 87, Bonn, 1988, pp. 211-212. The author warns that the risk of strategic surprise by 
conventional military attack has been forgotten – and that the Soviet Union had a legacy of seeking to leverage 
surprise.  
11 A recent and comprehensive overview is provided in: Cancian, Mark F.: Avoiding Coping with Surprise in 
Great Power Conflicts, Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Washington D.C., 2018. 





However, the observation of surprise on the one hand, but its neglect as a potentially decisive 
factor for the overall outcome and the exploration of its generalisable causes can be observed 
not only in the context of the German Crimea debate, but also in the broader, 'Western' debate 
on the annexation of Crimea. Although surprise is a frequently observed aspect of the 
annexation of Crimea, the focus that guided the debate following the annexation was on two 
other aspects: First, on the question of the legality of Russia's action12. Secondly, the question 
of whether the annexation of Crimea was a carefully executed plan or whether it was a rush job 
followed by Russian muddling through played a central role.  
 
The very day after Crimea was ‘officially’ annexed into the Russian Federation, the BBC's John 
Simpson concludes that "The whole operation was very cleverly planned and executed. But 
there is absolutely no doubt about what it was - a remarkable, swift and largely bloodless coup." 
13  A little later, Thomas Gutschker, writing for the German Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 
reveals "Putin's battle plan", tracing it back to 2013, when Western intelligence agencies 
discovered that small groups of Russian special forces had been secretly deployed to Crimea, 
and warned of a possible Russian invasion of Crimea14. In February 2015, the German weekly 
DieZeit reported that a Russian strategy document that preceded the annexation of Crimea was 
published in Russia's Novaya Gazeta, confirming the widely held belief that the annexation of 
Crimea was the result of a long-term plan15. The plan, the article argues, was developed by a 
think tank that advised the Kremlin on marketing and strategy.   
 
At the same time, there was also the opposite assumption - that Putin and Russia acted 
spontaneously, and that the annexation of Crimea was characterised by Russian ad-hocerism 
rather than Russian strategic and operational art. Shortly after Crimea was absorbed into the 
Russian Federation, Shaun Walker writes for the Guardian that the search for the Russian plan 
is a futile effort. The decision itself, the article argues, was a snap decision with deeper roots in 
Putin's biography and Russian history; a "knee-jerk reaction" to recent events in Ukraine and a 
sense of living in an unjust international system. That it was a short-term decision made by a 
 
12 Merkel, Reinhard: ‘Die Krim und das Völkerrecht: Kühle Ironie der Geschichte‘, in: Frankfurter Allgemeine 
Zeitung, 08.04.2014, Frankfurt, 2014. 
13 Simpson, John: ‘Russia's Crimea plan detailed, secret and successful’, in: BBC World Affairs, 19.03.2014, 
London, 2014.  
14 Gutschker, Thomas: ‚Putin’s Schlachtplan‘, in: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 07.09.2014, Frankfurt am 
Main, 2014.   
15 Dobbert, Steffen; Grosev, Christo; Dülffer, Meike: ‚Putin und der geheime Ukraine-Plan‘, in: Die Zeit, 
26.02.2015, Hamburg, 2015. 




very small number of people under Putin's leadership is further demonstrated by the fact that 
even Russian newspapers at the time "reported that all their government sources had been 
caught completely off guard"16. As further evidence for the assumption that the decision to 
annex Crimea was made on the spot, the article quotes a Kremlin-linked analyst, Sergei 
Markov, who states that "the original plan was not to annex Crimea[...]".  Therefore, instead of 
looking for Putin's master plan, it would be more purposeful to look into the question of why 
Putin annexed Crimea and why "the Russian president simply snapped and decided it was time 
to act unilaterally"17. However, what role surprise played for Russia, both as a possible trigger 
for the snap-decision argument and as a possible means to secure the overall goal of annexing 
Crimea, was not considered by either camp looking at Russia's plan for annexing Crimea.   
 
In sum, this research, by assessing the role surprise played for the 2014 annexation of Crimea 
in general, and for Germany in particular, fills several research-gaps: First, it considers a 
phenomenon whose frequency is increasing and whose effects are negative for governments, 
and asks for generalisable causes; second, it considers it in the context of an empirical case, the 
annexation of Crimea in 2014, a case of historical significance in which the phenomenon of 
interest was widely observed but did not play a central role in the debate. Third, it looks at the 
phenomenon with a particular focus on Germany, whose claim to assume more international 
responsibility seems particularly challenging in a world characterised by surprises. Lastly, the 
results of this research are presented in English to provide a contemporary German perspective 
on surprise.  
2. Structure 
The present study consists of five parts. In contrast to the usual approach of theoretical 
anticipation, which first considers theoretical explanations for the phenomenon in question and 
then examines which theory most convincingly explains the empirically recorded reality, this 
study first considers the empirics before resorting to theory to better explain the findings on the 
role of surprise in the annexation of Crimea. 
 
 
16 Walker, Shaun: ‘Ukraine and Crimea: what is Putin thinking?’, in: The Guardian, 23.03.2014, London, 2014.  
 
17 Walker, Shaun: ‘Ukraine and Crimea: what is Putin thinking?’, 23.03.2014. 




3. Surprise as trivia of the annexation of Crimea? 
First, a selection of previously published works on the annexation of Crimea as well as on 
Germany in the context of the annexation of Crimea will be considered in order to assess what 
role surprise has been assigned to the outcome of the annexation of Crimea in these previous 
works. It turns out that surprise, while unanimously observed, has not been analysed in terms 
of its role in the overall outcome . Although various explanations for the occurrence of surprise 
in the context of annexation can be identified, for most of the works examined, the role of 
surprise for the annexation of Crimea and for Germany is negligible for the overall outcome, 
and rather a side effect of annexation than a key element for it. An aspect that would make it 
into the "trivial" section of a film encyclopaedia if the annexation of Crimea were a film and 
not a bitter reality. The literature review shows that this is also the conclusion of those who test 
the assumption Russia helped create the conditions for the surprise through deliberate deception 
and information operations. These approaches also fail to explain how exactly the targeted 
deception contributed to the surprise in the context of the annexation and what this meant for 
the outcome of the annexation. Thus, the role of deception in the annexation of Crimea remains 
just as random - and thus not comprehensible. 
4. The challenge of tracing surprise. 
Having identified from the literature reviewed some assumptions about why surprise occurred, 
and what role it had in the outcome, the challenge was how to proceed from here. By analysing 
how the literature reviewed had reached its conclusions, it was possible to elicit clues for how 
to proceed in this research project. On the one hand, it became apparent that most of the 
reviewed papers pay little attention to methodological and theoretical considerations. On the 
other hand, a common feature is found in the perspective from which the case is viewed: The 
case is viewed from hindsight - that is, the starting point of the works considered is the outcome 
known only from hindsight. However, this approach seems ill-suited to the research interest of 
examining surprise and its role for the annexation of Crimea and for Germany in particular. To 
understand the role of surprise and to better understand why it happened, this research argues 
that it is first necessary to establish what was expected before the unexpected outcome became 
known. This requires taking the perspective that was offered when the outcome - Russia's 
annexation of Crimea - was still unknown.  
 




The difference between the two perspectives can be described using the example of a jigsaw 
puzzle. The works examined all looked at the pieces of the puzzle with knowledge of the picture 
that the correctly assembled puzzle pieces produce. It is different when it comes to the question 
of why something seemed surprising and what effects the unexpected event had on the further 
course of events. Here, the researcher must find out which picture was expected by the puzzlers 
involved when looking at only the pieces of the puzzle, but without knowing the final picture. 
It is therefore a matter of first looking at the expectations that turned out to be wrong in 
retrospect before conclusions can be drawn about what exactly was surprising, why it was 
surprising and what role the surprise played in the outcome of the annexation of Crimea. 
5. Which Sources, which data? How much information is enough? 
Another question that arose after the literature review was what sources of data should be 
consulted to find what was expected before the unexpected. Here, the first obstacle to overcome 
was the validity of the data - a problem that, as this paper notes, is inherent in all efforts to study 
the annexation of Crimea. This also explains why much about the annexation and how it took 
place remains controversial to this day. The fact is that to this day, high-quality data, such as 
discussions of government minutes, are not accessible to the researcher, and will remain so for 
the foreseeable future. On the other hand, the question of sources and data is particularly 
challenging because, in contrast to the lack of availability to high quality sources and data, the 
universe of available secondary data overwhelms the individual researcher18.  
 
Taken together, these aspects inherent to the case present the researcher with a dilemma: either 
abandon the study at this point, as meeting academic standards is rendered impossible by the 
available data; or compromise on academic standards on the grounds that the case is of historical 
significance and in the hope that, even if academic standards must be compromised and 
academically at best a specific explanation of an individual case can be expected, valuable 
insights into the case and policy-making can be found. This study resolves the dilemma by 
choosing the latter. However, it differs from the literature discussed on the annexation of 
Crimea in that it identifies the inherent problem of the case for academic consideration, reflects 
on it, and describes a comprehensible and falsifiable way out. 
 
18 The search term “annexation of Crimea” generates 2.9 million results in Google search: 
https://www.google.com/search?q=Annexation+of+Crimea&rlz=1C1CHBF_deDE822DE822&oq=Annexation+of
+Crimea&aqs=chrome..69i57j0i22i30l9.3762j0j15&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8 




6. A continuous analysis of the daily coverage of one media source from the beginning 
of the Ukraine crisis in October 2013 until the annexation of Crimea in April 2014. 
Instead of relying on several secondary sources without a priori defined selection criteria, as 
was often observed in the literature considered, the third part of this study is limited to an in-
depth analysis of a single source: the reporting of the Arbeitsgemeinschaft der öffentlich-
rechtlichen Rundfunkanstalten der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (ARD). To minimise the risk 
of selection bias of the selected contributions and the data they contain, a continuous, daily 
analysis of ARD's coverage was conducted from 29 October 2013 until the Russian Duma 
officially welcomed the peninsula as a member of the Russian Federation on 18 March 201419. 
A total of 349 ARD reports and news items were identified, transcribed, translated and analysed 
for the third part of this study. The focus of the investigation is the question of which 
expectations about further developments can be ascertained from the reporting, especially from 
the German government perspective, which turned out to be false after Crimea was annexed by 
Russia on 18 March.   
7. A diametrical conclusion on the role of surprise: Created by Russian deception, 
and decisive for the outcome. 
The results of this analysis, which are reproduced and discussed in the fourth part of this study, 
are diametrically opposed to previous conclusions about the role of surprise for the Russian 
annexation of Crimea, but especially for Germany. It concludes that an unexpected event - the 
disappearance of Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych on the night of 21 February - 
triggered the developments that led to the annexation of Crimea, and that the announcement 
during the EU Council crisis summit on 06 March 2014 by the Crimean regional government 
to hold a referendum on the regional parliament's decision on Crimea's accession to the Russian 
Federation determined the outcome.  
 
The analysis of ARD’r reporting suggests that two surprising events are of different nature: The 
disappearance of Yanukovych came like a bolt from the blue and surprised both Germany and 
Russia. Regarding the decisive surprise on 06 March 2014, however, the analysis of ARD's 
coverage concludes that it was brought about by deliberate Russian, and in particular Putin's, 
subterfuge: Rather than creating the conditions for surprise by increasing ambiguity, as previous 
 
19 This has the additional advantage of covering the two different observation periods identified in the German 
and broader debate on the annexation of Crimea, see fn 17.   




attempts have argued with little specificity, this research finds that Putin's ruse was to create 
certainty about the false alternative.   
 
Putin wanted his opponents to believe that another Georgia war was imminent. His stratagem 
to achieve this expectation was the military. The expectation of an imminent repeat of 
developments in Georgia in 2008, when Russia baited the new Georgian president Mikhail 
Saakashvili into responding to Russian military manoeuvres near the Georgian border in the 
false expectation that NATO would come to his aid, set the stage for the surprising event that 
shaped the outcome: the announcement by the Crimean regional government during the EU 
Council summit on 6 March 2014. But while Russia's military manoeuvres intended to mirror 
a Georgia-like scenario were Putin's central stratagem, the Russian president himself was 
Russia's chief "stratagemist" - and Angela Merkel the main target of his ruse. The analysis of 
the ARD coverage makes it clear that Putin did not use these calls to dispel the German 
chancellor's doubts about Russian intentions, but to confirm and reinforce her pre-existing 
image of Russia and its president.  The principle applied both to the role of the military and to 
telephone diplomacy with the German chancellor: Putin's Georgia strategist exploited 
prejudices of his opponents to create the false expectation that another Georgia was imminent.  
 
The effect of Putin's orchestrated surprise on 6 March 2014 was that it determined the outcome. 
The referendum that was announced on 06 March could no longer be averted and was held on 
16 March 2014. Unsurprisingly, the regional parliament's decision was overwhelmingly 
approved, and on 18 March the Crimean Peninsula, previously an autonomous republic on the 
territory of Ukraine, became part of the Russian Federation.  
 
Hence the difference in the assessment of the role of surprise for the annexation of Crimea, 
especially for Germany compared to the works discussed in the literature review could not be 
greater. It is diametrical. While in the assessed works, surprise was random and its effect on the 
overall outcome negligible, the analyses of the ARD coverage suggests that surprise was 
decisive to outcome, and deliberately brought about by Russian subterfuge. In addition, the 
analysis suggests a direct link between Russian deception and the decisive surprise event on 
March 6, and identifies a deceptive pattern: Russia's strategic ploy was to make the opponent 
certain of the wrong option. Instead of increasing uncertainty, it increased certainty about this 
false option. 
 




8. Where you stand on surprise, depends on where you sit in strategy. 
But how can this difference be explained? The assumptions on the role of surprise and deception 
for the annexation of Crimea drawn from the analyses of ARD’s reporting are diametrical to 
those identified in previous works. The fourth part of this endeavour therefore seeks to better 
understand and explain this difference through a recourse to theory. It does so by turning to the 
theoretical debate about strategy, and considers the relationship between strategy, deception 
and surprise.  
 
This also addresses the lack of theory that was observed in previous works. While broadly 
speaking, the annexation of Crimea can be considered as a case of international relations, the 
question this research raises is too specific for International Relations theories.  It asks whether 
surprise can be decisive in competition and conflict among states, and how it can be achieved. 
Therefore, rather than seeking to better explain the diametrical conclusions about the role of 
surprise (and deception) by turning to the grand theories of international relations, this research 
considers the role surprise and deception played in the theoretical considerations about strategy 
as in this context the question what is decisive for the outcome of conflict, competition, crisis 
and war between states is central.  
 
It finds that the discussion about the relationship between surprise, deception and strategy is as 
old as are intellectual musings on strategy. While there is agreement that surprise is a 
psychological effect that can serve as a great force multiplier, two distinct notions on the utility 
of surprise as decisive for the outcome of war are identified in classical strategy: the direct 
approach, best captured by the Prussian war-theoretician Carl von Clausewitz, and the indirect 
approach, best captured by the British war-correspondent Sir Basil H. Liddell-Hart. While 
Clausewitz acknowledges the utility at the tactical level of war, where it should be actively 
sought as it serves as a great force-multiplier, the Prussian godfather of strategy is critical of 
strategic utility of surprise. To him, surprise in war is rarely decisive, as in war, only the 
battlefield engagement can be decisive. The focus on the decisive battlefield engagement is also 
why Clausewitz is critical of the means to achieve surprise, cunning and deception. To him, 
they are a waste of time and effort, and a weapon of last resort for the morally inferior. To Sir 
Liddell-Hart and the adherents of the indirect-approach, on the other hand, surprise causes 
dislocation of the adversary, and is therefore ultimately decisive. Consequently, the indirect-
approach holds deception in favourable terms, and has little moral quarrels about using it. The 
reason for this is that unlike the disciples of the direct approach who seek the decisive battle of 




annihilation, the votaries of the indirect approach consider it the acme of skill to win without 
fighting, and search for ways to evade costly battlefield engagements. The two positions make 
answering the question of the role of surprise for strategy intractable. Where you stand on 
surprise, depends on where you sit in strategy.  
This does not change by the findings of the study on the relationship between strategy and 
surprise in the nuclear age. While surprise remains a central element of the strategy debate, 
given the threat of a devastating, unexpected nuclear first strike, the question of the potential 
strategic effect of surprise no longer arises. The technological development of the nuclear 
weapon dissolved the doubts that Clausewitz and the students of the direct approach had about 
the role of surprise in strategy. An unexpected thermonuclear attack could well have strategic 
effect20. This had consequences for the debate on surprise in strategy. Instead of pursuing the 
question of the strategic relevance of surprise, i.e. its ability to decide the outcome of war, two 
other questions moved to the centre of the debate on strategy in the nuclear age of the Cold 
War. One is the question of why governments fall victim to surprises; the other is whether 
surprises could be prevented in the future.  
 
The examination of the strategy debate on the phenomenon of surprise in the nuclear age shows 
that towards the end of the Cold War there was widespread agreement on the causes for the 
emergence of surprises. At the heart of the matter is the realisation that surprise arises even 
though, in retrospect, it can be determined that information was available that could have 
pointed to the subsequent surprise21. The question was why existing, correct information was 
not considered. Of particular relevance was the human factor and the cognitive filters that make 
it difficult to interpret new information correctly. Another factor identified as filtering the 
correct interpretation of information was the idiosyncrasies inherent in groups and bureaucratic 
structures, which were described as of special relevance in the intelligence environment. 
Finally, while presented as of secondary importance compared to the causes inherent in a 
government affected by surprise, cunning and deception of the adversary were also described 
as potential causes of surprise. The reason for this suppression of planned, adversarial action as 
a causal agent of surprise can be justified by the observation of this paper that the debate on 
 
20 Consequently, the military units that would deliver such weapons were ‘strategic’. Whether this conflation of 
technological capabilities and strategy has led to the increasing illiteracy in strategy this paper finds merits 
further research.   
21 See in particular: Wohlstetter, Roberta: Warning and Decision, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1962, a 
seminal work in the study of surprise, which examines the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941 and is the 
first to point out the paradox of governments being taken by surprise despite information that could have 
prevented later surprise. 




strategy in the nuclear age is unilaterally based on Carl von Clausewitz's axioms on the strategic 
value of surprise and the direct approach22.  
 
There was also agreement in the extensive debate on the phenomenon of surprise during the 
Cold War on the question of turning away future surprises: Future surprises cannot be 
prevented. It is this point where a new attitude developed towards the end of the Cold War, 
again under the impact of technological developments, this time in the field of information 
gathering and data processing. In contrast to the pessimistic assessments, they come to the 
conclusion that technological advances at least give reason for hope to rule out surprises in the 
future23. The debate between the two schools also for the first time considers the question of 
how to approach the study of the phenomenon of surprise24. Previous approaches have been 
criticised for their lack of scientific rigour, so that despite the unity of the research, it is not 
possible to speak of a theory on the emergence of surprises for governments. This criticism was 
countered by the argument that the phenomenon of surprise confronts the researcher with a 
fundamental dilemma, since its characteristics do not allow it to be grasped through a 
Procrustean bed of scientific rigour, thus making the development of a generalisable theory in 
the strict scientific sense impossible25.  
 
The debate about the suitability of the phenomenon for scientific study equally marks the end 
of the strategic debate about surprise. With the end of the Cold War, and the perception of the 
end of the nuclear threat, interest in surprise also faded and moved out of the centre of the 
strategy debate. However, it did not disappear entirely, and for considerable time changed from 
a pessimistic outlook on the ability to prevent surprise to an optimistic one. This changed when 
Nassim Taleb published his successful work Black Swan in the wake of the collapse of the 
world financial markets in 200826. However, it took until the late 2010s until the phenomenon 
was more systematically considered, especially from the field of military studies in the United 
States of America. This renewed debate is marked by the pessimistic notion that surprises will 
 
22 This view is held by Barton Whaley, see Whaley, Barton: Stratagem, Artech House, Boston London, 
1969/2007 (reprint). 
23 Levite, Ariel: Intelligence and Strategic Surprise, Columbia University Press, Washington D.C., 1987. 
24 Levite, Ariel: ‘Intelligence and Strategic Surprises Revisited: A Response to Richard K. Betts's "Surprise, 
Scholasticism, and Strategy"’, in: International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 33, No. 3, 1989, New York, Columbia 
University Press, 345-349. 
25 Betts, Richard K.: ‘Surprise, Scholasticism, and Strategy: A Review of Ariel Levite's Intelligence and Strategic 
Surprises’, in:  International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 33, No. 3, 1989, New York, Columbia University Press, pp. 
329-343. 
26 Taleb, Nassim K: The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable, Random House, New York, 2007. 




continue to dominate the international environment in the future. Instead of avoiding them, it is 
smarter to find a ways of coping with them27. 
9. The continued relevance of strategy or the alarming signs of ‘strategy blindness’?  
Irrespective of the question whether surprise can be ruled out in future, in recent research even 
more than in the strategy debate on surprise in the Cold War era, the decoupling of the question 
of the role of surprise for the outcome of a war, the fundamental in the strategy debate of the 
pre-nuclear era, but above all the two fundamentally different attitudes that can be found on this 
in the debate, is increasingly receding into the background.  
  
This is also evident in the research and debate on the annexation of Crimea as a whole, in which 
the core question: "what was decisive for the outcome" has been conducted detached from 
earlier findings of the strategy debate on this question.  
 
However, if one relates the two assumptions about the role of surprise in the outcome of the 
Russian annexation of Crimea that this thesis has identified in the previous chapters, it becomes 
clear that these can be explained by the strategy debate on the general relationship between 
surprise and strategy from the pre-nuclear era. Those who argue that the role of surprise and 
deception in the annexation of Crimea is negligible and accidental find confirmation in Carl 
von Clausewitz and the direct approach to strategy. And the conclusion drawn from the data 
analysis conducted for this research can be explained by Basil H. Liddell Hart's theses on the 
strategic utility of deception and surprise.  Both perspectives are given a set of possible, 
generalisable causes for surprise in the context of Crimea, without, however, being able to 
determine with certainty what exactly was causal for the surprise, in general as well as 
specifically for Germany. 
 
However, this means that it does not resolve the dichotomy of assumptions about the role of 
surprise in the annexation of Crimea, especially for Germany, but confirms both views: where 




27 Cancian, Mark F.: Avoiding Coping with Surprise in Great Power Conflicts, pp. 30 – 33, Centre for Strategic 
and International Studies (CSIS), Washington D.C., 2018. 




Although this result prevents a clear answer to the question of which assumption about the role 
of surprise for the annexation of Crimea elaborated in this paper is better explained by the 
theoretical insights about the role of surprise in strategy, and in this respect is not completely 
satisfactory, conclusions arise from the observation of the decoupling of the debate about the 
annexation of Crimea as well as in the context of the phenomenon of surprise from its core 
question. The first is that from the perspective of strategy, surprise, even if its value for the 
overall outcome is debatable, is a factor that, if observed, should not be neglected. Surprise is 
important. And if there is no surprise, it should always be expected. Because surprise is always 
in the future. Second, this research has shown that while thinking about the role of surprise in 
strategy is as old as thinking about winning wars, the debate has undergone significant shifts in 
focus - from examining its role in winning wars before the advent of the nuclear weapon to 
asking what causes governments to fall victim to surprise and whether and how this can be 
prevented in the future. Thirdly, as already observed in the context of the debate on the 
annexation of Crimea, the debate on the role of surprise in strategy became increasingly 
decoupled from its theoretical foundations. Therefore, even more important than an 
examination of the phenomenon of surprise, against the background of theoretical recourse, 
seems to be the apparent knowledge about strategy. 
10. Policy Recommendations  
Against the background of these findings and in line with its interest especially in Germany’s 
foreign and security policy, this study concludes with two recommendations for further 
reflection in the context of German foreign and security policy. The first is to undertake a 
thorough, government-wide examination of the main events that have taken the German 
government by surprise since the Arab Spring in 201128. The results should be submitted to a 
broad, media-led public debate, especially in the German Bundestag. Such investigations and 
debates are not without precedent and have been conducted, for example, in the United States 
after the 9/11 attacks on behalf of the government, or as part of large and adequately funded 
research projects examining various surprise events and their origins29.. While neither example 
could prevent future surprises, both efforts contributed to improved self-awareness that reduced 
 
28 For example the inquiry into the terror attacks on the New York World Trade Centre on the 9th of September 
2001, online available at: https://9-11commission.gov/report/911Report.pdf , last accessed: 10.04.2021 
29 For example: Nolan, Janne E.; MacEachin, Douglas; Trockman, Kristine: Discourse, Dissent, and Strategic 
Surprise: Formulating U.S. Security Policy in an Age of Uncertainty, Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, School 
of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, Washington, 2006.  




vulnerability to surprises and triggered structural and procedural changes in policymaking that 
contributed to more resilient and adaptive policies.  
 
The second recommendation aims to increase competence in matters of strategy in Germany by 
establishing an academic chair in strategic studies - of which there is currently none in 
Germany. While there were good reasons why Germany did not think about strategy in the past, 
the track record of the last thirty years as a sovereign nation suggests that opening the strategy 
box is unlikely to lead to Germany planning the next war of aggression. Rather, it could help 
Germany to be better able to take on more international responsibility and make the German 
debate on strategic issues less guided by assumptions shaped by the past. Moreover, it would 
be an opportunity for Germany to develop its own contemporary and forward-looking 
understanding of strategy, which, as this study shows, goes beyond engagement on the 
battlefield: while the principles of strategy remain relevant, the face of its object, war, conflict, 
crisis and competition between and among states, has changed fundamentally, as has the 
geopolitical context in which they take place. Not dealing with these changes in the strategic 
environment always carries the risk of being taken by surprise. Finally, such a chair could help 
bring a German perspective to the broader debate on strategy. 
 
11. Closing Remarks 
 
In closing, a few remarks what this research is not. It does not ask whether the annexation of 
Crimea could have been prevented; neither does it search for someone to blame for the events. 
It also does not seek to judge on the legal or moral aspects of the annexation. The verdict in this 
regard, that Russia broke international law, and committed an act of aggression, is out – and 
fully shared by the author. However, the verdict does not change history, and should not deflect 
from considering what happened. Furthermore, this research did not set out to find a silver 
bullet to prevent surprise, as others had done. Lastly, it this research was never intended as an 
attempt to better understand Russia, or its leader Vladimir Putin. As important and relevant 
such an effort is, the individual limitations of the researcher, especially pertaining to the lack 
of command of the Russian language.  
 
This research limits itself to the question which role surprise played for the annexation of 
Crimea, especially for Germany. The objective is to contribute to a better understanding of a 
phenomenon that in recent years has widely been observed, but rarely been analysed with a 
view to its strategic effect. The axiom to this endeavour the conviction that a better 




understanding the underlying drivers of an empirically observable, problematic phenomenon 
improves the ability to cope and deal with this problem.    
 
The longer the author studied the phenomenon of surprise the more the inherent complexity of 
the seemingly simple word surprise became apparent. And the longer the author contemplated 
the existing assumptions on the role of surprise for the annexation of Crimea, the more 
confusing the web of explanations appeared. As if looking through a kaleidoscope, what was 
described seemingly depended on who looked. The following work is an attempt to do justice 
to this complexity and to make it comprehensible using the annexation of Crimea as an example. 
It hopes to be of relevance to all those involved in academia and policy making that must take 
decisions against the inherent uncertainty of the future, and constantly worry about their 




This work on the elusive phenomenon of surprise in the highly dynamic and volatile context of 
international relations would not have ended if it were not for the support and guidance of many. 
For their patience, guidance, their willingness to share their expertise and experience I am 
tremendously grateful. In times of despair, they motivated me to carry on. In times of certainty, 
they cautioned me to look again. When I was lost in the web of my own doing, they took the 
time to listen and help order my thoughts again. When in self-doubt, they made me understand 
that this is a known side-effect of a doctorate. Most importantly, they never stopped believing 
in me and the value of conducting this research.  
 
I would particularly like to thank Dr. Thomas Bagger, Rainald Becker, Dr. Joachim Bertele, 
Dr. Andreas Beyer, Rob Bucknall, Prof. Laura Cleary, Curti Covi,  Gudrun Eitel, Dr. Günther 
Eitel, Valeska Esch, Viktoria von Flemming, Sigmar Gabriel, Anne Harbour, Heinz-Dieter 
Jopp, Prof. Dr. Joachim Krause, André Krüger, Marcel Krüger, Johannes Kurt, Steven J. Main, 
Prof. Andrew Monaghan, Chester Myers, Claudia Nick, Nigel Prescott, Reinhold Robbe, Anna 
Rosenberg, Sean Monaghan, Wolfgang Nowak, Henry Plater-Zyberg, Malte Roschinski, Prof. 
Peter Schmidt, Dr. Rainer Sontowski, Prof. Dr. Johannes Varwick, Dr. Adam Zagorecki, Dr. 
Albrecht Zunker(†) and Joana Zygo.  
 
They made this research better and stronger. The shortcomings are entirely my own. 






























INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 





























INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 




II. Literature review  
Despite the plethora of publications that followed Russia’s seizure of the peninsula, none 
specifically addresses the role of surprise and its relationship to the annexation of Crimea30. 
Therefore, the objective of the following review of a selection of earlier publications is to distil 
which role these works attributed to surprise in the context of Crimea’s annexation, and which 
explanations are offered as to why surprise occurred. There are two parts to this literature 
review. The first part scrutinizes a selection of literature that represent the wider debate about 
the annexation of Crimea. The second reviews a selection of publications that specifically focus 
on Germany in the context of the annexation.  
1. The wider debate about the annexation of Crimea: which role for 
surprise?  
In the wider debate about the annexation of Crimea, three dimensions received heightened 
attention: Understanding Putin; Putin’s ability as strategic leader; and what was decisive for the 
annexation, traditional military operations, or information operations. The following will 
review a selection of works addressing these dimensions.  
1.1. Understanding Putin  
Of special relevance and interest was the Russian President, Vladimir Putin. Understanding 
him, it was assumed, would be equal to understanding Russia’s rationale – and not 
understanding him equal to great risk, as Fiona Hill points out:  
 
“A misreading of this man – now one of the most consequential international political 
figures and challenges to the US-led world order since the end of the Cold War – could 
have catastrophic consequences. Russia’s 8.000 nuclear weapons (and the vehicles to 
deliver them to any point on the globe) underscore the huge risks of not understanding 
who Putin is, what he wants, how he thinks and why”31.  
 
 
30 A Google search of ‚annexation of Crimea’ and its German equivalent, ‘Annektion der Krim’ produces 1,5 
million and 203.000 results respectively.  
31 Hill, Fiona: ‘Putin: the one man show the West doesn’t understand’, in: Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 72:3, 
2016, pp 140-144, p. 140. 




That such an understanding of the Russian president was not present prior to the annexation of 
Crimea was pointed by John Mearsheimer, one of the most eminent neo-realist International 
Relations scholars. He argues that ‘the West’ has to blame itself for pushing Russia into the 
behaviour witnessed in Ukraine and Crimea, because it neglected Russian interests and broke 
promises made to Russia since the end of the Cold War. Russia, in Mearsheimer’s neo-realist 
reading, behaved perfectly rational, and the West pursued policies oblivious to likely Russian 
reactions to its own behaviour. Better understanding Putin and his logic would be the best bet 
against surprise32. 
 
1.1.1. Why Putin annexed Crimea 
 
Numerous efforts were undertaken to get a better grasp of what Putin wants, how he thinks and 
why. In 2016, Stephen Treisman critically analyses the existing explanation why Russia (or 
Putin) decided to annex Crimea and identifies three dominant patterns of explaining the 
annexation of Crimea with the Russian president, Vladimir Putin33.  
 
The first such pattern he calls “Putin the defender”34. Fearing that with his crony, Ukrainian 
president Yanukovych having disappeared, and a new government in his place hostile to 
Russian interests, and closely connected with Western powers, Ukraine will soon not only join 
the European Union (EU), but also NATO, Putin decided to step in to pre-empt further NATO 
eastward enlargement. Others focus more on the competition between the EU and Russia. They 
find that from the Russian president’s perspective a closer association of Ukraine with the EU 
would equal the end of Putin’s own regional integration project, the Eurasian Customs Union, 
in which Ukraine played a central role.  In sum, these scholars argue that the reason why Putin 
annexed Crimea was in defence of vital Russian interests.  
 
 
32 Mearsheimer, John J.: ‘Why the Ukraine Crisis is the West’s Fault: The Liberal Delusions that Provoked Putin’, 
in: Foreign Affairs, Vol. 93 No. 5, September/ October 2014, Council on Foreign Relations, 2014, pp 77-84, 85-
89.  
33 Treisman, Daniel: ‘Why Putin took Crimea: The Gambler in the Kremlin’, in: Foreign Affairs Vol. 95 No 3, 
May/June 2016, pp. 47 - 54, p. 48, Council on Foreign Relations, 2016. Stefan Meister offers a similar 
characterisation in a summary review critically assessing prevailing explanations of the annexation of Crimea, 
and why they are flawed, see: Meister, Stefan: ‘Fünf Illusionen über das System Putin’, in:  Arbeitspapiere für 
Sicherheitspolitik, Nr.6/2015, Bundesakademie für Sicherheitspolitik, Berlin, 2015; another good overview of 
the dominant explanations of the Russian president is, see:  Walker, Shaun:  Ukraine and Crimea: ‘What is Putin 
Thinking’, in: The Guardian, 23.03.2014, London, 2014. 
34 Treisman, Daniel (2016): Why Putin took Crimea, p. 48. 




The second pattern Treisman calls “Putin the imperialist”35. According to Treisman, this 
reading builds on another statement by Putin, in which the Russian president described the end 
of the Cold War and the demise of the Soviet Union as the greatest tragedy in history.  In this 
view, rebuilding the former Soviet Union’s spheres of influence and power status, has been 
Putin’s calling ever since he assumed presidency in 1999. This is evidenced by his New Russia 
or Novo Rossija agenda, which seeks to instil a new sense of Russian self-esteem and patriotism, 
not only in Russia, but among all Russian speakers. Crimea  should therefore be regarded the  
climax of a “gradually unfolding systematic project on part of the Kremlin to recapture the lost 
lands of the Soviet Union”36, as Treisman put it. The annexation of Crimea was thus an act that 
used an opportune moment to realize a long-standing plan.  
 
A third pattern that could be observed in the prevalent explanations why Putin annexed Crimea, 
“Putin the populist”37. Unlike the previous patterns, this explanation does not look at the 
external dimension as being the root cause for Vladimir Putin’s decision to seize Crimea. 
Rather, it emphasises the Russian domestic dimension – and the assumption that the best 
distraction from domestic crises are international crisis38. For the first time since his re-election, 
Putin’s popularity rates dropped – from over 80% after the election, to below 60% at the 
beginning of 2014. The annexation of Crimea was hence an act with the sole intention to rally 
support behind Putin and his course by instigating an external crisis.  
 
Despite the differences between these explanations why Putin annexed Crimea, they have one 
notion in common: their axiom is that the annexation of Crimea should not have come as a 
surprise and point to indicators that could – and should – have warned about the risk of Putin 
waiting for an opportunity to further his objectives.  
 
However, not only does this invoke the response that with hindsight, one is always blessed with 
20/20 vision, it also invites additional questions in relation to this research: could surprise have 
been averted had decision-makers heeded to the authors of these publications? Had the authors 
consistently pointed to Russia waiting for an opportunity to annex Crimea before? What were 
 
35 Treisman, Daniel (2016): Why Putin took Crimea, p. 47. 
36 Treisman, Daniel (2016): Why Putin took Crimea, p. 50 
37 Meister, Stefan: ‚Putin richtig verstehen: warum die Ukrainekrise eine Russlandkrise ist‘, in: Deutsche 
Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik (ed): DGAP-Standpunkt, Nr. 6, Berlin, 2014; Taylor, Adam: ‘Is there a link 
between Putin’s approval rating and aggressive Russian foreign policy?’, in: The Washington Post, 26.11.2018, 
Washington, 2018. 
38 A popular and humorous account of this tendency is presented in the Hollywood Movie ‘Wag the Dog’, 
starring Robert de Niro.  




the obstacles that led to this disregard? Another notion is shared by those pointing to the signals 
in the past – they do not consider Putin a great strategist, but an opportunist willing to exploit 
every instrument and opportunity to further his interests.  
1.1.2. Gambler vs. Strategist 
 
1.1.2.1. The Gambler 
Stephen Treisman rejects these characterisations of Putin as imperialist, revanchist or populist. 
Instead, he argues finds that:  
“Putin’s seizure of Crimea appears to have been an improvised gambit, developed under 
pressure, that was triggered by the fear of losing Russia’s strategically important naval base 
in Sevastopol.”39  
 
In other words: Putin is a gambler. The decision to annex Crimea was not taken because of the 
president’s hurt feelings about the course of history, his dwindling domestic support, or his 
worry about Russia’s sphere of influence, but about the naval base in Sevastopol.  
 
To come to this conclusion, Treisman argues, one needs to ask how the decision to annex 
Crimea was taken, instead of seeking to explain why. With this question in mind, Treisman 
finds a process that was lacking strategic vision and a plan.  
 
First and foremost, Putin had no plan for Crimea at the onset. This was confirmed to Treisman 
in a personal conversation with Vladimir Putin himself: “Putin told me, at a reception in Sochi 
in October 2015, that the operation to seize Crimea was “spontaneous” and was “not at all 
planned long in advance”40.  
 
According to Stephen Treisman’s analysis of events, at the beginning of the military operation, 
Putin was still in control of events, and could have called off the operation41. But with time 
progressing, and the West furious about Russian military manoeuvres on Crimea, he found 
himself trapped – and had no exit strategy. In fact, Treisman argues that “a week after the 
 
39 Treisman, Daniel: Why Putin took Crimea, p. 48. 
40 Treisman, Daniel: Why Putin took Crimea, p. 47. 
41 Treisman, Daniel: Why Putin took Crimea, p 52 




beginning of the operation, Putin had not yet decided on annexation”42.   This, Treisman opines, 
can be concluded when looking at the political aspects of the annexation:  
 
“[t]he clearest evidence against a consistent plan for territorial expansion is the chaotic way 
in which the Crimean intervention unfolded. Although the military component ran smoothly, its 
political aspects at times revealed an almost farcical lack of preparation.”43 
 
For Treisman, all of this goes to show Putin’s inability as a leader and strategist, and 
demonstrates his gambling approach to international politics. This, he argues, has serious 
implications for Western leaders needing to deal with the Russian president:  
 
“A rational imperialist can be contained, but the appropriate response to a gambler who makes 
snap decisions based on short-term factors is less clear. In both Crimea and Syria, Putin has 
sought to exploit surprise, moving fast to change facts on the ground before the West could stop 
him”44.  
 
Like the publications he went to criticize, Treisman, acknowledges surprise. However, in 
Treisman’s analysis surprise is not something peculiar to the annexation of Crimea, or caused 
by Western negligence of Russia, but idiosyncratic to the Russian president. Because he is a 
gambler, and not a strategist, these surprises are unforeseeable consequences of knee-jerk 
decisions by the Russian president, but not part of a Russian strategy, let alone a plan.  
 
Thus, Treisman offers a decidedly different reading why and how Putin surprised his 
antagonists. Unlike the previously discussed approaches which argue that surprise occurred 
because of self-delusion and a lack of understanding of the Putin’s motives, Treisman argues 
that surprise was caused by Putin’s irrational and erratic nature – and the outcome of a dilemma 
the Russian president had created for himself.  
 
While Treisman makes a convincing argument to shift the attention from why Russia annexed 
Crimea to how it was annexed, he fails to address the question himself in his zeal to characterize 
the Russian president as a gambler: Firstly, because he mainly considers how the decision was 
taken, and dependent on that how Crimea was annexed. Secondly, because his central argument, 
 
42 Treisman, Daniel: Why Putin took Crimea., p. 52 
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that this can be observed by lack of a plan at the onset, the farcical nature of the political process, 
which suggests that Putin send the military without having considered the political outcome is 
not convincing: After all, Crimea was annexed by Russia despite the chaos, and irrespective of 
the question whether it was according to a plan or according to the situation.  
 
The more interesting aspect in how Russia annexed Crimea therefore appears to be in the 
question what role the political process had in relation to the overall outcome; how it compared 
to the role of the military component; and which of each contained surprise Putin could then 
exploit.  
1.1.2.2. Strategist 
Finally, Fiona Hill, former national security advisor to U.S. president George W. Bush and well 
known for her expertise on the Soviet Union and Russia, offers a reading of the Russian 
president that is diametrically opposed to Treisman’s characterisation. Unlike the latter, Fiona 
Hill characterizes the President as being very methodical in his decision making – and in fully 
accordance with the methods he obtained in his formation as a KGB official.  
 
Hill is critical of earlier explanations why Putin decided to annex Crimea, too. Although 
agreeing that Russia’s assertive course has roots deep in her political culture, its self-perception 
as the underdog that is not taken seriously, a “regional power”, Fiona Hill criticizes existing 
explanations for only offering conventional descriptions of Putin – “[…] a “run-of-the-mill” 
autocrat, or a petty kleptocrat who is focused on saving his own skin, shoring up his regime, 
and siphoning off state assets […] he is dubbed as a naked opportunist, or, at best, a talented 
tactician.”45 
 
Hill’s key argument is that earlier attempts overlook the question what makes Putin stand out 
from the leaders he deals with: the fact that he is a former KGB operative, and not a member of 
the political class who has built a career in party politics and political backrooms. And that he 
approaches running the country as a former KGB agent – including doing away with all 
oversight mechanisms, as Hill finds that “[t]he Russian presidency and the Russian constitution 
 
45 Hill, Fiona: ‘Putin: the one man show the West doesn’t understand’, in: Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 72:3, 
2016, p. 141. 




are essentially fused, with each guaranteeing each other. […] [Putin] is the operative that runs 
himself”46.  
 
The former U.S. National Security Advisor argues that to comprehend how this shapes analyses 
and policy choices of the Russian president, it is essential to understand Putin’s formation as 
KGB agent. The chief ability the KGB sought to invoke in its operators was to be able to deal 
with and adapt to the unexpected.  
 
“This is something all operatives learned at the KGB: operations inevitably go wrong; events 
throw off the best-laid plan. You have to keep your options open and have backup plans. You 
must be willing to improvise last minute exit stratagems, and make the most of unexpected 
opportunities, if you are to live to fight another day and keep one step ahead of your 
adversaries. Putin’s next steps always depend on how everyone else reacts”47 
 
This mindset coupled with no institutional constraints keeping him from swiftly translating 
decisions into action distinguish Putin from his democratic counterparts. It is this what makes 
him so hard to understand for Western leaders, unpredictable, and seemingly following a 
different logic. 
 
Hill also points out how Putin’s KGB background influences his interactions with other nations: 
 
“His KGB training taught him to focus on individuals, not on societies. His mission was to 
target vulnerabilities of individuals to manipulate him to his advantage. Putin does not pay 
attention to larger social or political dynamics, as long as he knows how to – as he puts it – 
“work with people” and “work with information” at the top of any system to get his way.”48 
 
However, as Hill points out, Putin’s individual and systematic strengths are also what she 
considers his biggest weakness: The inability to understand his adversaries, the ‘West’: “[…] 
their motives, their mentality, and also, their values and principles”49.  
 
 
46 Hill, Fiona: ‘Putin: the one man show the West doesn’t understand’, p. 141. 
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Therefore, when Putin seeks to interpret Western behaviour, he falls back to ”his age old threat 
perception”50 that  
 
“ […] Western efforts to promote democracy and liberal markets abroad as nothing less than 
the continuation of “active measures” by Western intelligence agencies to undermine their 
enemies political systems and pursue regime change in selected counties […] everything 
Western leaders and analysts say about Russia’s internal weaknesses […] or the inevitability 
that Putin will fail in securing his objectives, or that the state will be pulled apart by domestic 
tensions, gets Putin’s antennae up.”51  
 
According to Hill, Putin considers these efforts to be a direct threat, to which he reacts 
forcefully. However, the Russian president is acutely aware that reacting forcefully against the 
U.S. and the ‘West’ is difficult, as they are far superior to Russia’s military and economic clout.  
To off-set this power-imbalance, according to Hill the Russian president again resorts to the 
KGB operators handbook: “[…] in an “asymmetric” struggle with the United States, Putin and 
Russia have to be innovative, catch the West off guard, and fight dirty.”52 
 
In sum, unlike the previously discussed attempts at understanding Putin and his rationale to 
annex Crimea, Fiona Hill does not specifically focus on Crimea – her focus is Vladimir Putin 
only. The key to understanding him his background and training as KGB operator. Fiona Hill’s 
analysis of Putin’s methodological toolbox from the KGB, and how it impacts his style of 
government as well as the way he conducts his foreign policy challenges the previous findings 
on several dimensions:  
 
- She points to the fact that Putin does not believe in plans, as they are liable to go wrong; 
instead, he puts a premium on flexibility and adaptability and the ability to create and 
exploit unexpected opportunities. While she does not call Putin a strategist, she outlines 
strategic maxims that guide Putin’s actions – straight from the KGB’s how to be an 
operator textbook. 
- In dealing with other nations, Putin only considers the individuals represented the 
political top-level, whose minds he aims to manipulate to his own interest.  
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- Putin is overly sensitive about the relationship with ‘the West’ and is acutely aware of 
the Wests technological, economic and military superiority. His strategy is too off-
balance his perceived adversary by inducing surprise.  
 
In other words, Hill argues that Putin may after all be a strategist for the very fact that his 
strategy is asymmetric to the notion of strategy held by his perceived adversaries.  Putin’s 
strategy operates based on broad maxims – flexibility, adaptability, improvisation, surprise – 
whereas the strategy of his adversaries operates based on a plan.   
 
While Fiona Hill does not point to the role of surprise in the annexation of Crimea, her analysis 
suggests that from Putin’s perspective, surprise is of strategic relevance to Putin. And while she 
does not explain how surprise was achieved in the annexation of Crimea, she nonetheless 
provides a clue how Putin goes about it in general:  by targeting and manipulating the mindset 
of individuals at the very top of government – not of the general public.  
1.1.3. Putin and surprise 
The previously discussed examinations of the Russian president share the observation that to 
the Russian president, surprise is of utmost relevance. They, too, acknowledge surprise have 
played a role in the annexation of Crimea. This notwithstanding, their characterisations of the 
Russian president and what role surprise plays for him are diametrical: 
 
- Surprise is the outcome of Putin’s inability as a strategist; it is an expedient of his 
inability to act strategically, but not the outcome of a (pre-planned) strategy.   
- Surprise is a strategic maxim for Putin; For Putin, strategy lies not in a plan, but in the 
maxims flexibility, adaptability, and exploitation of unexpected opportunities.  
 
Despite a unequivocal acknowledgement that surprise is relevant in the context of Crimea and 
Putin, with the exception of those arguing that the West is to blame itself for being surprise, 
none of these works describe how Putin goes about to achieve surprise – because before it can 
be exploited, it needs to be created. This requires looking at more depth at the question Stephen 
Treisman rightfully raised but failed to answer – how Crimea was annexed.  
 
 




1.2. A pivot to information operations vs. the continued relevance of the battlefield 
 
1.2.1. Pivot to Information Operations: Information operations as central to the 
annexation of Crimea 
A key role in the debate how Crimea was annexed was a blog entry by Mark Galleotti in July 
2014, in which he reprinted a speech delivered by Valeri Gerasimov, the Chief of Staff of the 
Russian Armed Forces, on the future shape of war, and what can be learned about the future of 
war by considering early 20th century Soviet military intellectuals. The speech was delivered in 
before Crimea was seized, and much of it read like a blueprint for the way Russia then went 
about it53. The ‘Gerasimov Doctrine’ Galleotti had uncovered, provided a possible conceptual 
framework of a plan, and if not that, then at least it provided very strong evidence for the 
assumption that Crimea followed a detailed plan authored by Putin and his military.  It fell very 
nicely into the emerging narrative that the annexation was planned well in advance, and the 
execution of a plan.  
 
The Gerasimov Doctrine was quickly adopted by many, and in conjunction with the hard to 
argue away fact that Russia did annex Crimea a ‘new way of war’ was diagnosed. Soon this 
new way of war received its own name: ‘Hybrid War’. 
 
The term ‘hybrid war’ existed prior to 201454. But only in the aftermath of Crimea’s annexation 
and Russia’s subsequent activities in Eastern Ukraine, its perceived meddling with elections in 
the United States, BREXIT, and supporting divisive political movements in other countries it 
received heightened attention55. A comprehensive study led by NATO-researchers developed 
the following definition of hybrid warfare:  
 
 
53 Galleotti, Marc: ‘The Gerasimov-Doctrine and Russian Non-linear War’, in: In Moscows Shadows, 06.07.2014, 
online available: https://inmoscowsshadows.wordpress.com/2014/07/06/the-gerasimov-doctrine-and-russian-
non-linear-war/, last accessed 29.03.2021.  Since then, Marc Galleotti has acknowledged that it is wrong to 
speak of a ‘Gerasimov Doctrine’ and deduct implications on contemporary Russian warfare from the speech, 
and publicly excused himself, see: Galleotti, Marc: ‘I’m sorry for creating the Gerasimov-Doctrine’,in: Foreign 
Policy, 03.05.2018, online publication available at: https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/03/05/im-sorry-for-
creating-the-gerasimov-doctrine/ , last accessed 29.03.2021 
54 See Stoker, Donald; Whiteside, Craig: ‘Blurred Lines: Gray Zone Conflict and Hybrid War – Two Failures of 
American Strategic Thinking’, in: Naval War College Review, Vol. 73, No. 1, Winter 2020, Article 4. 
55 A good German languange summary and discussion of the hybrid war concept can be found in Asmussen, 
Jan; Hansen, Stefan; Meiser, Jan: ‘Hybride Kriegsführung – eine neue Herausforderung?‘, in: Kieler Analysen zur 
Sicherheitspolitik, Nr.43, Dezember 2015, Kiel, 2015.  




“[Hybrid Warfare is] the synchronised use of multiple instruments of power tailored to 
specific vulnerabilities across the full spectrum of societal functions to achieve 
synergistic effects. […] Hybrid warfare is asymmetric […] and […] shares an increased 
emphasis on creativity, ambiguity, and the cognitive elements of war. This sets hybrid 
warfare apart from the attrition-based approach to warfare, where one matches the 
strength of the other, either qualitatively or quantitatively, to degrade the opponent’s 
capabilities.”56  
 
The concept of hybrid war and the ‘Gerasimov Doctrine’ were often seen in relation – with 
Gerasimov’s doctrine providing the Russian military with the grammar to implement this new 
type of war. The key enabler for Russian power projection, it was held, were Russia’s superior 
information operation skills. Skills of non-kinetic effect, that require creativity, create 
ambiguity, and aim at the cognitive elements of war. Key evidence was the observation that 
from the beginning Russia, made aggressive use of propaganda, and was keen to exploit the 
opportunities provided by social media to pursue her aims in Ukraine and Crimea.  
 
However, this research is neither interested in assessing the applicability of ‘hybrid warfare’ 
concept, nor the impact of General Gerasimov’s speech about the value of Soviet military 
intellectuals and their relevance to contemporary warfare. Nor is it interested in the intricacies 
of information operations. Instead, the following will examine whether previous publications 
have established an interrelationship between information operations and surprise in the 


















1.2.1.1. Crimea as a test case for Russia’s ‘new way of war’: Which role of information 
operations. 
Russia’s information operations in Ukraine received heightened attention. Of key interest to 
research were the characteristics of Russia’s information operations57. In addition, attention was 
given their intended target audience58 and to the themes or narratives59 employed by Russia and 
the channels and agents60 used by Russia for its information operations. What is apparent in 
these attempts is that they tend to focus on the Russian speaking audiences both domestically 
in Russia and the Russian speakers abroad.  
 
A good example is a report analysing Russia’s information campaign against Ukraine prepared 
by the NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence in Riga, published in 2015.  It 
finds that 
 
57 One of the core interests in the analyses of Russian information operation was to identify patterns of Russian 
information operations. In “The Anatomy of Russian Information Warfare: The Crimean Operation, a Case 
Study” Jolanta Darczewska identifies five features of the Russian information campaign during the annexation 
of Crimea: 
- “massive and long-lasting impact (repeat the same themes over and over again) 
- Desired information (manipulate messages to play upon the fears of ethnic Russians in Ukraine) 
- Emotional agitation (use themes that will make ethnic Russians in Ukraine act out of irrational anger) 
- Clarity (present Ukrainian conflict in simple terms of good and evil) 
- Supposed obviousness (match propaganda messages with widely held Russian myths and legends).,  
see: Darczewska, Jolanta: ‘The Anatomy of Russian Information Warfare: The Crimean Operation, A Case 
Study’,  in: Centre for Eastern Studies(ed): Point of View, Number 42, May 2014, p. 25.  
58 Three audience groups are distinguished by these studies: the Russian domestic audience, the Russian 
speaking audience abroad, and international audience or “the West”. Much attention was given to the 
domestic and Russian speaking audience as target groups, while the international audience played a lesser role.  
59 In relation to the domestic and Russian speaking audience, several dominant themes were employed by 
Russia:  
- positioning Russian Slavic Orthodox Civilization in Opposition to “decadent” Europe; 
- positioning Ukraine as integral to Eurasianism and the creation of the Eurasian Economic Union; 
- Promoting the Russian World which unites Eastern Slavs […]; 
- Portraying Ukrainians as a pseudo-nation who are unable to administer their own country; 
- Referring to the Great Patriotic War thus bringing out the hatred of Nazism and relating it to the 
Euromaidan protesters who are labelled as nationalists, Nazis and fascists posing a threat to the 
ethnically Russian part of Ukraines’s population;  
- dividing the West by utilising the different EU member states and positioning the USA in opposition to 
the EU; and using legal and historical justifications to legitimize Russia’s actions in Ukraine (including 
the Crimea referendum), see: NATO StratCom Centre of Excellence Riga (ed).: Analysis of Russia’s 
information campaign against Ukraine: Examining the non-military aspects from a strategic 
communications perspective”, Riga, 2015; for a more detailed description of the communications 
themes employed by Russia, see Kofman et al, appendix A, p 79 – 83 
60 Channels: Russia employed various channels to deliver these messages to their target audiences. Of 
particular role was the state-controlled TV, where synchronized messages could be delivered to both the 
domestic and the international audience. Furthermore, it made widespread use of the Internet and social 
media, targeting mass audiences of with messages generated automatically by so called “bots”. Traditional 
means, like newspapers, leaflets or billboards were also employed. Agents: In addition to the media outlets, 
Russia made use of different agents. These range from formal agents, like Vladimir Putin and Sergey Lavrov, or 
other Russian politicians and experts to informal agents abroad that support the Russian cause.   





“[…] Russia’s information campaign was central to Russia’s operations in Ukraine. 
The information campaign and related military action by Russia corresponds to the 
characteristics of a new form of warfare where the lines between peace and war, foreign 
military force and local self-defence groups are blurred and the main battle space has 
moved from physical ground to the hearts and minds of the populations in question.”61 
 
But not only did the report find that information operations are central to Russia’s operations, 
it also concludes that the “[c]risis in Ukraine is a result of Russia’s long-term strategy”62.  
 
The NATO Centre of Excellence considers the annexation of Crimea to be a test case for 
Russia’s new way of war: 
 
“Looking at the execution of the Crimea operation, it can be concluded that Russia has 
been preparing to conduct a modern type of warfare where media and other information 
channels are an important part of the war theatre, and Crimea […] an important test 
case. It proved that by applying the elements of the new type of warfare, victory can be 
ensured without open military conflict and deployments of large amounts of hard 
military power to the conflict area”63.  
 
The authors of the report identify several characteristics of the Russian information campaign:  
 
“thorough Target Audience Analysis; dominance in the information field by speedy 
production of large quantities of information and its effective distribution; blockage or 
disruption of hostile information channels; using an asymmetric approach to rebuff the 
effect of a stronger information subject; effective multi-conduit message distribution; 
applying social management processes to the target country with social, political, 
economic and mental changes being achieved through manipulation; gaining the 
prerogative by surprise attacks; developing one’s own information sources to be able 
to compete with other countries in the information field; and abusing the lack of clear 
 
61 NATO StratCom Centre of Excellence Riga (ed).: Analysis of Russia’s information campaign against Ukraine: 
Examining the non-military aspects from a strategic communications perspective”, Riga, 2015, p.4. 
62 NATO StratCom Centre of Excellence Riga (ed).: Analysis of Russia’s information campaign against Ukraine: 
Examining the non-military aspects from a strategic communications perspective”, Riga, 2015, p.5. 
63 NATO StratCom Centre of Excellence Riga (ed).: Analysis of Russia’s information campaign against Ukraine: 
Examining the non-military aspects from a strategic communications perspective”, Riga, 2015, p.26. 




definitions and restrictions on international peacetime information influencing 
activities”64.  
 
Somewhat contradictory, when it comes to the question whether information operations not 
only played a central, but a decisive role, the authors point out that the effect of all these 
characteristics of Russia’s information operation in the annexation of Crimea they identified 
would not have come to full fruition if it would not have been for the “Russian Special Forces 
(so called “polite men”) on the ground who acted in accordance with the strategy to minimize 
bloodshed and apply strategic communication intent”65.  The magic of Russia’s new warfare is 
therefore not so much a question of the prerogative of the kinetic military operations or the 
information operations element aiming at hearts and minds, but the seemingly seamless and 
synchronized implementation of cognitive and physical elements of war.   
 
According to the NATO report, Russia’s new way of war has four characteristics: “escalation, 
dominance, speed, momentum and deception”66. The NATO Centre of Excellence finds that 
“deception is used by Russia as a tactic to distract and delay”67. A key feature of Russian 
deception, the authors argue68, is the rapid dissemination of “false information, different 
versions of events and even conspiracy theories”69. The aim is to delay the adversary’s analysis 
and decision process, as investigating and disproving this information “requires a lot of time, 
effort, and resources”70. While the report does not establish a direct link between deception and 
surprise, it is a logical conclusion that delaying the information and decision process increases 
the risk of the adversary being taken off-guard. More simply: Deception can be regarded as a 
method to surprise. However, it remains unclear whether the author’s consider deception as part 
of Russian military tactics or of its information operations – nor whether deception specifically 
 
64 NATO StratCom Centre of Excellence Riga (ed).: Analysis of Russia’s information campaign against Ukraine: 
Examining the non-military aspects from a strategic communications perspective”, Riga, 2015, p. 26 
65 NATO StratCom Centre of Excellence Riga (ed).: Analysis of Russia’s information campaign against Ukraine: 
Examining the non-military aspects from a strategic communications perspective”, Riga, 2015, p. 26. 
66 NATO StratCom Centre of Excellence Riga (ed).: Analysis of Russia’s information campaign against Ukraine: 
Examining the non-military aspects from a strategic communications perspective”, Riga, 2015, p. 26. 
67 NATO StratCom Centre of Excellence Riga (ed).: Analysis of Russia’s information campaign against Ukraine: 
Examining the non-military aspects from a strategic communications perspective”, Riga, 2015, p. 5. 
68 Interestingly, in the report’s discussion about Crimea as a test case of Russia’s new type of warfare, the 
subchapter on deception considers a different incident, the downing of the passenger flight MH-1768. It finds 
that the focus of Russian deception in this case here is on the dissemination of false or wrong information, with 
the objective to misguide and manipulate the audience.  
69 NATO StratCom Centre of Excellence Riga (ed).: Analysis of Russia’s information campaign against Ukraine: 
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aims to surprise the adversary, or merely to increase the likelihood of the adversary being caught 
off guard.   
 
In sum, while the report makes a strong case for the importance of information operations to 
the ‘new’ Russian way of war and concludes that the annexation of Crimea had been planned 
long in advance, they are less verbose on the interrelation between information operations and 
surprise. In fact, they do not consider surprise much at all. This notwithstanding, the report 
suggests that the relationship between information operations and surprise can be in found in 
the term deception, as it may lead Russian adversaries’ analysis to lag behind the actual 
developments on the ground, and eventually be caught by surprise. However, the report does 
not allow for a conclusion to which realm deception belongs – the kinetic-military realm or the 
non-kinetic information operations realm, nor how exactly deception was employed to create 
which surprise in the context of the annexation of Crimea.  
1.2.1.2. Russian Strategic Deception  
The role of deception in Russia’s information operations has been the subject of a study 
commissioned by the Finnish Institute for International Affairs published in 2016. Rather than 
seeking to answer the question about the relative role of information operations, and whether 
Russia was implementing a long-term plan, the study narrowly focuses on Russian deception71. 
One of the reasons for this is that to the authors, “ ‘hybrid war’ as a concept for Russian 
operations proved to be of little analytical value”72.  
 
Deception on the other hand “can be traced to Russian military thinking and it captures an 
essential feature of the Russian strategy: alteration of the target audiences’ perception of reality 
to secure strategic objectives”73.  
 
Unlike previous attempts analysing Russian information operations, the study is not limited to 
Russian speaking audiences, or Russian language media and social media platforms. Instead, 
 
71 A similar approach was adopted in: Meister, Stefan; Puglierin, Jana (eds): Meister, Stefan; Puglierin, Jana : 
‚Perzeption und Instrumentalisierung: Russlands nicht-militärische Einflussnahme in Europa.‘, in: DGAP 
kompakt, Nr. 10, Forschungsinstitut der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik e.V., Berlin, 2015. 
72 Pynnömiemi, K; Racz, Andras (eds): Fog of Falsehood: Russian Strategy of Deception and the Conflict in 
Ukraine, Finnish Institute for International Affairs, Helsinki, 2016, p. 16.  Emphasis in original. 
73 Pynnömiemi, K; Racz, Andras (eds): Fog of Falsehood: Russian Strategy of Deception and the Conflict in 
Ukraine, p. 16. 




the Finnish volume measures “Russian propaganda and disinformation, here collectively called 
strategic deception”74, in non-Russian speaking countries. 
 
According to the editors, strategic deception differs from standard deception.  Deception merely 
aims to hide an object, “for example as Russia successfully did with the invention of ‘little 
green men’ during the Crimean operation”75, because it seeks to influence the cognition of the 
adversary. “[…] Strategic on the other hand means that perception(s) of reality based on actual 
facts on the ground are replaced with simulacra that look real but are artificially created and 
controlled”76. This is done by “using a full spectrum of means from political, informational, 
economic, financial, and military spheres”. The aim of deception is to put the adversary “into a 
defence posture and off balance, and thus, conditions are created for (military) surprise”77.  
 
Two preliminary assumptions guide the Finnish investigation: The first is that there is a certain 
congruence between Soviet and contemporary Russian strategic deception. The second is that 
a distinction must be made between strategic deception aimed at the domestic audience, and 
strategic deception aimed at international audiences: while the main objective of Russian 
propaganda and disinformation inside Russia is to win over public support for its actions, 
“regarding the West […] Russian communication is not aimed at convincing the decision-
makers, but at dazzling the public audience by providing numerous alternative narratives to 
Western ones”78.  
 
The study is not seeking to measure the effect of strategic deception, however: “In this research, 
we will not study the impact of Russian propaganda and disinformation on target countries 
above”79. In other words, the study does not consider the role strategic deception had in the 
annexation of Crimea.  
 
 
74 Pynnömiemi, K; Racz, Andras (eds): Fog of Falsehood: Russian Strategy of Deception and the Conflict in 
Ukraine, p.16. 
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76 Pynnömiemi, K; Racz, Andras (eds): Fog of Falsehood: Russian Strategy of Deception and the Conflict in 
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Rather, the intention is “to analyse the emergence and evolution of metanarratives about the 
conflict in Ukraine used in Russia for deception purposes”80. On the bases of this analysis the 
authors seek to “ascertain the main policy objectives of Russian strategic deception inside 
Russia and in selected countries of the European Union”. It is somewhat mysterious how these 
main policy objectives can be ascertained if the effect of the means to achieve them – strategic 
deception – are not considered.  
 
Instead, the Finnish investigation identifies a distinctive vocabulary of the Russian 
metanarrative, which is then attributed to various channels using this vocabulary categorized in 
three levels– official statements, mainstream media and the “local blogosphere”81. Of these 
channels, the investigation only examines the first two levels. How the distinctive vocabulary 
is put into action by these two channels is examined by case studies. These case studies, grouped 
by country, analyse the prevalence of the metanarratives in the scrutinized countries’. Each case 
looks at four events, for which the prevalence of the Russian metanarrative in the public 
discourse of the analysed country is examined.  
 
- The official annexation of Crimea on 16 March 2014. 
- The burning of the Trade Union Buildings in Odessa on 2 May 2014. 
- The downing of the MH 17 flight on 17 July 2014. 
- The emergence of the humanitarian catastrophe narrative in August 2014. 
 
The investigators limit the time frame of analyses to the week following each of these events, 
as they “assume that this time period will be sufficient for tracing the appearance of the major 
narratives”82. In that period, the authors of each case study measure the frequency of appearance 
and the variability of use in the events studies.  In doing so, it is hoped to gain new insights on 
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The report has six main conclusions83: 
 
1) The influence of Russian metanarratives on mainstream media remains largely limited. 
Although the analysed European media quotes, it does not adapt the Russian 
metanarratives. 
2) If they were present, it was due to already existing preferences by the given news 
channel, “not because Russian metanarratives were strong enough to transform the 
views of the media. 
3) Generally speaking, the dealing with the Russian meta-narrative by European media 
was “conscious”.  
4) The most effective channels for misinformation proved to be the Russian state officials 
like President Putin, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, or the Kremlin and the Russian 
Foreign Ministry. The systematic use of metanarratives by Russian diplomacy, the 
editors’ note in their concluding remarks, also is an indication for the continuity of 
Soviet strategic deception,  
5) There are limits to the effect of information operations. The authors “did not find a 
single case of Russian information measures resulting in any meaningful changes in the 
policies of the countries examined”.  
6) Well grounded, fact-based knowledge and the willingness to invest into gathering it is 
the best guard against strategic deception.  
 
To summarize, unlike the previously discussed publication, the study commissioned by the 
Finnish Institute for International affairs goes to great lengths to fulfil academic standards – and 
develops a research framework and methodology for its undertaking. While it is helpful to 
ascertain the prevalence of Russian metanarratives, it allows only for few conclusions on the 
interplay of strategic deception and its aim, surprise, in relation to the annexation of Crimea.  
 
Firstly, the definition of strategic deception offered raises questions: To the authors, it is 
synonymous to propaganda and disinformation. But why is there a need to “collectively call 
propaganda and disinformation strategic deception”? Are they really the same? How does this 
relate to previous research on propaganda and disinformation, and why is the term strategic 
deception needed? What role does disinformation and propaganda play in Russia’s overall 
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information operations, are they exclusive to information operations, or are they applied by the 
military as well? Also, the distinction between strategic deception and standard deception is 
somewhat nebulous: while the editors consider them to be distinct, they argue that they use the 
same means – channels of communication – and share the same aim: to surprise the adversary.  
 
Secondly, the authors make no effort to consider what makes the deception they set out to 
measure ‘strategic’ – which relates to the effect, not to the means applied to achieve this effect. 
This lack of concern about the term ‘strategic’ can also be observed when considering the 
timeframe, the study applies to measure the ‘strategic deception’. Whereas the authors describe 
the aim of “strategic deception to create the conditions for surprise”, they only consider the 
prevalence of their metanarratives after the surprise events, while at the same time failing to 
pin-point the surprise event. This may explain why the report could not identify substantial 
policy changes in the examined cases.  
 
Thirdly, there seems to be a mismatch between the actors analysed and the effect observed. To 
the authors, the objective of “strategic deception” is “not aimed at convincing decisionmakers, 
but at dazzling the public audience by providing numerous alternative narratives to Western 
ones “. But what is the role of the wider audience in the creating the conditions for surprise, and 
why is it more important – strategic – than the decisionmakers in this regard? In addition, if the 
objective is to dazzle the public with alternative narratives, how are these alternative related to 
create the condition for surprise – and can their prevalence as antecedent condition for surprise 
be measured with data produced after the surprise event?  
 
In sum, while the Finnish study aims at fulfilling high academic research standards, there 
appears to be a mismatch between what they set out to measure, antecedent conditions, effect, 
and relevant actors. This may be academically satisfying, however, the policy conclusions that 
can be drawn are somewhat limited. Furthermore, for this research’s interest, while it suggests 
a link between surprise, information operations, and (strategic) deception, it does not help to 
clarify how exactly they are interrelated. Like all previous attempts, surprise plays an important 
role – but neither is it made clear what exactly what was surprising in the annexation of Crimea, 








1.2.2. The continued relevance of the battlefield and military operations 
This leaves the last dimension considered in the context of the annexation of Crimea – the 
relationship between military operations, information operations, and the annexation of Crimea.  
 
Interestingly, neither the NATO Report, nor the investigation commissioned by the Finnish 
Institute for international Affairs into Russian strategic deception, conclude that the information 
operations were decisive for the annexation of Crimea alone. Both stress the importance of the 
traditional military-operational aspect in the peninsula’s seizure and consider their 
simultaneous and seamless application to be the key to success. But due to the focus on the 
information operation aspect, both attempts also fail to provide exactly how this simultaneous 
application looked like, and which – with the knowledge of hindsight – was decisive.   
 
Amongst the first critical voices about the focus on the information operation component was 
Andrew Monaghan. In thorough research of changes to Russian military fighting power84 he 
finds that Russia had only paid little attention to information operations. Much rather, the 
Russian military was concerned with applying the operational lessons learned from its key post-
Cold War operations, the wars in Chechnya and Georgia. Rather than paying attention to 
‘hybrid warfare’, a term that remained hyphenated in Russian for a long time, Monaghan argues 
that Western scholars should refocus on how Putin has fused Russia’s power projection 
capabilities, vesting all authority with the President and the presidential administration. While 
Monaghan suggests that herein lies Putin’s ‘Grand Strategy’ he is cautious about Russian 
efficiency and argues that this should not imply that Russia had identified the silver military 
bullet85. 
 
Another study that considers the role of the military in the annexation of Crimea is a edited by 
Andrew Kofman and published by the RAND Corporation. This study directly addresses the 
question what was ultimately decisive for the annexation of Crimea – the military operational 
aspects, or the information operations.  The study concludes that in the annexation of Crimea, 
information operations played only a marginal, if any, role: “The Russian information campaign 
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accompanying its military movements was no more than a minor contributor to what proved to 
be a conventional takeover”, helped by a number of “unique contextual factors”86. Crucially, it 
argues that the campaign was “a by-product of the general information campaign to convince 
the Russian domestic audience that Ukraine’s interim government was the result of an 
illegitimate coup”. While Kofman and his co-authors accept that Russia was engaged in 
information operations, they do not consider them to be decisive for the overall campaign. To 
them, in relation to the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula, the role of information operations 
cannot be traced and measured.  
 
The study does not debunk the role of information operations without having conducted its own 
assessment of the information operation component87. However, like the NATO report on 
Russia’s information operation, the study only takes into consideration the effect of Russian 
information operations in the Russian language domain, and it uses the same set of data used 
by these studies, namely Russian TV stations, and public statements by Putin, his foreign 
minister Sergey Lawrow or the Kremlin. Much of the RAND findings on the information 
operations element therefore echo the findings of the previously discussed NATO-report. 
 
Kofman and his co-authors find that the annexation of Crimea was not the product of long-term 
planning and rest this on the observation that Russia appeared ill prepared to manage the 
political process of the annexation. It was an ad-hoc decision taken by Putin after the flight of 
then Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovych during the night of the 21st of February. To the 
authors, the annexation of Crimea was not the consequence of planning, but a reaction to the 
dynamic situation on ground. They argue that this becomes apparent by the mixed messaging 
after the peninsula had been seized. It consisted “of a series of loosely connected messages 
rather than a carefully considered narrative. 
 
 In other words, they also mirror the findings Stephen Treisman had offered earlier on how the 
decision to annex Crimea, as well as how it then subsequently happened. However, while share 
Treisman’s observations that it was a snap-decision that led to the annexation, they see different 
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objectives driving the decision: For Treisman, it was taken to secure the Naval Base in 
Sevastapol – and the annexation of Crimea the outcome of a dilemma Putin had created himself. 
To Kofman and his co-authors, securing the Naval Base was part of the swift military operations 
that aimed at gaining as much as possible – ideally the peninsula.  
 
While the authors find that the role of information operations cannot be traced or measured, the 
RAND study finds that surprise played a decisive role for the campaign. This findings is based 
on a single piece of evidence, a protocol of a secret meeting of the Ukrainian National Security 
Council held on 27th of February 2014, the day after the storming of the Crimean regional 
parliament, that to the authors goes to show that the Ukrainian leadership was so gravely 
stunned by the unexpected appearance of heavily armed men and a Russian military snap 
exercise at their border, that it refrained from ordering its at this moment still superior military 
to stay in the barracks. They feared that Russia was attempting to lure them into firing the first 
shot, so that they could claim their response to be a case of self-defence88:“The Ukrainians 
government immediately understood that there were Russian forces on Crimea, but could not 
discern their ultimate intent, and therefore chose restraint”89 This gave Russia enough time to 
re-enforce, so that the Russian forces would at least equal, ideally outweigh the Ukrainian forces 
on Crimea, as to rule out a military response.  
 
In other words: Had Russia not surprised the Ukrainians so effectively, then the operation would 
highly likely have taken a less favourable turn for Russia.  
 
The authors find that surprise was achieved by deception. However, they argue that  Russia 
only employed tactical and operational military deception. On the tactical level, it was able to 
convince the local population that the armed men were a friendly force. On the operational 
level, Russia disguised its true intentions to the Ukrainians, and thereby delayed their 
response90.  
 
This notwithstanding, the authors find that Russia’s tactical and operational deception had 
strategic level impact: 
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“At the strategic level, the West mistook Russian tactics aimed to create plausible 
deniability. As signs of an effort to negotiate a political settlement and then de-escalate, 
rather than to annex the peninsula. Western officials urged caution and sought to freeze 
the conflict, thinking Moscow might be seeking an off-ramp to the crisis. […] The 
deception also afforded Russia multiple entry points for disengagement and plausible 
deniability should the operation gone awry. It was in fact, Russia’s exit strategy”91.   
 
Thus, to the RAND researchers, Russian tactical and operational deception, more by incident 
than by intention, led to strategic level impact, as the West was unable to uncover Russia’s 
deceptive tactics and therefore cautioned restraint. But if the West represented the strategic 
level, then the question is whether Ukraine was the only intended victim of deception and 
ultimately surprise. And, related to that, whether Russian deception was at play in relation to 
‘the West’, with the intention to influence decision-makers in a particular way, or only aimed 
at the wider Russian speaking audience? How did this effect the decision to urge the Ukrainian 
government to caution restraint?  
 
To The RAND researchers these questions are not relevant and conclude that this surprise was 
not achieved by the application of Russian information operations or the consequence of long-
term planning. Rather, it was the result of Russia’s military-operational ability “to leverage 
mobility, speed of action […] and the capability to command forces securely at the small-unit 
level”92 that ensured it could then leverage surprise strategically93.  
 
Hence, according to the authors, Russia’s military surprise attack coincidentally had strategic 
effect, enabling Russia to annex Crimea by creating a window to re-enforce its military presence 
on the peninsula while keeping Ukraine’s international partners guessing about Russia’s next 
step. To Kofman et al, this effect was not planned or foreseen, but a co-incidence of a surprise 
attack aimed to take the Ukrainian government off-guard that was then further exploited by 
Russia and the Russian military. Hence, while the authors acknowledge a force-multiplying 
effect of surprise that even had impact on the strategic level, what its role for the overall 
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outcome was remains unclear. It furthermore remains unclear from the study how military 
deception at the operational and tactical level differs from the deception as part of information 
operations that was considered by other works on Crimea. How are they different, how are they 
similar? Can they be distinguished? Lastly, if ‘the West’ represented the strategic level in the 
context of the annexation of Crimea, then it remains unclear from the account why Russia only 
aimed to surprise and stun the Ukrainian government into inaction. To achieve the strategic aim 
to annex Crimea, it would seem that the ‘strategic level’, that is the West, and how it would 
react to Russian military manoeuvres on the Crimean Peninsula, especially against the backdrop 
of the preceding months of ever-increasing tensions between ‘the West’ and Russia, was also 
considered by Russia.  Unfortunately, however, this is not further explored in the RAND study 
edited by Andrew Kofman.  
 
1.3. Summary: The role of surprise for the annexation of Crimea in the wider debate 
The previous literature review on the annexation of Crimea outlined and discussed a selection 
of the available literature about the annexation of Crimea with the aim to distil the findings of 
these works on the role of surprise for the annexation of Crimea.  
 
Often these publications assume diametrical positions, as was especially witnessed in the debate 
about the role of information operations and military operations. These differences remain 
unresolved, however, as until now, no view could prove its position for lack of unambiguous 
evidence. This is an interesting observation, as despite hindsight, and a plethora of publications 
and investigations into the annexation of Crimea, the case appears like a kaleidoscope – 
everyone who gets a turn sees things a little different, without being able to prove that this view 
resembles reality best or better than previous views.  This is also true when considering earlier 
findings and which role they attribute surprise for the annexation of Crimea.  
 
Despite the differences, however, there are also commonalties. One of them is observance of 
surprise. Without exemption all reviewed publications attribute surprise to have played a role 
in the annexation of Crimea. Although surprise has not been the research focus of the previously 
reviewed works, several assumptions why surprise occurred in the context of the annexation of 
the Black Sea peninsula can been identified in the available literature:  
 
 




- The ‘West’ was surprised due to self-delusion about Russia, Putin, and his motives. 
- Putin is a gambler and acts irrationally and erratic. Surprise must always be expected. 
- Putin is a strategist, and actively pursues a strategy of surprise to off-set Russian 
disadvantages when directly confronting the West. 
- Strategic deception as part of Russian information operations created the conditions for 
surprise. 
- As a co-incidence of military tactical and operational deception, surprise rendered 
strategic level effects. 
 
However, they fail to explain the role of surprise in the annexation of Crimea due to gaps on 
several dimensions: 
 
- What is the effect of surprise on the overall outcome?  
- What is the exact relationship between information operations, deception, strategic 
deception, and surprise? What between military operations, deception, and surprise? 
What between surprise and strategic surprise?  
- What exactly was the surprise/surprising in the annexation of Crimea, and how does it 
relate to the overall outcome?  
- What role for Putin? Is surprise part of his ability as a strategist, or is it an expression 
of his gambler nature? How did he contribute to surprise? 
- Who was the victim of surprise? Ukraine? The Russian speaking audience? The ‘West’ 
(who is it?)  
 
In sum, while the phenomenon of surprise is universally observed, which role it had for the 
annexation of Crimea remains intractable from the selection of literature reviewed for the first 













2. Germany and the annexation of Crimea: which role for surprise?  
As for the annexation of Crimea and the early days of the on-going Ukraine crises in general, 
Germany’s role in the context of the annexation of Crimea has received considerable attention 
for two reasons: Germany’s special relationship with Russia and Germany’s role in the context 
of the annexation of Crimea. Prior to the review of the literature considering Germany in the 
context of the annexation of Crimea, it seems important to provide a short background on these 
aspects:  
2.1. Germany and Russia: It’s complicated 
What many refer to as ‘special relationship’ between Germany and Russia prior to the 
annexation of Crimea developed over shared history and close economic ties. Many of 
Germany’s Western allies, especially the United States had long been critical of what they 
perceived as German proximity with Russia. But not only Germany’s allies were critical. 
Germany’s Russia policy is highly contested domestically as well, as the following outline of 
the developments in the German-Russian relationship under Angela Merkel shows.  
 
At the beginning of her chancellorship, the relation between the two countries were especially 
close, best exemplified by a “modernization partnership”, which was signed during Angela 
Merkel’s first grand coalition in 200894.  
 
At that time, Germany’s foreign minister was Frank-Walter Steinmeier. Steinmeier’s first term 
in the office of federal foreign minister ended in 2009, when his Social Democratic Party 
experienced a dramatic election result and was voted out of government.  Although being 
victorious in the 2009 federal elections, Angela Merkel did not gain enough votes to rule 
without a coalition partner and entered a coalition with the liberal FDP party led by Guido 
Westerwelle for the next 4 years. Guido Westerwelle assumed the office of the foreign minister.  
 
For long, Germany had been considered Russia’s best friend in Europe for a number of reasons, 
but especially for the shared history as well as their economic interdependencies between the 
two countries. To some, this policy was advocated by Russland-Versteher, or Russia-
understanders, which refers to policy-makers seeking to understand Russia rather than set 
 
94 Petersburger Dialog e.V.: ‚Modernisierungspartnerschaft‘, online available at: https://petersburger-
dialog.de/modernisierungspartnerschaft/ , last accessed 29.03.2021. 




Russia its limits. Often, but not exclusively, these Russia-Understanders belonged to the Social 
Democratic Party and seeing themselves in the lines of former chancellor Willy Brandt’s 
Ostpolitik, trying to bring new life to the slogan of choice, Wandel durch Annäherung (change 
through rapprochement).  
 
However, Merkel’s second government, made up of her conservative CDU and the liberal FDP, 
continued the foreign policy towards Russia of the previous government. It was the head of the 
liberal party and foreign minister Guido Westerwelle, who signed a second modernisation 
partnership, that even was to include questions on military modernisation and security in 
2010.95  
 
At that time, the Russian president was Dimitri Medvedev, while Putin had become prime 
minister. Although Dimitri Medvedev could never escape the shadow of Putin, and despite the 
beginning of his presidency in 2008 marked by the 5-day war with Georgia, his approach to 
Berlin and other Western capitals was more cooperative than his predecessors.  
 
The re-election of Putin gave renewed rise to a debate in Berlin about him and his policy styles, 
and whether the cooperative stance of German policy towards Russia can continue in German 
policy circles. Many policymakers in Berlin remembered well that just before ending his second 
presidential term, the Russian president had already given a taste of how he views the world. In 
2007, at the Munich Security Conference, a conference founded during the Cold War to provide 
a dialogue platform for the two sides of the curtain, Putin was the first Russian president to ever 
visit the conference. In spite of hopes and contrary to expectations, Putin used the conference 
stage to lash out at ‘the West’: He described a world dominated by the single-superpower USA 
that had overstepped its borders in every aspect, accused NATO and the EU of imposing their 
will on countries, criticised the eastward-expansion of NATO for bringing military 
infrastructure close to the Russian territory and warns the military alliance of further escalation. 
Following the thundering speech by the outgoing Russian president, participants asked whether 
the world was entering a new Cold War96.  
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Half a year later, in August 2007, for the first time since 1992, Russian long-range bombers 
entered British airspace97. A year later, in 2008, and just over 100 days after his successor 
Medwedew took over the presidential office, there was a five-day war with Georgia.  
 
In 2012, Putin became Russian president again, and with it, Russian politics turned increasingly 
authoritarian. Congruent with the nationalist tone that undergirded his narrative of a Nowo 
Rosija or New Russia approach, the government was getting tougher on those critical of it. This 
became very visible when in early 2012, when government forces brutally cracked down on 
protesters on Moscow’s Volotnaya Square after they had taken to the streets following what 
many considered rigged regional elections.  
 
None of this was forgotten within German policy circles, and those critical of Germany’s 
ongoing cooperative stance it called out the “Russlandversteher” in a parliamentary debate 
about Germany’s Russia policy in November 201298. The debate is noteworthy, as it is not 
common practice that the German Bundestag discusses the policy the German government 
should assume vis-à-vis another country in a plenary-session99.   
 
However, the debate must also be considered in the domestic German context, and the 
upcoming 2013 federal elections. Merkel’s coalition with the liberal FDP was not a success-
story. Especially evident was the difference in the relationship of Angela Merkel to her liberal 
foreign minister Westerwelle and the relationship she enjoyed with his predecessor Frank-
Walter Steinmeier. But not only was Angela Merkel unhappy about the coalition-partner, so 
was the electorate. The FDP had lost much of its appeal to voters soon after it was elected by 
introducing policies many voters considered to be clientelist100. 
 
Interestingly, Guido Westerwelle, the liberal foreign minister, continued and even expanded the 
‘modernisation-partnership’ with Russia, as for many within Angela Merkel’s conservative 
party, the Social-Democrats were those being too permissive of the Russian government. The 
Bundestag debate initiated by CDU parliamentarians that were also critical of Merkel of not 
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being conservative enough can therefore also be understood as an attempt by those fearing that 
in a second grand-coalition, which the polls at the time already indicated as being likely, the 
social-democratic coalition partner would seek continue or even expand its traditional line of 
Russlandverstehen or “understanding Russia” approach to Russia. Calling them out in a 
parliamentary debate may thus have been a move designed to hedge against just that and signal 
a red line for the potential upcoming coalition treaty negotiations.  
 
The polls proved to be correct, and in 2013, amidst raging protests in Kyiv and other Ukrainian 
cities that followed a decision of the Ukrainian government to withdraw from an agreement 
with the European Union that had been negotiated since 2009, Merkel signed the second 
coalition treaty with SPD in November 2013, after painstakingly long coalition treaty 
negotiations. The policy towards Russia was considered in these negotiations.  
 
From the beginning, Merkel’s second grand coalition with the SPD, again with Frank-Walter 
Steinmeier as her foreign minister, was confronted with an increasingly assertive Russia. But it 
took Ukraine crisis and the annexation of Crimea in 2014 until Germany changed its policy 
towards Russia. Whether this surmounts to a paradigm change in Germany’s Russia policy, or 
whether it was just a temporary stiffening of relations, remains an important question in the 
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2.2. Germany, the Ukraine-crisis, and the annexation of Crimea: Germany for the 
first time at the geopolitical centre-stage since the Cold War ended 
The bone of contention that let loose the dynamics that ultimately led to the annexation of 
Crimea and an ongoing conflict in Eastern Ukraine was the agreement that the European Union 
had been negotiating for with 6 former Soviet republics: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, 
Georgia, Moldovia and Ukraine as part of the Eastern Partnership (EaP) Initiative since 2009. 
This joint EU initiative “aims at building a common area of shared democracy, prosperity, 
stability and increased cooperation.”102 The agreement between the EU, its member states and 
the six former Soviet republics on a closer association with the European Union – but not 
membership – was to be signed on the occasion of the third Eastern Partnership Summit in 
Vilnius in November 2013.  
 
The negotiations about the agreement had been ongoing since 2009, when the Eastern 
Partnership Initiative was officially launched following a proposal by Sweden and Poland the 
year earlier. Germanys used the opportunity of the inception summit in Prague 2009 to 
especially highlight the dire economic situation and general political instability in the region, 
which had greatly been increased by Russia’s illegal occupation of Georgian territory following 
the five day war between the two unequal rivals the year before and a “gas war” with Ukraine.  
At that time, the German chancellor was Angela Merkel, and her Foreign Minister Frank Walter 
Steinmeier – Merkel’s first grand coalition government between the conservative CDU and the 
social-democratic SPD. Russia criticized the initiative, and accused the EU of “trying to carve 
out a new sphere of influence in what Moscow defines as its region of "privileged interest 
[…]."103  
 
According to one commentator at the time the former Soviet republics “seem divided between 
Moscow and Brussels and are playing one off against the other.”104   
 
This notwithstanding, four years after the EaP Initiative was officially launched in Prague, an 
association agreement was reached, to be signed by the heads of states of the parties of the 
agreement at the EU Council summit in Vilnius on the 29th of November 2013 Vilnius. 
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However, the signing ceremony turned sour by Ukraine’s stepping back from signing the 
agreement that was to associate the country more closely with the European Union.  
 
The EaP agreement was the bone of contention for the developments and dynamics that 
followed. Although the agreement became less central in light of these developments, it played 
a role throughout. However, at the very latest with the withdrawal of Ukraine from signing the 
association agreement, the antagonism between Russia and ‘the West’ over Ukraine became 
more and more apparent. And in this antagonism that found an interim climax in the annexation 
of Crimea, Germany played an unusually exposed role and lead the crisis management efforts.  
 
The EaP Agreement also is the backdrop for the second reason why Germany’s role in the 
Ukraine crisis and the annexation of Crimea received heigthened attention: that the country, 
especially Chancellor Merkel played a key role throughout – “In fact her actions allowed 
Germany to assume geopolitical leadership of Europe for the first time since 1945”105. The 
point of interest here is how this leadership was performed was also an important topic on the 
German role in the Ukraine crisis and the annexation of Crimea. While some, like Elizabeth 
Pond attest the German government to have lived up to the expectations, others, like Hans 
Kudnani, argues that German leadership was at least lukewarm, as during the crisis that 
ultimately led to the annexation of Crimea, Germany continued to be torn between East and 
West106. The different assessments on Germany as a geopolitical leader offered by Kudnani and 
Pond notwithstanding, both make clear that it was the German chancellor and her foreign 
minister that assumed the role of “negotiator-in-chief” on behalf of ‘the West’, and directly 
engaged with their Russian counterparts Putin and Lawrow. They also point to the strong 
economic interdependence between Russia and Germany, that compromised Germany’s 
brokering position towards Russia in the eyes of its Western allies from the beginning.  
 
Taken together, the two reasons for Germany receiving specific attention also explain why for 
most of these efforts do not specifically address the annexation of Crimea, but instead refer to 
the ‘Ukraine crisis’, of which Crimea is part. As Stefan Meister argues, from the German 
government perspective, the ‘Ukraine crisis’ was chiefly a ‘Russia crisis’107. The relationship 
 
105; Kudnani, Hans; Pond, Elizabeth: Germany’s real role in the Ukraine crisis: Caught between East and West, 
in: Foreign Affairs, Vol. 94, No. 2, March/April 2015, pp. 173 – 177.  
106 Kundnani, Hans: ‘Leaving the West behind: Germany looks East’, in: Foreign Affairs,Vol. 94 No. 2, pp.175 - 
177.  March/April 2015; See also: Adomeit, Hannes: ‚Bilanz der deutschen Russlandpolitik seit 1990‘. 
107 Meister, Stefan: ‚Putin richtig verstehen: warum die Ukrainekrise eine Russlandkrise ist‘, in: Deutsche 
Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik (ed): DGAP-Standpunkt, Nr. 6, 2014, Berlin. 




with Russia, especially with Putin has been a contested domestic issue prior to the annexation 
of Crimea. As the beginning of the deterioration of the situation in Ukraine coincided with the 
German federal elections, many efforts begin their observation with unilateral decision by the 
Ukrainian president from signing an agreement with the European Union that would associate 
his country closer with the E.U., and end the observation with the annexation of Crimea, as it 
marks a climax in the developments, but also a shift in Germany’s policy towards Russia, as it 
agrees to punitive measures against Russia in the form of sanctions.  
 
In addition to the assessment of how it faired in its leadership role, Germany was mostly 
considered as a key actor within the broader context of ‘the West’108, or the European Union109. 
The question guiding these efforts however was less to provide a better understanding of what 
just happened, why and how, but the same question that had been posed to the German 
government already: how should ‘the West’ shape its policy towards an assertive and 
authoritarian Russian government after Crimea had been annexed110. Surprise, though, was not 
specifically considered.  
 
2.3. Which role of surprise for Germany in the German debate about the annexation 
of Crimea? 
However, as the following literature review will show, the question whether surprise could have 
been averted, and who is responsible for surprise features in the debate revolving around the 
annexation of Crimea in the German context.  
 
 
108 See for example: Hanns-Seidel-Stiftung (ed): ‚Die Ukraine-Krise und der Westen‘, in: Politische Studien 
(München), 66 (Mai-Juni 2015) 3, München, 2015, pp. 12-53.  
109 See for example:  Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung (ed): ‚Ukraine, Russland, Europa‘, in: Aus Politik und 
Zeitgeschichte, No. 47–48/2014, Berlin, 2014; Schröder, Hans-Henning: ‚Lehren vom Majdan: Russland, die 
Ukraine und die EU.‘ In: Russland-Analysen, Nr. 272, February 2014, p.2 . A valuable approach on how the E.U. 
fared during the Ukraine crisis and the annexation of Crimea is offered by Peter Schmidt, who examines the 
strategic assumptions of the European Union that ultimately failed. Unlike traditional „strategic blunder“ 
literature, which tends to focus on the intelligence agencies or the military, Schmidt offers a highly useful 
approach to assess political blunders, by identifying premises held by the EU that were proven wrong by the 
developments,  see: Schmidt, Peter: ‘Reasons for Big “Blunders”—EU Policy towards Ukraine’, in: L'Europe en 
Formation 2016/3 (n° 381), pp 73 – 100, 2016.  
110 See for example: Heinemann-Grüder, Andreas: Was lehrt der Ukraine-Konflikt? In: Zeitschrift für Außen- und 
Sicherheitspolitik, Vol. 11, No. 4, S.521-531, Wiesbaden, 2018.  




2.3.1 A primary source-based account: How the German government experienced the 
annexation of Crimea.  
An early attempt to make sense of the annexation of Crimea is provided by Andreas Rinke, 
head of the Reuters News Agency office in Berlin, in a contribution in Internationale Politik, 
titled: ‘Wie Moskau Berlin verlor’ – ‘how Moscow lost Berlin’ as early as May 2014111. It is 
an attempt to make sense of the developments that had just occurred and focusses on the 
German-Russian interaction between July 2013 and April 2014. He finds that initially, the 
German government was hesitant to change course, but argues that under the impression of 
Putin’s actions on Crimea was forced to change its traditional ‘balancing’ policy towards 
Russia: harsh words followed by no substance.  
 
Unlike the previously discussed literature, which relies heavily on secondary sources for its 
conclusions, Rinke, who published his contribution two months after the peninsula had been 
seized by Russia exclusively relies on primary sources from the German government involved 
in the crisis for his conclusions.  
 
An additional difference to the previously discussed works on the annexation is that to Rinke, 
as to most German commentators and analysts, the time-period that is considered is much 
longer – dating back to summer 2013, when first signs of Russias change of course in relation 
to Ukraine became feasible. In his attempt order and structure the events and developments that 
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Table 1: The six phases how Moscow lost Berlin by Andreas Rinke 
Phase Disillusionment  Protests in Kyiv, 
Harmony in Berlin 
Escalation Russia isolates itself Rupture Shock Preventing 
spillover 




21.02. - 02.03.2014 02.03. - 
06.03.2014 
06.03. - 18.03.2014 After 
19.03.2014 
Key dates 28.11.2013: 
Ukrainian President 
Yanukovych refuses 
to sign Eastern 
Partnership 
Association 
Agreement with the 
EU. 
29.11.2013: Beginning 
of Mass Protests in 
Kyiv as response to 
non-signature comes 















Moscow to meet 























protests in Eastern 
Ukraine. 23.02.2014: 





regional parliament in 
Crimea. 28.02.2014: 
Merkel calls Putin; 
Putin assures no 
regular Russian troops 
in Crimea, defends 
demands of pro-
Russian population in 
Crimea. 
02.03.2014: 
Phone call Merkel 
/ Putin: Putin for 









with Lavrov and 
Kerry in Paris. 
06.03.2014: 
amidst EU Council 
meeting 
discussing 







speech in Bundestag 
preparing MPs for 
sanctions against Russia 
(several members of 
her own party voiced 
empathy for Russian 
behaviour). 
13.03.2014: Merkel 
states that Russia uses 
methods of 19th and 
20th century. 
16.03.2014: 
Referendum on Crimea 
deciding for joining 
Russian Federation. 
17.03.2014: additional 
US and EU sanctions 
against Russia. 
18.03.2014:  Putin gives 
speech in Duma, signs 
accession of Crimea to 
Russia. 
 
[Wecken Sie das Interesse Ihrer Leser mit einem 
passenden Zitat aus dem Dokument, oder 
verwenden Sie diesen Platz, um eine 
Kernaussage zu betonen. Um das Textfeld an 
einer beliebigen Stelle auf der Seite zu 
platzieren, ziehen Sie es einfach.] 




Throughout these 6 periods, Andreas Rinke identifies several events he characterises as 
‘surprising’ to the German government.  
2.3.1.1. Ukrainian U-turn on Association Agreement with European Union 
The first surprise is the Ukrainian president’ refusal to sign the EU Eastern Partnership 
Agreement (EaP) on the occasion of the EU-Council summit on the 29th of November 2013 in 
Vilnius. According to Rinke it was clear to the German government that Putin had pressured 
the Ukrainian president to stay away from signing the deal. According to his sources it was 
motivated bv Putin’s desire to include Ukraine into his own economic bloc, the Eurasian 
Customs Union. Putin’s pressure was the key driver that led to a change of policy amongst 
those in the German government that had traditionally called for a more friendly course towards 
Russia – the Russlandversteher. 
 
Rinke does not provide much detail on how Putin exerted this pressure on Yanukovych, or 
whether he did so with the intention to surprise Germany or the European Union. He only points 
out that Putin and Yanukovych met on several occasions, and that Putin had voiced concerns 
over “technical issues” that would prevent Ukraine to become a member of his Customs Union 
if it signed the deal.  
 
Rinke describes the effect of Yanukovych refusing to sign the EaP association agreement in 
Vilnius: “In Berlin and Brussels, there is a deep seated feeling of shock and having been 
defeated.”112  
2.3.1.2. Mass protests in Kyiv 
The second surprise event, according to Rinke not anticipated by neither Russia nor Germany, 
was the mass-protests that immediately followed Yanukovych’s unilateral withdrawal from the 
agreement on the 29th of November 2013 and lasted until the last week of February 2014.  Rinke 
argues that from the German perspective, the persistence of the protesters and the inability of 
Yanukovych to end the protests, leads Putin to change his policy towards Yanukovych. Had he 
first offered the Ukrainian president financial assistance to alleviate him from the dire economic 
situation the country found itself in until then, now he increased pressure on him113.  
 
112 Rinke, Andreas: ‘Wie Moskau Berlin verlor‘, p. 36. 
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In his account, Rinke does not offer details on how Putin exerted this pressure on Yanukovych. 
In addition, this observation is somewhat contradictory to the observation by the German 
government, to whom Yanukovych’s walking away from the EaP association agreement 
signing ceremony was the result of Putin putting pressure on Yanukovych.  
 
The German government, under the impression that the mass protests are pro-European, and 
despite the “poison of mistrust Yanukovych’s withdrawal had triggered”114, continued to hope 
that there is still a chance for the association treaty to be signed by Ukraine. Due to the German 
assumption that Putin is unlikely to escalate the situation in Ukraine before or during the 
upcoming Winter Olympics in Sochi, efforts undertaken by German and E.U. diplomats to 
convince Putin that the association agreement is neither a threat to Russia, nor does it preclude 
Ukraine’s membership in the Customs Union, are further intensified. An additional reason for 
this is the assumption held by the German government that if the domestic situation in Ukraine 
is not resolved before the end of the Sochi Olympic games on the 23rd of February 2014, a 
Russian escalation must be feared.  
 
Rinke reports that on 14th of February 2014, Frank-Walter Steinmeier, now German Foreign 
Minister for the second time, visits Moscow and speaks with Putin and Lavrov. His efforts to 
lobby their support for the establishment of an international contact group and an OSCE 
monitoring mission in Ukraine are ill-fated. Rather, Putin and Lawrow bemoan Western 
interference into Ukraine’s domestic affairs – and ensure that the territorial integrity of Ukraine 
will be observed.  
 
Shortly after the foreign minister’s failed Moscow mission, on the 18th of February, violence 
erupts in Kyiv, leaving many dead and wounded. According to Rinke in this moment Germany 
becomes a key player in the management of the crisis115. He argues that so far, diplomatic 
efforts were led by the European Union’s High Representative Catherine Ashton and 
Commissioner for Enlargement, Stefan Füle, but did not reach much. Furthermore, during the 
escalation on Maidan High Representative Ashton was preoccupied with negotiations with Iran 
to convince the country to desist a further build-up of its nuclear program.  
 
 
114 Rinke, Andreas: ‘Wie Moskau Berlin verlor‘, p. 37. 
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According to Rinke, the new German role as the West’s chief negotiator becomes evident after 
a meeting of the Franco-German Council of Ministers held on the 19th of February 2014. On 
the following day, Germany, together with France and Poland, took the lead in helping to broker 
an agreement between the protesters in Kyiv and other (western) Ukrainian cities, and the 
Yanukovych government. On 21st of February 2014 an agreement was signed. Russia was also 
present as Viktor Yanukovych had asked them for their support, only initialled the agreement.  
2.3.1.3. The president’s gone, long live the president? Yanukovych’s disappearance 
On 21st of February 2014, despite the agreement, a third surprise occurs – Ukrainian president 
Yanukovych flees Ukraine. According to Rinke, in the wake of this surprise development, the 
domestic conflict in Ukraine turns into “an open international conflict”116.  
 
From the German perspective, the signing of the agreement, meant that the pro-Western 
opposition would take over the government in Kyiv, which led Putin to change “to Plan B, in 
order to maintain Russian influence in strategically important regions in Ukraine”117. The main 
driver for this change was Putin’s “fear that after the disintegration of the Soviet Union [Russia] 
may now also lose control over the northern Black Sea Region, and alongside with it, access to 
the Mediterranean”118. However, as the unnamed sources Rinke references point out, “these 
developments were not clearly discernible at the time”.  
 
By all accounts, an overnight disappearance of a president who had just signed an agreement 
after months of domestic crisis is an extraordinary event. However, the hindsight assessment of 
one of Andreas Rinke’s sources leaves unclear whether it was Yanukovych’s disappearance, or 
the agreement that triggered Putin’s change of plans. It raises the additional question why 
Russia would then have initialled the agreement if it would lead to such deterioration of its 
position, or whether Russia was involved in the disappearance of Yanukovych.  
 
At the time this meant that the German government did not focus on Russia and the 
developments on Crimea. Instead, the main attention given to the Ukrainian domestic situation. 
Under the impression of far reaching decisions taken by the new government in Ukraine that 
triggered pro-Russian protests in Eastern Ukraine on the 22nd of February, the main effort by 
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the German government was to prevent the Ukrainian government to undertake further steps 
that may lead to a splitting of the country or civil war.   
 
On the 23rd of February, the last day of the Sochi Winter Olympics, Andreas Rinke accounts 
for a warning to Russia to not intervene into Ukraine militarily issued by the U.S. national 
security advisor, Susan Rice.  He also mentions that on the same day Merkel calls Putin, who  
appeared cooperative: Putin, too, wishes a stable Ukrainian government capable of acting and 
supports the notion that Ukraine’s territorial integrity must be retained119.  
 
The cooperative tone notwithstanding, according to Andreas Rinke’s sources there are growing 
concerns about the Russian motives in Berlin. The disappointment about the developments that 
followed the diplomatic efforts to negotiate between the opposing sides in Kyiv looms large in 
the German chancellery and foreign ministry. In addition, there are increasing signals that 
Crimea might opt for a secession. On 27th of February 2014, the regional parliament in Crimea 
is occupied, a Russian flag hoisted on the building, and a referendum about the future of Crimea 
announced for the end of May 2014. On the 28th of February, armed men without insignia storm 
the airports of Simferopol and Sevastopol. These armed militia-men, Rinke argues, “have 
formed weeks before and in parallel to the Maidan protests, and it is insinuated that they are 
steered by Moscow”120. This is denied by Putin in another phone conversation with Merkel on 
the same day, in which he states that there are no regular Russian troops active on Crimea. 
However, he also ‘expressly’ supports the demands of the pro-Russian Crimean population 
during the call.  
 
Rinke does not characterise these events as surprise, but as signals that Crimea might opt for 
secession. This is noteworthy, as in the previously discussed literature about the annexation of 
Crimea, it is usually these events, that in addition to the disappearance of Yanukovych, are 
characterised as surprising.  
2.3.1.4. The decisive call 
According to Rinke’s sources, the 02nd of March 2014 marks a decisive turning point in the 
German Russian relations, as during this call, “Putin omits for the first time that the militias 
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operating on Crimea have direct links with the Russian troops.”121 According to Rinke’s 
sources, the phone call leads “international crisis diplomacy to run at full speed.”122  
 
It furthermore led to a re-assessment of the German governments’ analysis of Russia’s intention 
in relation to Crimea. According to Rinke, the German chancellor and her foreign minister 
speak on the phone several times before and after the phone call with Putin. “There is broad 
agreement in the internal analysis: Russia indeed plans for the secession of Crimea. Both 
[Merkel and Steinmeier] feel deceived and lied to by the Russian president”123.   
 
Consequently, there was also agreement between the two German top-decision makers 
personally involved in the developments when it came to the appropriate response by the 
German government: Germany, the EU, the West must take a tougher stance on Russia if they 
want to keep their chances to make Putin change his mind.  Following the motto “We have to 
see what is still possible with Russia”124, Rinke identifies three policy objectives the German 
government pursued simultaneously following the phone call between Merkel and Putin on the 
2nd of March:  
 
- To help Ukraine stabilize economically with EU funding. 
- Move Russia to “international coordination about and with Ukraine” through the 
establishment of an International Contact Group.  
- Prepare sanctions to signal Putin how serious the situation is. 
 
Rinke also points out that the German government imposed itself a deadline for reaching these 
objectives before re-considering “what is still possible with Russia”: the 6th of March, when the 
EU Council was to convene for a summit in Brussels125.  
 
Rinke continues that once the German government had decided what it was aiming for and gave 
itself a deadline to achieve these objectives, the decision was swiftly operationalized – with 
Germany’s foreign minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier taking a leading role as ‘the West’s’ chief 
negotiator in the field just a week after he had brokered the deal in Kyiv. 
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Unfortunately, Andreas Rinke makes no mention whether the ‘decisive’ phone call also 
contained elements of surprise. He leaves open whether it was ‘decisive’ because the German 
chancellor did not expect the anonymous paramilitary forces that were occupying strategic 
locations on the Crimean Peninsula had direct links with Russian military forces, or whether 
other aspects related to this omission led to the change of German policy.  
2.3.1.5. The shock: a referendum 
Already on the day following the decisive phone call, Rinke’s account continues, the 3rd of 
March, Steinmeier has to convince his European colleagues at an EU Foreign Minister summit 
– here, “he ha[d] to fight to not yet impose sanctions”, which he ultimately succeeded in126. 
Rinke reports that following his performance at the Foreign Ministers summit, on the 4th of 
March, he meets his Russian colleague Lavrov for an informal dinner in Geneva. While the 
Russian foreign minister used the opportunity to repeat the Russian charges against the new 
Ukrainian government, it’s neo-fascist ideology, that it came to power by an illegal coup d’état 
and that the West is to blame for the chaos in Ukraine, the German foreign minister sought to 
convince his colleague to accept the idea of an international contact group and return to the 
negotiating table -and accept Ukraine at it, too. Unlike on the previous day with his E.U. 
colleagues, Steinmeier failed in his informal endeavour with his Russian counterpart.127  
 
However, as Rinke accounts, he was to have a second chance on the following day– this time 
supported by the U.S. secretary of state, John Kerry, the French foreign minister Laurent Fabius 
and UK’s foreign secretary William Hague. The informal foreign ministers meeting in Paris 
began with a direct interaction between John Kerry and Sergey Lavrov, which lasted much 
longer than anticipated – however, again to no avail. The bilateral meeting was followed by a 
meeting between all foreign ministers present in Paris. According to Rinke, the four NATO 
foreign ministers almost convinced Sergey Lavrov of the idea to establish an international 
contact group – “until he gets a phone call from Moscow […] and postpones the talks.”128 An 
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This meant that the end of the self-imposed deadline had passed without being able to move 
Russia back to the negotiation table by the self-imposed deadline, the 6th of March. According 
to Rinke, the German government – this time Angela Merkel representing Germany at the EU 
Council –  “intended to discuss two types of sanctions”129: in a first step the freezing of 
diplomatic contacts and, as a second step, the freezing of assets and the imposition of visa-
restrictions.  
 
However, the summit ended with a much tougher EU response than the German government 
had intended. During the negotiations amongst the EU member states’ heads of state, the news 
broke that the Crimean government announced that the referendum had been moved ahead 
again, this time to the 16th of March. This had “massive influence on the debate amongst the 
heads of state”130, and instead of the two-step sanctions approach proposed by Germany, the 27 
member states agreed to a three-step sanction regime, adding economic sanctions if Russia 
destabilizes further parts of Ukraine. Angela Merkel, too, Rinke accounts, takes a much tougher 
stance from that moment on131.   
 
Andreas Rinke describes the announcement of the Crimean regional government during the EU 
Council summit as a shock. The Oxford dictionary describes the word shock as “a strong feeling 
of surprise as a result of something happening, especially something unpleasant; the event that 
causes this feeling.”132  
 
Thus, Rinke’s primary source-based description of the impact of the news during the EU 
Council summit on the 6th of March suggests that in the series of surprise events t identified, 
the announcement of the Crimean regional parliament is the event that marks the strongest 
feeling of surprise. Unfortunately, he does not explain why this referendum was particularly 
surprising or considers its effect in the context of the overall outcome. Instead, from Andreas 
Rinke’s chronological account that considered how, and under which circumstances German 
policy towards Russia changed between late Summer 2013 and the annexation of Crimea in 
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spring 2014, the phone call between the German chancellor and the Russian president on the 
2nd of March was decisive for Germany.  
2.3.1.6. The inevitable outcome: annexation by referendum 
Following the EU Council summit on the 6th of March, in addition to agreeing to impose 
sanctions against Russia in the E.U. framework the German government tried to convince the 
Russian government to not support the holding of the referendum – while making clear that it 
would not acknowledge its outcome. However, to no avail. The course of history could not be 
changed anymore: the referendum was held on the 16th of March, and the ethnic-Russian 
dominated Crimean population voted in favour of joining the Russian Federation.  
 
Following the referendum, the last phase Rinke discerns begins: the beginning of the escalation, 
with Germany and the ‘Western’ governments taking punitive action against Russia in the form 
of sanctions. At this point, Rinke notes that “all actors acknowledge that they have assumed for 
too long that Putin follows the same logic as the West; but he follows his own”.133 
 
Rinke argues that German policy between the federal chancellery and foreign office was well 
coordinated. The differences, at best, were nuances. As one of his sources “jokingly” states 
about the differences: “[O]ne sides wants to set Russia its limits, while maintaining the channels 
of communication – the other wants to maintain the channels of communications while setting 
Russia its limits.”134  
 
The harmonic interplay between the two German strategic-decision makers as well as their 
bureaucracies, Rinke finds, is much helped by three factors: Firstly, the German foreign 
minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier, traditionally in favour of maintaining closer ties with Russia, 
had felt betrayed and lied to by Russia – and also learned that Russia could not be moved in 
this question. More precisely, he felt that Vladimir Putin and Sergey Lavrov whom he had 
known for such a long time could not be moved. Secondly, on the 6th of March, then leader of 
the Social Democratic Party, Sigmar Gabriel, met with Vladimir Putin in person, and “returns 
sobered up about Russia”135. According to Andreas Rinke, these personal experiences of the 
two leading figures of the Social Democratic Party – the “Russia -Understander Party”-, helped 
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the German government to take a unified stance in confronting the German private sector, who 
was critical of economic sanctions136. The third element that according to Rinke helped the 
agreement within the German government was what Rinke describes as “congruence” of the 
German and the U.S. position, as “despite all statements about U.S. resolve”, the United States 
also “warned the eastern Europeans to not shoot beyond the aim”137. At the end of the day, 
Russia, Rinke found, was too important for the United States to find solutions for other 
conflicts, be it in Syria, Iran, or the Near and Middle East.  
 
Rinke suggests that from the German government’ perspective at that time, a repeat of the 
annexation of Crimea in Eastern Ukraine was unlikely, due to the military and logistical 
complexities of such an attempt. Therefore, Berlin repeats its call for an Exit-Strategy in 
policies towards Russia, “as Russia is not going to leave Europe”138. Rather than escalation, 
this suggests that Germany was trying ways to convince its partners and Russia to identify ways 
to wind back the sanctions that were just imposed. As Rinke writes: “After [the referendum] 
the German government in principle remained with the triad “talks with Moscow”, “if 
necessary, sanctions” and “Aid for Ukraine””. Hence Germany’s strategy for dealing with 
Russia have not changed substantially after Crimea was annexed, and remained de-escalatory 
rather than escalatory.  
 
In closing his account, Rinke even reports a sense of self-complacency amongst the German 
government, when he cites one of his anonymous sources at the end of his account, arguing that 
despite the unwanted outcome on Crimea, other than following the war with Georgia in 2008, 
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2.3.1.7. Summary: A primary source-based account 
Andreas Rinke argues that between July 2013 and the annexation of Crimea in March 2014, 
Germany and the German top-leadership experienced several surprise events – Yanukovych’s 
refusal to sign the association treaty; the mass-protests that followed in Kyiv and elsewhere in 
Ukraine; Yanukovych fleeing Ukraine after a deal had been brokered between him and the 
protesters; the announcement of the Crimean regional government to hold a referendum about 
the peninsula joining the Russian Federation.  
 
Unlike in the research on the annexation of Crimea discussed in the previous chapter, which 
often is unspecific about what exactly, or which event was surprising, Andreas Rinke accounts 
that from a German government perspective, there were several surprise events he clearly 
identifies. He even distinguishes their quality, by characterising the unexpected announcement 
of the Crimean regional government as a shock, to characterise the event as an occasion when 
the German government’s feeling of surprise was especially strong. However, even though he 
is more specific in pointing out which event was surprising than other scholars, this review 
finds that in relation to the role of surprise for the annexation of Crimea, Rinke, too, raises more 
questions than he answers.  
 
This is also true for the explanations why the German government was surprised on the various 
occasions that could be identified in Wie Moskau Berlin verlor . In theis context it also becomes 
apparent that the reliance on primary-source oral interviews only is a dual-edged sword for 
research: While Rinke’s reliance on primary sources provides rich insight into the German 
reading of Russian courses of action, it is problematic from the researcher’s perspective, as they 
have opted to speak with Rinke on the premise of anonymity. While there is no reason to doubt 
the validity of the statements of the sources to provide valid insights into what happened, it 
cannot be assessed with how many individuals Rinke spoke, where they work in government, 
and what their relationship to the decision-making during the crisis was. That the reliance on 
interviews with primary sources may be problematic from a research perspective is furthermore 
shown in the variance of explanations why surprise occurred to the German government found 
in Andreas Rinke’s article. Three different explanations why the German government was taken 
off-guard could be identified:  
 




a. it was not possible read Putin’s next step during the situation, because everything 
was marred with ambiguity – and certainty was gained in hindsight, after Russia 
had created facts on the ground. At the time, the rapid developments made it 
impossible to process and analyse incoming information correctly.  
b. The German government had been suffering from mirror imaging: “for too long, 
one has been operating on the premise that Putin follows the same logic as the 
West; but instead, he followed his own”, which inhibited it from separating the 
wheat from the chaff.  
c. Merkel and Steinmeier were deceived and lied to by Putin personally.  
 
While each of these explanations why the German government was surprised may stand on its 
own, they could equally have been at work at the same time, or at different times in relation to 
different events. Unfortunately, Rinke does not observe the discrepancy that becomes apparent 
in his primary sources’ statements’, and thus does not offer any further explanations.  
 
Like the literature reviewed in the first part of this literature, Andreas Rinke argues that Russian 
deception has contributed to the German government being caught unaware. However, unlike 
previous literature, which considered deception to either be aimed at the wider public, or be a 
military operational practice, Rinke suggests that from the German government perspective, 
deception was directed at the top-leadership involved, and done by the Russian president 
personally. However, Rinke fails to detail how exactly Putin deceived Merkel and Steinmeier.  
 
Instead, Rinke argues that the decisive moment in the relationship between Germany and Russia 
was a phone call between Merkel and Putin on the 2nd of March and argues that it was Putin’s 
admonition that the anonymous paramilitary troops had direct links with the Russian military, 
which led the German government to change its stance towards Moscow. At the same time 
Rinke insinuates that it was this admission that triggered the sensation by Merkel and 
Steinmeier that Putin had deceived them and lied to them. What does not become clear from 
Rinke’s account, however, is whether this admonition by Putin was a surprise to Angela Merkel 
and Frank-Walter Steinmeier, and how Putin had contributed to creating the conditions for it. 
This question becomes especially pertinent when considering that between the first appearance 
of unidentifiable men using Russian military equipment occurred 72 hours earlier – and that 
besides taking the Crimean regional parliament hostage and replacing the pro-Russian governor 
that had been elected just a week earlier with an even more pro-Russian governor, hoisted an 




oversize Russian flag over the occupied building. Taken together, from Andreas Rinke’s 
primary source based attempt the role of surprise for the annexation of Crimea from a German 
perspective remains unfathomable.   
2.3.2. Surprise despite warning? A view from the German foreign intelligence service  
Although Andreas Rinke identifies multiple events that were surprising to the German 
government, in his chronological tracing of events from the German government perspective 
and offers various explanations as to why surprise occurred to the German government, he does 
not ask whether the German government could have averted these surprise events. To the 
contrary. For one, he does not link the premises and assumptions guiding the German policy to 
those events characterised as surprising, making them appear freak events, bolts from the blue 
impossible to anticipate – and thus to prevent. Secondly Andreas Rinke draws an image of a 
harmoniously functioning German government, where seemingly everything was ‘under 
control’ despite these unexpected developments. Even though the outcome is not what the 
German government had aspired and fought for, Rinke closes his account on a note of 
complacency he ascribes to one of his sources – under the circumstances, the German 
government and its allies fared better than it had before, when Russia occupied Georgia in 2008.  
 
However, a year after Rinke’s publication, an article appeared in the German daily newspaper 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung drawing a different picture about the inner workings of the 
German government before and during the crisis. In an article that was published a year after 
Crimea’s annexation in March 2015, under the title ‘Manchmal staunt sogar Putin über den 
BND’ (Sometimes even Putin is surprised by the BND) the German foreign intelligence service, 
the Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND) is discussed in the context of foreign and security policy 
decision-making the role of service prior and during the Ukraine crisis specifically addressed140.  
It suggests that even if the annexation of surprise may not have been prevented by the German 
government, the developments should not have come as a surprise, as the intelligence service 
had provided warning that Russia might seek a more assertive course since the war with 
Georgia.   
 
 
140 Lohse, Eckart; Sattar, Majid; Wehner, Markus: ‚Manchmal staunt sogar Putin über den BND‘, in: Frankfurter 
Allgemeine Zeitung, 09.03.2015, Frankfurt, 2015.  




The article is one of the rare media publications about how the German foreign intelligence 
service goes about its business and discusses its role in the German policy and decision-making 
process.  
2.3.2.1. Institutional framework: the place of intelligence in Germany’s foreign and 
security policy architecture 
The BND is under the direct responsibility of the German federal chancellery. As a subordinate 
federal authority, it has its own president and bureaucracy but reports to intelligence coordinator 
in the chancellor’s office. The primary consumer for BND intelligence is the federal chancellery 
and the federal ministries. On a daily base intelligence dossier grouped by regions are sent to 
the corresponding department heads in the chancellery and federal ministries. If at this level the 
incoming information is considered to require urgent action, the information will be passed up 
the federal chancellery’s hierarchy. The chancellor herself will be taken into the loop last, and 
from her intelligence coordinator personally.  
 
The newspaper article also describes how these dossiers are structured: They typically describe 
three scenarios, which are based on estimates the BND extrapolates from the information it 
collects and analyses. However, the service usually refrains from making political conclusions, 
as “this is a political task”141.  
2.3.2.2. A disputed agency: the role of intelligence in Germany’s foreign and security 
policy 
The article reports that within the German government, the BND is not undisputed, and has lost 
influence especially since Angela Merkel became chancellor in 2005. From the onset of her 
chancellery, her relationship with the German intelligence services has been a rather distant 
one. The authors of the article argue that her biographical background, being born in the German 
Democratic Republic and having experienced first-hand the methods and means of the Eastern 
German intelligence service Stasi, had made her sceptical about the role of intelligence services. 
While this points to idiosyncrasies in Angela  Merkel’s relationship to intelligence services, the 
article points out that her predecessors showed similar levels of disinterest: Like her 
predecessors she does not participate in the weekly intelligence briefing, which is usually held 
at the level of state-secretary, the highest ranking officials in a German federal ministry. This 
 
141 Lohse, Eckart; Sattar, Majid; Wehner, Markus: ‚Manchmal staunt sogar Putin über den BND‘. 




notwithstanding, the German chancellor is also characterised as not entirely rebuffing the 
services of the BND, as she “sometimes requests briefings, but she prefers broader crisis reports 
over purely intelligence-based briefings”142. 
 
According to the article, not only the chancellor is cautious about German foreign intelligence 
service and its analysis. As the article points out, her reluctance is mirrored in the federal 
chancellery as well as by the federal foreign office. Both, the article reports consider the BND 
as “alarmistic”, and according to the article, particularly the foreign office had rejected 
intelligence reports on Russian military modernization since the Georgia War 2008.  The 
estimates that Russia may choose a more aggressive and militaristic foreign policy course 
offered by the BND were not considered for political reasons. “They would stand in the way of 
deepening strategic relationships.”143 And therefore, as the article points out “German politics 
bet on partnership instead of changing its policies”144.  
2.3.2.3. Could the annexation of Crimea be foreseen, and surprise be averted?  
The article also asks its sources if an annexation of Crimea was a scenario the BND had 
identified, reported and discussed with the political leadership? According to the source 
consulted for the publication, such a scenario was discussed at the Foreign Offices policy and 
plans unit shortly after the Georgia War in 2008, but soon dismissed as “unlikely” by the 
diplomats.  
 
However, the article goes on to argue that Even if it had been taken up as a likely scenario – 
foreseeing that Putin would decide to annex Crimea would have been impossible, “a high 
ranking security official” cited in the article argues: “To be able to have known about this 
decision, one would have had to run Putin as a source”145. To the official’s mind, the decision 
was a snap decision taken personally by Putin and very few individuals, after his Ukrainian 
crony, Viktor Yanukovych, unexpectedly fled the country. For Putin, this came equal to defeat, 
and instead of welcoming Yanukovych in Moscow, he only offered him exile in Rostow/Don. 
Initially, the source is paraphrased, Putin continues to leverage his influence through 
Yanukovych’s political party in Ukraine. “The decision to annex Crimea is taken only after the 
 
142 Lohse, Eckart; Sattar, Majid; Wehner, Markus: ‚Manchmal staunt sogar Putin über den BND‘. 
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party announces its dissolution, the status of the Russian language is threatened and the lease 
agreement for the Russian naval base in Sevastopol is being questioned by the new Ukrainian 
government”. 146 
 
In other words, it was an ad-hoc decision, a knee-jerk reaction taken by the Russian president 
alone, some days after the disappearance of Yanukovych, impossible to foresee and warn 
against. This notion is very similar to that offered by Stephen Treisman in his characterisation 
of the erratic leader Putin discussed in the previous chapter. This notwithstanding, the article 
insinuates that even if the exact moment and circumstances may have been unforeseeable, it 
should not have come as a surprise by German decision makers as the its intelligence service 
had long reported about Russia’s military modernization and increasingly assertive foreign 
policy in its neighbourhood. The article this concludes by stating: 
 
“What politics was lacking was a sensorium which conclusions one had to draw from the 
developments in Russia […] Berlin assumed the best case, even it had to close at least one eye 
for this”147 
2.3.2.4. Summary: a view from Germany’s foreign intelligence service 
Whereas Andreas Rinke identifies several events that were surprising for the German 
government, and is concise about the dates of these events, the FAZ article considers only one 
surprise: it characterizes the ‘entire’ annexation of Crimea as surprise. This is also distinct to 
the literature about the annexation of Crimea discussed in the previous chapter. While here it 
was found that often it was difficult to identify what exactly was surprising, as the term is used 
but none of the previously discussed attempts equated the annexation of Crimea – the outcome 
- with surprise. Instead, the majority considers the annexation of Crimea as a process marked 
by surprises. However, framing the annexation of Crimea itself as surprise leads to the question 
what exactly was surprising about it – a question already raised in the previous chapter.  
 
Like Andreas Rinke, the article published in the FAZ relies on primary sources for its argument. 
The newspaper-article shining a light on the perspective of the German foreign intelligence 
service BND thus gives reason to question the image of “harmonious crisis management” 
within the German government. Much more importantly for this research, it questions the 
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reasons why surprise occurred to the German government. It rejects the assumption of surprise 
events occurring like bolts from the blue, and that it was impossible to foresee at the time what 
Putin may have in mind. It makes no mention that Russian deception was of concern. It even 
suggests that the German government need not have been surprised, as the German intelligence 
had been warning the government repeatedly that Russia might change its foreign policy from 
cooperative to confrontative.  
 
Clearly, the BND had a perspective on what had occurred that differed not only in nuances to 
those held in the chancellery and foreign ministry and did not feel it’s position was adequately 
represented in the public discourse. Therefore, when reading the article, one cannot help to get 
the sensation that the German foreign intelligence community was seeking to set their own 
record straight, by putting the blame at the political top-level. According to the article, the 
intelligence services had provided the German political decision-makers with warning that 
could have enabled them to foresee the course Russia took, but the concerns voiced were 
rejected as alarmist.  
 
In the context of Russia’s annexation of Crimea, however, the article makes the point that the 
exact moment was impossible to foresee, as it was a snap-decision taken by Putin himself. This 
is akin to the finding of Stephen Treisman, who argues that surprise occurred chiefly because 
of the idiosyncrasies of Vladimir Putin, which are beyond reason and rationality. However, 
unlike Treisman who argues that surprise was inevitable because of Putin, the FAZ article 
suggests that surprise could have been prevented had it not been for the German political 
decision-makers.  
 
In other words: The German government was surprised by the annexation of Crimea not 
because it lacked warning, but because the warning was politically unwanted for. This echoes 
those studies discussed in the previous chapter that argue that surprise was caused by self-
delusion, and the unwillingness by political decision-makers to consider available signals. It is 
distinct from this argument brought to the for by historians and scholars of strategy, however, 
as unlike the more academic works that with the knowledge of hindsight provides fitting signals 
for the eventual outcome, the analysis offered by (German) intelligence services is part of the 
policy-process; even if dismissed, it is discussed within the complex undertaking captured by 
the terms government and policy. Secondly, it is distinct as the analysis is not provided with 
the knowledge of hindsight, but with a view to reduce the uncertainty of the future. These 




differences, however, do not question the findings offered by those arguing that ‘the West’ has 
to blame itself, but rather strengthens them, as it suggests that the signals identified with the 
luxury of hindsight were known before the outcome were known to the German government, 
but actively rejected.  
 
Lastly, the FAZ article makes no reference at all to the role of Russian deception or information 
operations, an aspect observed unanimously in the previously discussed works. This may imply 
that the German foreign intelligence service does not attribute any role to it or that the German 
foreign intelligence could provide accurate warning because it had de-ciphered Russian 
deceptive efforts. It may also imply that from the BND’s perspective Russian deception did not 
play any role in the context of the annexation of Crimea. The article suggests yet another 
alternative, however: by putting the blame on the political decision-makers, and charging them 
to not have heeded to the advice that in hindsight turned out to be accurate, insinuates that the 
level of self-delusion that reigned in the German government was so high, that Russian 
deception efforts are a negligible factor when it comes to explaining why the German 
government was surprised. More simply put: the surprise was home-made, and the consequence 
of ignorance, rather than of another nations attempts to manipulate the perception of reality. 
This ignorance required no further feeding by Russian deception.  
2.3.3. Willing partners for Russian propaganda? The role of media in the German 
debate about Ukraine and Russia’s annexation of Crimea 
In hindsight, the revelations of the FAZ publication appear explosive enough to set in motion a 
more systematic enquiry why the German government was surprised. After all, a government 
agency accused the German political leadership with failure. But the issue was not taken up 
further in the debate.  
 
The opposite was true for the public debate that followed Russia’s annexation of Crimea about 
the role of the media148. According to a survey conducted in late 2014, “[…] more than 50% of 
respondents do not believe the media coverage of the Ukraine conflict in Germany. The reasons 
 
148 For example, Germany’s leading public broadcasting station, ARD,  was heavily criticized for its Russia-critical 
reporting: Bidder, Benjamin: ‚Programmbeirat wirft ARD „antirussische Tendenzen“ vor‘, in: Der Spiegel,  
23.09.2014, Hamburg 2014; for a profound analyses of the German media coverage of Russia, see Pörzgen, 
Gemma: ‘Das Russlandbild in den deutschen Medien’, in : Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung (ed): Dossier 
Russland,  Bonn, 09.05.2018. Online available at: 
https://www.bpb.de/internationales/europa/russland/47998/russlandbild-deutscher-medien , last accessed 
29.03.2021. 




mentioned for this critical view include the feelings that reports are one sided and not objective 
(31%) and that there is even disinformation” 149.  
 
This criticism was particularly loudly voiced by actors known to be “friendly” towards Putin 
and Russia, like Gerhard Schröder or Helmut Schmidt, both former SPD chancellors: both 
argued that the reporting on Russia is biased. But there was no shortage of those arguing the 
opposite: reporting was pro-Russian. This argument was more in fashion with those belonging 
to the conservative spectre of German party politics, who were highly critical of Russia, Putin 
– and social-democrats as well as left leaning journalists150.  
 
Both criticisms contained the notion that at least in part, the media is to blame for what 
happened – and if there had been different reporting, than there might have been different 
courses Germany could have taken. Because the either too critical or too friendly reporting 
about Russia and the situation in Ukraine created perceptions that had a negative impact on 
political decision-making. This provided an alternative scapegoat for the mistakes that 
according to the German intelligence service were the responsibility of political decision-
makers both views on the role of the media could agree on. Unlike the criticism of the 
government by its own government agency, however, the media scolding led to formal inquiries 
to assess the objectivity in reporting of the German public broadcasting stations on Russia, the 
developments in Ukraine and on Crimea. Interestingly, in the heat of the argument no one asked 
what the role of the media, and what is reported, has on the decision-making in the German 
government.  
 
The inquiries showed that there was no empirical evidence to the charges being made151. This 
is also the finding of Nicole Ahler’s chapter on Germany in the already discussed edited volume 
“Fog of Falsehood” commissioned by the Finnish Institute for International Affairs152. Unlike 
the account of Andreas Rinke and the report published in Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 
which consider the time before Russia annexed Crimea, Ahler, staying true to the methodology 
 
149 Burkhard, Fabian: ‘Analyse: Die Ukraine Krise in den deutschen Talkshows’, Bundeszentrale für politische 
Bildung (ed): Dossier Ukraine, Bonn, 24.06.2014. Online available at: 
https://www.bpb.de/internationales/europa/ukraine/187151/analyse-die-ukraine-krise-in-den-deutschen-
talkshows , last accessed 29.03.2021.   
150 Bidder, Benjamin: ‚Programmbeirat wirft ARD „antirussische Tendenzen“ vor‘, in: Der Spiegel, 23.09.2014, 
Hamburg, 2014.  
151 Pörzgen, Gemma: ‚Das Russlandbild in den deutschen Medien‘ 
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developed for the overall volume, only considers the week after Crimea was integrated into the 
Russian Federation by a pompous (if not pathetic) event in the Russian Duma presided over by 
Vladimir Putin. To reach her conclusions, Ahler assesses a selection of Germany media outlets 
that are selected on the base of their political orientation, from conservative to progressive.  
 
The general criticism on the overall volume applies to the chapter on Germany as well, but the 
case study too shows that the German media could not be considered servile instruments in 
Putin’s propaganda machinery, but dealt with Russian propaganda “professionally” 153.  
 
In sum, although soon after the annexation of Crimea there were voices in Germany arguing 
that the media is at least in part responsible for the unforeseen events in Ukraine and on Crimea, 
thus offering an additional explanation as to why the German government was surprised, this 
hypothesis was falsified soon. However, the direction of the debate and inquiries that something 
unforeseen had occurred, and in its aftermath Germany was in search of who to hold 
responsible.  
2.4. Summary: The role of surprise for Germany in the context of the annexation of Crimea  
The previous review of a selection of publications concerned with Germany and the annexation 
of Crimea shows that the German government, was taken off guard by the events that ultimately 
led to the annexation of Crimea.  As to the question what exactly was surprising for the German 
government two diverging views can be distinguished in literature.  
 
- There were several events surprised the German government between November 2013 
and March 2014.  
o The decision of the Ukrainian government to not sign the EU Association 
Agreement, 29th of November 2013. 
o The mass-protests in Kyiv after the refusal to sign the agreement. 
o The disappearance of Ukrainian president Yanukovych after an agreement had 
been signed with the protesters, 22nd of February 2014. 
o The announcement of a referendum by the Crimean regional parliament during 
the EU Council summit, 06th of Mach 2014. 
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- There was only one surprise: The annexation itself.  
 
Three explanations why the German government was caught off guard were identified in the 
literature discussed for this section:    
 
- Everything was marred by ambiguity, and impossible to foresee Putin’s steps. When 
and why he took the decisions became discernible only with hindsight.  
a. Mirror Imaging: Germany was surprised because it thought that the Russian 
president would act on the same rational premises as the German government. 
b. Putin deceived Merkel and Steinmeier. 
 
- Germany was surprised despite warning; Accurate warning was available and made 
known to the policy level, but not considered. The role of deception is negligible.  
 
- German media reporting was biased, leading to a distorted perception of the 
developments in Ukraine and concerning Russia, and therefore caused surprise.  
 
Overall, it was found that the works that consider the role of surprise for Germany in the context 
of the annexation of Crimea mirrors the findings of the review of the wider debate on the 
annexation: Surprise is universally observed, but its effect for the overall outcome is intractable.  
  
 
In addition, the previous discussion has furthermore demonstrated that many of the gaps and 
inconsistencies in relation to surprise in the annexation of Crimea that were observed already 
in the literature dealing with the annexation of Crimea in general, can be identified in the 
literature looking at Germany and the annexation of Crimea as well:  
 
- The effect of surprise on the overall outcome is not considered. In the case of several 
surprise events: how are they similar, how do they differ? What is the difference 
between a shock event and a surprise event? What is the difference between a shock-
event and the feeling of shock after a surprise event? What role for surprise in the 
decisive event? 
- The role of deception is observed, but how exactly it contributed to surprise is not 
considered.  




- Why exactly was the German government surprised if it had been warned by its 
intelligence service?  
3.  Methodological Remarks  
So far, this research has only considered and reviewed the findings of available literature about 
Germany, surprise and the annexation of Crimea. However, little has been said about how these 
efforts reached their results. This is much helped by the fact that except for the investigation by 
the Finnish Institute on International Affairs154, none of the publications discussed above pays 
overly detailed attention to methodological considerations or undertake efforts to establish a 
research framework.  
3.1. Which theory? 
Above all, it is mostly theory-free. However, this is not to say that the annexation of Crimea 
and Russia’s aggressive foreign policy turn in 2013/2014 did not play a role in the debate about 
international relations theories–quite the contrary - it particularly provided the school of realism 
and neo-realism a case in point. It is not by coincidence that it was John J. Mearsheimer, one 
of the most prominent representatives of the neo-realist school in international relations, that 
argued that the West ought to blame itself for the turn in the relationship with Russia by 
neglecting Russia. The same was true for realism – its heydays dated back to the age of the 
Cold War and nuclear weapons Since the end of the Cold War, which realism could neither 
foresee nor explain, it lost appeal, and got more and more neglected. For realism and neo-
realism, the illegal annexation of Crimea by Russia somewhat marks their 21st century 
renaissance – because Russia’s turn it could explain155.  
 
Probably the most important factor for this is that the interest in the annexation of Crimea 
originated much more from its relevance to policy than its relevance to academia. Marking the 
first change of borders by military force in Europe since the end of the second world war, the 
annexation of Crimea is an event of historical importance.  
 
 
154 Exceptions for example are:  Pynnömiemi, K; Racz, Andras (eds): Fog of Falsehood, 2016. Or: Darczewska, 
Jolanta: ‘The Anatomy of Russian Information Warfare, 2016. Both rely on theories from the field of 
communications science.  
155 See for example: Belloni, Roberto, Della Sala, Vincent, Viotti, Paul (Eds.): Fear and Uncertainty in Europe 
The Return to Realism?, Palgrave MacMillan, Basingstoke, 2019. 




While there is little doubt that Crimea is a case of historical importance, and since then is  
regularly referred to as a paradigm-changing moment for the international context, the notion 
to ‘cut straight to the cheese’ that characterises the majority of the literature discussed in the 
previous chapter leaves open the question what Crimea is a case of – the previous discussion 
has shown several points of view how the annexation of Crimea could be analytically framed: 
for example, it could be viewed as a case of international relations, or case of a inter-state 
conflict,  each of which are subject to theoretical considerations.  
3.2. Quantitative or Qualitative  
Most of these case studies are of qualitative nature. An exception is made by studies seeking to 
measure the impact of Russian information operations or identify communicative patterns of 
Russian propaganda and in which contexts they can be observed – and how often. Such studies, 
like the NATO Centre of Excellence report on Russia’s new way of war, or the investigation 
by the Finnish Institute for International Affairs take a quantitative approach, for example by 
counting the frequency of communicative patterns and drawing conclusions and policy 
recommendations from that. 
3.3. Single Case Study, Small-n and large-n comparative approaches 
As a case of historical importance and high policy relevance, the annexation of Crimea often 
was studied as a single-case in-depth case study. However, due to the immediately ensuing 
Russian activities in Eastern Ukraine, where Russian-backed rebels began a civil war for 
independence shortly after the annexation of Crimea, it has also been analysed as a comparative 
case, particularly in relation to the Hybrid War debate. However, these comparative case studies 
are mostly small-n studies, like the comprehensive volume commissioned by the Finnish 
Institute for International Affairs.     
3.4. Sources 
The bulk of sources of the more academically oriented policy research relies on is secondary 
sources, in which media plays a key role. In the context of the annexation of Crimea, media, is 
not only used as a source, but also analysed as an actor – for example in Germany, where 
investigations and special committees were set up to investigate whether the media had reported 
a distorted image of Russia that had a negative effect on public perception, or in Russia, were 
the media is state-controlled. 





The role of Russia’s media in relation to propaganda and deception in the annexation of Crimea 
received great attention. As a result, Russian media publications from TV, newspapers, and 
social media have been very systematically examined, both before and after the annexation of 
Crimea. This somehow contrasts to the reporting of media outside Russia or Ukraine, where 
the analysis of media sources is less systematic156.  
 
Other secondary sources include government documents or statements by heads of state or high-
ranking officials.   
 
Primary sources, for example government officials, or journalists involved in the developments, 
were more often used in the literature scrutinizing Germany in the context of the annexation of 
Crimea. For example, Andreas Rinke’s attempt to order the events in Ukraine since November 
2013 from a German perspective. Published just two months after the annexation, his account 
relies heavily on the insights gained from interviews with German government officials that 
spoke on the base of anonymity. More journalistic publications, like the article published in 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung also make use of primary sources. Although the use of primary 
sources greatly contributes to a better understanding of the developments at the time from the 
German perspective, the views offered on why the German government was surprised by the 
primary sources are sufficiently conflicting to raise more questions than they provide answers. 
3.5.  Quality of Data  
“Data quality can be defined as the state of completeness, validity, consistency, timeliness and 
accuracy that makes data appropriate for a specific use.”157 In the previously discussed 
literature, it is especially the more quantitative research into Russia’s information operations 
and their role in the annexation of Crimea that specifically addresses the question of data 
quality.  
A general aspect related to the quality of data and the annexation of Crimea is that the quality 
of data could only be defined after Crimea was annexed – not before. So, whether data was 
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“appropriate for a specific use” only became apparent with the knowledge of hindsight. 
However, as the competing explanations why and how Crimea was annexed discussed above 
show, despite the knowledge of hindsight, despite knowing the outcome, how this outcome 
came about remains contested. Thus, the “truth” is yet to be uncovered – especially as there is 
hardly any reliable data on Russia – be it the decision making of President Putin or on how the 
military operation unfolded. It is also true, however, for the German government, or indeed, 
many other “Western” actors involved.  
 
It can be safely assumed that such data will not be accessible for research for a long time to 
come. Without having access to them, the researcher interested in the annexation of Crimea 
must be aware of the limitations to the quality of data, and how this affects the relative value of 
the research outcome. A particular risk is selection bias, using data that fits the desired research 
outcome, rather than the other way around.  
 
In the previously discussed literature, a distinction can be made between efforts that consider 
data from before the annexation and those that consider secondary data about the annexation 
that was made available after Crimea had become part of the Russian Federation. The previous 
notion is more common in Germany, as from the German perspective the annexation of Crimea 
can not be distinguished from the preceding crisis in Ukraine. The latter notion is more 
prevalent in those efforts that seek to explain how Russia annexed Crimea, and which role 
traditional military operations and modern information operations had for the overall outcome.  
3.6.  Summary: Methodological Remarks 
None of the previously discussed publications on Crimea is methodologically flawless or fulfils 
the highest academic standards. This notwithstanding, all the previously discussed publications 
have provided valuable insights into a case of high historical importance, and offer lessons 









4. Discussion of the findings: Which role for surprise in the annexation 
of Crimea, especially for Germany? 
The previous chapters discussed the findings of a selection of publications on the annexation of 
Crimea with two main perspectives: the role of surprise for the annexation of Crimea and the 
role of surprise for Germany in the context of the annexation of Crimea. The key finding of this 
discussion for this research is that while the phenomenon of surprise is unanimously observed, 
its relationship with the overall outcome is not systematically considered. What exactly was 
surprising, why it was surprising, as well as the role of surprise for the overall outcome – 
Crimea’s annexation by Russia - remain intractable.  
  
This notwithstanding, the review of a selection of literature allows to identify three general 
assumptions as to why surprise occurred. While some argued that the West was surprised due 
to self-delusion, not wanting to see what was apparent and known, others argued that surprise 
was inevitable due to Putin’s irrational style of leadership. Others still considered that deception 
– be it military operational, or as an element of Russia’s information operations – to have 
contributed to surprise in the annexation of Crimea. Deception receives more systematic 
attention than surprise, and three assumptions in relation to deception were identified: Russia 
and Putin employed deception. Deception created the conditions for surprise; deception served 
to increase ambiguity, and keep Russia’s adversary guessing about your intentions. 
 
However, the discussion of the previous literature highlighted that no specific explanation how 
Russian deception in the context of the annexation of Crimea created the conditions of surprise 
is offered. While there is a shared notion in the previous works that deception was employed to 
increase ambiguity, how this ambiguity specifically contributed to surprise has not been 
detailed in the reviewed literature. 
 
This gap also provides a point of connection for this research’s interest, the role of surprise in 
the annexation of Crimea, especially for Germany.  Because if it can be established that surprise 
was the direct effect of Russian deception, then surprise would become tractable, allowing to 
consider its role for the overall outcome. However, in order to be able to consider if and how 
Russian deception contributed to creating the conditions for surprise, surprise first needs to 
become tractable.  
 




In absence of earlier systematic attempts with this objective in mind, the question is how to 
proceed from here.    
4.1. Tracing surprise: How to recollect what was expected before the unexpected 
happened. 
The core challenge for this research is thus to make surprise tractable, as this would allow to 
address not only the core questions for this research, but also allow to re-consider the findings 
of previous works.  
Previous research has made unexpected events by pointing to the events that were surprising. 
They limit their view to on the unexpected. This approach however merely allows the 
characterisation of an event as surprising but disconnects the events from the period during 
which the event was not expected. More simply put they explain++++++ the case with the 
luxury of hindsight and already knowing the outcome. However, to trace what exactly was 
surprising, and why, it is necessary to consider first what was expected instead of merely 
describing the unexpected that is known to have been unexpected with the luxury of hindsight. 
  
A closer look at the sources and data used by the previously discussed research provides an 
explanation for this focus on the known unexpected outcome:  The reviewed sample of literature 
looking at the annexation of Crimea heavily relies on secondary sources that were published 
after the peninsula was annexed, whereas the reviewed sample of literature on the role of 
Germany in the context of Russia’s annexation of Crimea to the contrary relies heavily on 
primary sources that were approached after the annexation.  
 
However, to understand what was surprising, why it was surprising, and what effect the 
unexpected had on the outcome it is first important to understand what was expected before the 
unexpected happened. Thus, rather than making surprise tractable by pointing out the 
unexpected, this research will seek to make surprise tractable by seeking to find out what was 
expected to happen before the unexpected happened.  
 
Using a jig-saw puzzle as an example makes apparent that the difference between the two 
perspectives is not trivial. A jig-saw may have 500 or 1.000 pieces, small and of mosaic 
character, with plenty of different and often confusing shapes. The objective is to puzzle them 
together so that pieced together they represent an image. To achieve the objective, the jig-saw 




puzzler is helped by the fact that he is given the image his 500 or 1.000 pieces must represent 
when they are fitted together. The outcome is known and provides a guideline to structure the 
500 or 1.000 pieces. But what if one only had the pieces, without the image? What did the jig-
saw puzzler expect the 500 or 1.000 pieces to represent before he saw the image?  
 
For this research, finding out these expectations before the unexpected happened is key.  Only 
if the assumptions and premises about the future that were proven wrong later can be identified 
the reasons for the mismatch between what was expected and what eventually happened can be 
considered more systematically, and the effect of being caught unaware on the outcome be 
grasped.  
 
The question is which data and sources should be considered to find out what was expected 
before the outcome was known, that is both available to the researcher and of manageable 
proportions, and how to go about it.   
 
4.2. Which sources, which data 
 
To remain in the image of the puzzle with an unknown picture: The question of sources and 
data corresponds to the decision where to look for the pieces of the puzzle. This decision is 
guided by considering the likelihood of finding as many pieces that ultimately belong to the 
image as possible.  
 
One option would be to increase the number of primary sources consulted for the research. An 
increased number of sources could be further refined by allocation of sources to government 
agencies involved or differentiate them by the level of government they represent – diplomats, 
intelligence officers, policy-officials, and decision-makers, for example. While this is likely to 
provide an even more refined picture of the developments prior to the annexation of Crimea, 
and the identification of potentially competing assumptions that were guiding different 
segments of the German government at the time, it would be provide yet another “hindsight” 
perspective. 
 
Another option would be to seek access to governmental archives, with the aim to obtain as 
many minutes and protocols of government meetings and interactions among leading political 
decision makers in Germany as possible, hoping to get the most complete picture of which 




assumptions were guiding the German government at the time, when they are unexpectedly 
proven false, and whether there are some indications as to why these miscalculations occurred. 
Such data would have the additional advantage of being an unbiased representation of the 
thinking at the time, as written documents will have remained unchanged since they have been 
produced. Unfortunately, access to such data is not granted. It can be expected that even if 
access to some documentation is granted, or made available for the researcher, it is likely to be 
scattered, still leaving gaps. Lastly, even if one would have access to such archives, the amount 
of data to collect, systematize and analyse would overwhelm the individual researcher.  
 
The difficulties related to availability of government documentation explains why works 
considering the annexation of Crimea regularly resort to media reports as their secondary 
sources when tracing the events and developments before Crimea was annexed by Russia on 
the 18th of April 2014. While the media is a secondary source only, it offers certain advantages:  
 
- Availability: unlike governmental documentation, media reporting is open access, and 
thus available for the researcher.  
- Continuity: media reports 24/7, allowing for a continuous observation over a period.  
- Media and politics: although it cannot be expected that decision-makers disclose 
themselves fully, they will give statements and interviews outlining their views and 
intended policy responses. This is especially true in democracies observing the freedom 
of the press. In addition, media often offers several perspectives on political 
developments.  
- Structural similarity: there is a structural similarity between the media and policy, as 
both work against the inherent uncertainty of the future but are required to extrapolate 
assumptions about future developments from the incoming information; like analysts, 
journalists need to confirm the validity of their information, and consider the 
implications of validated information in their context.  
 
These advantages notwithstanding, it is important to be aware that there are also key differences 
between journalists and government analysts and decision-makers in policy: 
 
- The principal role of media and journalism is to provide the public with verifiable 
information about events that lie in the past – known events. The job of media is not to 




consider possible future adverse developments, and devise ends, ways and devise means 
to this prevent this eventuality. This is the task of government. 
- Neither the governmental analyst nor the journalists must take a decision on how to act 
upon incoming information against the inherent uncertainty of the future, similar to 
subject-matter experts engaged in policy-advocacy offering ‘policy recommendations’, 
or activists. This means that they also do not share the decision-makers immediate 
burden: that she or he will be held directly accountable for decisions taken despite an 
uncertain future at a moment when the uncertainty has been replaced by certainty – and 
wrong decisions may come at great cost.  
- Unlike governmental analysts, who work in a rigid and strictly hierarchical bureaucracy, 
and which are required to develop an organisational position, journalists enjoy much 
more liberty to develop and present their individual interpretation of the event if it is 
based on verifiable facts, and clearly earmarked as opinion or comment. In practical 
terms this means that the government analyst is required to take on his organisation’s 
position even if her or his reading deviates, thus offering a unified position, journalists 
are not – leaving a cacophony of opinions and interpretations of an event for the 
consumer to consider.  
 
The most important difference, however, is that the media is not the government. For this 
research, which is interested in the German government’s assumptions that were proven wrong 
by unexpected events, this is not trivial. There are three aspects to this difference.  
 
The first concerns the role of media to inform the public – in this regard, media also will contain 
statements from government representatives, be it in the form of interviews or by reporting 
statements made by members of the government. However, these elements are only a fraction 
of reporting, albeit an important one. While these interviews and statements are the data-gems 
for this research, it cannot be expected that they represent the view of the entire government, or 
even the individual asked. This may be because the individual has no interest or desire to 
disclose the full reading or intentions, or it may be because elements that were key to the 
interviewee were considered less relevant to the interviewer and journalist and vice-versa.  
 
The second aspect is more of practical nature for the researcher analysing media data for 
government positions: the chief task is to distinguish between the opinions and analyses that is 
offered by reporters and journalist, and information that provides insights into how the 




government viewed the situation, and which steps it intends to take. In the cacophony of 
opinions available, it is easy to confuse them.  
 
The third aspect is related to this: while media is not the government, it also is one source of 
information for the government – in fact, most governments are very media sensitive. 
Therefore, although the opinions and interpretations of events offered by media ARE NOT the 
governments views, it is safe to assume that they are at least considered by government analysts, 
in addition to sources of information privy to the government, like intelligence reports or 
diplomatic cables. However, for this research this means that it can be assumed that if 
something is reported in media, it is also known to the government. Adding to this that for its 
reporting, journalists tap into government sources, while maybe not being able to account for 
all factors that lead to the governments decision-making during a crisis, the readings offered in 
the reporting will roughly represent the most dominant notions held within the government and 
policy-circles.  
 
In sum, despite the limitations, using media sources offers the researcher interested in trying to 
find out what was expected before the unexpected occurred a good place to look for the pieces 
that make up the image that resembles the expectations before the unexpected happened.  
 
4.3.  How much information is enough? 
 
A key challenge when trying to piece together a puzzle with an unknown image is to decide on 
the number of pieces the image has. Thus, after having decided where to look for the pieces of 
the puzzle, it first needs to be considered how many pieces there are overall – and how many 
of them are needed to identify the unknown image.   
 
Was it the scarcity of data to be expected from primary sources, when considering media as a 
source, the opposite is the case – the researcher is confronted with an overwhelming amount of 
sources to consider and data they produce to consider. In its entirety, the amount of data media 
sources and data they produce overwhelms the individual researcher.  
 
However, the previously discussed efforts have implicitly or explicitly indicated ways to reduce 
the number of sources by establishing criteria for their selection and thereby to the reduction of 
sources and data to consider.  





The first concerns the timeframe to be analysed. The previous discussion has identified four 
different views on the the question of which timeframe to consider for analysing the annexation 
of Crimea:  
 
- An extended historical view putting the annexation of Crimea into the context of Russia 
since the end of the Cold War in 1989158. 
- From late summer 2013 until the official integration of Crimea into the Russian 
Federation on the 18th of April 2014.  
- The period between the disappearance of Victor Yanukovych during the night of the 
21st of February 2014 and the official integration of Crimea into the Russian Federation 
on the 18th of April. 
- One week after the official integration of Crimea into the Russian Federation on the 18th 
of April.  
 
The issue which timeframe to consider is a key criterion when trying to identify what was 
expected before the unexpected occurred. To remain in the image of the jig-saw puzzle, it 
strongly impacts on the amount of pieces to look at.  
 
For example, the timeframe after the unexpected occurred that was considered in ‘Fog of 
Falsehood’ is unlikely to provide valid insights beyond the observation that what had happened 
had been unexpected. It is simply the wrong scope for this undertaking interested in before the 
surprise expectations. Equally taking the extended historical view and considering the period 
since 1989 would beyond the scope of this undertaking, blurring the clarity of the findings. 
However, a merging of the medium- and short-term views seems feasible.  
 
The second criterion for the selection of sources and data that could be observed in the 
previously discussed works concerns the type of media consulted – this question is especially 
pertinent for those that considered the information operation element of the annexation. Media 
types considered were traditional media, like newspapers, television or radio, as well as digital 
media outlets, with a particular emphasis on social media.  
 
 
158 For example, Mearsheimer takes such an extended historical view, see: Mearsheimer John J.: 
Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West's Fault, 2014.  




The third criterion used for source selection in the previously considered works was media 
origin. Especially the efforts that considered the role of Russian information operations took 
into account Russian state TV, both domestic stations as well as Russia Today, Russia’s 
international propaganda outlet. Although the role of social-media, and especially the Russian 
facebook equivalent vkontakte was argued to have been a considerable element of Russian 
information operations, on closer inspection it becomes apparent that none of the discussed 
works undertakes a thorough social-media analysis, as it is argued that a systematic content 
analysis would overwhelm the individual research159.  
 
An exception to the focus on the Russian state-media is the comprehensive study ‘Fog of 
Falsehood’ into Russian deception160. To conclude on the impact of Russian deception in the 
EU – member states, each case considers a selection of the media published in the country in 
question. For example, the media selected by Nicole Ahler, who considers how Russian 
deception affected German media, has been chosen on the grounds to cover the normative 
spectrum of German media outlets, ranging from liberal-progressive to national-
conservative161. Hence, a fourth criterion that can be identified for source selection in the 
literature on the annexation of Crimea is to consider the normative-ideological underpinning of 
a media outlet.  
 
Lastly, the editors of ‘Fog of Falsehood’, introduces a fifth selection criterion that could serve 
to limit the number of sources to consult and overcome biased selection of media sources and 
data they produce: media quality. None of the case studies scrutinizes what is commonly 
referred to as yellow press – media, which is considered to uphold lower standards of 
professional standards.  
 
Taken together, these criteria are helpful to limit universe of media- sources and the data they 
produce to consider for the individual researcher. However, they do not suffice to answer the 
question how much information is required and where to look for it to identify the image – this 
requires also to consider how the data produced by the sources is analysed.  
 
159 For example: NATO StratCom Centre of Excellence Riga (ed).: Analysis of Russia’s information campaign 
against Ukraine, 2015 
160 Pynnömiemi, K; Racz, Andras (eds): Fog of Falsehood, 2016. 
161 Ahler, Nicole: ‘Russian Strategic Communication reflected in the German media’, in: Pynnömiemi, K; Racz, 
Andras (eds): Fog of Falsehood: Russian Strategy of Deception and the Conflict in Ukraine, Finnish Institute for 
International Affairs, Helsinki, 2016, pp. 131 – 146. 
 





4.4. Conclusion: A continuous assessment of a single media source between October 
2013 and the annexation of Crimea in March 2014 
 
Two approaches can be identified in the previously discussed works. The first is a continuous 
assessment of a pre-defined data set over a pre-defined timeframe, like in the case studies 
provided in ‘Fog of Falsehood’. The second is to consider only data that is known to be a piece 
of the final image and take it from where it can be found.  
 
Arguably, the latter is the less complex challenge, and carries much lower risk to get lost in the 
thick of information. However, to trace what was expected before the unexpected occurred, a 
continuous assessment prior to the event that marks the outcome is required.   
 
In sum, although previous research offers expedients to overcome the challenges in relation to 
the selection of sources, quality and volume of data, the amount of possible sources to consult, 
and the volume of data requiring analysis they produce still overwhelms the individual 
researcher interested in tracing what was expected before the unexpected occurred. This makes 
further containment necessary.  
 
Rather than throwing the towel on this research in the face of the large amount of data and the 
associated difficulties, this effort will proceed by drastically reducing the number of sources 
considered, while simultaneously increasing the depth of analysis by both extending the 
timeframe for analysis and by a continuous assessment of an unbiased selection of data. 
Concretely put, rather than considering a selection of sources, where the selection criteria are 
unclear, as seen in previous attempts, this research will limit itself on a single media source for 
data, and provide an in-depth analysis of its day-to-day reporting: The German public 
broadcasting network ARD.  
 
Building on the criteria identified in previous works, the following aspects were considered to 
identify ARD to be a suitable source for making surprise tractable by finding out what was 
expected before the unexpected happened162: 
 
162 An additional point about the selection of ARD as the sole source for data in an attempt to identify what was 
expected before the unexpected occurred is the fact that there are two public broadcasting stations in 
Germany, that both offer the same merits: day to day coverage and full, free of charge archival access. It could 
be argued that this research should consider the reporting of both ARD and ZDF. However, the intent here is 





1. Origin and Originality: This research is interested in both the role of surprise to the 
annexation of Crimea, as well as the role of surprise to Germany in the context of the 
annexation of Crimea. As this researcher does not speak Russian, and Russian media 
has been subject to extensive scrutiny already, considering German media as a source 
addresses a source and data gap, especially against the backdrop of Germany’s leading 
role in the context of the annexation.  
2. Media Type: Unlike an individual newspaper, homepage, or Facebook-profile, ARD is 
a media-network that combines all types of media except hard-copy print: television, 
radio, and online. In addition, there is a variety of news formats. 
3. Continuity: ARD provides daily news coverage in a variety of news formats in their 
program.  
4. Quality: As a public broadcasting station, financed by taxpayers, ARD is committed to 
uphold high-levels journalistic professionalism and accountability for its work.  
5. Availability: As a public broadcaster, the ARD news archive makes available the entire 
reporting within the ARD-network free of charge. The archive allows to search news 
items by keyword or date of publication, and thereby allows for a systematic, day-to-
day analysis.   
6. Reach: Although the media landscape has undergone tremendous changes in the age of 
digitalisation, the ARD tagesschau news is by far the most widely viewed news in 
Germany, being viewed by around 10% of the German population every evening.  
 
The volume of data by ARD alone is considerable: between the 29th of October and the 18th of 
March, ARD features a total of 349 news items covering the developments in Ukraine and on 
Crimea163. The search criterium to identify the 349 items was the date. This ensured that no 
 
not to scrutinize to what extent a selection of media outlets has correctly and timely reported everything that 
with the knowledge of hindsight is known to be relevant, but to get the best possible idea of the expectations 
about future developments in and around Ukraine held by the German government that were proven wrong by 
something that happened unexpectedly. The objective of this chapter is not to provide a media comparison.  
163 Not all 349 news items that were identified in the archive were shown in the ARD ‘evening news’ called ARD 
tagesschau. The 349 items identified cover the entire spectrum of ARD news reporting: the reporting aired 
during ARD’s late news called tagesthemen, the news produced for the ARD radio broadcasting network, 
contributions that were made available online on tageschau.de only, special news formats like ARD Brennpunkt 
providing immediate in-depth background information on breaking developments, or regular in-depth formats 
like Bericht aus Berlin, a weekly in-depth TV show covering German politics. At times, there were redundancies 
in reporting – for example a repetition of an evening news item during the late news show. This can be 
observed more when the situation in Ukraine was not in the centre of media attention. However, the more 
dynamic and fluid the situation in Ukraine and Crimea became, the less repetitive reporting became, and the 
more important it appeared during the analysis of the reporting for this research to consider each element of 




news item escapes the researcher, as well as unbiased selection of the data available. Rather 
than repeating the reporting chronologically, the following chapter will discuss the key findings 
of the analysis of ARD news as it pertains to this research’s interest and the assumptions on the 
role of surprise in the annexation of Crimea identified in the literature discussed in the previous 
section. The full data set used for the remainder of this chapter can be found in Annex 1.  
 
As many of the items are moving images with oral information, an in-depth analysis requires 
their transcription, and as the language of this research is English, translation by the researcher. 
While this activity greatly adds to a better understanding of what had been expected before the 
unexpected occurred, the preparation of the data for analysis is labour intensive, and cannot be 
eased by the application of artificial intelligence – it requires the full mind of the researcher.  
 
This research is guided by two research interests related to the annexation of Crimea. The first 
interest is to assess is the role of surprise for Germany in the context of the Russian annexation 
of Crimea; the role surprise played for the overall outcome, the annexation of Crimea, the 
 
reporting.  A second observation that can be made is the varying the frequency of reporting on Ukraine by ARD 
news over the period of observation. At the beginning of the observation period, the reporting is 
discontinuous, and increases before and after key political events, like EU Council or EU foreign minister 
summits. It is followed by a period by hardly any reporting on Ukraine 17th of December, the day Angela 
Merkel’s second grand coalition cabinet was sworn in and Russia and Ukraine announced their bilateral credit 
agreement, and the end of January, there is little to no reporting.  A short spike can be observed again around 
the EU-Russia summit at the end of January 2013 and the annual Munich Security conference immediately 
after the summit, an event bringing together global leaders in foreign and security Germany. In 2014, the 
conference celebrated its 50th edition, and the domestic German dynamics as well as Ukraine played a mutually 
supporting role keeping the media’s attention. Following the conference, another fortnight passes with Ukraine 
playing only a minor role in reporting. However, starting with the escalation of violence in Kyiv mid-February, 
Ukraine, and shortly thereafter the developments on Crimea a thoroughly covered; in accordance with the 
speed of developments following the escalation of violence in Kyiv, the number reporting increases, peaking 
with the EU Council on the 6th of March, when the news about the Crimean regional government and 
parliament’s decision to join the Russian Federation and hold a referendum on this decision spoiled the EU 
summit.  While Crimea, Ukraine and Russia are still featured prominently in reporting until the referendum on 
the 16th, little is added to the findings for this research. As Andreas Rinke observed, while the German 
government remained highly active, from then on it was facing the inevitable, Russia’s illegal annexation of 
Crimea. Possibly the best measure for the relevance ARD allocates to breaking news or developments, is the 
special news format Brennpunkt, as it is a format that interrupts and delays the normal ARD evening program 
for 15minutes, to provide additional information to the audience. A typical Brennpunkt issue would be for 
example natural catastrophes, like the floods of the Elbe river in the Czech Republic and Germany in 2002. In 
recent years, the number of Brennpunkt shows has increased somewhat, but the costs incurred for interrupting 
and delaying a program, risking losing viewers is a step that continues to be considered carefully. As an 
indication for the relevance ARD reporting gave the developments in Ukraine over time, the following table 
shows the number of news item corresponding with the phases identified. It also shows the number of 
Brennpunkt formats that were aired in each phase considered in the following analysis. The varying frequency 
of reporting can also be expressed in numbers: While in the fourteen days between the 22nd of February and 
the 06th of March 158 news items are reported and four Brennpunkt editions shown, in the two months 
between November 2013 and the end of 2013, only 58 news items can be counted.  




second.  Mindful of the findings of earlier works, and how they reached their conclusions, the 
core objective of the analyses of ARD’s reporting is to identify what had been expected before 
surprise occurred, and draw conclusions from it as to the role of surprise (and deception) in the 
context of the annexation of Crimea.  
 
To this end, the following questions guided the analysis of the ARD reporting:  
 
1. The role of surprise in the annexation of Crimea:  
- Which events are reported as surprising or unexpected?  
- What had been expected to happen before the surprise occurred? 
- Which effect did the unexpected event have for the overall outcome?  
 
 
2. The role of surprise for Germany in the context of the annexation of Crimea 
- Which events came as a surprise to the German government?  
- What did the German government expect to happen before the unexpected 
occurred?  
- Why did they come as a surprise to the German government? 
- Did Putin and/or the Russian government play a role in raising false 
expectations, and if so, how? 
- Which effect did Germany’s surprise have on the overall outcome? 
 
Mindful of the limitations involved when relying on a single source, but also aware of the 
obstacles for the researcher, the following section will discuss the core findings in relation to 
surprise, Germany and the annexation of Crimea of a chronological analysis of the 349 news 
items that were available at the ARD news homepage tagesschau.de archive164 with a view to 
consider these findings in relation to the conclusions on the role of surprise in the annexation 






164 For the entire data set used for the following section, see Annex 1.   




III. Tracing Expectations before the Unexpected: A day to day 
analysis of ARD reporting on Ukraine and Crimea from 
29.10.2013 to 18.04.2014.  
 
1. Key Findings: A competing hypothesis on the role of surprise  
Overall, the analysis of ARD-reporting on the crisis of Ukraine and Crimea between the 29th of 
October 2013 and the 18th of March 2014 suggest an additional hypothesis of how the Crimean 
Peninsula was annexed, and the role surprise and deception played in it:  
 
This analysis finds that:  
 
- Surprise played a decisive role in the annexation of Crimea. A surprise events marks the 
beginning and defines the outcome.   
- Russian deception directly contributed to creating the conditions for the surprise event 
that defined the outcome.  
- The German political leadership, especially German chancellor Angela Merkel was the 
target of President Putin’s deceptive efforts, as it had assumed the lead role of ‘Western 
efforts’ and was considered the strategic antagonist to Russian interest in Ukraine and 
on Crimea165.  
- The conditions for surprise were created not by increasing ambiguity, with the aim to 
keep the adversary guessing, but to make the adversary certain about the wrong 
intention. To achieve this, the military was Putin’s stratagem.  
 
In entire period of observation multiple unexpected events can be observed; however, only two 
of these events can be causally linked to the annexation of Crimea. The analysis of ARD’s 
reporting suggests that they had a decisive effect on the outcome.   
 
a. The disappearance of the Ukrainian president Yanukovych during the night of 
the 21st of February, after he had signed an agreement with the opposition after 
 
165 This also means that the annexation of Crimea cannot be fully explained without considering the role of 
Germany. While Ukraine was the locus of Russian aggression, the target was ‘the West’, led by Germany and its 
role in Ukraine – helping a pro-Western government come to power in Kyiv after months of protests.   




months of protests and increasing violence. It was causal for the developments 
that led to the annexation of Crimea.  
b. The announcement of the Crimean regional government that the regional 
parliament had voted to join the Russian Federation, and that there will be a 
referendum to confirm this vote during the EU-Council Summit on the 6th of 
March. It defined the outcome.  
 
However, the two decisive surprise events are quite different in nature. The analysis of ARD 
data suggests that the disappearance of Yanukovych came as a bolt from the blue for both 
Germany and Russia It was not the consequence of Russian deceptive efforts, and no direct 
Russian interference can be observed. To the contrary, data suggests that the Ukrainian 
president fled his country without prior consultation with the Russian president, and thereby 
caught the Russian president off-guard166. It was a decisive surprise nonetheless in the sense 
that it marks the beginning of the developments which ultimately led to the annexation of 
Crimea – as for example Pearl Harbor drew the United States into the Second World War.  
 
It was furthermore decisive because the disappearance of the Ukrainian president provided 
Russia and President Putin with the ingredients to exploit for deception and thus ultimately 
surprise the adversaries: the assumptions or expectations that guided his adversaries’ thinking 
about the relationship between Victor Yanukovych and the Russian President, the patterns of 
behaviour of Vladimir Putin, as well as Putin’s interest in Ukraine, which became apparent in 
the crisis-ridden preceding months, during a tug-of-war between the EU and Russia about 
Ukraine167 that became apparent when Victor Yanukovych walked away from signing an 
agreement with the European Union that would have associated his country closer with the EU. 
 
166 ARD reporting does not explicitly state that the disappearance was surprising to Putin or Russia. However, 
that there had been no contact about Yanukovych’s disappearance becomes evident in reporting, as the 
Ukrainian president confirms that he had no heard from the Russian president for a period of time – suggesting 
that he acted on his own judgment, which ARD correspondents comment as “interesting”, see: Lilischkies, Udo: 
‘Zuspitzung der Lage auf der Krim’, in: ARD (eds): tagesthemen, 28.02.2014, Hamburg, 2014. It is also indicated 
by the German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier during an interview on the 2nd of March, almost a 
week after the disappearance of Yanukovych, where he argued that his disappearance “could not have been 
foreseen by anybody”, see: Deppendorf, Ulrich: ‘Interview with Frank-Walter Steinmeier on the situation on 
Crimea’, in: ARD (eds): Bericht aus Berlin, 02.03.2014, Berlin, 2014. 
167 Grytsenko, Oksana; Taylor, Ian: ‘Ukraine U-turn on European pact was agreed with Vladimir Putin’, in: The 
Guardian, 26.11.2013, London, 2013.  




Just a few days later, together with the Russian President, a bilateral credit agreement intended 
to prevent Ukraine’ – and his domestically contested president’s – bankruptcy, is signed168.  
 
These premises were:  
 
- Putin requires Ukraine for his own geopolitical vision, the Eurasian Customs Union169. 
- Putin has no moral hesitation to use pressure and deceive and lie to achieve his 
objectives170. 
- Putin will not escalate the situation before the end of the Winter Olympics in Sochi 
2014171. 
- Yanukovych is fully controlled by Putin, as his corrupt system of cronies relies on 
Russia. He undertakes no step without prior consultation of Vladimir Putin172. 
 
Putin greatly contributed to them by his stick and carrot policy vis-à-vis the Ukrainian 
government, his secret diplomacy that undermined efforts to associate Ukraine closer with the 
European Union through the Eastern Partnership Initiative173.  
 
 
168 Bock, Olaf: ‚Ukraine: Präsident Janukowitsch unterzeichnet Vertrag mit Russland‘, in: ARD (eds): tagesschau, 
17.12.2013, Hamburg, 2013.   
169 Küstner, Kai: ‘”Die Zeit läuft davon“‘,  ARD Hörfunkstudio-Brüssel, 18.11.2013, Brüssel, 2013.  
170 See: Lilischkies, Udo: ‘Putin doesn’t take the EU serious’, in: ARD (eds): tagesthemen, Der Kommentar, 
28.01.2014, Hamburg, 2014, or: Stöber, Sylvia:  ‘Tsar attitude and KGB methods’, in: ARD(eds): tageschau.de, 
28.01.2014, online-publication available at: https://www.tagesschau.de/ausland/russlandpolitik100.html , last 
accessed 29.03.2021.  
171 This premise becomes apparent in ARD’s reporting about the 50th Munich Security Conference, where the 
situation in Ukraine and Russia’s role in it played an important role, see: Rau, Sabine: ‘Live from the Munich 
Security Conference’, in: ARD (eds.): tagesthemen, 31.01.2014, Hamburg, 2014. Less important, however, than 
the signalling of the new German government that it is willing to take more responsibility. The discrepancy 
between what reporting on the conference suggests being a fundamental disagreement on what this new 
German responsibility looks like, and what is in hindsight referred to as the ‘Munich Consensus’ merits further 
exploration, as it would seem the disagreement still awaits resolution. That the disagreement prevailed of 
consensus becomes especially apparent in an interview with the German Foreign Minister, Frank-Walter 
Steinmeier, in the aftermath of the conference, see: Roth, Thomas: ‘Live-Interview mit Frank-Walter 
Steinmeier’, in: ARD (eds.): tagesthemen, 03.02.2014, Hamburg, 2014.   
172 Stöber, Sylvia:  ‘Tsar attitude and KGB methods’, 2014. 
173 The wrath this invoked with the German government becomes apparent during the swearing in ceremony of 
the German government on the 17th of December 2013, the same day Yanukoych and Putin announce the 
bilateral credit agreement. Frank-Walter Steinmeier, newly sworn in Foreign Minister, who during his 
campaigning lobbied for closer relationship with Russia, used the opportunity to call recent Russian behaviour 
“outrageous”, see: Rinke, A: Wie Moskau Berlin verlor, 2014, p. 35. ARD reporting only mention that Putin 
acted clandestinely to undermine the EU’s efforts to associate Ukraine closer, but fails to provide specificities. 
These are provided in a background piece published by Reuter News Agency, see: Piper, Elizabeth: ‘Special 
Report: Why Ukraine spurned the EU and embraced Russia’, in: Reuters (eds): Emerging Markets, 19.12.2013, 
London, 2013. Also: Spiegel-Staff: ‘How the EU Lost Ukraine’, in: Spiegel International, 19.12.2013, Hamburg, 
2013.  




While none of these premises that the analysis of ARD’s reporting up until the unforeseeable 
disappearance of Victor Yanukovych can be translated into concrete expectations, ARD 
reporting after the disappearance suggests that they nonetheless were instrumental in shaping 
the expectations considering the developments that followed174. 
 
 To use the example of the jigsaw-puzzle again, and the quest of this research to trace what had 
been expected before the image to piece together became known, this means that although it is 
not possible to conclude from data what exactly was expected, it is possible to discern the 
corner-pieces that make up the images that those involved in the crisis might have had when 
trying to guess the final image.  
 
This becomes evident when considering the premises and the range of expectations against the 
nature the surprise event that shaped the outcome: the referendum about the Crimean regional 
parliament’s decision to join the Russian Federation on the 16th of March. Data suggests that 
Putin and Russia used these premises to weave a web of deception intended to make his 
adversaries certain about the wrong option, and thereby create the conditions for the surprise 
event that was decisive for the outcome: the announcement of the Crimean regional government 
during the EU Council summit on the 6th of March. For it to be effective as surprise, Putin 
needed to make sure that his adversaries thought that he would adopt patterns of behaviour 
known in the past, in which hard power and the military played a key role. Concretely, Putin’s 
deception was to make his adversaries certain that they are facing a repeat of the Georgia-
scenario. To achieve this, the military and ambiguity-increasing acts were his chief stratagem, 
covering his real intention: to deal ‘the West’ a political surprise. 
 
Without having considered ARD reporting from late October 2013 to the disappearance of 
Victor Yanukovych neither the premises that informed the expectations about Russian 
behaviour in the German government, nor the central role Germany had assumed would have 
become apparent. However, the key findings for the role of surprise and deception in the 
annexation of Crimea are found in the reporting between the disappearance of Victor 
Yanukovych and the announcement of the Crimean regional government during the EU Council 
summit on the 6th of March 2013. Therefore, the following discussion will be limited to these 
 
174 One expectation that does become apparent in reporting but cannot be confirmed from data directly to 
have been shared by the German government is that it was expected that Russia would attempt to re-install 
Yanukovych as Ukrainian president.  




two surprise events, their interrelationship and how this pertains to Germany in more detail, as 
it is in this period the role of surprise and deception in the annexation of Crimea becomes most 
strongly evident175.  Following the 6th of March, the outcome is clear: Crimea will become part 
of the Russian Federation.  
 
A key challenge for this research that is particularly interested in the expectations and premises 
held by the German government, and seeks to uncover them by an in-depth analysis of the 
reporting on Ukraine and Crimea by ARD, one of the two German public broadcasting 
networks, is the observation that between the signing of the Maidan Agreement on the 20th of 
February and the 1st of March 2014, the two decision-makers of the German government 
directly involved in the crisis-management, Chancellor Angela Merkel and Federal Foreign 
Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier,  are most noted by their silence. It changes with effect of the 
2nd of March 2014, when Germany again assumes a leading role in the crisis management in 
and around Ukraine.  
 
The same is true for Vladimir Putin – however, unlike the German government, which had been 
very outspoken in the previous months, the Russian President’s public appearance in the entire 
period of reporting analysed is very little. In fact, he gives his only extended press statement on 
the situation in Ukraine and on Crimea on the 4th of March 2014 only.  
 
Data suggests that the two surprise events that mark the beginning and the outcome of what is 
called the annexation of Crimea are very different in nature: The first one, Victor Yanukovych’s 
disappearance, came as a surprise to both the German and the Russian government with no 
traces of direct Russian interference that led Yanukovych to run away; the second, the 
announcement of the referendum on during the 6th of March, however, was only surprising to 
Germany, and was the direct outcome of Russian deception.  
 
Nonetheless, data allows to draw some conclusions on the German government’s thinking and 
Russian deception when they were most noted by their absence. As the following chronological 
account from Yanukovych’s disappearance in the night of the 21st of February 2014 to the EU-
 
175 For example, data suggests that Russia employed deceptive practices throughout the period of observation. 
However, neither was it of the same level of sophistication as the deception employed after the disappearance 
of Victor Yanukovych, nor does data suggest it was overly successful in leading to surprise. The three types 
identified were (1) secrecy and cover, (2) ambiguity increasing, (3) certainty about wrong alternative, see also 
Part IV in this research.  




Council summit on the 6th of March will show, considering the interrelationship between these 
two events makes apparent what Germany was falsely expecting, and how Russia contributed 
to it with deception. Russia’s deceptive pattern built on the same premises that barred the 
German government from reading the impact of Yanukovych’s disappearance correctly 
initially.  
2. A chronological account: from Yanukovych’s disappearance on the 
21st of February to the EU-Council Summit on the 6th of March 2014 
 
2.1. A highly ambiguous situation and phoney diplomacy: from Yanukovych’s 
disappearance to the decisive call between Angela Merkel and Vladimir Putin 
on the 2nd of March 2014. 
 
2.1.1. A fugitive president, the end of the Winter Olympics, and noise from Crimea 
ARD reporting suggests that instead of considering the likelihood of the mysterious 
disappearance of the Ukrainian president being just as surprising to Russia as it was to the 
German government176, it was assumed that the Russian government is the master of puppets 
behind the disappearance – and that what Russia has in mind will become clearer when the 
fugitive ex-president re-appears.177  
 
This notwithstanding, with the closing ceremony for the Winter Olympics on the 23rd of 
February, and a perception that Putin had experienced defeat in Ukraine all eyes were on 
Russia178. There was much uncertainty after Yanukovych’s disappearance, especially since 
“whether Russia continues to support the Ukrainian government is an open question.”179  
 
 
176 It may well be the mirror-image that prevented President Putin from not considering the likelihood that 
there could have been NO direct ‘Western’ involvement in the mass-protests following Ukraine’s withdrawal 
from the EaP Association Agreement, but the sudden mass-display of EU flags on the 29th of November 2013 
just as surprising to ‘Western’ governments. 
177 Lilischkies, Udo: ‚Zuspitzung der Lage auf der Krim‘, in: ARD (eds.): tagesschau, 28.02.2014, Hamburg, 2014. 
178 The notion that „Russia had lost” and the EU achieved a diplomatic success was especially strongly put 
forward in a commentary during the tagesthemen late news by Jörg Schönenborn, see: Schönenborn Jörg: ‘Eine 
kluge Strategie der Außenminister’, in: ARD (eds.): tagesthemen, Der Kommentar, 21.02.2014, Hamburg, 2014.  
179 Osten, Demian von: ‘Nach dem Umsturz in der Ukraine’, in: ARD (eds.): tagesschau, 24.02.2014, Hamburg, 
2014.  




In these considerations Crimea played an important role early on. On the 22nd of February, 
immediately after the Maidan-agreement and coinciding with Yanukovych’s disappearance 
ARD’s online news portal tagesschau.de publishes a background piece arguing that Russia 
might try to repeat what it did in Georgia in 2008, when Russia after a five-day war with Georgia 
occupied the two Georgian territories Abkhazia and Southern Ossetia180. On the following day, 
after reports of pro-Russian mass-protests and violent clashes on the peninsula, and the 
announcement by the new, pro-Russian governor to stop paying taxes to the central government 
in Kyiv181. Thomas Roth, ARD late news tagesthemen anchor with extensive experience in 
Russia, observes: 
 
“One scenario that many fear is that Crimea will simply separate itself, and then regards itself 
Russian”182 
 
However, in the same show Ina Ruck, ARD Moscow correspondent covering the closing 
ceremony of the Sochi Winter Olypmics, Russia appears to be in a “state of emotional stupor” 
because “his geopolitical dreams about the Eurasian customs Union” are “worthless” without 
Ukraine183.  
 
On the 24th of February, in a background report by Golineh Atai aired during ARD tagesthemen 
late-news, the question is raised if Russia “would consider using military force to support the 
protests” to an eminent expert on Russia, Fyodor Lukyanow. The expert does not consider it 
likely, unless an extreme situation would occur184.  
 
All the mentioning and worries about Crimea and their later materialisation notwithstanding in 
ARD’s reporting following the Maidan agreement and the disappearance of the Ukrainian 
president notwithstanding – they played second fiddle. Reporting was more strongly focussed 
 
180 Stöhr, Sylvia: ‘Gefährliche Geopolitische Spiele‘, in: ARD (eds.): tagesschau.de, published online 22.02.2014, 
available at:  http://www.tagesschau.de/ausland/ukraine-analyse100.html , last accessed 29.03.2021. 
181 Lilischkies, Udo: ‘Ukraine – der Tag danach‘, in: ARD (eds.): tagesthemen, 23.02.2014, Hamburg, 2014.  
182 Roth, Thomas: ‘Anmoderation’ in: ARD (eds.): tagesthemen, 23.02.2014, Hamburg, 2014.  
183 Ruck, Ina: ‘Russian reactions to the developments in Ukraine’, in: ARD (eds.): tagesthemen, 23.02.2014, 
Hamburg, 2014. She also reports that Angela Merkel had spoken with Vladimir Putin and Yuliya Timoshenko on 
the phone, however without providing details about the call.  
184 Atai, Golineh: ‘Interessenslage der Ukraine an Russland’, in: ARD (eds.): tagesthemen, 24.02.2014, Hamburg, 
2014. 




on the economic and political situation in Kyiv. Economic, because the country remained on 
the brink of bankcruptcy; political, because the country now faced a threefold crisis185:  
 
- the Maidan-Agreement was highly contested among the Maidan-opposition, with one 
side threatening violence with the risk of escalating into civil war. 
- the rejection of the agreement by the population in Eastern Ukraine, which could lead 
to a split of the country;  
- a fugitive president and no government in place to negotiate with. 
 
Thus reporting shows that while Crimea was already identified as a place to watch after the 
Maidan agreement was reached, and the risk that Russia might consider a military response 
considered, the domestic issues of Ukraine, especially its dire economic situation are the central 
focus of reporting until the 25th of February. This day marks the day with least reporting on 
Ukraine, and it is merely reported that Catherine Ashton had visited the Ukrainian capital186.  
2.1.2.  Let the games begin: The snap exercise on the 26th of February 2014 
On the 26th, the domestic situation remains the key focus on the 26th of February. On this day, 
the transitional government in Kyiv is announced. It is reported that among the first acts of the 
government is the dissolution of the Berkut-police forces, who had supported the government 
against the protesters in the streets in Kyiv. Furthermore, reports mention that there have been 
clashes between pro-Russian and protesters and those supporting the new government in the 
Crimean capital Simferopol.  
 
That Putin had ordered a massive snap-exercise on the Ukrainian borders on the 26th of February 
“to test the readiness of the troops” was worth the introductory phrase, but received no further 
consideration in the reporting of the day.187 As previous works on the annexation of Crimea 
have argued, this research finds that the ordering of the snap-exercise on the 26th of February 
was the first Russian step in a series of escalations that would end in the integration of the 
Crimean peninsula by a flawed referendum, backed up by military power.  
 
 
185 The threefold crisis is described in the evening news in the situation report on Ukraine, see:  von Osten, 
Demian: ‘Nach dem Umsturz in der Ukraine’, in: ARD (eds.): tagesschau, 24.02.2014, Hamburg, 2014. 
 
186 Lilischkies, Udo: ‘Umbruch in der Ukraine’, in: ARD (eds): tagesschau, 25.02.2014, Hamburg, 2014.  
187 Lilischkies, Udo: ‘Umbruch in der Ukraine’, in: ARD (eds): tagesschau, 26.02.2014, Hamburg, 2014.  




The event receives astonishingly little attention in ARD reporting on the 26th of February 2014. 
however, from hindsight, and as ARD reporting in the following days makes evident, it was 
instrumental in playing to the premises about Russian patterns of political behaviour, as well as 
to the identified risk that Russia might seek to pull another Georgia on Crimea, which Putin 
would exploit to weave his web of deception until the 6th of March, when his true intentions 
were revealed.   
2.1.3. ‘Little green men’ or the return of Yanukovych?  
On the following day, the 27th of February it becomes more apparent why the snap-exercise 
ecieved little attention. The premises about Putin’s relationship with the fugitive Ukrainian ex-
president that seemingly kept the ARD journalists to pay more attention to the surprise attack 
on the Crimean regional parliament by unknown, heavily armed men in the morning of the 27th 
of February. This day marks a key date in the literature published after the annexation of Crimea 
published. It is considered as a key development in reporting, however, on the 27th, the focus is 
elsewhere: the re-appearance of Victor Yanukovych in Russia, and his announcement to hold a 
press-conference. Another premise distracting from the developments that ultimately turned out 
to be decisive becomes apparent in the reporting during the day – the notion that the snap-
exercise ordered on the previous day must be considered as typical Russian “sabre-rattling” 
after having suffered defeat in Ukraine.  





ARD reports about the storming of the parliament, as well as of the announcement by the 
Crimean regional government that it intends to hold of a referendum, in the evening news. 
However, the focus of reporting is threefold188: firstly, it continues to be on the Ukrainian 
domestic situation, as the new government is sworn in during the day. Secondly, Russia’s 
military manoeuvres on Ukraine’s south-eastern border, as well as the news that Putin also put 
the Russian Air Force on high alert are considered. For the covering ARD correspondent, Ina 
Ruck, things are clear: the exercise is “sabre-rattling, and exactly like this the manoeuvres must 
be understood” and can be explained with the hurt feelings of the Russian president after loosing 
out in Ukraine189. An additional report outlines that NATO Secretary Anders Fogh Rasmussen 
stated that “NATO has no indicators that Russia wants to interfere militarily”190, but that NATO 
is watching the situation closely. And thirdly on the day the new government was sworn in, the 
fugitive now ex-president re-appeared in Russia, and announced a press conference for the 
following day191.  
 
The third and last aspect that served to replace the ‘little green men’ that appeared so important 
in hindsight, and confirms that at least to the mind of ARD reporting, the premise about the 
relationship between Yanukovych and Putin was still guiding expectations. The interview with 
Udo Lilischkies, the ARD correspondent in Kyiv with a long track record in the post-Soviet 
world, is revealing in this sense: firstly, it exposes the premise on the relationship between Putin 
and Yanukovych, and what this means for Russia’s future course; secondly it shows that the 
focus still very strongly was on the political and economic situation in Kyiv, and the ‘little green 
men’ given a far lesser priority.  
 
Caren Miosga: “Yanukovych today announced he will give a press statement from Russia, and 
that he still regards himself as the legitimate president: What does this mean for the relationship 
between Moscow and Kyiv?” 
 
Udo Lilischkies: “Well, that it is currently not very harmonic. What I find particularly 
interesting is that apparently the Kremlin has not finally decided how far it is willing to go. 
Concerning the legitimacy of the new government in Kyiv, in the periphery of the Russian 
 
188 Ruck, Ina: ‘Lage in der Ukraine‘, in: ARD (eds.): tagesschau, 27.02.2014, Hamburg, 2014. 
189 Ruck, Ina: ‘Lage in der Ukraine’, 27.02.2014. 
190 Ruck, Ina: ‘Lage in der Ukraine’, 27.02.2014. 
191 Ruck, Ina: ‘Lage in der Ukraine’, 27.02.2014. 





government much warlike language can be overheard. For example, that the new government 
is a government of fascists and extremists that have purged themselves to power with violence, 
that they are not legitimate. However, so far, we have not heard from either Putin or Medwedew 
themselves. The same goes for the case, or mystery, of Yanukovych. Here in Kyiv, he is being 
searched for mass murder, while he asks Russia for protection - which Russia is likely to grant, 
it is being said. But so far, we haven't seen him [J in Russia], and we have only heard that 
Russia will grant his wish for protection by security circles. But it has not been confirmed by 
Putin or Medwedew. I think that only if Yanukovych would really appear tomorrow in 
Rostow/Don, then it will become clear how the Kremlin has positioned itself - and that it is 
willing to accept this dramatic new low point of relations with the West.”192 
 
Thus, although uncertainty continued to prevail about Russian intentions, the re-appearance of 
Yanukovych, and his announcement of a press conference for the following day, gave way to 
the expectation that the press conference – if it occurs – will indicate how far the Kremlin “is 
willing to go”.   
 
Taken together, ARD reporting of the events on the 26th and the 27th of February shows that 
the events that were described as decisive from hindsight, at the time received little attention. 
In fact, Crimea, which had featured so prominently in reporting and likely scenarios for Russian 
responses immediately after the Maidan agreement had been signed, had slipped on the 
backbench of reporting focus on the 27th.  
2.1.4. Replacing expectations: Yanukovych out, Georgia in 
The 28th of February marks the changeover of focus in the news – and the replacement of 
assumptions on Russian courses of action. The dominant expectation that Russia’s next steps 
could be deducted from Yanukovych’s moves was dropped, and swiftly replaced with the 
‘Georgia-scenario’, which referred to the five-day war between Georgia and Russia in 2008193.  
 
 
192 Miosga, Caren: ‘Live-Interview mit Udo Lilischkies, Kyiv’, in: ARD (eds.): tagesthemen, 27.02.2014, Hamburg, 
2014.  
193 The war ended with Russia occupying the Georgian territories of Abkhazia and South-Ossetia, hence the 
name. 





From the 28th of February onwards, the focus was firmly on the developments on Crimea, and 
Russia’s role in it. This change of focus – and expectations - occurs throughout the day, and 
again revolves around the anticipations coupled with Yanukovych’s press appearance.  
 
His press appearance, which took place in the afternoon of German time, and was thus prior to 
the evening news, and what it revealed left the journalists “with something to think about”, as 
Ina Ruck reports during an interview in the afternoon news194: Yanukovych himself – possibly 
unintentionally, giving away much of his character – casts strong doubts about the assumptions 
held about his relationship with Putin and Russia by his disclosure that he “had not spoken with 
[Putin] personally” about his plea for protection195. In other words, his re-appearance helped 
little in understanding better how far Russia was willing to go. With his statement, Yanukovych 
took himself off the chess-board – or out of the puzzle’s image.   
 
The press-conference in Rostow/Don marks the last time the fugitive ex-president plays a key 
role in reporting. What is interesting about this in the context of reporting is the fact that there 
was no reflection of the fact that Yanukovych had effectively taken himself of the chessboard, 
and what this may imply for Russian intent, even though it was acknowledged as something to 
ponder. Instead, the pondering was dropped and the focus on Yanukovych somewhat elegantly 
replaced with a focus on Crimea. This becomes evident in the interview with Udo Lilschkies, 
who on the previous day had been clear about his expectations in relation to Yanukovych and 
Putin’s next steps. Even though noting that “Yanukovych said something very interesting” 
Lilschkies observed “In Rostow/ Don we saw what appears to be the confirmation that the 
Kremlin has opted for open confrontation.”196 
 
However, the news of the day locates this conclusion not in Rostow/Don, where the ex-
president held his press-conference, but on the Crimean Peninsula.  There was no connection 
provided between Yanukovych’s press-conference, and the news of the day from Crimea that 
indicated that Russia was opting for open confrontation. However, in the context of the 
 
194 Ruck, Ina: ‘Yanukovych’s Press Conference in Russia’, in: ARD (eds.): tagesschau, 28.02.2014, 15:00, 
Hamburg, 2014.  
195 Ruck, Ina: ‘Yanukovych’s Press Conference in Russia’, in: ARD (eds.): tagesschau, 28.02.2014, 15:00, 
Hamburg, 2014. 
196 Lilischkies, Udo: ‘Zuspitzung der Lage auf der Krim‘, in: ARD (eds.): tagesthemen, 28.02.2014, Hamburg, 
2014. 





developments on Crimea, the key question was whether Russia was unfolding a scenario like it 
had in Georgia in August 2008 – a question raised by the newly sworn in Ukrainian government. 
The tagesschau evening news, taking up on the raid on the peninsula’s regional parliament from 
the previous day, report that the Ukrainian Minister of Interior, confirms Russian troop presence 
on Crimea and calls the events from the previous day an “invasion and occupation of Crimea 
by Russia.”197  
 
In the tagesthemen late news of the 28th of February, it is reported that since the surprise attack 
on the previous day, 2.000 additional Russian soldiers have arrived on Crimea. It is furthermore 
strongly insinuated by the correspondent reporting from Simferopol, Crimea’s capital, that the 
masked men without insignia are Russian soldiers, despite not being able to confirm this198. 
The newly sworn-in Ukrainian president Alexander Turtschinow is reported to be more precise 
than his minister of interior when he tells the international press that “everything follows the 
scenario which Russia used when it occupied Abkhazia”, but that unlike Georgia in 2008, 
“Ukraine will not let itself be provoked.”199 
 
Asked whether the Abkhazia-scenario is an adequate analogy, ARD correspondent Ina Ruck 
argues that there are indeed many aspects that remind of this scenario. However, she also 
expresses doubts whether Russia is willing to risk the international isolation that would be the 
consequence of such a course200.  
2.1.5. Where is the German government?  
The 28th also marks the day when both the two political decisionmakers directly involved in the 
previous developments, Frank-Walter Steinmeier and Angela Merkel, re-appear in reporting 
for the first time since the Maidan agreement.  
 
While there are no direct statements on the unfolding situation on Crimea from either, what is 
reported allows for an insight on how the situation in Ukraine was assessed, especially from the 
 
197 In the reporting, ARD does not want to confirm the claim that the unidentifiable ‘green men’ were Russian 
troops, as the Crimean government did. However, it was strongly insinuated, especially in the live report from 
Simferopol, see: Atai, Golineh:’Live from Simferopol’, in: ARD (eds.): tagesthemen, 28.02.2014, Hamburg, 2014.  
198 Atai, Golineh: ’Live from Simferopol’, in: ARD (eds.): tagesthemen, 28.02.2014, Hamburg, 2014. 
199 Miosga, Caren: ‘Interview mit Ina Ruck, Moskau’, in: ARD (eds):. tagesthemen, 28.02.2014, Hamburg, 2014. 
200 Miosga, Caren: ‘Interview mit Ina Ruck, Moskau’, 28.02.2014. 





reporting on Frank-Walter Steinmeier’s visit to Washington – his first official trip since taking 
up office as Germany’s foreign minister for the second time on the 17th of December 2013. The 
report on the trip makes apparent, that in relation to Ukraine, the chief focus of the German 
foreign minister was the economic situation in Ukraine – prior to visiting his counterpart John 
Kerry in Washington, he meets the president of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
Christine LaGarde to consult with her on how to prevent the economic collapse of Ukraine. The 
IMF president sees “no reason to panic”201, and assures that the IMF stands ready. In the 
meeting with John Kerry, however, the situation in Ukraine was only one item on the agenda, 
as the German had a difficult bone to pick in the context of the U.S. German relations, as they 
had taken a serious blow when it was revealed that the U.S. National Security Agency (NSA) 
had been tapping into German government communications. The revelations in 2012 marked a 
low-point in the U.S.-German relations. Especially in Germany, a heated debate ensued, leading 
to the issue playing an important role in the 2013 elections. To overcome the low-point with 
Germany’s strategic ally, Frank-Walter Steinmeier and the German government had lobbied 
for a “no-spy-agreement” to be signed by the two countries. The German foreign minister had 
hoped that his visit would mark a breakthrough on this question – however, even though the 
report stresses the friendly atmosphere of the encounter, Steinmeier bites on granite with his 
intent. The U.S. has no interest in such an agreement202.  
 
The report on the visit of Frank-Walter Steinmeier in Washington suggests that on the 28th of 
February, two days after unknown men stormed the Crimean parliament and hoisted a Russian 
flag, the situation in Ukraine and on Crimea was not the only concern the German government 
had. From the reporting about the German Foreign Minister’s visit to Washington it appears to 
have been viewed as dicey, but manageable if the economic situation can be resolved, and 
priority was given to an issue that was peculiar the German-U.S. relationship, and of special 
domestic relevance in Germany in the previous federal elections203.   
 
Angela Merkel on the other hand appears in a different context on the 28th of February – it is 
reported that Russian president Putin calls the German chancellor during the day. In this call, 
 
201 Hassel, Tina: ‘Steinmeier zu Besuch in Washington‘, in: ARD (eds): tagesschau, 28.02.2014, Hamburg, 2014. 
202Hassel, Tina: ‘Steinmeier zu Besuch in Washington‘, in: ARD (eds): tagesschau, 28.02.2014, Hamburg, 2014. 
203 The issue had been one of the four most decisive topics for the outcome of the federal elections in 2013, 
see: ARD (eds): ‘Bundestagswahl 2013’, online dossier available at: https://wahl.tagesschau.de/wahlen/2013-
09-22-BT-DE/index.shtml , last accessed 29.03.2021.  





according to the report, the Russian president “urges de-escalation, and repeats that Russia fully 
accepts the sovereignty of Ukraine”204. It is the only information about the content of the call 
that is reported, as the phone call between Moscow and Berlin, provides the bridge for the 
reporting to juxtaposing it to what is happening on the ground: “we are experiencing the exact 
opposite […] many people here are reminded of the Abkhazian scenario.”205 However, there is 
no indication as to what the German chancellor said in the conversation, or whether she shared 
the ARD’s correspondent observations.  
 
This notwithstanding, the reporting of the 28th marks a key shift in the focus of reporting. With 
Yanukovych taking himself off the chess-board, a key assumption guiding the expectations 
about Russian courses of action was proven wrong. Although it was acknowledged that this 
required thinking about what Russia might have in mind instead, the developments on and 
around Crimea that had begun already two days ago led to simply replace the premise about 
Yanukovych with a new premise: That Russia will resort to patterns of behaviour in the past. 
This premise also led to the adoption of a concrete expectation, or scenario: that Russia will 
seek to repeat what it did in Georgia in 2008, when it lured the Georgian government into 
responding to Russian military pressure, thereby giving Russia grounds to claim a right of self-
defence. In the context of the reporting since Yanukovych’s disappearance, this is particularly 
interesting, as this was risk had been discussed for Crimea early on, but was side-lined by the 
domestic situation in Kyiv, and the expectations around Yanukovych.  
 
As for the German government’s leadership directly and personally involved in the 
developments, data does not allow to draw this conclusion – however, the report about Foreign 
Minister Steinmeier’s trip to Washington, as well as Angela Merkel’s silence after the phone-
call with Vladimir Putin that so starkly differed from the realities on the ground on the 
peninsula, suggest that the German government was still hesitant in its assessment: it considered 
the biggest risk for further escalation the new Ukrainian government, and the domestic 
dynamics that might lead to irrational acts. Hence, even if not explicitly, on the eve of the 28th 
of February it seems that essentially the German government shared the assessment that the 
Georgia scenario was unravelling. After all, it was the newly elected and politically 
inexperienced Georgian president Saakashvili that committed an error by betting on NATO’s 
 
204 Miosga, Caren: ‘Interview mit Ina Ruck, Moskau’, 28.02.2014. 
205 Miosga, Caren: ‘Interview mit Ina Ruck, Moskau’, 28.02.2014. 





solidarity and military backing Russia could exploit. A situation that seemed all too similar with 
that in Ukraine at the end of February 2014.  
2.1.6. “Will there be war?”  The Duma approval, 01.03.2014 
Whereas the events on the 27th of February received a lot of attention after Crimea had been 
annexed, with “little green men” becoming almost a synonym for how Russia annexed the 
peninsula but were noted more in passing in ARD-reporting, the opposite is true for the events 
on the 1st of March. On this day, news break of an approval granted by the Russian parliament, 
the Duma, to a request from President Putin that will allow him to use military force in the 
entire territory of Ukraine to protect the rights of ethnic Russians. In the previously discussed 
works that were published after the annexation of Crimea on the other hand, the event did not 
feature prominently – and if so, not as an unexpected event.   
 
However, unlike the storming of the Crimean parliament, where it is difficult to observe the 
level of surprise in data, as other developments ranked higher on the agenda, the news about 
the Duma’s authorisation of Putin’s request to deploy troop in the entire territory of Ukraine 
were clearly reported as surprising in ARD206. Furthermore, contrary to the previously 
discussed literature published after the annexation of Crimea, it was this event that changed the 
heading from ‘Domestic Crisis in Ukraine’ to “International Conflict between Russia and 
Ukraine”207, and thus the conceptualisation of the nature of the conflict.  It shows the impact 
the decision had on the expectations, at least within the group of journalists that had been 
covering the situation from Moscow, Kyiv and Simferopol in the recent days. The big question 
now was whether Russia is about to invade neighbouring Ukraine. Hence, on the 1st of March, 
the expectations about the image of the jig-saw puzzle were truly clear. Considering the recent 
news the big question now was: Will there be war?  
 
An interesting observation the analysis of the attempts to resolve this question in ARD reporting 
reveals is that while there was an acute sense of uncertainty about Russian the probability of 
 
206 Unlike the storming of the regional parliament on the 27th of February, the Duma approval on the 1st of 
March led to an ARD Brennpunkt special news interrupting and delaying the scheduled program. See: ARD 
(eds): Brennpunkt, ‘Psychokrieg um die Krim‘, 01.03.2014, Hamburg, 2014. 
207 Lilischkies, Udo: ‚Russischer Militäreinsatz auf der Krim‘, in: ARD (eds): tagesschau, 01.03.2014, Hamburg, 
2014. In the following days, the situation on Crimea was referred to as the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. 
Interestingly, this framing implies that there was no ‘Western’ role.  





war initially, this sense of uncertainty is replaced by an acute sense of certainty about how to 
read the recent developments, and what therefore to expect from Russia208. Reporting 
furthermore makes apparent how this sense of certainty is reached – by focussing on the 
incoming information that confirmed the premise, that Russia will not deviate from historically 
known patterns of behaviour.  
 
It was especially the reports that Russia was effectively in control of the peninsula that led to 
the growing sense of certainty amongst the reporting ARD-correspondents209. While the 
readings of Russia’s intentions still differ between the individual journalists covering the 
situation, the variation is only in nuances210. There is agreement that Russia will not intervene 
or actively seek a military solution. First and foremost, because there was no need to intervene 
anymore, but also because Russia would not risk international isolation. Therefore, the Duma 
decision and the threat of a Russian invasion is merely “serious sabre rattling” and to create a 
“pure pressure scenario” with the objective to make sure that Russia continues to have a say on 
the future of Ukraine – but in the end, Russia will agree to a negotiated solution211.  
 
The premises leading to this shared expectation and certainty at the end of the reporting day 
become apparent from reporting. Responding to the plea to Russia “to come to its help to re-
stablish security” by the newly elected Crimean regional government, a leading ARD-
journalist, Jörg Schönenborn, observes: “This reminds us in fatal fashion of the times when the 
 
208 This is indicated in the closing comments of the anchor for the ARD Brennpunkt special news shown on the 
1st of March, Jörg Schönenborn. It is also one of the rare moments that tickle the humour of the analyst: 
Schönenborn closes the special news feature by stating that due to the uncertainty of what will happen next, 
all journalists covering the story are on duty, and the ensuing program will be interrupted if there are any 
further developments. He then wishes the viewers great joy in watching the following show with the name 
“one side will win”., see: Schönenborn, Jörg: ‘Concluding Remarks’ in: ARD (eds.):  Brennpunkt, ‘Psychokrieg um 
die Krim‘, 01.03.2014, Hamburg, 2014. 
209 That the men without insignia are Russian troops is first confirmed by Golineh Atai during the tagesschau 
evening news, see: Atai, Golineh: ‘Live from Simferopol’, in: ARD (eds.): tagesschau, 01.03.2014, Hamburg, 
2014. During a live interview in the Brennpunkt special news immediately after the 20:00 tagesschau evening 
news, Atai states that Russia had already taken full control of the peninsula, and does not require any further 
troops, see: Atai, Golineh: ‘Live-Interview from Simferopol’, in: ARD (eds.):  Brennpunkt, ‘Psychokrieg um die 
Krim’, 01.03.2014, Hamburg, 2014. 
210 The notional differences become evident in the Brennpunkt special news. However, these differences were 
overcome in the tagesthemen late news 2 hours later, where covering journalists were unambiguous about 
their expectation that Russia will not go to invade Ukraine. Already the heading indicates this: was the 
Brennpunkt titled “Psycho War on Crimea”, the tagesthemen heading for the news about Ukraine was “strong 
sabre rattling” see: Ruck, Ina: ‘Die Ukraine-Krim-Krise spitzt sich zu’, in: ARD (eds.): tagesthemen, 01.03.2014, 
Hamburg, 2014. 
211 See especially the interviews and reports by Ina Ruck, ARD’s Moscow correspondent on the 01st of March 
2014.  





Soviet Union let itself be called for help against external aggression from its Soviet brother 
people.”212 Already during the tagesschau evening news, his colleague Udo Lilischkies reports 
that this plea “had been expected by many”213.  
 
In other words, the journalists observed parallel patterns of behaviour between Russia on 
Crimea, and that of the former Soviet Union and socialist ‘brother nations’ during the Cold 
War, an epoque sthat had ended almost 3 decades earlier. Much more dominant in reporting 
however was the tendency to compare Russian behaviour with the situation prior to the five-
day war with Georgia in 2008.  
 
This can also be seen in what both ARD journalists, as well as a Russia expert that regularly 
advises the German government interviewed for the Brennpunkt special news, consider as a 
remaining risk for the situation to escalate into a war. The risk identified by all is to be found 
in Ukraine: if Kyiv decides to respond to the provocation – like Saakashvili did in Georgia 2008 
- then Russia has put everything in place to make its ensuing military operation appear legal; 
and considering the troop movements and occupation of strategic locations of Crimea, the war 
would be a quixotic undertaking by Ukraine. Hence, data suggests that on the 1st of March, a 
repetition of the Georgia scenario was seen as the biggest risk on Crimea on the 1st of March214.  
 
While the two historical analogies about known behaviour steered from Moscow’s Kremlin that 
served as premises in shaping expectations differ in many aspects, they have one thing in 
common: they consider patterns of Russian behaviour in the past and extrapolate them with a 
sense of linearity to the situation faced on Crimea on the 1st of March.  
 
Instead of considering how the incoming information differs from known patterns of Russian 
behaviour, incoming information was used to confirm pre-existing knowledge215. Except for 
 
212 ARD (eds.):  Brennpunkt, ‘Psychokrieg um die Krim‘, 01.03.2014, Hamburg, 2014. 
213 Lilischkies, Udo: ‚Russischer Militäreinsatz auf der Krim‘, in: ARD (eds): tagesschau, 01.03.2014, Hamburg, 
2014.  
214 The views discussed are put forward during the Brennpunkt special news that were aired in response to the 
Duma approval on the 1st of March 2014. 
215 This tendency becomes apparent already in the context of the storming of Crimea’s regional parliament on 
the 27th of February. Although on that day it is mainly the distraction by the re-appearance of Yanukovych in 
Russia that prevents to consider the events in more detail, on the following day the “Georgia scenario” 
becomes the dominant theme, leading to an exclusive focus on the “military aspect” of the annexation of 
Crimea. This is best exemplified in when the military snap exercise is characterised as typical Russia sabre-
rattling. The categorization of these the snap-exercise and the storming of the parliament with men wearing no 





the call for help by the newly elected Crimean regional government to Russia, which confirms 
such known patterns of Russian behaviour, nothing related to what earlier efforts have called 
“the political aspect”216 of the annexation of Crimea was considered in any depth in ARD 
reporting, as none of them fitted into the historical patterns of Russian behaviour.  
 
The other two, however, that a new, pro-Russian government had been installed on that day217, 
and that this government announced that it would move the date of the previously announced 
referendum considerably ahead218, suffered the same fate as the initial announcement to hold a 
referendum by the Crimean regional parliament in the wake of the surprise seizure of the 
regional parliament on the 27th of February: negligence. To interfere in local politics with the 
cunning objective to hold a referendum – that is, to let the people speak, as 2 years later the UK 
did with Brexit - was not in the books about Russia or Putin. That Russia would use deceit, set 
a trap for its adversaries while trying to appear acting legitimately, or to keep the adversaries 
guessing about the true intentions, and that this inevitably involves Russia flexing its military 
muscle, however, was.  
2.1.7. Merkel’s continued hesitance 
As was the behaviour of Vladimir Putin. Since the beginning of the tug-of war about Ukraine 
with the EU in November 2013, he again and again had demonstrated that he cannot be trusted. 
And had he not called the German chancellor on the 28th of February, urged de-escalation, only 
to grant the Duma’s permission to invade anywhere in Ukraine the very next day? While there 
is no mentioning of his phone conversation with Angela Merkel on the previous day it is highly 
unlikely that the discrepancy was entirely lost on the ARD correspondents that had been 
covering the events in the previous days and weeks from Moscow, Kyiv and Simferopol, all 
with experienced and recognised Russia expertise. 
However, this research’s interest is not to better understand how media interpreted the events 
at the time, but the German government.  
 
insignia as ‘Russian-style’ surprise events known from previous Russian patterns of behaviour also explains why 
in reporting, neither event is characterised as overly surprising.  
216 For example Treisman, Daniel: ‘Why Putin took Crimea: The Gambler in the Kremlin’, 2016. 
217 The new government had already been elected on the previous day. With the luxury of hindsight, it appears 
as if this is the only key event that was reported not reported on the day of its occurrence, which emphasises 
the high-quality of ARD’s overall coverage of the developments in and around Ukraine.  
218 From the 25th of May to the 30th of March 2014.  






On the 1st of March, the German political top-leadership breaks its silence on the developments 
in and around Ukraine. Already before learning about the Duma’s authorisation for Putin to 
deploy the Russian military, Angela Merkel somewhat fretfully states that she “is worried about 
the situation”, but also that she is “engaged with the political leadership of Ukraine and Russia”. 
A statement that according to ARD reporting, she repeats after speaking with the new Ukrainian 
prime minister, Arsenij Yatseniuk, on the phone. The message she sent was ‘worried but 
engaged’ – but allows for little conclusions about her thinking beyond what she said. It is a 
rather ambiguous statement – and may either be considered a cunning move to shroud how she 
reads the situation, or as a sign of uncertainty. Considering Angela Merkel’s self-acknowledged 
tendency to only act “when she has reached the firm grounds of certainty”219, the latter appears 
more likely, but cannot be confirmed from ARD’s reporting.  
 
What ARD reporting furthermore shows is that at that time Angela Merkel was already under 
pressure to respond to the developments. Already earlier – which means just hours after the 
German Foreign Minister left Washington – the U.S. president had called the “Russian activities 
on Crimea an act of aggression and a breach of international law”, an assessment which the 
Polish foreign minister Radoslaw Sikorski echoed just a little later.  
 
Angela Merkel’s ambiguous and short statement on the 1st of March does not allow to conclude 
that the German chancellor had a substantially different reading than two of its closest and most 
important allies, or the journalists covering the story.  Considering that the Russian president 
had just lied to her when he pledged de-escalation in a phone call he initiated, suggesting that 
he wanted  to lie to the German chancellor about his real intention to escalate the situation 
himself on the next day by requesting the Duma’s approval for him to order the deployment of 
Russian forces in the entire territory of Ukraine, as well as Merkel’s past experiences with the 
Russian president would suggest that she may well have shared the judgment by Barack Obama 
and Radoslaw Sikorski.  
 
219 See Gaus, Günther: ‘Angela Merkel’, in: rbb (eds): Zur Person: Porträts in Fragen und Antwort, 28.10.1991, 
Berlin, 1991. Online available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YQBslPEZceI&t=4s , last accessed 
30.03.2021. When asked where she believes this idiosyncrasy has its roots, the then rising star from the east – 
Angela Merkel was born in the GDR, who had just emancipated herself from the towering ‘Chancellor of Unity’ 
Helmut Kohl, argues that her professional background in fundamental research in the field if nuclear physics 
may have caused this deformacion profesionelle. She also associates this trying to get to the bottom of things 
approach with her tendency to remain silent until she is certain to have reached this bottom.  






Why she chose to remain ambiguous can thus only be speculation. Three explanations appear 
plausible on the 1st of March: The first is that despite her personal disliking and distrust of the 
Russian president, her experience as well as Germany’s historic and economic ties with 
Moscow also told her that it was better for Germany to find a solution with Russia than one that 
would entrench it even further. That Germany’s national economic interest, especially its 
energy dependency kept it from assuming a more decisive position considering the blatant steps 
by Russia was a key explanation for Germany’s hesitance after Crimea had been annexed220.  
The second explanation is that on the 1st of March, the German chancellor considered the risk 
that an irrational act by the new Ukrainian government might trigger a war between the two 
post-Soviet countries, as is suggested from the reporting of Frank-Walter Steinmeier’s visit in 
Washington on the previous day, and thus share the Georgia-scenario assessment. The third is 
that the German chancellor opted to remain hesitant because she considered that if she would 
join Barack Obama and Radoslaw Sikorski in singling out Russia, then reaching a diplomatic 
solution would be made nee impossible, as Russia would be cornered as the aggressor from the 
onset – and not agree to any diplomatic solution.  
 
That a negotiated solution would be “without alternative”, to use a phrase that to some observers 
has become synonymous for Angela Merkel’s style, however, became clear only after Angela 
Merkel had spoken – and the decision was taken in Washington, not in Moscow, Brussels, 
Berlin or Warsaw: in an emergency meeting of the National Security Council, a military 
response was ruled out221. However, to send a clear message to the Russian president that “every 
intervention will come with a cost”222 as U.S. President Barack Obama had stated prior to the 
meeting, economic responses were to follow.  
 
Devoid the option to respond militarily – even if hurriedly scrambled together, the European 
NATO-Allies would not have been able to mobilize the required force levels, let alone have an 
 
220 Especially Hans Kudnani stresses the dilemma German was facing in its dealings with Russia, see: Kudnani, 
Hans; Pond, Elizabeth: Germany’s real role in the Ukraine crisis: Caught between East and West. For Hannes 
Adomeit on the other hand the economic interrelationship is a self-made dilemma, which has its root cause in 
Germany’s blue-eyed policy towards Russia since 1990, see: Adomeit, Hannes: ‚Bilanz der deutschen 
Russlandpolitik seit 1990‘, 2020. 
221 Miosga, Caren: ‘Live Interview mit Tina Hassel, Washington’, in: ARD (eds): tagesthemen, 01.03.2014, 
Hamburg, 2014.  
222 Miosga, Caren: ‘Live Interview with Tina Hassel, Washington’, 01.03.2014.  





idea of how a military response to the complex military situation on the ground on Crimea could 
look like, or stop Russia from what already appears to be a fait accompli – the debate amongst 
the ‘Western’ nations from that decision onwards revolved around sanctions – and how drastic 
these sanctions should be223.  
 
Therefore, on the 1st of March, despite the U.S. and Polish governments calling out the Russian 
invasion – which had been ongoing in plain sight for 48 hours – the response reported by ARD 
from ‘Western governments’, including the German government, are possibly best captured 
with how Tina Hassel describes the mood in Washington after the decision to rule out a military 









223 This cannot disproof the findings about Ukraine’s initial military superiority, and the conclusion that Russia 
may have been deterred to act further had there been an immediate response by the forces stationed on 
Crimea. However, it proofs that in relation to the developing situation on Crimea, President Obama, the United 
States, NATO and ‘the West’ certainly showed the same restraint as George W. Bush and the West did back 
then: they pulled a Bismarck, and questioned why they should risk to escalate the limited conflict on Crimea to 
what might turn into a hot war between NATO forces and Russia. This suggests that even had they been 
prepared to respond militarily, thy would not have decided differently for political considerations. 
During the Berlin Balkan Conference in 1878, which dealt with the ongoing the Balkans-Crisis, the Prussian 
chancellor famously said: "Die Händel auf dem Balkan sind mir nicht die gesunden Knochen eines einzigen 
pommerschen Grenadiers wert.", which translates into “The quarrels on the Balkans are not worth the healthy 
bones of a single Pommerian Grenadier”. On Bismarck and his changing perception through time: Gall, Lothar: 
Bismarck – der weiße Revolutionär, pp 709 – 733, Propyläen-Verlag, Frankfurt/M, Berlin, Wien, 1980.  
224 Miosga, Caren: ‘Live Interview with Tina Hassel, Washington’, 01.03.2014.  





3. From a diplomatic solution is still possible to a new division in 
Europe: From Putin’s call on the 2nd of March to the EU Council 
Summit on the 6th of March 2014. 
 
3.1. From very certain that a diplomatic solution is possible and without 
alternative…: Frank-Walter Steinmeier’s interview with ARD Brennpunkt. 
With respect to the German government, this changes with the 2nd of March.  Data suggests that 
for the German government, the 2nd of March was indeed decisive225. On the 2nd of March, the 
German government appeared very certain about what was at stake and what to do about it:  
 
The key evidence in data for this reading is an extensive live-interview with the German foreign 
minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier in the weekly political background show about the key topics 
moving political Berlin, Bericht aus Berlin.  
 
- The situation is at risk to develop into another Georgia; a reversal is only possible if the 
new Ukrainian government can be kept from irrational act, and if both Russia and 
Ukraine can be moved to the negotiating table.  
- Russia will continue its military posturing and destabilisation policies, but not risk 
initiating a war.  
 
This notwithstanding, to Frank-Walter Steinmeier’s mind “a reversal is still possible”226. To 
convince Russia to to return to the negotiating table, would require to not cut off the channels 
 
225 However, the effect of the phone call was not that Germany changed its approach to Russia or adopted a 
tougher stance. Data clearly shows that Germany takes a stance that warns against toughening up against 
Russia too soon, and pledges for a political solution for which it assumes responsibility following the phone-call 
as a broker. The fact that the Federal Chancellery and Angela Merkel let publish a press-statement in which the 
international treaties Russia was violating are cited does not change this observation, as the press statement 
ends on the note that President Putin had agreed to consider Angela Merkel’s proposal of an international 
contact group, which would chaperone the dialog between Russia and Ukraine. It indicates much more strongly 
that at that point, Germany was willing to look beyond the treaty violations if the proposal for a contact group 
is taken up.  
226 The German foreign minister lays out how he believes this “reversal” looks like and how he intends to 
achieve it. Thus, in the interview, for the first time since the beginning of the observation, the German 
government gives itself a strategy: “We must try, beyond the strong statements, to return to politics. And this 
can only work out if we bring Russia and Ukraine into direct dialogue. If this is not possible that they talk 
directly, then there are other things that can be agreed, for example that the OSCE is asked to establish what 
we call a fact-finding mission with which we want to verify what is really going on on Crimea and in Eastern 





of communication with Russia, which finger-pointing or punitive action would both certainly 
achieve227.  While not stating it explicitly, possibly to not snub at the new Ukrainian 
government, as the original sin that led to the war in Georgia was committed by the Georgian 
Prime Minister Saakashvili by losing temper and falsely judging his ties to U.S. friends, the 
German Foreign Minister’s interview makes evident that the German leadership personally 
involved was now very certain what it was looking at228: the risk of another Georgia in 2008, 
the event that broke the already uneasy relationship between Moscow and NATO after the Cold 
War. Therefore, during the interview, the German Foreign Minister does not call out the recent 
Russian actions as illegal from an international law perspective229.  
 
To counter the risk of a renewed war as witnessed in Georgia, the German foreign minister lays 
out how he believes this “reversal” looks like and how he intends to achieve it. Thus, in the 
 
Ukraine. But this is not, so to speak, the solution. For example, a part of the solution could be that we agree on 
an international contact group, in which the Europeans, the United Nations, but also Russia and Ukraine are 
part.” ARD Bericht aus Berlin, Live-Interview with Federal Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier,. 
227 The foreign minister argues that punitive actions against Russia, like kicking the country out of the G-8, as 
the U.S. Foreign Secretary Kerry had suggested, could be counterproductive when he states: “This is an issue 
that the heads of EU governments will certainly discuss this week. There are discussions amongst them. One 
group says, ‘we must send a strong signal now and exclude Russia’, while others – and I am closer to them – 
argue that the G8 is the last format in which we and Russia are directly talking. Should we really sacrifice this 
last remaining format? I think we must see that we contribute to a de-escalation in Ukraine, and not speak to 
soon of any possible toughening-up. In case of doubt, this will not help”, see: Deppendorf, Ulrich: ‘Interview 
with Frank-Walter Steinmeier on the situation on Crimea’, in: ARD (eds): Bericht aus Berlin, 02.03.2014, Berlin, 
2014. 
228 To this end, the new Ukrainian government had contributed by passing the so-called ‘language-law’, which 
banned Russian as second official language in Ukraine. The Foreign Minister, who on the eve after the 
agreement he had helped to broker watched the agreement being booed on Kyiv Maidan, and threats of 
violence by ultra-nationalist groups of the opposition, was acutely aware that these forces now were also part 
of the government, and as in the case of their leader, Alexei Tiagnibok, held key positions in Ukraine’s security 
sector. Unlike in the case of Russia, where nothing seemed to deviate from known patterns of behaviour and 
led to a sense of certainty about what to expect from Russia, the most incalculable actor was the government 
in Ukraine, that had just moved from its headquarters on the streets of Maidan to the houses of government. 
This is alluded to by Mr. Steinmeier during the interview, when unlike the other allied ’Western’ governments 
that had called out Russia as the sole villain, the German foreign minister emphasises that the Ukrainian 
government is not without responsibility either. He even pleas “to the Ukrainian government to portray itself 
as the government of all Ukrainians, and therefore the law that had just been passed, the language law, has to 
be taken back”. As for Russia and its recent actions, The German foreign minister considers the Russian soldiers 
on Crimea to be in breach with the lease agreement about the use of Crimea as base for the Russian Black Sea 
Fleet between Ukraine and Russia, but not breaching international law, which he only mentions at the very end 
of the interview: “ […]it must be that Russian soldiers return to their barracks and stick to the lease agreement 
between Russia and Ukraine […].”, see: Deppendorf, Ulrich: ‘Interview with Frank-Walter Steinmeier on the 
situation on Crimea’, in: ARD (eds): Bericht aus Berlin, 02.03.2014, Berlin, 2014. 
229 Instead, he considers the Russian soldiers on Crimea to be in breach with the lease agreement about the use 
of Crimea as base for the Russian Black Sea Fleet between Ukraine and Russia – which he only mentions at the 
very end of the interview.  





interview, for the first time since the beginning of the observation, the German government 
gives itself a strategy:  
 
“We must try, beyond the strong statements, to return to politics. And this can only work out if 
we bring Russia and Ukraine into direct dialogue. If this is not possible that they talk directly, 
then there are other things that can be agreed, for example that the OSCE is asked to establish 
what we call a fact-finding mission with which we want to verify what is really going on on 
Crimea and in Eastern Ukraine. But this is not, so to speak, the solution. For example, a part 
of the solution could be that we agree on an international contact group, in which the 
Europeans, the United Nations, but also Russia and Ukraine are part.”230 
 
Asked whether he believes that a negotiated solution is feasible, the foreign minister refers to a 
phone call between the new Ukrainian prime minister Arseniy Yatseniuk and his Russian 
counterpart Dmitri Medvedev, which he considers a positive signal, even though he is uncertain 
whether it can be considered a breakthrough231. He also cautions against expecting too much – 
a fast, simple, and straight solutions. Rather, the German foreign Minister expects a political 
solution with the parameters he outlined before to be a process, when he argues: 
 
“This will not be one conversation, and one agreement, but we must now – as often is the case 
in such gridlocked conflicts, look for options to prevent further escalatory steps, and get the 
conflicting partner to talk to each other[…].”232 
 
There are two additional noteworthy aspects from the interview with the German Foreign 
Minister on the 2nd of March 2014. The first is raised by the German Foreign Minister’s 
response to the question whether the German government should have engaged with Vladimir 
Putin on Ukraine much earlier. The minister responds laughingly, and nonchalantly points out 
that much earlier would not have been possible for him, as he was in office for only two months. 
He also points out his visit to Moscow on the 14th of February, just five days before the joint 
 
230  Deppendorf, Ulrich: ‘Interview with Frank-Walter Steinmeier on the situation on Crimea’, 02.03.2014. 
231 He stated:  “[…] whether it is a breakthrough, but it is at least a hint that today the new Ukrainian Prime 
Minister Yatseniuk and Prime Minister Medvedev for the first time talked to each other.” 
Deppendorf, Ulrich: ‘Interview with Frank-Walter Steinmeier on the situation on Crimea’, 02.03.2014. 
232 Deppendorf, Ulrich: ‘Interview with Frank-Walter Steinmeier on the situation on Crimea’, 02.03.2014. 





mission with his Polish and French colleague to Kyiv and argues that “[o]n this occasion, the 
topic of Ukraine was not quite as hot, but was already present as a discernible crisis.”233  
 
The data analysed for this research between the beginning of the tensions with Russia around 
Ukraine in November 2013 and the German Foreign Minister’s official visit, however, made 
apparent that indeed the crisis had been very discernible for months by then. More interesting, 
and relevant, however is the fact that when reviewing the ARD reporting from Steinmeier’s 
visit, it becomes apparent that despite all the changes to the context that had occurred since then 
until the day of the interview – that is, 16days or 384hours ago, changing the nature of the 
conflict from a domestic Ukrainian crisis to a situation short of international war – the German 
way out of the maze remained unchanged234.  
 
The second aspect concerns the Foreign Ministers characterisation of the disappearance of 
Victor Yanukovych, which makes evident that to his reading, this event “was unforeseeable”235. 
This confirms that the disappearance had been a surprise to the German government, and the 
concise speaking German foreign minister also leaves room for interpretation that the effect on 
the Russian government may have been the same. However, it remains unclear from the 
statement when the German government had reached this reading, and whether this judgment 
was reached prior to the asylum-seeking fugitive ex-president Yanukovych’s taking himself off 
the chessboard on the 28th, or before.  
 
Thus, ARD reporting confirms the finding that the 2nd of March 2014 marks a decisive date for 
the German government in the context of the annexation of Crimea. It breaks its silence and 
assumes both a position and strategy.  
 
 
233 Deppendorf, Ulrich: ‘Interview with Frank-Walter Steinmeier on the situation on Crimea’, 02.03.2014. 
234 On the same day, the German Interior Minister Friedrich resigned because of his role in dealing with the 
investigations against a Member of Parliament suspected to be involved in child-pornography, Sebastian 
Edathy, which was the focus of reporting of the day.  Frank-Walter Steinmeier’s visit to Moscow, however, did 
not feature prominently, see: Mayer-Rüth, Oliver: ‘Bundesagrarminister Friedrich zurückgetreten’, in: ARD 
(eds.) tagesschau, 14.02.2014, Hamburg, 2014. 
235 Frank-Walter Steinmeier mentions this in the context of the question asking whether Germany should have 
engaged earlier. He states: “Maybe yes, but I personally felt during the negotiations only at that point, with the 
more than 80 fatalities, Yanukovych was willing to consider helping to structure the political future of the 
country. That he then did not want to be part of this new order was unforeseeable but has created the vacuum 
that others filled.”, Deppendorf, Ulrich: ‘Interview with Frank-Walter Steinmeier on the situation on Crimea’, 
02.03.2014. 





However, data contradicts the notion that the date was decisive because the German political 
leadership directly involved, Frank-Walter Steinmeier and Angela Merkel, feeling “deceived 
and personally lied to” following Putin’s revelation that the man wearing no national insignia 
are directly linked to the Russian military, hardened their stance towards Russia. To the 
contrary, data suggests that the biggest risk was seen in the new government in Ukraine, 
whereas Russia ‘could be talked to’.    
 
Therefore, from the interview on the 2nd of March by the Foreign Minister it may be concluded 
that at that point, the German government was very certain that it was looking at a “Georgian 
scenario” on Crimea.  
 
This notion is also mirrored in the reporting during the day.  Here, the phone call played only a 
side-role, further putting in question the centrality it plays in Andreas Rinke’s account. Instead, 
three other aspects dominated reporting during the day, all under one headline – is war 
imminent: news about Ukrainian defectors on Crimea, the formation of volunteer corps across 
Ukraine – including the pro-Russian east – to defend Ukraine against the expected Russian 
invasion, and the international crisis response trying to prevent further deterioration, and 
Germany’s role in it.  
 
Consequently, on the 2nd of March, the risk of war continued to dominate the headlines despite 
the assessment of Russia was that it would not risk initiating a war against Ukraine.236  The 
reason for the perceived continued war-threat becomes apparent during an interview with ARD 
correspondent Udo Lilischkies. Prompted by his colleagues’ question about the options left for 
the Kyiv government, he points to the source of the renewed uncertainty about the possibility 
 
236The introduction by ARD tagesthemen anchor-woman Caren Miosga sums up the sensation at the time her 
introductory remarks: “We are on the brink of a catastrophe”, the Ukrainian prime minister said today. And on 
the same day he lost an important ally. Irrespective of international warnings, the Russian president seems fully 
determined to not let Ukraine go from his chokehold: In what came little short of a cloak and dagger operation, 
Putin annexed Crimea. And nobody wants to preclude anymore that he will expand to the eastern regions of 
Ukraine, where many Russian-born Ukrainians live. Like [U.S. Sec. of State] John Kerry, who today threatens to 
kick Russia out of the G8, the entire West is admonishing and grouching, but yet looks stunned. Because 
military support from NATO [for Ukraine] could invoke a conflict of larger proportions one doesn’t want to 
imagine.”. Interestingly, the tagesthemen anchor-woman speaks of the annexation as already have occurred. 
This again casts doubts on the conclusion that a swift military response to the Russian aggression by the 
Ukrainian troops stationed on Crimea may have prevented Russia from annexing Crimea, as it points to the fact 
that ‘Western’ governments were invariably tied with the new Ukrainian government, which at that time had 
only been in office for 96hours. Miosga, Caren: ‘Anmoderation’, in: ARD (eds.): tagesthemen, 02.03.2014, 
Hamburg, 2014. 





of war: “Putin’s hints that he will also defend the interests of ethnic Russian in Eastern Ukraine 
has electrified people”237. The risk, however, was not Putin, who coolly moved ahead with his 
plans, but the uncertainty how electrified Ukrainians, especially the ultra-nationalist elements 
that now were part of the government, would respond.   
 
During the interview, the anchor-woman also touches on the phone call between Merkel and 
Putin. It becomes apparent in her question that at the time the late-news were aired, there had 
not yet been confirmation about the content and outcome of the call, or a press release by the 
Federal Chancellery: “Putin, we hear this evening, is said to have accepted Angela Merkel’s 
suggestion to establish a contact group.”238 In his response to the rumours about Putin’s 
acceptance of the German suggestion to establish a contact group, her Kyiv-based colleague 
Udo Lilischkies responds:  
 
“We have […]just heard what his head of government, prime minister Medwedew, just said: 
that the Kyiv government has violently taken over power, and their government will end in 
another revolution and bloodshed. This sounds much less conciliatory and open for dialog. 
Putin always had been fairly moderate, while his military and intelligence services unfolded the 
scenario we are witnessing now. What we are also witnessing here is an increasingly aggressive 
Russian propaganda, as the people call it here, against Ukraine. For example, the Russian 
border guards claim that there is an exodus of 140.000 Ukrainians leaving for Russia and asked 
for asylum, that there are even indicators for a humanitarian crisis. The Ukrainian border 
guards deny this, says this is complete non-sense, and that the numbers are as usual. In a 
nutshell: the propaganda, the psychological mobilization in Russia is running at highest speed, 
therefore one may doubt whether the conciliatory tone of Putin really is what some … [pauses] 
hope to be able to read from it.”239 
 
In other words, he charges the German foreign minister’s assessment as wishful thinking, as 
everything appears to be gearing up for conflict. Reversal is not possible. To the journalist’s 
mind, Putin always plays the good cop, while his military and intelligence services ruthlessly 
move ahead with their scenario, tightening the noose around the new Ukrainian government 
until they respond, and Russia can claim to act in accordance with international law when it 
 
237 Miosga, Caren: ‘Anmoderation’, in: ARD (eds.): tagesthemen, 02.03.2014, Hamburg, 2014.  
238 Miosga, Caren: ‘Live-Interview mit Udo Lilischkies, Kyiv’, in: ARD (eds.): tagesthemen, 02.03.2014, Hamburg, 
2014.  
239 Miosga, Caren: ‘Live-Interview mit Udo Lilischkies, Kyiv’, 2014. 





launches a full on invasion into its neighbouring brother-country. Its aggressive propaganda 
that is also received in Ukraine will only add oil to an already looming fire. Putin wants the 
Ukrainians to respond.  
 
The difference in what to expect between the experienced foreign minister and seasoned 
journalist with specific Russia-expertise notwithstanding, the base assessment is the same: it all 
follows the pattern before the war in Georgia.  
3.2.  “The day before war?” and “signs of de-escalation”, 3rd – 5th of March 2014. 
The following day, 3rd of March 2014, marks the date when the risk of a direct military 
confrontation between Ukraine and Russia about Crimea looms largest in reporting. It was 
asked whether this “is this the day before the outbreak of war”. Again, it was Russia playing 
with the fuse of the powder-keg: President Putin ordered another military snap-exercise, this 
time on Russia Western border – or NATO’s eastern flank. There too were rumours of a Russian 
ultimatum for the Ukrainian forces on Crimea to surrender.  
 
Much attention was paid to the German, EU and international diplomatic efforts to bring the 
conflicting parties back to the negotiating table and come to Ukraine’s economic aid receive, 
and the EU Foreign Minister Meeting in preparation of the EU Council Summit on the 6th of 
March was covered extensively. What becomes apparent from reporting is that the positions of 
the EU members vary greatly, with the Eastern and Central Eastern European Member States 
demanding the EU to act with punitive measures, and even contemplate a military response, 
others are more cautious. The summit postpones a verdict on sanctions, which indicates that the 
German foreign minister could convince his EU-colleagues that now is the “hour of 
diplomacy”, and not of punitive actions240.   
 
Did the reporting of the 3rd of March focus on the threat of war vs. the hour of diplomacy, 
reporting on the 4th of March focusses on the conciliatory tone that was read into the Russian 
president’s first TV interview on Ukraine and Crimea since the beginning of the dispute in late 
 
240 The reporting during of the meeting also comments on the dilemma the EU faces in dealing with Russia, 
especially due to the dependency on Russian energy supplies, see: Bohne Marcel: ‘Krisentreffen der EU-
Außenminister’, in: ARD(eds): mdr-Brussels Radio, 03.03.2014, Brussels, 2014. 





2013. From “is this the day before the outbreak of war”, the headline shifted to “signs of de-
escalation”, and “Putin open for negotiations”241.  
 
Putin’s press conference confirmed all preconceptions about him: the assumption about his 
tendency to resort to deception, when he continued to cover the true origin of the unidentifiable 
armed men; his tsarist attitude, and the grief about the collapse of the Soviet Union, by the style 
he presented himself to a group of pre-selected, Russian journalists; and above all the 
expectation that despite all sabre-rattling, Putin will eventually agree to a negotiated settlement 
by his conciliatory tone242. 
  
The climax of ‘Western’ crisis resolution efforts was to be on the following day, the 05th of 
March. On this day U.S. Foreign Secretary John Kerry was to meet with his Russian counterpart 
Sergey Lawrow for bilateral talks in Paris, followed by a joint dinner with the foreign ministers 
of France, Germany and the United Kingdom in the French Foreign Ministry.  
 
The meeting is covered by ARD with much detail, with live-interviews from Paris already 
during the mid-day and afternoon news, and reporting does suggest that some saw signs for 
hope. However, as the reporting during the ARD-tagesthemen late news makes evident, the 
hopes were not fulfilled. With a body language strongly contrasting with his self-confident 
presence during the Bericht aus Berlin interview just 72 hours earlier, Frank-Walter Steinmeier 
appears tired and concerned, and comments on the outcome of the informal Paris summit with 
undisguised disappointment:  
 
“I am not happy about the overall result. I am at best content that all those we spoke to 
signalled that they will not contribute to a further escalation of the of the situation. But 
difficult days remain ahead of us.”243  
 
241 Considering the notable absence of Putin, which had repeatedly been commented on by various ARD 
journalists, it is astonishing that when he finally appeared before the (carefully selected) press, the fact that he 
did was not considered in any depth. Furthermore, it is astonishing that hearing and seeing Putin striking a 
conciliatory tone is reported as a sign of de-escalation after the notion of a conciliatory Putin had so strongly be 
rejected by Udo Lilischkies on the 2nd of March.  
242 Virnich, Birgit: ‘Putin verteidigt Krim-Intervention‘, in: ARD (eds.): tagesschau, 04.03.2014, Hamburg, 2014. 
243 Fröder, Ellis: ‘Außenministertreffen zum Ukraine-Konflikt‘, in: ARD (eds.): tagesthemen, 05.03.2014, 
Hamburg, 2014.  





3.3. … to very wrong: The EU Council Summit and the announcement by the Crimean 
regional government about the regional parliament’s decision to join the Russian 
Federation and hold a referendum about this decision on the 6th of March 2014. 
Despite the setback, making clear that Russia could not be moved back to the negotiating table 
before the EU Council Summit on the following day, ARD reporting on the 6th of March 
suggests that the German delegation led by Chancellor Merkel went to the EU Council summit 
remained committed to the course outlined by her Foreign Minister on the 2nd of March244. Prior 
to departing for the summit, Angela Merkel stated her intentions:  
 
“This means we will also look at sanctions of different kinds. Whether these must be 
imposed now, or not, will be decided by us depending on the progress of our diplomatic 
efforts.”245  
 
Hence, the package the German government wanted to discuss merely contained a warning 
signal in relations to Russia, that if there was to be no return to the negotiating table, then 
sanctions would be considered. Considering the decidedly different stance especially of 
Central- and Eastern European EU members already reported in the context of the EU Foreign 
Ministers meeting a few days earlier, the willingness to look at sanctions but stepping on the 
break to impose them by introducing the conditionality of progress of the diplomatic efforts 
appears likely more intended to appease the concerned EU member states than to punish Putin. 
In any case, it was old wine in old hoses – it was essentially the same proposition the German 
Foreign Minister had made on the 2nd of March, with the exception that now the German 
government was willing to “look” at sanctions. The political, diplomatic solution as outlined 
 
244 One reason that gave the German top-leadership involved in the crisis some ground for hope may have 
been that already on the 5th of March, the EU Commission President Barroso announced an 11 billion Euro 
financial aid package for Ukraine – a signal that in respect to the other core objectives of the German 
government at the time, one had been achieved, providing some confidence that the other objectives might 
follow. The positive news about the EU’s ability to agree on massive substantial aid package for Ukraine and 
the new government may have contributed to the confidence that the second objective, to bring Russia back to 
the negotiating table, was equally feasible, and the course of the previous days had shown that the Russians 
were talking. And then, even despite Steinmeier’s disappointment of the outcome of the informal Paris 
summit,  possibly the highest level informal foreign minister summit of the former ideological blocks since the 
end of the Cold War the Russians have asked to postpone negotiations, not to end them.  
245 Bohne, Marcel: ‘Auf der Suche nach dem Minimalkonsens‘, in:  in: ARD (eds.): mdr-Brussels Radio, 
03.03.2014, Brussels, 2014. 





by her Foreign Minister was ‘without alternative’ when Merkel arrived at the Summit on the 
6th.  
 
During the summit, however, the news about the announcement of the new Crimean governor 
about the decision of the regional parliament to join the Russian Federation and to hold a 
referendum about it within ten days, fell into the negotiations between the heads of state.  
 
The news changed the outcome of the EU Council dramatically. Germany now had to give in 
to the demand on the imposition of sanctions. From those in favour of this step, the summit was 
considered a success. That this was the direct effect of the news from Crimea was pointed out 
by the Polish prime minister Donald Tusk, who at the end of the summit stated:  "We have 
achieved more than wo could have expected only a few hours ago"246. There was only one 
element that had changed the circumstances in the previous hours – the news about the 
referendum.  
 
The reactions of the German government starkly contrast from those of Donald Tusk. Deviating 
from the usual ARD reporting conduct that refrains from commenting on outer appearance of 
members of government and conclusions to be drawn from it, an ARD Brennpunkt shown on 
the 6th of March describes the reaction of the German foreign minister:  
 
“Shamefacedness loomed large after this shock was triggered by the speaker of the Crimean 
parliament. You will be able to see this in a moment when you look at the facial expression of 
the German Foreign minister – a deeply upset foreign minister stood before the cameras just 
before this show.”247 
 
The German foreign minister introduced in this fashion is shown, and provides the following 
assessment of the recent development:  
 
246 Scharkus, Bettina: 'EU-Gipfel zur Ukraine-Krise, in: ARD (eds.): tagesschau, 06.03.2014, Hamburg, 2014.  This 
almost jubilant Polish perspective notwithstanding, the EU Council’s decision still adopted some of the German 
positions. On the one hand, the summit decided to impose a first, relatively moderate sanctions regime. 
Depending on the success of the diplomatic efforts to get Russia back to the negotiating table, and refraining 
from further escalations especially in Eastern Ukraine, additional, broader sanctions hitting entire economic 
sectors would be implemented. To be ready to impose these sanctions in case of no diplomatic progress, the 
EU-Council furthermore decided that these sanctions already be prepared by the EU Commission.  
247 Strempel, Michael: ‘Anmoderation’, in: ARD (eds.): Brennpunkt: Ukraine vor der Spaltung, 06.03.2014, 
Hamburg, 2014.  






“We must make it clear to us – a new division in Europe, a speechlessness between the West 
and Russia would make it impossible to bring any of the larger conflicts, in Iran, in Syria, to a 
resolution”248 
 
The statement caught immediately after the EU Council summit ended brutally exposes the 
emotional state the German foreign minister is in – disappointment at least. Taking into 
consideration that the foreign minister just a couple of days ago confidently wiped away the 
risk of renewed confrontation between “East and West”, and equally confidently proposed a 
way out of the maze – diplomacy and a political solution – this should not be a surprise.  
 
Angela Merkel’ response to the news is much less emotional than that of her foreign minister, 
but make very clear that the 6th of March marks a decisive turning point for her249. Firstly, ARD 
reports that the German chancellor deems “the referendum, which was announced today” 
illegal250.  
 
Secondly, ARD reporting strongly stresses the point that “the German chancellor that had long 
favoured a dialogue oriented course”,  but  “at the meeting of the EU heads of state, the usually 
so hesitant chancellor saw no other way than to decide in favour of punitive action”251.  
 
Thirdly, it is under the impression of the news received during the EU Council summit, the 
German chancellor shines a light at her experience of dealing with the Russian president in the 
previous days.  
 
 
248 Strempel, Michael: ‘Anmoderation’, 06.03.2014. 
249 Which may also have been helped by a poll on how German’s view Russia and the situation in Ukraine, 
showing that under the impression of recent months, Germans were of the impression that Putin is not 
trustworthy, and a tougher stance by the German government should be taken against him, see: Schönenborn, 
Jörg: ‘Deutschlandtrend 1’, in: ARD (eds.): tagesthemen, 06.03.2014, Hamburg, 2014. 
250 In the report, however, Angela Merkel’s statement does not explicitly say that. Her focus is on the legality of 
the announced referendum – and even in this context, Angela Merkel is at pains not to use the term ‘legal’ 
when she states:  “If such a referendum is requested on a base that doesn’t even exist, to assume that it is 
possible to bring about an opinion-building process within ten days, then this to my mind has not the least to do 
with any sound preparation of elections or referenda.” See: Scharkus, Bettina: 'EU-Gipfel zur Ukraine-Krise, 
06.03.2014.  
251 Scharkus, Bettina: 'EU-Gipfel zur Ukraine-Krise, 06.03.2014. 





“We don’t wish for [imposing additional sanctions], we wish for a diplomatic process, and will 
direct all efforts in this direction. But it must also be clear that – we have now experienced 
many disappointments in this regard – we are also ready to act.”252 
 
According to Andreas Rinke, all three aspects led the German government already on the 2nd 
of March to adopt a tougher stance towards Russia253. Data suggests to the contrary, and that it 
was under the impression of the announcement of the Crimean regional government that these 
decisions were taken. Furthermore, taking into consideration the different emotional 
appearances displayed especially by Frank-Walter Steinmeier, but that are also captured in 
Merkel’s accessory sentence hinting at ‘disappointments’, it seems that the two German 
decision-makers personally involved felt ‘deceived and lied to’ on the 6th. Because it is the news 
that break into the EU Council summit meeting that make clear: A reversal is NOT possible. 
Russia has no interest in a negotiated solution.  
 
The decisions taken at the EU Council Summit on the 6th of March, and the changes on the 
German government’s position it had, therefore did not change the outcome anymore. It was 
defined on the 6th, by the surprising announcement that the Crimean regional parliament will 
hold a referendum on the 16th of March to join the Russian Federation. On the 18th of March it 
was officially welcomed.  
4. Discussion of the findings 
 
4.1. Why the surprise on the 6th of March was strategic to Germany and ‘the West’. 
The fact that the announcement on the 6th of March shaped the outcome alone would suffice to 
qualify the surprise news as strategic – as D-Day on the 6th of June 1944 is considered a strategic 
victory for what ultimately led to Nazi Germany’s defeat, even though Germany’s surrender 
was still another bloody year away.  
 
However, there are two additional aspects that qualify the surprise as strategic. Firstly, for 
Germany, the surprise was strategic because it nullified the strategy – no punitive actions, a 
 
252 Scharkus, Bettina: 'EU-Gipfel zur Ukraine-Krise, 06.03.2014. 
253 Rinke, Andreas: ‘Wie Moskau Berlin verlor‘, pp. 40-41. 





diplomatically reached political solution - it had adopted under the assumption that ‘a reversal 
is still possible’ on the 2nd of March.  Putin had no interest in finding a negotiated solution – 
but instead presented his political solution, and slamming the door for a negotiated solution in 
doing so.   
 
Secondly, this is also why the surprise effect on Germany cannot be decoupled from that for 
’the West’: the nature of the surprise on the 6th of March was not military; it was not a military 
surprise attack, like Pearl Harbor, that led to a war or ended it, like D-Day. It was the 
presentation of a – however flawed and illegal – political solution. Moreover, it used 
instruments of legitimization that could have been the outcome of a political solution negotiated 
with the help of the ‘West’:  a parliamentary decision followed by a referendum. It thereby 
turned two key ‘Western’, or liberal principles – the freedom of choice and the people as the 
sovereign - against those that were upholding these principles in the past. It robbed the ‘West’ 
of its chief argument that it had been voicing since the beginning of the mass protests in Kyiv: 
freedom of choice, and power to the people254.  But what if the people did not want to turn 
westwards, but east? What complicated the situation further was the fact that the demographic 
reality on Crimea made the counter-argument – that is their true desire to ‘turn west’ is 
oppressed by an authoritarian regime – exceedingly difficult in general, but against the 
backdrop of the highly polarized domestic Ukrainian context since the beginning of the protests 
in November 2013, even more difficult.  
 
The decision of the Crimean regional parliament to join the Russian Federation, and the 
announcement to hold a referendum mirrored this very notion – however, with the outcome that 
 
254 This is the message for example Guido Westerwelle, Frank-Walter Steinmeier’s predecessor sent when he 
visited the protesters in Kyiv when he was already only acting foreign minister, as the coalition treaty 
negotiations the followed the September Federal Elections 2013 had not yet been finalised, and Germany was 
represented by an acting government. On Westerwelles’s visit to Kyiv, see: Ruck, Ina: ‘Machtkampf in der 
Ukraine’, in: ARD (eds.): tagesschau, 04.12.2013, Hamburg, 2013. Another example of the role ‘freedom of 
choice’ and power to the people was in the EU-Russian tug-of-war about Ukraine is an interview with Elmar 
Brok, head of the EU foreign relations committee and long-standing conservative EU parliamentarian during 
the tagesthemen late news on the 27th of January 2014, in which Elmar Brok states in his closing remark:  “We 
must make clear that no country has the right to interfere in another country's trade negotiations by 
blackmailing the victim by increasing commodity prices. It must be made clear to Putin that every country has 
the right to choose for itself, the decision does not take place in Moscow, nor in Brussels. The UKR population 
must be given the right to decide for itself”., see: Roth, Thomas: ‘Interview mit Elmar Brok, MdEP, zur aktuellen 
Lage’, in: ARD (eds.):  tagesthemen, 27.01.2014, Hamburg, 2014.   





the freedom of choice would not mean turning westwards, turning democratic – but turning 
eastward, turning Russian.   
 
Of course, the Russian claim that the decision of the Crimean parliament or the referendum are 
in factual accordance with the freedom of choice, and the rule of (international) law, was as 
farcical then as it is today. Politically though, and at the time it was tremendously difficult to 
argue away without being forced to question whether past actions by “the West” had not also 
been in violation of these principles. Even more difficult when considering that in the months 
prior to the annexation, ‘Western’ politicians have repeatedly been calling for the freedom of 
choice and power to the people in relation to the protests in Kyiv. Now the Crimean regional 
government offered its people the freedom of choice by holding a referendum on a decision the 
parliament had already taken.  
 
The strategic effect of the surprise event thus went far beyond Crimea, and aimed at the core 
principle of ‘the West’ and liberal democracies: freedom of choice and power to the people.  
Since the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, from the Russian 
perspective, there was no freedom of choice – and if so, ‘the West’ was the ultimate judge 
whether the choice was correct. The political surprise on the 6th of March, however, introduced 
a political alternative. If “freedom of choice” is without alternative – then what freedom of 
choice is there? Thus, the annexation of Crimea marks the beginning of the liberal order being 
strategically challenged by a revisionist power: Putin’s Russia. The surprise event on the 6th of 
March marked its beginning – BREXIT, the election of Donald Trump and increasing support 
for populist demagogues in liberal democratic countries were to follow. And as often is the case 
– when two sides quarrel, the third is lucky. China, already identified by the United States as 
strategic competitor, had just been gifted with its key opponent having to open a second front 
and divert its efforts.  
4.2.  Why Germany was surprised.  
In many cases competing priorities – like the German federal elections in 2013, and the long 
coalition-treaty negotiations that followed, leaving the German government fully focussed on 
domestic policy paying less attention to the developments in Ukraine -  contributed to the 
German government being caught by surprise. Another example of competing priorities could 
be observed in relation to the domestic situation in Ukraine. Throughout the period of 





observation, the political situation and the economic situation in Ukraine demanded attention. 
The question was, which one was more important, and which one needs to be considered first.  
A third example of competing priorities that contributed to Germany being taken off guard is 
Frank-Walter Steinmeier’s visit to Washington, were seemingly the bilateral relationship was 
given a higher priority than the situation in Ukraine.  The visit was also heavily impacted by an 
issue dear to the heart of the German domestic audience, as the foreign minister tried to use the 
occasion to address the revelations that the United States had been engaged in broad intelligence 
gathering in Germany, including the private phone conversations of the German chancellor. 
Consequently, neither the situation on Crimea, where armed men had seized the regional 
parliament and raised a large Russian flag, nor the re-appearance of the fugitive ex-president, 
or the contested language-law introduced by the new government played a role in the reporting 
of the visit.  And lastly, there were other international crises that required the attention of 
international policymakers: Especially the situation in Syria, but also the developments around 
Iran required the attention of foreign policy-makers – and here the situation was made even 
more delicate by realisation that these international conflicts can not be addressed without 
Russia255.  
 
However, the key contributing factor to Germany being taken off-guard identified in the data 
analysed for this chapter were assumptions guided by false premises in relation to the situation 
in Ukraine, on Crimea and Russia’s role in it. At the latest on the 2nd of March 2014, in Frank-
Walter Steinmeier’s interview, both the premise and the expectations about the future become 
apparent: The developments on and around Crimea have the potential to turn into another 
Georgia. While Russia will not invade, it is fully prepared for the use of military force if the 
new Ukrainian government conducts an irrational act giving Russia a legitimate (even if 
dubious) reason to use its military.  
 
The premise here is that Russian behaviour will not deviate from patterns of behaviour it had 
previously shown, a premise which suggests that the level of innovation expected in Russian 
 
255 Whether other causes, for example frictions in the interplay of government as was indicated by the 
argument that the German foreign intelligence had warned the German government of the likelihood of such a 
scenario on Crimea, played a role cannot be concluded from the data analysed for this chapter. Nor can the 
notion of harmony offered by Andreas Rinke be confirmed.  





policies was fairly moderate256. The expectation was a repetition of the developments that led 
to a war between Georgia and Russia in 2008, in which Russia lured the newly elected, pro-
Western Georgian president Saakashvili into firing the first shot.  
 
This premise – and the expectation deducted from it – led to overlook those elements of 
information that ultimately shaped the outcome of what is referred to ‘the annexation of 
Crimea’: The local political developments set in-motion and controlled by the Kremlin on the 
27th of February under the cover of heavily armed men wearing no insignia and that raised a 
large Russian flag over the regional parliament.  
 
Data shows that the political events that ultimately shaped the outcome were reported, and thus 
could have been considered257. However, neither are there indications that they were considered 
by the covering journalists, nor by the political decision-makers involved. Instead there was a 




256 This also leads to overlook the developments within Russia that occurred as a consequence of the Georgia 
War. As Margarete Klein convincingly argues, the Russian Georgia operation and the lessons learned led to a 
large modernization effort of the Russian forces. Although military reform and modernisation often is a slow 
process, the six years that separate the Georgian War and the situation on Crimea is enough to have led to 
some changes in the way Russian military will operate. See: Fischer, Margarete: ‚Militärische Implikationen des 
Georgienkrieges: Zustand und Reformbedarf der russischen Streitkräfte‘, in: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik 
(ed): SWP-Aktuell, 2008/A74, Oktober 2008, Berlin, 2008.  
While the military modernisation that was backed by a massive spending programme certainly had an effect on 
the military operational aspects on Crimea – as the RAND study by Andrew Kofman details – but there were not 
only military reforms between the Georgia War and the annexation of Crimea. An example may suffice for this 
point: the Apple iphone had been introduced to the market in 2007, one year before the Georgia War. In its 
wake, communication and information flows have experienced the most profound change since the invention 
of the Gutenberg printing press. The effect, however, was much quicker, and not limited to a world-region. 
Today, the whole world is connected through our pocket. While it may be argued that the digital age, and the 
‘revolution of military affairs’ triggered by it, had impacted the context of military operations much earlier, and 
were seen as early as in the first Iraq War (24/7 news coverage), their role in letting ourselves call our age the 
‘Digital Age’ pales in comparison with Apple’s smartphone technology and how it impacted on the lives across 
the globe. Thus, the context in which the annexation of Crimea occurred was fundamentally different to that of 
Georgia due to non-military changes.  
257 This observation strengthens the argument that surprise occurred to the German government despite 
warning. Specifically in the context of the German debate, where it was indicated that the German foreign 
intelligence service BND had warned the German government about Russian motives in relation to Crimea 
since the Georgia War, it raises the question whether the German intelligence had considered the signals that 
were reported, or whether within the German intelligence service the observed tendency that incoming 
information was analysed for similarities to known patterns of behaviour, or whether there was room in the 
intelligence analyses for dissimilarities.  





4.3.  How Russian deception contributed to Germany’s surprise. 
Data has shown that in the period between the disappearance of Victor Yanukovych after the 
Maidan agreement, and the announcement of the Crimean regional government during the EU-
Council Summit on the 6th of March 2014, the Russian president did everything he could to 
support this specific reading of the situation. This distinguishes it from Russian deception and 
deceptive practices that could be observed from data between November 2013 until 
Yanukovych’s disappearance, which do not aim to create a specific, false image, but aim to 
increase the overall ambiguity of the situation – for example in the lead up of the bilateral credit 
agreement the Putin and Yanukovych announced on the 17th of December 2013, or the notable 
silence Putin maintained between October 2013 and the 4th of March 2014.  
 
Data does not allow any conclusions as to when the decision was taken by Putin to annex 
Crimea, nor when the decision was taken to pursue a strategy based on deception and strategic 
surprise. Neither – like the previous efforts seeking to explain the annexation of Crimea – can 
it proof that this indeed was his strategy, nor whether the strategy followed a detailed plan 
drawn much earlier. Therefore, as has been stressed already on the onset of this chapter, the 
finding on Russian deception and how it contributed to surprise can at best add another 
hypothesis on the existing assumptions on how Crimea was annexed by Russia, specifically on 
the role of deception.  
 
This notwithstanding, data allows to identify a pattern of Russian behaviour that served to 
support the creation of this specific false expectation by the German government.  
 
4.3.1. The military: Putin’s stratagem 
 
The first unambiguously Russian step after the disappearance of Yanukovych is the ordering of 
a snap-exercise on Ukraine’s Eastern border on the 26th of February 2014. In Georgia, 6 years 
earlier, just weeks before the war broke out, there were Russian military exercises on Georgia’s 
northern border258.  
 
 
258 Anonymous: ‘Russia holds military exercise in the north Caucasus’, North Caucasus Weekly, Vol. 9, No. 28, 
17.07.2008, available online:  https://jamestown.org/program/russia-holds-military-exercises-in-the-north-
caucasus/ , last accessed 31.03.2021. 





The deceptive pattern is introduced on the following day. Whereas the snap-exercise only 
introduces one alternative – Russia will use (or not use) the military – the following Russian 
military escalations that are discernible from hindsight always introduce two alternatives: a 
military option, and a political option. From the 27th onwards, each military escalation by Russia 
was accompanied by a political escalation. Each time, the focus of the data analysed for the 
previous chapter, was firmly on the military angle, and risks involved, while neglecting the 
political developments.   
 
- On the 27th, the Crimean regional parliament is seized by heavily armed men, that later 
raise a Russian flag. The governor of the peninsula is replaced, and the parliament 
announces the holding of a referendum on the future status of autonomy of Crimea.  
- On the 1st of March, the Duma authorises the Russian president to use the Russian 
military in the entire territory of Ukraine to protect ethnic Russians. The Crimean 
regional government announces that the referendum will be considerably moved ahead 
and calls on the Russian government to come to its help.  
- On the 2nd of March, another phone call between Merkel and Putin occurs. Putin 
acknowledges that the paramilitary troops operating on Crimea have direct links with 
the Russian military – but also indicates that he is willing to consider the German 
suggestion of an international contact group to resolve the conflict.  
 
Hence, the military takes a central role in the deceptive strategy aiming to make Russia’s 
adversaries believe that another Georgia is unravelling – it is Putin’s stratagem. However, as 
the referendum that ultimately shaped the outcome – the annexation of Crimea – goes to show: 
the military was NOT decisive. It was, however, the key enabler for the non-military annexation 
that followed.  
 
4.3.2. Vladimir Putin: Russia’s chief stratagematist  
 
The other key Russian actor involved in creating this specific, false expectation about the future 
within the German government is the Russian president. Unlike in the case of the military 
escalation covering the ultimately decisive political developments, which could be seen across 
the globe, the Russian president chose to remain publicly silent, but seek direct engagement. 
Although there were phone calls between Putin and Barack Obama reported in the period of 





observation, it is clear that the Russian president directly interacted most frequently with the 
German chancellor Angela Merkel, which is evidenced by numerous phone-calls. The widely 
observed notion that these phone-calls are evidence to Germany actively assuming a leading 
role in international crisis responses is not confirmed by data – data shows that in the period 
identified as decisive for the annexation of Crimea, the Russian president also took the initiative 
to reach out to the German chancellor. Considering the findings of Fiona Hill on Vladimir Putin 
and his KGB operators’ mentality, this suggests that Germany may not only have assumed a 
leading role in the context of the annexation of Crimea because it wanted to, but also because 
Putin chose Germany as the victim of his deceptive plan.  
 
- On the 28th, Vladimir Putin initiates a call to Angela Merkel, in which he urges de-
escalation, but also expresses his support of the pro-Russian supporters on Crimea.  
- On the 1st of March Putin receives the Duma’s authorisation to use troops in 
neighbouring Ukraine, a request he had personally filed. 
- On the 2nd of March, following the Duma’s authorisation for the use of military force in 
the entire territory of Ukraine, Putin acknowledges in a call with Merkel that the 
paramilitary troops that had begun to operate on the peninsula since the 27th of Crimea 
and by then had taken de facto control, had direct links with Russia, but also indicates 
that he is willing to consider the German suggestion of an international contact group 
to resolve the conflict.  
 
In his phone calls with the German chancellor, it appears as if the Russian president did 
everything to confirm the suspicions long held against him by the German chancellor, the effect 
of which was that the German chancellor would believe that Putin would not hesitate to react 
if Ukraine commits a mistake, but would not risk a military intervention for fear of the 
international repercussions.  At the latest on the 2nd of March, following his phone call with 
Angela Merkel and the interview of the German foreign minister Steinmeier outlining the 
German response, it becomes apparent in reporting that the German government had adopted 
the reading of the situation the Russian president wanted it to have: that there is a risk of a 
repetition of a war like in Georgia: the powder to the keg is generously poured onto Crimea by 
Russia -  but the sparkle that may lead to its explosion may come from the fires still smouldering 
in Kyiv.    
 







Whether the Russian president has a specific liking of Sushi is not known. However, in the 
context of the poisoning of Alexander Litwinenko, the Russian foreign intelligence community 
to which the Russian president proudly counts himself, has shown that it is fully aware of the 
applicability of Sushi for the pursuance of sinister aims: the former KGB spy Litwinenko would 
not have expected that the inside of the Sushi he ordered and confidently indulged in had been 
prepared with Polonium, leading to a horrible and slow death for an unwanted person.  
 
For the annexation of Crimea, it seems from the analyses of ARD reporting, Putin yet again 
showed his ability to apply the universe of sushi-variations to realpolitik, but in inverted form 
and on a strategic level: Had the Russian lead-up to the Georgia War been a standard Sushi, 
where the raw fish is covered by rice wrapped in algae, the annexation was very much like an 
inside-out sushi role. Here, the fish forms the outside of the roll, while the rice forms the centre. 
It is arguably much more complex to produce, as it is much more difficult to create the 
adhesiveness required for the sushi to maintain its form. In offering his opponents the fish first, 
however, Putin made sure that his adversaries would be certain that they are looking at the 
Russian sushi they knew from the past. The longer they looked at it, the more certain they 
became. Only when biting on it his adversaries realized, that the Sushi they expected was 
nothing else than the sushi-version of a Potemkin village – but by then, it was already too late. 
There never was a Georgia to be prevented259. Putin took Crimea without fighting, but by the 
cunning use of a referendum backed by a gun.  
4.4. Discussing the findings of this analyses in the context of findings in previous 
works 
In the absence of certainty and unambiguous proof about the annexation of Crimea, neither 
falsify nor confirm the findings of earlier works about the annexation of Crimea. Rather, the 
findings of the preceding analysis provide yet another turn of the kaleidoscope the annexation 
of Crimea. Therefore, the view that has been described in the previous section must be 
considered as an additional hypothesis on the annexation of Crimea.  
 
259 As implied by one of the primary sources consulted by Andreas Rinke. That “another Georgia was 
prevented” implies that a Georgia was at stake. This research suggests the opposite, by arguing that Putin 
WANTED his opponents to believe “another Georgia” was at stake.  






The findings of the previous section furthermore the research gaps that were identified in the 
discussion of prior works:  
 
 
- It related the effect of surprise to the overall outcome.  
- It details the nature of the surprise event, rather than merely observing that an event has 
been surprising.  
- It provides a systematic relationship between creating the conditions for surprise – 
deception – and its effect. 
- It details the role of the Russian president in creating the conditions for surprise.  
- It shows that Germany – not Ukraine or ‘the West’ – was the intended victim of Russian 
deception.  
 
In addressing these gaps, however, the findings surmount to an additional, competing 
hypothesis on the annexation of Crimea: According to this research, surprise was decisive for 
the outcome, and the conditions for surprise were created by Russian deception that aimed to 
make its victim certain about the wrong option. To achieve this aim, Putin exploited premises 
bout him and Russia that became apparent in the previous months and years. The stratagem in 
Russia’s deception that created the space for the decisive surprise event during the EU Council 
Summit on the 6th of March was the military. It served two functions: to confirm the pre-existing 
images about Russia and Putin on the one hand, and to provide a cover-up for the developments 
that ultimately proved decisive – the political developments on Crimea that were set in motion 
by the paramilitaries that stormed the regional Crimean parliament on the 27th of February 2014.  
 
The hypothesis this research puts forward, especially the finding that surprise was decisive for 
the outcome of the annexation of Crimea, and that Russian deception created the conditions for 
this surprise strongly differs from the dominant view in earlier publications arguing that surprise 
and deception were intractable in the context of the annexation of Crimea beyond the military 
operational aspects. The conclusions drawn from the analyses of ARD’s reporting are the exact 





opposite260: Surprise was decisive for the outcome; it was achieved by Russian deception; 
Russian deception aimed at increasing certainty about the wrong alternative.   
 
This leads to the final question this research will address before concluding its systematic 
analysis of the role of surprise in the annexation of Crimea, especially for Germany – what role 
for surprise (and deception) in strategy. Considering the role of surprise in strategy will not only 
help to consider the variation in the findings about the role of surprise in this research and 
previous findings, but it also allows to reflect on the question whether there is a role for surprise 
(and deception) in strategy general, and whether the findings this research puts forward have 
been considered can be explained by the more abstract knowledge about the interrelationship 


















260 In the context of earlier research discussed for this undertaking, the findings presented by Fiona Hill on the 
Russian president and how his background as a KGB-operator influences both his readings of international 
politics, as well as it defines how he goes about it most closely resemble the findings made in this research. 
While Fiona Hill however only considered how the KGB-background impacts on Vladimir Putin and how this 
sets him apart from his contemporary heads of state across the globe, and thus provides a psychogram of the 
Russian president, this research provides a case study confirming many of her assumptions of the Russian 
president. See: Hill, Fiona: ‘Putin: the one man show the West doesn’t understand’, 2016.  





IV. On the relationship between surprise, deception, and strategy  
 
1. Preliminary Remarks 
As had been shown in the discussion about the methodological underpinnings of the previously 
published works reviewed for this undertaking, little attention was paid to the question which 
theory could explain the annexation of Crimea best. Instead, most researchers opted “to cut 
straight to the empirical cheese” and wasted no time with such considerations. Broadly 
speaking, the annexation of Crimea may be considered a case of inter-state conflict, and thus a 
case belonging to the realm of international relations. However, the scope the common schools 
of International Relations, realism, liberalism, and constructivism, apply to explain the relations 
between states appears to broad and unspecific for the purpose of the following chapter.  
 
Instead, rather than turning to the theories about the relationship between states in general, this 
effort will consider the theoretical findings of what is decisive in case of conflict between states. 
This is the quintessential question that is considered by literature on strategy, which focusses 
on how to win in competitive environments. Therefore, the following will review and discuss 
the theoretical findings on the role of surprise in strategy.   
 
It is astonishing that neither surprise nor deception, despite their unanimously agreed role in the 
annexation of Crimea have received so little systematic scrutiny in general, but in the context 
of strategy specifically – especially when one considers the quintessential role the question 
whether Crimea’s annexation was an indication of Putin’s strategic ability or incapacity: 
Deception and Surprise are as old as war and conflict, and thus strategy: A classic example is 
the Trojan Horse. More recent examples that come to mind are the Japanese surprise attack on 
Pearl Harbor, or the Allied D-Day surprise attack on the coast of Normandy. Considering the 
United States as a victim of surprise, in their contemporary contribution Surprise, Deception, 
Denial and Warning: Strategic Imperatives, Lani Kass and J. Phillip J. London list additional 
unexpected events:  
 
“[…]the February 1979 invasion of Vietnam; the December 1979 Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan; the September 1980 Iraqi attack on Iran; the 1982 Argentine invasion of 





the Falklands, and the August 1990 Iraqi attack on Kuwait. Likewise, Operations Desert 
Storm, Allied Force, Iraqi Freedom and Odysee Down (Libya) all involved successful 
surprise and deception by the belligerents.”261 
 
However, not only the United States was caught off guard. For example, Israel was surprised 
by the coordinated Syrian-Egyptian attack in 1973. So was the Soviet Union when in 1971 U.S. 
president Richard Nixon visited communist China to re-establish the relationship between the 
two Pacific-nations. Germany, on the other hand, seemingly has not been caught off-guard since 
the end of the Second World War.  
 
Furthermore, unexpected events are not limited to military operations, nor to the 20th century: 
Consider the surprise visit of U.S. president Nixon in China 1971; or, in the field of economics, 
the Asian financial crisis of 1998, or the global financial markets collapsed leading to the global 
financial crisis; natural disaster like in 2004, when much of Southeast Asia was hit by a 
devastating Tsunami; the use of surprise by non-state actors, as during the attacks on the World 
Trade Centre on September 11, 2001; or of socio-political nature, like in 2012, the Arab Spring 
unexpectedly changed much of the long-standing political realities in the countries affected.  
 
The list continues: in 2014 Russia annexed Crimea, and a terror group so far not considered, 
the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria swiftly took control of much of the territories of the two 
countries; in 2016, the United Kingdom opted to leave the European Union, and Donald Trump 
was elected as the 45th president of the United States – against all polls.  
 
While this list is not exhaustive, it makes evident that surprise events occur throughout history 
– and are likely to occur, in future as well. As Colin S. Gray notes: “Surprise is not merely 
possible, or even probable, it is certain”262. It should therefore not be astounding that surprise 
and deception have received considerable attention in literature on war and conflict. A 
discussion of these earlier findings with the objective to develop a better understanding of the 
interrelationship of surprise and deception and strategy are discussed in the following chapter.  
 
261 Kass, Leni; London, J. Phillip J. London: Surprise, Deception, Denial, Warning: Strategic Imperatives, in: Orbis, 
Vol. 57, No. 1, 2013, p.63.  
262 Gray, Colin S.: Another Bloody Century: The Future of War, p. 25, Weidenfeld and Nicholson, London, 2005.  






Consulting the Oxford Dictionary of English makes apparent that the interrelationship between 
war and surprise can also be traced in the definition and etymology of the term surprise.  
 
It defines ‘surprise’ as an unexpected or unanticipated event or fact263, and points to the 
etymology of the term: Its Medieval Latin root suprehendere means “to seize”, which is also 
the meaning of the Old French term surprendre. In Old Middle English the term surprise, refers 
to “unexpected seizure of a place or attack by troops”264.    
 
The German term ueberraschen is a composite term based on the Germanic adjective rasch, 
meaning “quick, speedy”, and adverb über, meaning “too”. “Überraschen” was originally used 
to describe a sudden attack – too sudden to guard against it.  Thus, the Germanic term 
ueberraschen adds speed and suddenness to something unexpected happening.  
 
Russian knows three terms for surprise, ϲторпиз (syurpriz), НеоЖиДаННоϲт 
(neoschidannost), and ВНезапНость (Vnezapost). While syurpriz is a lent term capturing the 
element of “unexpectedness”, the two latter, Slavic terms, much like the German 
“ueberraschen”, consider the time element of the unexpected, stressing suddenness or 
abruptness.  
 
The military origin of the term, however, does not mean that surprise and its effect is limited to 
the military realm, nor to governments. In fact, surprise is an everyday experience for most 
people. While individuals also make up the government, this research is concerned with surprise 






263 Online version of the Oxford Dictionary, see: https://www.lexico.com/definition/surprise , last accessed 
30.03.2021. 
264 The differences between the “orthodox school” and the “revisionist school” are summarized in: Cancian, 
Mark F.: Avoiding Coping with Surprise in Great Power Conflicts, pp. 30 – 33, Centre for Strategic and 
International Studies (CSIS), Washington D.C., 2018.  






The definition of surprise as an unexpected or unanticipated event distinguishes surprise from 
other terms – especially from crisis265. A crisis concerns a time, has a beginning and an end. If 
between states, it may, but must not begin with a declaration of hostile intent and is usually 
characterised by increasing tensions, or even. While surprise events may occur during a crisis 
or may mark the beginning or the end of a crisis, a surprise is a specific, unique event.  
 
The second concept surprise needs to be distinguished from is co-incidence – which, as the term 
implies, is an unrelated event266. Surprise, on the other hand, occurs in relation to something 
often to a crisis, but not exclusively.   
 
The third term that requires to be considered in the context of surprise are so called ‘Black 
Swan’ events. The term, coined by Greek satirist Juvenal who called his faithful wife a rara 
avis in terris, nigroqie simillima cygno267, as white swans were unknown at the time in Europe. 
Following their discovery in Australia in 1697, it became a metaphor for freak events – highly 
improbable events that nonetheless occur268.  The financial crisis of 2008 led to a renaissance 
of the term. In its wake, “Black Swans – The Impact of Highly Improbable Events” by the 
stock-market guru Nassim K. Taleb became a best-seller269.  In it, Taleb dissects why there are 
events that are wholly unexpected but with grave consequences. The sophistic presentation of 
his arguments notwithstanding, Taleb essentially repeats the pessimistic notion offered by 
earlier scholars – surprise is inevitable, unless one is blessed with serendipity270.  Like the 
 
265 For a distinction from other, similar concepts see also: Jones, M.; Silberzahn, P.: ‘The Essence of Strategic 
Surprise’, Academy of Management Meeting Proceedings, 2014 No.1, Philadelphia, 2014, pp. 4-6. 
266 Buchstein, Hubertus: ‚Zufallsentscheidungen historisch betrachtet. Eine (kleine) Geschichte des Einsatzes 
von Losverfahren für Regierungshandeln.’ In: Zeitschrift für Führung und Organisation, Jg. 88, Heft 3/2019, 162-
168. In his short history of the use of lottery for government action Buchstein points out that in democratic 
Athens, most public offices were allocated by the use of lottery – or fate and co-incidence – amongst the 
citizens of Athens. These offices included senior positions, for example tax-collection. Mostly a measure against 
corruption, it also created a sense of citizen responsibility by the theoretical chance that any citizen could be 
chosen by fate to assume public office. However, some offices were exempt from lottery, as it was held they 
should not be left to luck and chance, and they were elected. One of these offices was that of the “strategos”, 
the leader in war.  
267Iuvenalis, Decimus Iunius: Die Satiren Des Decimus Junius Juvenalis in einer erklärenden Übersetzung, Decker 
Verlag, Berlin, Leipzig,p. 182; online available at: https://digital.slub-dresden.de/werkansicht/dlf/69231/192/0/ 
268 Interestingly, two eminent figures in the history of the humanities and social sciences, John Stuart Mill and 
Karl Popper considered Black Swan events as example of deductive reasoning.  
269 Taleb, Nassim K: The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable, Random House, New York, 2007.  
270 Terje Arven argues that the difference between a Black Swan event and a strategic surprise is somewhat 
semantical in relation to the effect.  See Arven, Terje: Risk, Surprises and Black Swans: Fundamental ideas and 





distinction between a ‘normal’ surprise and a strategic surprise event, the difference between a 
‘black swan’ event and strategic surprise is somewhat blurry. However, unlike ‘strategic 
surprise’, ‘Black Swan Events’ may also encapsulate co-incidence: That the Black Swan was 
discovered had nothing to do with the Black Swan, but with the Black Swan and the Dutch 
explorer Willem de Flamingh happened to be at the same place at the same time.  
1.3. Effect  
The effect of surprise is that one “[s]uddenly and deeply feel[s] that the universe is no longer a 
rational, orderly system”271. In other words, it is a cognitive sensation, a psychological effect. 
 
Most works on the phenomenon of surprise to governments consider its effect in war and 
strategy. James Wirtz, for example, observes the effect of a military surprise attack as follows, 
“[s]urprise temporarily suspends the dialectical nature of warfare (or any other strategic contest) 
by eliminating an active opponent from the battlefield”272.  
 
Kass and London point to the three common effects of surprise to governments:  
 
“First, they are traumatic to the victim. Second, they accord a significant, albeit 
temporary, advantage to the initiator. Third, they generate a seemingly endless stream 
of assessments and analysis seeking to determine what happened and why, who was at 
fault, and how to reorganize the system in order to avoid similar failure in the future.”273  
 
The key term in the descriptions of the effect of surprise in war and strategy is temporary. 
Whether or not surprise can be decisive, thus have direct effect on the outcome is contested 
among strategists and scholars on surprise alike.  
 
concepts in risk assessment and risk management, pp. 115 – 124, Routledge, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon, 
2014. However, there is a difference in cause – strategic surprise involves an malevolent actor aiming to 
surprise its adversary.   
271 Weick, Karl E.: ‘The collapse of sensemaking in organizations: The Mann-Gulch disaster’, in: Administrative 
Quarterly Science, cf.: Jones, M.; Silberzahn, P.: ‘The Essence of Strategic Surprise’, in: Chicago Academy of 
Management (eds.): Proceedings, Vol. 2014, No.1, August 2014, p. 5.  
272 Wirtz, James: A Theory of Surprise, part 1,slide 3, July 2008. Online presentation available at the Homeland 
Security Digital Library: https://www.chds.us/ed/items/1636, last accessed: 30.03.2021. 
273 Kass, Leni; London, J. Phillip J. London: ‘Surprise, Deception, Denial, Warning: Strategic Imperatives’, in: 
Orbis, Vol. 57, No. 1, 2013, p. 69.  





2. The elusive concept of strategic surprise 
Although there is no universally agreed definition of what constitutes a strategic surprise, 
literature offers some definitions of the term.  
 
For example, Paul Miller of the Atlantic Council Strategy Consortium offers the following 
definition: “strategic surprise is an unanticipated development that erodes if not ends our 
prevailing strategic assumptions, undermines one or more policy lines, and demands a policy 
response”274 
 
Another definition of strategic surprise is offered by Milo Jones and Phillippe Silberzahn:  “We 
define strategic surprise as the sudden realization that one has been operating on the basis of an 
erroneous assessment which results in a failure to anticipate an event that has significant impact 
on vital interests”.275  
 
The difference between a “normal” surprise and a strategic surprise event experienced by a 
government remains blurry. A distinction can be drawn looking at the severity of the adverse 
impact of the unanticipated event: The difference between a foreign minister unexpectedly not 
being able to board a government-jet because of a mechanical failure and an unexpected attack 
by two hi-jacked civilian aircraft steered by Muslim fundamentalists on the World Trade Centre 
is the severity of their relative impact. Simply put, a strategic surprise event is an unexpected 
event with especially grave consequences for its victim, and one that for this reason is 
particularly well remembered. Up until today the Horse of Troy is remembered to have caused 
surprise with strategic effect. Thus, whether a surprise was strategic can only be judged with 
the knowledge of hindsight – it requires the surprise event to occur276.  This notwithstanding, 
surprise has featured prominently in considerations about strategy. The following will outline 
the debate about the relationship between strategy and surprise from classical strategy to 
contemporary considerations on the phenomenon.  
 
274 Miller, Paul: Responding to Strategic Surprise, in: Atlantic Council (eds.):  Strategy Consortium, 12.05.2017, 
Washington, 2017. 
275 Jones, M.; Silberzahn, P.: ‘The Essence of Strategic Surprise’, in: Chicago Academy of Management (eds.): 
Proceedings, Vol. 2014, No.1, August 2014, p. 3. 
276 Leni and Kass offer the assumption that the impact of a surprise event depends on how strong the 
perceptions that are falsified by the surprise event are held and how much is at stake, see: Kass, Leni; London, 
J. Phillip J. London: ‘Surprise, Deception, Denial, Warning: Strategic Imperatives’, 2013, p. 73. 






2.1. Strategy and Surprise in the pre-nuclear age: surprise as a decisive factor for 
winning wars? 
As the military origin of the term surprise suggests, surprise is as old as war itself277. And as 
Colin S. Gray notes: “Surprise is not merely possible, or even probable, it is certain”278. But it 
certainly is not new.  
 
And so is the reflection about the role of surprise in the art and science of winning wars, 
strategy. In the search of how to best win wars, the question whether surprise can be decisive – 
that is, strategic, - is contested.  
 
Two schools of thought can be distinguished concerning the relationship of surprise and 
strategy in the classics of strategy: the direct and the indirect approach279.  
 
 
277 Classic examples are the Japanese surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, or the Allied D-Day surprise landing on 
the coast of Normandy. Considering the United States as a victim of surprise, in their contemporary 
contribution ‘Surprise, Deception, Denial and Warning: Strategic Imperatives’, Lani Kass and J. Phillip J. London 
list additional unexpected events: “[…]the February 1979 invasion of Vietnam; the December 1979 Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan; the September 1980 Iraqi attack on Iran; the 1982 Argentine invasion of the Falklands, 
and the August 1990 Iraqi attack on Kuwait. Likewise, Operations Desert Storm, Allied Force, Iraqi Freedom and 
Odysee Down (Libya) all involved successful surprise and deception by the belligerents.” Kass, Leni; London, J. 
Phillip J. London: ‘Surprise, Deception, Denial, Warning: Strategic Imperatives’, p. 69 277 However, not only the 
United States was caught off guard. For example, Israel was surprised by the coordinated Syrian-Egyptian 
attack in 1973. So was the Soviet Union when in 1971 U.S. president Richard Nixon visited communist China to 
re-establish the relationship between the two Pacific-nations. Furthermore, the history of surprise does not 
end with the 20th century, nor are unexpected events limited to military operations and diplomatic coups. The 
Asian financial crisis of 1998 came as a surprise, as did the attacks on the World Trade Centre on September 11, 
2001; In 2004, Southeast Asia was hit by a Tsunami; in 2008, the global financial markets collapsed leading to 
the global financial crisis; in 2012, the Arab Spring unexpectedly changed much of the long-standing political 
realities in the countries affected; in 2014, Russia annexed Crimea, and a terror group so far not considered, 
the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria swiftly took control of much of the territories of the two countries; in 2016, 
the United Kingdom opted to leave the European Union, and Donald Trump was elected as the 45th president 
of the United States.  
278 Gray, Colin S.: Another Bloody Century: The Future of War, p. 25, Weidenfeld and Nicholson, London, 2005.  
279 An excellent review outlining the distinction between the two western schools of strategic thought can is 
offered by Henry L. Roberts, see Roberts, Henry L: ‘Strategy: The indirect approach’, in: Foreign Affairs, Vol. 33, 
No. 2, 1955 





Disciples of the direct approach follow the notion that strategy is “the use of the engagement 
for the purpose of the war”280. Disciples of the indirect approach on the other hand argue that 
the direct engagement in a battle of annihilation has rarely been decisive and should be avoided. 
To them, “to subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill”281. In the following, the 
role of surprise in the strategic theory of Carl von Clausewitz and Basil Liddell Hart, the two 
eminent Western representatives of the two approaches will be discussed282. 
2.1.1. The direct approach: The limited value of surprise and deception 
In his quintessential work ‘On War’, the eminent Prussian strategist Carl von Clausewitz 
considers surprise in his third book of his Treatise, ‘On Strategy in General’, specifically in the 
second chapter, which considers the elements of strategy. Albeit viewing surprise as an element 
of strategy in general, the von Clausewitz is cautious to its strategic utility:  
 
“[…] while the wish to achieve is common, and, indeed, indispensable, and while it is 
true that it will never be completely ineffective, it is equally true that by its very nature 
surprise can rarely be outstandingly successful. It would be a mistake, therefore, to 
regard surprise as a key element of success in war. The principle is highly attractive in 
theory, but in practice it is often held up by the friction of the whole machine.”283 
 
This leads to the question what Clausewitz would consider “outstandingly successful”, or the  
“key element to success in war”. To the Prussian war theorist, success in war is the annihilation 
of the enemy on the battlefield, brought about in a single, decisive battle - the battle of 
 
280 On Clausewitz argument on the intractability of surprise: Watts, Bryan D.: ‘Clausewitzian Friction and the 
Future of War’, McNair Paper 52, Oct. 1996, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defence 
University, Washington D.C. 
281 Tzu, Sun: The Art of War, translated by Samuel B. Griffith, Oxford University Press, 1963, p. 79. 
282 It appears important to stress the same cultural origin of the authors assessed, as often the distinction 
between the direct and the indirect approach is wrongly related to different cultures, with the direct approach 
representing the Western school of strategic though, and the indirect school of strategic thought representing 
the Eastern or Asian school of thought. The distinction between the two approaches in strategy however was 
introduced by Basil Liddell Hart, a Western scholar applying positivist methods to test the assumptions offered 
by Carl von Clausewitz after the experience of the battles of attrition in the First World War. While Liddell-Hart 
was chiefly concerned with land warfare, a similar notion was developed for sea-based warfare and strategy by 
Sir Julien Corbett, see: Corbett, Julian S.: Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, Naval Institute Press, 1988.  
283 Clausewitz, Carl von: On War, edited and translated by Howard, Michael; Paret, Peter, Princeton University 
Press, Princeton, N.J, 1984, p. 198.  





annihilation. This decisive engagement serves as the axiom of Clausewitz’ strategy framework. 
His remarks on the value of surprise to strategy have thus to be seen in relation to this axiom.   
Clausewitz does not deny the attractiveness of surprise to military considerations – however, 
not in strategy: 
 
“Basically, surprise is a tactical device, simply because in tactics, time and space are 
limited in scale. Therefore, in strategy surprise becomes more feasible the closer it 
occurs to the tactical realm, and more difficult, the more it approaches the higher levels 
of policy”284 
 
In light of the attractiveness of taking the enemy by surprise, Clausewitz emphasises the 
importance of correct planning – because if the enemy is surprised based on flawed assumptions 
and with faulty measures, he will have little issue in overcoming the initial shock, as the surprise 
is not total and decisive. Once the surprise occurred, much is given away to the enemy about 
intentions and capabilities – and weaknesses, which the enemy can exploit after the initial shock 
following the surprise attack has faded.  
 
The main reason for Clausewitz’ critique of the strategic relevance of surprise is the fact that it 
is impossible to conceal the preparations for a surprise with strategic effect: “Preparations for 
war usually take months and these preparations rarely escape the adversary’s vigilance”285. 
Surprising the enemy strategically, Clausewitz holds, is a rare occurrence that “depend[s] on 
more than energy, forcefulness and resolution of the commander: it must be favoured by other 
circumstances “286.  
 
His fundamental criticism about the likelihood of a decisive, or strategic, surprise 
notwithstanding, Clausewitz is somewhat ambiguous about it. On the one hand he dismisses its 
value to strategy. On the other hand, though, he acknowledges that the psychological effect of 
surprise may be so great, that, if circumstances are right and the planning correct, the victim of 
 
284 Clausewitz, Carl von: On War, p. 198. 
285 This argument, slightly adapted, is repeated by those that believe that technological advances in 
surveillance and intelligence technology render surprise impossible, see especially:  Bracken, P.; Bremmer, I.; 
Gordon, D. (eds.): Managing Strategic Surprise, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2008 
286 Clausewitz, Carl von: On War,  p. 200. 





surprise will lose and never regain the bonds of inner-cohesion. This goes to show that despite 
all criticism, Clausewitz gives surprise a chance.  
 
Viewing Clausewitz’ chapter on surprise in isolation however only gives a limited impression 
on why the Prussian is sceptical about the strategic utility of surprise. It becomes clearer in his 
analysis the role of stratagem or cunning (Kriegslist) as the means to create the right 
circumstances for surprise287.  
 
“The term “cunning” implies secret purpose. It contrasts with the straight-forward, 
simple direct approach as much as wit contrasts with direct proof”288 
 
To the Prussian war intellectual all surprise “is rooted in at least some degree of cunning”289. 
The objective of cunning is to surprise the enemy:  
 
“The use of a trick or stratagem permits the intended victim to make his own mistakes, 
which, combined, in a single result, suddenly change the nature of the situation before 
his very eyes”290.  
 
Noting that strategy and stratagem share the Greek prefix strat-, Clausewitz acknowledges that, 
superficially, it seems plausible that strategy is derived from stratagem. To the grand Prussian 
strategist’s mind, this appears particularly true if one distinguishes between the execution of 
force (tactics) and the skilful exploitation of force for a larger purpose (strategy).  
 
From this perspective “no human characteristic appears more suitable to the task of directing 
and inspiring strategy than the gift of cunning”291. However, to Clausewitz 
 
“[s]trategy is exclusively concerned with engagements and with the directions relating 
to them. Unlike other areas of life, it is not concerned with actions that consist only of 
 
287 Clausewitz, Carl von: On War, p. 200ff. 
288 Clausewitz, Carl von: On War, p. 202. 
289  Clausewitz, Carl von: On War, p. 202. 
290  Clausewitz, Carl von: On War, p. 202. 
291  Clausewitz, Carl von: On War, p. 202. 





words, such as statements, declarations and so forth. But words, being cheap, are the 
most common means of creating false impressions”292.  
 
Words, or “analogous things in war”293 issued for appearance and confusion to Clausewitz have 
so little strategic value, that they should not be “considered as a significant independent field 
of action at the disposal of the Commander”. Clausewitz warns that  
 
“[i]t is dangerous, in fact, to use substantial forces over any length of time to merely 
create an illusion; there is always that risk that nothing will be gained and the troops 
deployed will not be available when they are really needed”294.   
 
According to Clausewitz, able generals are aware of this risk, and in war “stern necessity 
usually permeates direct action to such an extent that no room is left for such a game [of 
cunning].”295   
In sum, the Prussian military intellectual could be no clearer in his judgement on the strategic 
(in)validity of cunning, deception and, and their objective, surprise. To his mind, only “in a 
state of weakness and insignificance, when prudence, judgment, and ability no longer suffice, 
cunning may well appear the only hope”. 296  
2.1.2. The indirect approach: A premium on surprise 
Regarding the outlook of surprise being decisive for the outcome of war, the direct approach 
and the indirect approach assume diametrical stances. The following will discuss the 
considerations of the relationship between surprise and strategy offered by Basil H. Liddell Hart 
in his opus magnum, Strategy297.  
 
Contrary to Clausewitz hypothesis that the direct military engagement is the decisive factor in 
war, Liddell-Hart finds that historical evidence shows that only rarely has there been the 
decisive battle: “The perfection of strategy would be, therefore, to produce a decision without 
 
292  Clausewitz, Carl von: On War, p. 202. 
293  Clausewitz, Carl von: On War, p. 202. 
294  Clausewitz, Carl von: On War, p. 203.  
295 Clausewitz, Carl von: On War, p. 203. 
296 Clausewitz, Carl von: On War, p. 203. 
297 Liddell-Hart, Basil Henry Sir: Strategy, Praeger, New York, 1967.  





any serious fighting”298 Rather than seeking the decisive battle to annihilate the enemy, success 
in war to Liddell-Hart is achieved  by “diminish[ing] the possibility of resistance”, until the 
enemy is dislocated. He finds that the sequel of dislocation “may be either the enemy’s 
dissolution or his easier disruption in battle. Dissolution may involve some partial measure of 
fighting, but this does not have the character of a battle”299. This, according to the British 
strategist, is best achieved by exploiting “the elements of movement and surprise”300.  
 
According to Liddell-Hart, manoeuvre belongs to the physical realm and surprise to the 
psychological realm. However, Liddell-Hart emphasises their interrelation:  
 
“Although strategy may aim more at exploiting movement than at exploiting surprise, 
or conversely, the two elements react on each other. For a movement which is 
accelerated or changes its direction inevitably carries with it a degree of surprise, even 
though it be unconcealed; while surprise smoothes the path of movement by hindering 
the enemy’s counter-measures and counter-movements.”301  
 
To Liddell Hart, “dislocation is the result of the impression on the commander’s mind”302. A 
sudden realization of being at a disadvantage will increase the sense of psychological 
dislocation. In other words, while the physical sphere seeks to find the line of least resistance, 
the psychological sphere seeks to find the line of least expectation.  
From the perspective of the British thinker on strategy, the adversary’s mindset and 
psychological sphere is ultimately decisive. To his mind, surprise, is at the core of dislocating 
the adversary’s commander’s mind. Dislocation is rarely achieved in a single move, but rather 
requires preceding moves which Liddell-Hart calls “distractions”. These are aimed at depriving 
the enemy of his freedom of action. In the physical sphere, distraction should divert the 
adversary’s troops to unprofitable ends, while in the psychological distractions may be achieved 
by “playing upon the fears of, and by deceiving, the opposing command303.  
 
298 Liddell-Hart, Basil Henry Sir: Strategy, p. 338. 
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Psychological distractions are also the method to threaten the opponent with what Liddell-Hart 
calls alternative objectives. The efforts required by the opponent to guard against more than 
one objective serve as a distraction of mind and dispersion of forces. To “put the enemy on the 
horns of a dilemma”304 requires the concealment of the true intention, or deception and cunning.  
2.1.3. Surprise as essentially contested concept in war and strategy 
The two interpretations of strategy, and the role of surprise within it offered by Liddell-Hart 
and Clausewitz could not be any more different.  Strategy is concerned with the study of how 
to win war. In this regard, surprise, can be considered as an essentially contested concept in the 
theory of how to win wars, or strategy. Despite this, there are areas of agreement:  
(1) Surprise is a temporary, psychological effect. 
(2) Surprise is a powerful force multiplier. 
(3) The means to surprise is cunning and deception.  
It is on the question of the relative value of surprise to strategy, and hence to the question of 
how to win wars, where the two authors differ: For Clausewitz, surprise, is, at best, located in 
the world of tactics. A strategic surprise, one of decisive effect to the outcome of war, to 
Clausewitz seems unlikely: Longevity of preparation and the frictions inherent to large 
organisations stand in the way, preventing to fully conceal the plans from the adversary. 
Furthermore, Clausewitz makes a normative comment, stating that surprise, cunning and 
deception may serve as a last beacon of hope to the militarily inferior side. To Liddell-Hart, on 
the other hand, surprise is the effect that is ultimately decisive to impose one’s will on the 
adversary.  
While Clausewitz, in strict consequence to his dogma of the battle of annihilation to win wars 
considers surprise from its effect on the decisive battlefield engagement, and thus intractable, 
Liddell-Hart considers surprise to be of strategic effect, thus ultimately decisive to dislocate the 
adversary. While Clausewitz considers the effect of a singular surprise (attack), to the British 
thinker, it is not a question of “one” surprise, but of a series of surprise events, in which the 
ultimate surprise is then considered to be a “strategic surprise”. Finally, the two schools 
fundamentally differ in relation to the element of planning. While for the Prussian war theorist, 
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strategy and planning are almost synonymous305, the British theorist influenced by the 
experience of trench-warfare that characterised the 1st world war is more hesitant on the role of 
planning, and puts a premium on manoeuvrability, flexibility and adaptability. His is more a 
muddle-through the best you can but don’t waste time on writing a plan – or, as Clausewitz 
disciple Count Moltke the Elder argued – a system of expedients as no plan lasts longer than 
until the first contact with the enemy306. Table 2 summarizes the findings of the role of surprise 
to winning wars for the two approaches to strategy:   
Direct approach Indirect approach 
- Strategy is concerned with how to win 
wars.  
- Success in war is brought about by 
the annihilation of the adversary on 
the battlefield. 
- Psychological effect on adversary not 
always decisive. 
- Surprise only applicable at tactical 
level of war. 
- Achieved by deception = Effort to 
manipulate adversary’s mindset, with 
the aim to surprise.  
- If successful, force multiplier, but 
strategic effect unlikely due to 
internal friction (leaks) and risk of 
discovery (difficulty of concealing 
large military operations). Strategy is 
planning. 
- Weapon of the weak. 
 
- Strategy is concerned with how to win 
wars.  
- Success in war is when the enemy is 
dislocated.  
- Dislocating the enemy is achieved by 
movement and surprise and prevent 
battlefield engagements.  
- Surprise is achieved by efforts to 
manipulate the adversary’s mindset.    
- Psychological realm decisive. 
- Rather than seeking military 
engagement, seek to prevent it; 
winning without fighting is the 
ultimate art of strategy. 




305 Interestingly, his student who later turned into Prussia’s foremost war practitioner, Count Helmuth von 
Moltke (the elder) considered strategy to be a system of expedients, and that plans only last until the first 
contact with the adversary. This is a fundamental difference between the two eminent scholars of Prussian 
military thinking, see: Hughes, Daniel J. (ed): Moltke and the Art of War: Selected Writings, Random House 
Publishing, New York, 2009.  
306 The difference between the two Prussians could in fact not be more startling. A comparative analysis of 
Clausewitz and Moltke and their principles of strategy, how and why they differed might be a worthwhile 
endeavour.  






2.2. Nuclear Age pessimism and Post-Cold War Optimism: The victim’s perspective 
The preceding chapter has shown that amongst the classical thinkers of strategy, the question 
whether surprise can be strategic – that is, decisive in war – is essentially contested.  
 
The continued relevance of these two approaches to strategy notwithstanding, the military-
technological developments catalysed by the Second World War led to a paradigm change for 
the thinking about strategy. It also changed the focus of thinking about strategic surprise – 
facing the threat of an unexpected, decisive, nuclear attack, another questioned gained 
prevalence in relation to surprise: Can it be prevented.  
 
The advent of the nuclear weapon made a wholly new approach to strategy seem necessary, as 
the nuclear weapon was considered a technology rendering all previous thinking on how to win 
wars outdated. A weapon of such effect that a single strike had the potential to annihilate the 
adversary. A truly “strategic” weapon, to remain in the terms of Clausewitz; a weapon that 
made attempts to “dislocate” the adversary in a complex series of a cost-intensive and risky 
undertaking.  
 
The “absolute weapon” had been uncovered307. There was a requirement to “think the 
unthinkable”, as Hermann Kahn, one of the godfathers of civilian strategic thinking in the 
nuclear age eloquently put it308.   
 
The feasibility of strategic surprise was not only a consequence of the devastating effect of the 
atomic bomb, but also the technological advances in delivering them. This argument was first 
put forward by Albert Wohlstetter in a contribution to Foreign Affairs magazine titled “The 
delicate balance of power”309, where he points to the fact that the preparation and delivery time 
for a single, decisive blow was drastically shortened with the developments in air power and 
 
307 Brodie, Bernard: The Absolute Weapon, Atomic Power and World Order, New York: Harcourt, Brace and 
Company, 1946. 
308 Kahn, Hermann F.: Thinking the Unthinkable, Horizon Press, New York, 1962.  
309 Wohlstetter, Albert: “The Delicate Balance of Terror”, in Foreign Affairs, vol. 37, no. 2, pp. 211 – 234, Council 
on Foreign Relations, Washington, 1959.  





propulsion technologies, which also increased the chance of being caught unaware by an attack 
with nuclear – strategic - weapons.310 
 
The possibility of falling victim to a nuclear surprise attack led to systematically consider why 
governments are surprised. In 1962, Roberta Wohlstetter, Albert Wohlstetter’s wife, offered a 
seminal study on how governments fall victim to surprise. In “Warning and Decision”, she 
examined why the U.S. government was surprised by the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.  It 
was the first publication with this specific question in mind, and it served as a blueprint for 
many studies to come in the remainder of the Cold War era and beyond311.  
 
In 2018, Mark F. Cancian published a report for the Centre for Strategic and International 
Studies in which he considers surprise in the context of great power competition, in which a 
most useful summary of the key findings of the plentiful research into surprise since Roberta 
Wohlstetter’s Warning and Decision is provided312.  
 
Two schools of thought have developed over time, one being the orthodox-pessimist school of 
thought, the other being the revisionist school of thought. Their key tenets are summarized in 












310 This point is also made by Michael Handel, who notes that “although surprise has always been possible on 
the tactical level, its feasibility on the strategic level is a relatively new historical phenomenon of the twentieh 
century”. Handel, Michael: ‘Intelligence and the Problem of Strategic Surprise’, in: Journal of Strategic Studies, 
Vol. 7, No. 3, September 1981, p.231.   
311 Wohlstetter, Roberta: Warning and Decision, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1962. 
312 Cancian, Mark F.: Avoiding Coping with Surprise in Great Power Conflicts, Centre for Strategic and 
International Studies (CSIS), Washington D.C., 2018. 






Orthodox-Pessimist Revisionist Optimist  
- Surprise is inevitable 
- Surprise occurs despite the 
availability of warning. 
- While steps can be taken to lower 
susceptibility to surprise, factors 
inherent to surprise prevent the victim 
of surprise from accurately predicting 
and hedging against surprise: 
→ uncertainty inherent in future. 
→ unavoidable limitation in the 
warning and response mechanism of 
government. 
- Two subgroups within orthodox 
school: 
→ the majority considers surprise 
occurs because policy-makers fail to 
respond to available warning. 
→ the minority considers the 
intelligence community, or those 
agencies with the responsibility to 
warn the political leadership of 
impeding danger, to be the culprits.  
  
- Surprise can be avoided 
- Occurs despite the availability of 
warning. 
- Factors contributing to limitations in 
the warning and response mechanism 
of a government can be overcome.  
- Two ‘model-suggestions’: 
→ establish a strategic warning or 
foresight system for policy-makers. 
→ Restructure and reorganize the 




Table 3: The orthodox and the pessimist school on strategic surprise  
Generally, Cancian observes three general patterns in relation to the literature on surprise:  
- Publications come in short spikes after surprise events.  
- The majority of available works are single case-studies of a surprise event. 
- Most literature follows the orthodox-pessimist conclusion that surprise is inevitable. 
The key difference in the two perspectives is thus their outlook on the question whether surprise 
can be prevented. Furthermore, when considering the date of publication, a turn in notion can 
be observed: Throughout the Cold War, the orthodox-school was dominant. From the end of 
the bipolar ideological confrontation until the financial crisis in 2008, the more optimistic 
revisionist school was having the upper hand. However, under the impression of a more and 
more dynamic world, the orthodox-pessimist school experienced a renaissance – greatly helped 





by Nassim Taleb’s bestseller “Black Swans”. He joins the grim outlook – surprise is inevitable 
unless one is blessed with serendipity. However, the continued prevalence of surprise events 
has also given rise to increased efforts in strategic forecasting and thinking about surprise.  
 
The differences between the two surprise-camps notwithstanding, they agree as to the 
underlying factors that contribute to surprise. These will be outlined in the following section.   
2.2.1. Why governments are surprised 
 
As noted above, identifying the factors causing governments to fall victim to surprise have 
received most attention by research on strategic surprise during the Cold War years. In this 
time, widespread agreement on the facrors causing governments falling victim to surprise was 
reached. At the centre of these factors is the assumption that “warning is the antithesis of 
surprise.”313 However, warning alone does not suffice to prevent surprise, as it requires to act 
to warning, too. Thus, governments are surprised because either there was no warning, or 
because policymakers failed to respond.  
 
At the core of this failure is “the manner in which humans, as well as machines built and used 
by humans, process data”314, a factor affecting both warning and decision.  The “human factor” 
contributing to the susceptibility to surprise thus blurs the lines of distinction between warning 
and surprise, as humans account for both “intelligence failures” and “policy fiascos”. The 
question where the brunt of the responsibility for being surprised lies is contested – while some 
argue that surprise is caused  by failure in warning315, others consider the failure of decision-
makers to act on warning to be ultimately decisive for falling victim to surprise316. They argue 
that “Warning means nothing if decision makers fail to act.”317 However, pointing out whether 
surprise occurred due to a failure of warning or due to a failure to act is only possible in 
hindsight. While this may provide relief – or grief – to those that were caught off guard, as it 
allows finger pointing, no general tendency can be identified. Surprise events are unique cases, 
and the failures that ultimately lead to surprise are specific in each case.  
 
313 Kass, Leni; London, J. Phillip J. London: ‘Surprise, Deception, Denial, Warning: Strategic Imperatives’, p. 70. 
314 Kass, Leni; London, J. Phillip J. London: ‘Surprise, Deception, Denial, Warning: Strategic Imperatives’, p. 70. 
315 A key proponent of this notion is Michael I. Handel 
316 Marrin, Steve: ‘Why strategic intelligence analysis has limited influence on American foreign policy’, in: 
Intelligence and National Security, Vol. 32, No. 6, Routlegde, London, 2017, pp. 725 – 742.  
317 Kass, Leni; London, J. Phillip J. London: ‘Surprise, Deception, Denial, Warning: Strategic Imperatives’, p. 69. 






2.2.1.1. Human Factor  
 
The human factor, or “human weakness” as Mark Cancian describes it, equally applies to those 
responsible for warning as for those responsible to act upon warning. A key contribution to 
better understanding the effect of human weakness were Robert Jervis findings on the role of 
perceptions and misperceptions on decision-making in international politics318, in which he 
points to the impact of cognitive biases to international politics. More recent authors include 
Daniel Kahnemann or Phillip Tetlock, whose works highlight the human tendency for mental 
shortcuts, and how this distorts the assessment of incoming information and data319. The human 
being: 
 
- Focuses on the information that is already available, while not considering which 
additional information might be important. 
- Tends to search for information that confirms pre-existing assumptions. 
- Misjudge its ability to control events and rule out the impact of randomness. 
- Is inclined to focus on what is considered normal, creating path-dependencies that 
disregard the possibility of alternatives or disruptions (that is, surprise).  
 
Thus, all information and data are processed through a number of filters – “a perceptual prism 
comprised of [...] culture, assumptions, biases and experiences”320. Figure 1 developed by Kass 
and London describes the process how the human being deals with incoming information and 
highlights the steps in the process information is commonly lost.  
 
318 Jervis, Robert: Perception and Misperception in International Politics. Princeton University Press, Princeton 
NJ, 1976. 
319 Gilovich, Thomas; Griffin, Dale; Kahnemann, Daniel (eds.): Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive 
Judgment, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 2002; Tetlock, Philip E.: Expert Political Judgement: 
How good is it? How can we know?, new edition, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ., 2017. 
320 Kass, Leni; London, J. Phillip J. London: ‘Surprise, Deception, Denial, Warning: Strategic Imperatives’ p. 70. 






Figure 1: Model for Processing and Ordering Information321 
 
2.2.1.2. Organisational Filters 
 
However, these filters are not only limited to the individual, but, as the study of complex 
organisations finds, are reinforced by the mechanics of bureaucracies322. Research has 
identified several structural pathologies within large organisations which contribute to the 
vulnerability to surprise. Particularly hierarchy, specialization, centralization, and the 
regularized patterns of behaviour (like Standard Operating Procedures) „distort the acquisition, 
evaluation, dissemination and consumption of strategic warning“323.  
Irving Janis finds that groups develop a tendency to seek to avoid conflict and reach consensus 
without sufficiently testing and evaluating their courses of action, a phenomenon known as 
‘group think’. As Tetlock points out, the psychological pressures for conformity negatively 
impact the scope of thinking, introduce bias into analysis and punishes individual and 
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322 Allison, Graham T.: Essence of decision. Explaining the Cuban missile crisis, Little, Brown and Company, 
Boston, 1971. 
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independent thought324. The consequences of groupthink are that it increases the likelihood of 
an inaccurate analysis of available information. Furthermore, the limited scope of self-reflection 
may lead to inappropriate or very risky courses of action. 
 
In addition, cybernetic theory, and the related findings on the decision-making process in large 
and complex organizations has contributed to a better understanding to the organisational filters 
contributing to surprise. Filters are cybernetic  
 
“[f]eatures that hinder accurate threat perception and adequate response are: (1) narrow 
input channels; (2) low and highly structured receptivity to incoming information; (3) 
limited repertoire of responses attempted sequentially; (4) slow learning process”325.  
2.2.1.3.  Intelligence Specific Problem 
In the field of intelligence studies, the issue of surprise played a special role – naturall, as the 
world’s leading intelligence organisation, the CIA, was founded to prevent the U.S. government 
from being surprised. In the search for vulnerabilities that lead to being surprised, all of the 
general pathologies identified by those works not explicitly situating themselves in the field of 
intelligence studies are equally at work in the production and consumption of intelligence: The 
cognitive-perceptual issues on the individual as well as the organisational level, as well as the 
structural filters that make it more difficult for non-congruent information to be taken into 
professional consideration and pass it on to the consumer. Concerning the consumption of 
intelligence, the cognitive filters specific to the realities of the policy-world apply. Very often 
the literacy of decision-makers in intelligence is comparatively low. The main reason is that 
only few policymakers reach their position because of expert knowledge on intelligence – and 
even if they were, the importance of the cognitive filter of the individual and his subordinates 
is of particular relevance326.  
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However, when it comes to a government’s vulnerability to surprise, intelligence plays a major 
role, and requires specific attention. Therefore, the role of the intelligence analyst, and how her 
work is affected both by the relationship to policy as well as by the specific structural filters at 
work within the intelligence community led to the identification of intelligence specific issues 
that may contribute to a government’s susceptibility to being surprised.  
2.2.1.3.1. Signal to Noise 
The most prominent factor specific to the production and consumption of intelligence is what 
Roberta Wohlstetter calls the ‘signal to noise’ problem327. It may be regarded as the 
foundational problem of analysis: Accurate and relevant information, or signals, are embedded 
in inaccurate and or irrelevant information, or noise. The challenge for intelligence analysts is 
to distinguish the signals from the noise correctly. However, they are forced to do so against 
the uncertainty inherent to the future.  
2.2.1.3.2. Compartmentation 
Compartmentation is another issue which is specific to intelligence but can be linked to findings 
in relation to the study of small groups. Because of the confidential nature of the work of 
intelligence, specific restrictions apply on the pooling and sharing of information, or the 
incorporation of external views. The effects are twofold – (1) available warning may not be 
utilized because it was not made available, or (2) lead to the issues related to group think, were 
non-congruent information is not being considered to a professionally satisfying extent.  
2.2.1.3.3. Intelligence paradox No.1: Inherent uncertainty of the future  
The first intelligence paradox identified by Handel describes the challenge of the intelligence 
producer to provide certainty in face of inherent uncertainty.  
In the process of „figuring out what an actual or potential opponent is up to “ the intelligence 
analyst is „always at the mercy of the attacker to change his plans“328. In other words, the 
accuracy of information is perpetually subject to the possibility of the adversary to change his 
course of action – making „accurate“ warning a very raw gem.  
 
327 Wohlstetter, Roberta: ‘Warning and Decision’, 1962. 
328 Betts, Richard, K.: Surprise Attack: Lessons for Defense Planning, Brookings Institution Press, Washington 
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In addition, the process of intelligence, and the requirement for it to provide relevant and 
accurate information, creates a time lag in determining likely intentions of the opponent. This 
time lag increases the vulnerability of surprise in two ways: (1) the time lag may prove decisive 
in a sudden transition from routine to threat, and (2) accurate intelligence may become outdated 
by new developments. Formerly accurate information then serves as a cognitive barrier which 
new information has to penetrate.  
2.2.1.3.4. Intelligence paradox No.2: Deception  
Lastly, the information received may have been deliberately send or manipulated by the 
adversary to achieve a certain end or invoke a certain impression, ie to cover or distract from a 
signal. As Michael I Handel put it:  
“The ever-present possibility of deception further complicates the already difficult task of the 
intelligence analyst. Deception can be defined as the deliberate and subtle dissemination of 
misleading information to an intelligence service by its adversaries.”329  
Handel also highlighted that being alert to the possibility of adversarial deception leads to an 
intelligence paradox: “The more alert one is to deception, the more likely one is to become its 
victim.”330 In other words, Michael Handel warns against considering deception in too much 
depth, as it may turn into a self-fulfilling prophecy.  
2.2.2.  Preventing Surprise 
Considerable efforts were undertaken to find pathways to rule out future surprise. Much of it 
was carried by and developed in sync with progress in digital technology, affecting information 
gathering, analyses and decision-making processes alike. For example, in strategic intelligence 
or foresight, Bayesian networks play a key role, as they allowed to consider large amounts of 
data and identify possible future development and attach probabilities as to their likelihood331. 
Not everything, however, was informed by the development of technology. Undertakings like 
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Red Teaming, Critical Thinking, simulation exercises, workshops on group-think and the power 
of mental images , or considering possible surprises – grey instead of black swans, are less 
technology-driven, and focus more on the human factor contributing to surprise, seeking to 
raise awareness of possible blind-spots rather than forecasting the probabilities of the next 
unexpected event. A mix is of both the cognitive and the technological elements that may 
contribute to hedge against future surprise is offered by those that focus on the flow of 
information within government agencies and between them, between the political level and the 
bureaucracy or between academia and policy. This approach is possible the most traditional, as 
it mirrors the facets held by the adherents of cybernetics. The chief aim is to minimise 
susceptibility to surprise by seeking to improve the flow of information and decision-making 
processes.332  
 
However, despite the quantum leaps in technological developments the world experienced since 
Ariel Levite presented a more optimistic view on preventing future surprise, and the 
mushrooming of structured approaches aiming to raise awareness to the human factors 
contributing to surprise, surprise continues to occur.  
 
Some argue that ultimately, the blame rest with the decision-makers, whose competing 
priorities and lack of interest in matters that might occur in the future bar them from reacting 
when there would still be time. The criticism of the policymaker, however, is nothing new, and 
a common theme especially in intelligence studies. One man’s surprise is another man’s 
analysis.  
 
Others, like Leni and Kass, on the other hand, are cautious to point to a particular group of 
actors within government.  
 
“The readiness to open the mental, institutional and technological apertures and the ensuing 
ability to absorb and integrate new information in new ways are usually short-lived. Soon after 
the crisis that shocked the system and induced new behaviors passes, stability and “business as 
usual” become the natural default. The transformed behaviors become the new normal; newly 
created “memory boxes” become stale or irrelevant; complacency inevitably sets in. This allows 
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determined adversaries to find new opportunities to exploit the target’s comfort with and 
confidence in the “fixes” that have been introduced into the collection, analysis, and decision-
making system. Absent constant vigilance and adaptation to ever-evolving threats, fixes become 
fixations, generating new vulnerabilities to be exploited both symmetrically and 
asymmetrically.” 
 
More simply put – even though there is a period where perceptions are changed because of the 
recent experience of surprise, new path-dependencies and blind spots are created as time 
continues.  The following figure by Leni and Kass captures this eternal spiral of surprise:  
 
Figure 2: The eternal spiral of surprise333 
 
To maintain constant vigilance, the only cure against surprise, Leni and Kass propose ten 
maxims that should guide decision-makers, diplomats, soldiers and intelligence analysts at all 
levels and all times:  
- “1. Always conduct a reality check from not only your own perspective but also that of 
the opponent. Reality always has rough edges, ambiguities, and shades of gray. If 
everything is crystal clear and consistent with your best-case scenario, and the 
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adversary behaves just like you would in similar circumstances, you are probably being 
deceived.  
 
-  2. State assumptions clearly and explicitly. Identify pivotal assumptions, those that if 
proven wrong would upend your entire approach. Develop a system to periodically 
revalidate these assumptions, making sure you don't confuse estimates with facts, or 
hopes with viable courses of action. Remember that any plan that relies on more than 
two consecutive miracles and violates more than one law of physics is not suitable—
even as a deception or feint.  
 
- 3. Don’t fall in love with any plan, policy, program, or assessment. Don’t expect the 
opponent to cooperate. Have a branch and sequel to address the unexpected along the 
lines of “what if?” and “what next?” Pay attention to what both adversaries and allies 
are saying and doing—especially if there is a mismatch between words and deeds. Don't 
discount indicators just because they point to things you would never do. There are no 
universal standards of rationality or recklessness.  
 
- 4. Collaborate with all who might provide fresh insights and different perspectives. 
Keep this circle as diverse and wide as practicable. Help your colleagues by asking the 
“right” questions. Tell them explicitly what you need to know and why. But be realistic: 
no existing technology is capable of assessing intentions. Question the bona fides of any 
information—no matter how comforting, convincing, or highly classified.  
 
- 5. You don’t know what you don’t know, and what you don’t know can spell disaster. 
Create an organizational climate that allows for alternative viewpoints to be given a 
fair hearing. Beware of group-think and remember that just because something never 
happened before does not preclude it from happening. Every precedent was created by 
someone’s act of courage or folly.  
 
- 6. Trust your instincts and be ready to pay the price that might go with that. Warning is 
about being safe, not about being right. Beware of the “cry wolf” syndrome, but don’t 
dismiss the bearers of bad news. Sometimes the wolves are really at the gate and 
“inflammatory rhetoric” indicates a real and present danger.  
 





- 7. Timely, unambiguous warning is nice to have, but don’t count on it. Don’t assume or 
expect that appropriate decisions, authorities and actions would automatically follow. 
You have plenty of latitude within your own organization. Do what’s right, even if you 
have to stake your career on it. 
 
-  8. Don’t be a victim! It’s painful, even if you ultimately win. Never allow the initiator 
to exploit his initial success. Surprise only determines where and how the first battles 
will be fought, but it’s up to you to revalidate this principle every single time.  
 
- 9. Don’t get complacent. Hubris kills.”334 
While these practical maxims proposed by Leni and Kass are of little help to identify and 
prepare for the next surprise, they are helpful in the sense that they are simple to remember, and 
provide a structure of thinking mindful of the perils of the human being – and surprise to a 
government. It was therefore included here in full length.  
2.2.3. The researcher’s dilemma: Developing a theory of surprise vs. enriching insight 
on a specific event at the expense of academic rigour? 
Another shortcoming in the efforts on strategic surprise was the academic rigour applied, which 
was especially noted by Ariel Levite in Intelligence and Strategic Surprise335. Following its 
publication, a heated debate about the relative value of academic rigour for the study of surprise 
with one of the most outspoken scholars of strategic surprise, Richard K. Betts, broke out336.  
 
Levite, arguing on the base of a comprehensive review of the existing literature on the 
phenomenon of surprise argues that they are no more than “educated guesses, lacking the 
academic rigour required for establishing a theory. The existing body of literature, he argues, 
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is “plagued by severe methodological and substantive shortcomings that cast doubt on the 
validity of their conclusions”337.  
 
His criticism of what he called the orthodox pessimist school has several dimensions. The first 
concerns the quality of the data used to measure one of the variables of surprise identified by 
this school: warning. In the eyes of the proponents of the orthodox school, all information that 
could be known to the government prior to the surprise event can be considered as warning. 
Levite on the other hand argues that only information that has been processed by a 
government’s intelligence service can be considered warning. The second dimension concerns 
the methodology applied – he notes that most of the studies on the subject draw their 
conclusions on single, reconstructive case studies. Levite also notes a selection bias in these 
cases, as they predominantly focus on cases of military surprise attack, and do not represent 
what he considers the universe of surprise cases. Furthermore, they only consider successful 
surprise attacks, not unsuccessful ones. Lastly in the context of the second dimension of 
Levite’s fundamental criticism Levite argues that by focussing on single cases instead of 
comparing several cases, earlier studies do not fulfil the standards of comparison to distinguish 
between causation and correlation.  
 
The third dimension Levite criticizes is the sources used for data collection by earlier attempts, 
as it is mainly secondary data, but rarely primary data. This is in line with Levite’s narrow 
notion of warning in the context of surprise. The fourth dimension Levite criticizes concerns 
the determination of necessary and sufficient causes of surprise. To establish a general theory, 
the identification of the necessary or sufficient causes of surprise, as well as the identification 
of the decisive cause is required. However, Levite dismisses the prevalent, multi-causal 
explanations of surprise, as they are ill-suited to identify which variables produce necessary 
causes as opposed to sufficient ones.  
 
Levite’s criticism did not go unheeded and invoked a response by Richard K. Betts, a leading 
proponent of the notion that surprise is inevitable. His response is no less sharp than Levite’s 
criticism. In principle Betts agrees with the diagnosis of Levite but argues that “in practice it is 
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impossible to surmount barriers Betts rejects Levite’s critique by pointing out the peculiarity of 
surprise.   
 
“Even more than usual in social science, surprise attack is not susceptible to replication […]. While 
general similarities exist, specific differences between each case are so numerous that one could 
legitimately isolate parsimonious explanations with confidence.”338  
 
In other words, each case of surprise is unique, making the distinction between necessary and 
sufficient causes impossible and thereby rendering attempts to develop a theory that stands the 
proof of rigid academic scrutiny as an exercise in futility. This also goes for the isolation of the 
decisive cause, a criticism that Richard Betts counters as depoliticized, as only “foolhardy 
analysts would believe that they know which factors are decisive when dealing with matters of 
perception, that the officials whose decisions are under scrutiny may not even understand 
themselves” 339.  
 
In relation to Levite’s critique of the sources and data considered, Betts maintains a similar line 
– it is an apolitical assumption that government decision-makers only take information 
processed by the government’s intelligence services into account for their decisions. Thus, 
while he acknowledges that Levite’s narrow scope of sources and data qualified to measure the 
availability of warning, as it reduces the amount of data the researcher is required to consider, 
he rebukes the criticism as too academic to represent the messy reality of political decision 
making. Instead of offering an alternative, however, Richard Betts uses this argument to defend 
the predominant single-case studies, as each case requires the researcher to consider large 
amounts of data. To Betts, this is also the reason why Levite’s demand to conduct large-n 
comparative studies is beyond reach for the individual researcher.   
 
In relation to Levite’s demand for data from primary source, Betts points to a practical issue the 
surprise-scholar faces: Surprise, when it happens to a government is embarrassing, as it exposes 
a government’s failure to anticipate adversarial developments and hedge against them in due 
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time. Therefore, primary data is rarely made available for the scrutiny by academics, and if so, 
often only with a considerable time lag. This also explains why often, there is a considerable 
time lag between cases of surprise and research about them. A good case in point is Roberta 
Wohlstetter’s seminal “Warning and Decision” – it was published 17 years after the end of 
World War 2, and 21 years after the Japanese surprise attack on Pearl Harbor.  
 
Betts strongest challenge to Levite’s criticism about earlier works, however, is that he points 
out that despite the rigorous methodology Ariel Levite develops, his conclusions are no 
different to those of earlier research. That he has a more optimistic outlook on preventing future 
surprise was less to do with his findings on the factors contributing to surprise, then in the 
technological advances.  
 
Mindful of the academic desire to fulfil rigorous standards, and develop a theory, Betts 
concludes that:  
 
“In principle, much of his [Ariel Levite’s] diagnosis is correct. In practice it is impossible to 
surmount the barriers to more scientific treatment. The question becomes whether data should 
be forces onto a procrustean bed to produce the rigorous theory Levite endorses (which would 
be pseudo-science), or whether the goals of inquiry should be reduced to permit maximal 
methodological rigor (Levite’s solution), or whether scientific standards should be 
compromised to enrich insight.”340 
 
Thus, the researcher interested in surprise faces three basic choices: (1) Force data on a 
procrustean bed to produce a rigorous theory; (2) reduce goals of enquiry to permit maximum 
methodological rigour ; (3) compromise scientific standards to enrich insight.  None of these 
solutions is fully satisfying, each solution invites criticism. All options carry risks.  
 
The exchange of views between Levite and Betts about the value of the academic standards and 
the desire to develop a theory for social phenomena is rather heated. Most importantly, for the 
researcher it cautions against aiming academically too high. Surprise is a humbling experience, 
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both in theory and practice. And even though some341 claim that the widespread agreement that 
can be observed amongst researchers as to what causes the phenomenon of surprise, a theory 
that complies with the criteria laid out by Ariel Levite yet to be established.  
 
Therefore, instead of aiming to identify “conditional generalizations regarding the 
circumstances in which various causal patterns leading to surprise occur”, the researcher, as 
Richard Betts convincingly argues, should consider surprise as what it is:  a specific event, for 
which certain causal phenomena can be identified for its occurrence. While Levite makes a 
compelling case for academic rigour, seeking to establish a specific explanation appears to be 
an equally legitimate aim for analysing cases of surprise.  
 
For this research, the dilemma surprise poses to the researcher has already been resolved 
previously – it considers surprise in the annexation of a Crimea as a specific event, and it is 
interested in the questions which causal phenomena can be identified for its occurrence, and 
what role did surprise have for the overall outcome.  
2.2.4. Summary - Nuclear Age Pessimism: The victim’s perspective 
The focus of the debate in relation to surprise has shifted considerably compared to the lines of 
debate on the role of surprise between the direct and indirect approach to strategy. Instead of 
debating whether surprise can have strategic effect, and be planned for with that objective in 
mind, the essentially contested question became whether future surprise can be prevented. 
Secondly, unlike under the impression of the threat of a nuclear surprise attack, the issue has 
moved from being an essentially contested concept to a phenomenon about which widespread 
agreement was reached on many aspects of which one in particular demasks the overwhelming 
majority of the efforts to better understand the phenomenon of strategic surprise to have adopted 
the notion on the strategic relevance of surprise offered by Carl von Clausewitz and the disciples 
of the direct-approach: there is no need to consider how surprise is achieved. This notion is 
especially evident in the outright rejection on considering deception and cunning by Michael I. 
Handel. Although there is no shortage on citations of the eminent Prussian in the literature on 
strategic surprise, there is no reference or reflection of the indirect approach and its view on the 
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utility of cunning and surprise to win wars. Hence, the essentially contested question in the pre-
nuclear debate on how to win wars, or strategy, was answered before it had been discussed and 
reflected. This explains why the efforts undertaken to better understand strategic surprise 
exclusively consider only the victim’s perspective – but also makes evident that the debate 
between the direct and the indirect approach on surprise had been implicitly resolved in favour 
of the direct-approach.  
 
Interestingly, this limited focus on the victim’s perspective was addressed by most scholars, but 
countered with the arguments offered by Clausewitz – preparing surprise is a waste of time, and 
deception is a weapon of the weak. But since it is inevitably part of war, and a powerful force 
multiplier, it is better to seek ways to prevent it.  Furthermore, despite the optimism that better 
technology, a better understanding of the internal drivers that increase the susceptibility to 
surprise, improved decision-making systems and a plethora of tools and methods could prevent 
future surprise, future surprise were not averted. 
 
However, as the hypothesis about the role of surprise for the annexation of Crimea, and why it 
happened, identified in previous works and from the data collected and analysed for this 
research go to show, why surprise occurred in the context of Crimea cannot be fully answered 
if only the victim’s perspective is considered. It requires to consider the means to surprise, 
deception, as well, which, as the previous section outlined, was not thoroughly considered by 
those concerned with strategic surprise during the Cold War.  
3. The means to surprise: Deception. 
 
3.1. Preliminary Remarks 
Despite the role deception, cunning or subterfuge, as a means to surprise played in the pre-
nuclear debate about how to win wars, it was not considered in depth by those focussing on 
“strategic surprise” following the advent of the nuclear weapon, with one notable exception: 
Barton Whaley342. His doubts about the validity of the findings by Roberta Wohlstetter and her 
disciples of the orthodox school grew while studying another historical surprise event, Nazi-
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Germany’s surprise attack on the Soviet Union. While he found indications of the internal 
factors idiosyncratic to Stalin and the Soviet Union that contributed to their surprise, it was 
German deception that created the conditions for Stalin’s surprise. It did so by making Stalin 
very certain, and very wrong343. Whaley also was not convinced by the argument that deception 
should not be considered too deeply, as it carries the risk of creating self-fulfilling prophecies 
– rather, Whaley argued, if deception is an adversarial, methodological activity aimed to create 
the conditions for surprise, then in seeking ways to prevent surprise, countering deception is 
the only active defence available against the sole external factor identified for causing surprise 
to governments344.  
 
Whaley’s opus magnum on the subject, however, is Stratagem, where he conducts a large-n 
study on the inexorable link between deception and surprise. His works and numerous efforts 
notwithstanding, Whaley and his notion was the odd one out, a singular representative of the 
indirect approach345. Neither the inexorable link between deception and surprise Whaley sought 
to capture, nor the ‘theory of stratagem’346 he developed, nor his efforts to develop counter-
deception methods were seriously considered by mainstream strategic surprise experts of the 
Cold War period – or thereafter347. Instead, deception was considered in isolation, as an 
independent activity. The following section will consider and discuss the findings of these 
efforts.  
 
Unlike the research on strategic surprise which experienced its heydeys in the early days of the 
Cold War, deception only gained prominence as an academic research subject in the last decade 
of the bipolar confrontation. One reason for this is the fact that Soviet deception capabilities 
were considered inferior, and at best of tactical nature348. Much of this assumption was based 
on Stalin’s decision to remove surprise from a “principle of war” to the status of a “permanently 
operating factor” after the experience of Nazi Germany’s surprise attack in 1941. 
 
 
343 Whaley, Barton: Stratagem, Artech House, Boston London, 1969/2007 (reprint), p. 71. 
344 Whaley, Barton: Stratagem, Artech House, Boston London, 1969/2007 (reprint),, pp. 75-78. 
345 Whaley, Barton: Stratagem, Artech House, Boston London, 1969/2007 (reprint), pp. 61-63. 
346 Whaley, Barton: Stratagem, Artech House, Boston London, 1969/2007 (reprint), pp 67- 73. 
347 Unlike other works on deception or strategic surprise, however, Whaley’s core contribution, Stratagem, was 
reprinted in 2007.  
348 It led to a large Departement of Defense funded enquiry into the matter, later published as:  Daniel, Donald 
C; Herbig, Katherine L (eds): Strategic Military Deception, Pergamon Policy Studies on Security Affairs, 
Pergamon Press, New York, 1981.  





 However, in the early eighties, when NATO countries learned about the level of sophistication 
of Soviet military deception operations by the defector Wladimir Bogdanowitsch Resin, who 
prior to defecting was an officer of the Soviet Special Forces and the Soviet Military 
Intelligence Service GRU. Methods like “active measures”, or “reflexive control” indicated that 
Soviet deception capabilities had taken a surprising turn from what was until then perceived to 
be rather unsophisticated skills. 
 
The interest in deception, however, was rather short-lived, as only a few years after Resin 
changed sides, the world order would fundamentally change. The ensuing peace-euphoria led 
to the perception that there would be no need to further consider those aspects of war the 
“Western” strategist Clausewitz had so eloquently described as weapons of the morally inferior.  
However, it must also be noted that the issue of deception has always been very much a 
specialist subject, and of particular interest to the military and intelligence communities, and 
less to the research community. The lack of academic interest notwithstanding, research into 
how to deceive successfully has produced rich insights into the process of deception.   
3.1.1. Definition  
In a study on deception and urban warfare by Scott Gerwehr and Russell W. Glenn for the 
RAND Corporation, the authors point out that numerous definitions and concepts of deception 
have been offered by the foreign policy, intelligence and defence communities over time349.  
 
For example, Abram Shulsky offers the following definition of deception “the effort to cause 
the adversary to believe something that is not true, to believe a “cover story” rather than the 
truth, with the goal of leading him to react in a way that serves one’s own interest, rather than 
his”350. A shorter but broader definition is offered by Katherine Herbig and Daniel C Donald, 
to whom deception “is the deliberate misrepresentation of reality done to gain a competitive 
 
349 Gerwehr, Scott; Glenn, Russell: The Art of Darkness: Deception and Urban Operations, MR1132, RAND 
Corporation, Santa Monica, 2000, p.19. 
 
350 Shulsky, Abram: ‘Elements of Strategic Denial and Deception’, in: Godson, Roy;, Wirtz, James J.(eds): 
Strategic Denial and Deception – The Twenty First Century Challenge, Routledge, London, 2002,  pp. 15 – 33, p. 
15 





advantage”351.  To Gerwehr and Glenn, on the other hand, the precise wording of the definition 
of deception is irrelevant. To them, “if an operation, a technique, or measure has as its goal the 
deliberate purveyance of falsehood to another to aid friendly interests, we call it 
deception”352.This is done “to produce an inaccurate assessment, or misperception, in the mind 
of the target”. 
3.1.2. Aim of deception 
The aim of deception is to surprise the adversary.  It is a process, a means, not an end, intended 
to create the conditions for the victim to be surprised.  
3.1.3. Objectives of deception 
Kartherine Herbig and Daniel Donal distinguish three objectives of deception. The immediate 
objective of deception is to condition the target’s beliefs, the intermediate objective is to 
influence the target’s actions, and lastly, the ultimate aim is to benefit from the target’s 
actions353. 
3.1.4. Boundaries: Information Operations, Psychological Operations, Propaganda and 
Deception  
The U.S. Joint Chief of Staff Doctrine on deception from 2006 considers military deception 
activities to be part of information warfare. It defines Information Warfare as  “Information 
Operations conducted during times of crisis of conflict to achieve or promote specific objectives 
over a specific adversary or adversaries”354. Other Information Warfare activities include 
Psychological Operations (PSYOPS), Electronic Warfare (EW), Computer Network 
Operations (CNO), and Operations Security (OPSEC). They are “actions taken to […] influence 
others’ decision-making processes, information and information systems while protecting one’s 
own information and information systems”. To place deception into the context of information 
warfare, it appears important to distinguish it from the other information operations activities.  
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OpSec has the purpose to deny the adversary knowledge about friendly forces capability and 
intent. Another term used to describe the same effect is thus denial. As Abram Shulsky and 
others point out, denial is always part of deception, as key to a successful deception operation 
is to deny the enemy knowledge of the deception and its elements355.  
 
EW and CNO on the other hand seek to achieve a kinetic effect on the adversary’s critical 
national infrastructure (CNI) by the use of modern information technology and have both an 
offensive as well as a defensive (or OPSEC) component.  
 
Psychological Operations, however, aim at the cognitive elements in war. Both deception and 
propaganda target the mind of the adversary by the cunning use of words and can thus be 
considered as psychological operations or non-kinetic operations356. 
 
However, they are distinct activities357. Propaganda related activities can be distinguished by 
their source. While “white” propaganda refers to propaganda activities where the source is 
known, i.e. Russia Today, “Black” Propaganda refers to activities where the source is unknown. 
The latter is often a routine activity of intelligence services. However, it is unspecific in relation 
to its aims. Propaganda operations also are not specific but seek to influence the target’s belief 
in a more general fashion – for example to make the own side appear more legitimate in the 
eyes of the adversary’s public. It targets the wider public rather than seeking to achieve a 
specific objective with specific people. Lastly, propaganda is not only aimed at adversarial 
audiences, but is also used to condition the domestic audience’s mindsets, values and belief 
systems.  
 
Unlike propaganda, deception is specific in terms of what it seeks to misrepresent, the target 
audience required to accept the misrepresentation, and the objective it seeks to achieve by 
deception and surprise. A useful metaphor may be to consider propaganda as the production of 
 
355 Shulsky, Abram: ‘Elements of Strategic Denial and Deception', pp 15-16. 
356 The NATO – definition for PSYOPS is established by Military Decision MC 402/1 – NATO Military Policy on 
Psychological Operations. It defines PSYOPS as: “planned activities using methods of communications and other 
means directed to approved audiences in order to influence their perceptions, attitudes and behaviour, affecting 
the achievement of political and military objectives”, NATO: MC 402/1, p. 2,March 2003. 
357 Shulsky, Abram: ‘Elements of Strategic Denial and Deception’, pp 18-19.  





planned noise, while deception is about the transmission or suppression of a specific signal to 
achieve a specific effect. 
 
Although they are distinct activities, in practice it is often difficult to distinguish between 
propaganda and deception as they will appear intertwined – D-Day relied both on the deception 
campaign to mask the true location of attack, as it did on propaganda aimed at the German 
soldiers and populace at large. However, they are distinct activities that require distinct 
considerations how to go about them.  
 
The distinction between propaganda and distinction offered by earlier attempts to better 
understand deception certainly casts doubt on the synonymous use of propaganda and 
misinformation with strategic deception found in earlier works358. Rather, the previous 
discussion has shown, they may appear intertwined, and use the same means, but have widely 
different target audiences and aims.  
 
3.2. Factors influencing the likelihood of deception. 
Two groups of factors influence the likelihood for the use of deception. Contextual factors and 
the idiosyncrasies actors bring to a situation “by virtue of previous conditioning or personal 
predilection”359. The two groups should not be considered in isolation, as they likely interplay. 
It is thus difficult to assess which group is more important to the occurrence of deception, 
although the personal predispositions are ultimately of greater impact. The key question is thus 
why some actors resort to deception and others not. Table 4 summarizes contextual factors and 







358 Pynnömiemi, K; Racz, Andras (eds): Fog of Falsehood: Russian Strategy of Deception and the Conflict in 
Ukraine, Finnish Institute for International Affairs, Helsinki, 2016. 
359 Daniel, Donald C.; Katherine, Herbig L.: ‘Propositions on Military Deception’, p. 164. 
360 Daniel, Donald C.; Katherine, Herbig L.: ‘Propositions on Military Deception’, p. 164 





Contextual factors Actor idiosyncrasies  
High stake situations 
- When outcomes are criticial, actors will 
resort to make use if every available 
capability, advantage, to ensure victory 
or prevent defeat. 
Military weakness 
- Deception as a compensation to offset 
imbalance, by subterfuge and ruse to 
induce the enemy to lower his guard, 
dilute strength, or concentrate forces on 
the wrong objective. 
Cost-Benefit 
- Use of deception to lower costs, for 
example wish to avoid being regarded 
as an aggressor. 
Uncertainty  
- Under conditions of uncertainty, actors 
often seek to mislead or confuse to keep 
their options open and to test the 
reaction to alternative politics. 
Cultural Factors 
- Deception styles may vary from culture to 
culture361 
 
Type of governance 
- Deception may be more common in 
authoritarian states where political leaders 




- Organisations trained for a particular task 
will seek to perform them. 
- States that maintain an apparatus to plan 
and organise deception, or if its military 
preserves passes on or at least debates a 




- People tend to think in terms of what is 
available or familiar to them 
- Unclear why some leaders resort to 
deception while others not, or what 
characterises them; however, “a 
commander that has appreciated and relied 
on deception in the part is likely to do so 
again”364 
 
361 On the cultural aspect of strategic military deception see: Daniel, Donald C; Herbig, Katherine L (eds): 
Strategic Military Deception, Pergamon Policy Studies on Security Affairs, Pergamon Press, New York, 1981, 
particularly part II. An excellent British analysis of Soviet military deception patterns can be found in C.J. Dick: 
Catching NATO unawares: Soviet surprise and deception techniques, in: Rothstein, Hy; Whaley, Barton (eds): 
The Art and Science of Military Deception, Artech House, Boston, London, 2013, pp. 181 – 192. 
362 “secrecy and total control available, and the reduced inhibitions that accompany such exercises of power, 
facilitate and provide incentives for the exercise of craft, cunning and deception” ,see: Goldhamer, Herbert: 
Reality and Belief in Military Affairs: A First Draft (June 1977), edited by Joan Goldhamer, RAND Corporation: R-
2448-NA (February 1979), pp 107-108; cf: Daniel, Donald C.; Katherine, Herbig L.: ‘Propositions on Military 
Deception’ . The point that authoritarian regimes can employ deception more easily than democratic 
governments is also raised by Patrick Morgan and Klaus Knorr in: Morgan, Patrick; Knorr, Klaus: Strategic 
Military Surprise: Incentive and Opportunity, Taylor and Francis, London, 1984.  
363 Consequently, states that have no such capabilities or traditions will have to overcome the inertia when 
deception is suddenly needed again. 
364 Goldhamer, Herbert: ‘Reality and Belief in Military Affairs: A First Draft (June 1977)’, Joan Goldhamer (ed):, 
RAND Corporation: R-2448-NA (February 1979), pp 107-108, cited from: Daniel, Donald C.; Katherine, Herbig L.: 
‘Propositions on Military Deception’. Goldhamer suggests that politics either attracts individuals prone to 
deception, or conditions individuals to practice deception (political animal?). On the role of predispositions 
international relations, see: Jervis, Robert: Perception and Misperception in International Politics. Princeton 
University Press, Princeton NJ, 1976 






3.3. Types of deception  
Deception makes use of words – and is thus a non-kinetic activity, which in the military context 
is considered as part of information operations aiming at the “hearts and minds” of target. 
However, deception is not limited to the military realm, or to military actors. It may also be 
applied by intelligence services or diplomats. Research distinguishes between two types of 
deception: 
- Military Deception refers to deception efforts in wartime. Deception may deal with the 
strategic level (having a decisive effect on the entire war, ie in the initiation of hostilities 
or in ending them. Examples: Trojan Horse; Operation Barbarossa; D-Day), operational 
level (having an effect on a theatre of war; Examples: Operation Mincemeat;), or tactical 
level (affecting a single battle or engagement, example: Battle of Khalkin Gol, 1939)365.  
Its target audience are usually those directly engaged in the conduct of the war at each 
respective level of war366.  
- Strategic Deception refers to deception in both peace and wartime, “aimed at the highest 
levels of government or of the military chain of command” 367. This has a bearing on 
the nature of deception, as its core must be something of such relevance, that individuals 
that hold such high positions of influence would deal with the matter personally.  
Particularly challenging is the question about the objective or nature of strategic deception in 
peacetime. During wart, deception is always expected to be part of the war efforts, and the 
delineation between strategic (entire war), operational (theatre), and tactical (single battle) 
clear. In peacetime, this is more ambiguous, and implies a bigger variety of actors and 
audiences. Strategic deception in peacetime “would deal with major national decisions 
concerning fundamental issues of foreign policy, major decisions concerning military 
procurement, and an assessment of threats a nation faces”368.  
 
365 It should be noted that this single battle had a strategic effect, and so influenced the perception of the 
Japanese High Command, that they hesitated to open a second front against the Soviet Union as was the idea 
of Nazi-Germany, but attack the United States at Pearl Harbor instead.   
366 Joint Chiefs of Staff (eds): Joint Publication 3-13.4 (formerly JP 3-58): Military Deception, 2006, Executive 
Summary. 
367 Shulsky, Abram: ‘Elements of Strategic Denial and Deception’, p.17. 
368 Shulsky, Abraham: ‘Elements of Strategic Denial and Deception’, p.19. 






Table 5 summarizes the difference of strategic deception in war and peace369.  
War Peace 
- Desire to attack enemy who is 
not prepared because he was 
deceived when, where, or how an 
attack would occur. 
- Deny knowledge of weapons 
development, deceive about how 
new weapons operate. 
Deception may be practised in various ways; possible 
objectives include: 
- Deceive adversary to believe you are stronger 
than you are in order to gain concessions. 
- Convey false appearance of weakness or threat to 
dissuade an adversary from a military build-up or 
taking a more alert and suspicious course of 
action 
- Convince target that third party is the main threat 
and principal target oif hostility, so that target 
relaxes its guard 
- Seek to appear strong and weak at the same time, 
by addressing different audiences with specific 
cognitive predispositions in adversarial 
government to increase internal disagreement.  
 
3.4. Variants of Deception 
Ultimately, irrespective of whether the deception is military or strategic, the target is always 
the same: the mind of individuals. Thus, the principles guiding successful deception are 
detached from the question of type. The question is thus whether different types of categories 
can be distinguished that are regularly employed to achieve this aim. 
 
One categorisation of the variants of deception is offered by Barton Whaley and John B Bell. 
They identify two overarching objectives of deception – dissimulation (hiding the real) and 
simulation (showing the false). Depending on which objective is sought, the deception will have 
specific characteristics, like masking, repackaging, and dazzling if the deception seeks to 
dissimulate, or mimicking, inventing or decoying if the deception seeks to simulate370.  
 
 
369 See: Shulsky, Abram: ‘Elements of Strategic Denial and Deception’, pp 19 -26. 
370 Bell, Bowyer J.; Whaley, Barton: Cheating and Deception, Transaction Publishers, New York, 1992.  





In their effort to establish a theory of deception, Daniel and Herbig distinguish between two 
variants of deception, A-type and M-type. The A-type, which according to Daniel and Herbig 
is “simpler” and “less elegant” but more common than the M-type, seeks to confuse the 
adversary in order that he is unsure what to believe. The M-type on the other hand is described 
as a more complex effort, seeking to decrease ambiguity by building up the attractiveness of 
one wrong alternative. As Barton Whaley in his seminal study on Operation Barbarossa put it, 
German deception served to eliminate ambiguity, making Stalin quite certain, very decisive, 




371 Whaley, Barton: Codeword Barbarossa , p. 15. 
372 Daniel, Donald C.; Katherine, Herbig L.: ‘Propositions on Military Deception’, 1982, pp 157 – 159. 
A-type deception / “ambiguity increasing” 
“Simple” 
M-type deception / ambiguity 
decreasing 
- Confuses target in order that he be unsure as to 
what to believe. 
- Seeks to compound the uncertainties confronting 
any state’s attempt to determine its adversary’s 
(wartime) intentions: 
Contradictory indicators; missing data; fast-
moving events; time-lags between data-collection 
and analysis, chance – all inhibite accurate 
intelligence assessments.  
- Seeks to make use of intelligence analysis; 
premise: over course of time, true intentions will 
reveal themselves; → maintain level of ambiguity 
/ options high as to protect the secret of the actual 
operation.  
- Require that the deceiver’s lies be plausible 
enough and consequential enough to the target’s 
wellbeing that he cannot ignore them.  
- Faced with uncertainty, target may delay decision 
to await more information, giving deceiver more 
freedom of movement / freedom to retain/ take 
initiative. 
- If deceiver achieves that situation remains 
ambiguous, then target may be forced to spread 
resources thinly to cover all important 
contingencies. 
- Reduction of ambiguity by 
building up the attractiveness 
of one wrong alternative.  
- Causes a target to concentrate 
his operational resources on a 
single contingency, thereby 
maximizing the deceiver’s 
chances for prevailing all 
others. 
 





As Daniel and Herbig point out, these types are not mutually exclusive. Deception will oscillate 
between the two variants of deception.  
 
The distinction between the two variants of deception again allows to refine the understanding 
of the findings in research on the annexation of Crimea as discussed in the previous chapter, as 
well as the identification of a further research gap. There is the unequivocal characterisation of 
Russia’s deception, irrespective whether considered in the military, or propaganda context, as 
seeking to increase ambiguity for the adversary. However, lacking the detailing of what exactly 
the deception was, the distinction between the variants of deception suggests that the conclusion 
that all Russian deception rests on ambiguity may be premature. At the very least, if deception 
is suspected, research interested in confirming or disconfirming this assumption ought to 
consider both variants.   
3.5. The process of deception 
Even more so then access to data allowing to assess why a government has fallen victim to 
surprise, access to data that would allow the factors that contribute to successful deception is 
rare. It is therefore not surprising that much of the findings on the process of deception are often 
derived from former practitioners accounts. 
3.5.1. Planning for deception 
Gerwehr and Glenn describe the planning process for deception as a “backwards planning” 
procedure, which starts with identifying the desired end-state, and from that derives the target(s) 
of the deception, the targets’s desired response, the requisite misperception, and the “story” that 
needs to be told373.   
Implementing the plan then moves in the reverse direction: Informational elements are being 
transmitted (or obscured), creating the story, in the mind of the target(s) to achieve the objective.  
Another approach to describe the process of deception is offered by Daniel and Herbig. They 
consider it necessary to 
 
373 Gerwehr, Scott; Glenn, Russell: The Art of Darkness: Deception and Urban Operations, MR1132, RAND 
Corporation, Santa Monica, 2000, p. 28f. 





“[…]differentiate the categories of actors typically found on both sides of the interaction. On 
the deceiver’s side, it is necessary to keep in mind that wide-ranging deception plans do not 
begin without being cleared at the highest levels of government, irrelevant of how good the plan 
is or who is responsible for it.”374  
Taking the example of how deception plans, once agreed by the national leadership, were 
implemented by Allied troops in WWII, the authors point out the actors involved in 
implementing deception plans: 
 
“During WWII, such tasks were assigned to small cadres in intelligence gathering and covert 
action organisations as well as military staffs. These groups were often not a normal part of the 
civilian or military bureaucracy, but rather, like the famous London Controlling Section, were 
specially formed during the war and disbanded or severely cut back at its conclusion…National 
political leaders, high -level diplomats, civil servants, businessmen, and news reporters also 
often played a starring role in strategic deceptions.”375  
 
On the target side, the authors point to the initial target of deception, which usually are a state’s 
intelligence organisations. Such organisations monitor channels of communication for 
information about the adversary, and they tend to be the gatekeepers that screen the information 
to determine what is forwarded to authorities, which are the ultimate targets of the deception. 
3.5.2. Ways and Means 
Essentially, deception is about conveying (false) information to a target without the target 
noticing the falsehood. Therefore, when considering the means, or the how to of deception, the 
essential question is how the information gets to the target.  
 
Enablers for conveying (distorted) information are referred to as channels of information. These 
channels are “the links between the deceivers and target which make deception possible” 376. 
Literature points out to the fact that the variety of channels to convey information is virtually 
unlimited: They include newspapers, satellite reconnaissance, interception, diplomats, spies, 
 
374 Daniel, Donald C.; Katherine, Herbig L.: ‘Propositions on Military Deception’, 1982, p. 159. 
375 Daniel, Donald C.; Katherine, Herbig L.: ‘Propositions on Military Deception’, 1982, p.159. 
376 Daniel, Donald C.; Katherine, Herbig L.: ‘Propositions on Military Deception’, p. 159.  





double agents, actors of influence both formal and informal etc. The rapid developments in 
information technology has tremendously increased the opportunities to convey information in 
a targeted fashion on a massive scale tremendously 377.  
3.5.3. Principles of Successful Deception 
Over time some agreement has been reached over the key factors contributing to success of 
deception. Due to the widespread agreement on their key role, they may also be regarded as 
maxims or principles of deception. They are  
- Incentive and Opportunity 
- Secrecy, Organisation, and Coordination  
- Predispositions of the Target 
- Plausibility and Confirmation 
- Adaptability 
 
3.5.3.1. Incentive and Opportunity 
Deception is not a risk-free business, and usually carefully considered by the highest level of 
government. As research into why governments fall victim to surprise indicates, the contextual 
factors that lead to the likelihood of deception are also those, that will make deception more 
likely successful. Before considering planning a deception, it is thus important to consider 
whether deception is an approach suitable for the context, and the own relative position378.  
3.5.3.2. Secrecy, organisation, and coordination 
Deception requires detailed planning, that does not overlook the slightest triviality, as 
often the trivial holds a clue. This planning must be well organised and directed from a 
central point, usually at the headquarters or highest levels of government. However well 
planned and organized, “if strictest secrecy is not observed, all deception projects are 
condemned to failure from the start”. Denying the adversary knowledge that deception is 
 
377 Shulsky, Abram: ‘Elements of Strategic Denial and Deception’, pp 23-24. 
378 See Morgan, Patrick; Knorr, Klaus (eds): Strategic Military Surprise: Incentive and Opportunity, 1984.. 





being employed is of such paramount importance, that deceiving own and friendly forces 
is a “necessary by-product of deception” 379.  
3.5.3.3. Predisposition of the target 
The mental predisposition of the deception - target is a factor that gained importance with the 
insights of social psychology in the late 70s early 80s. Because deception targets the mindset 
of the adversary, and specific, high-ranking individuals in the target’s government, the target’s 
cognitive predisposition is an undeniably significant factor to successful deception. Deceptions 
that build on an already existing mental image in the mind of the target are more likely to 
succeed than those seeking to make the target do something against his mind.  
 
Building the deception on already existing cognitive predispositions has the advantage that 
much of the work of deception will be done by the victim – the deceiver’s task “then becomes 
providing clues which reinforce these predispositions while minimizing or discrediting clues 
which contradict them”380.  
3.5.3.4. Plausibility and confirmation of deception 
To the target, the core of the deception must appear at least as something which may plausibly 
happen. A deception is more credible if the lie is “woven in into a skein of truth to be confirmed 
by more than one source”381. These sources need to be credible and trusted – and often informal 
actors of influence appear to have greater credibility to high level members of government than 
formal actors. That the deception is ideally be confirmed by more than one source also implies 




379 Von Greiffenberg [sic], Hans: ‘Deception and Cover Plans’, Project #29, Foreign Military Studies, MS #P-044a, 
US Army, Historical Division, MMR, NA, cited from: Daniel, Donald C.; Katherine, Herbig L.: ‘Propositions on 
Military Deception’, p. 167. 
380 Daniel, Donald C.; Katherine, Herbig L.: ‘Propositions on Military Deception’, p. 161. 
381 Von Greiffenberg [sic], Hans: ‘Deception and Cover Plans’, Project #29, Foreign Military Studies, MS #P-044a, 
US Army, Historical Division, MMR, NA, cited from: Daniel, Donald C.; Katherine, Herbig L.: ‘Propositions on 
Military Deception’, p. 168. 
382 Shulsky, Abram: ‘Elements of Strategic Denial and Deception’, in: Godson, Roy;, Wirtz, James J.(eds): 
Strategic Denial and Deception – The Twenty First Century Challenge, pp 24 – 25.  






Another aspect of the relativity of truth is that it is subject to change. Truth is a dynamic, 
complex cognitive process.  
 
Deception thus needs to be conceived as a dynamic process, that can adapt to such changes of 
target preferences over time. If it doesn’t, then the deception becomes implausible.  
 
The need to adapt to target preferences over time again emphasises the central role of channels 
for successful deception campaigns. On the one hand they serve to deliver the deception, and 
on the other they make possible to monitor possible changes in the target preferences, and they 
lastly the measure available to the deceiver to ascertain whether his deception is achieving the 
intended effect.  
 
In sum, the factors contributing to success of deception, except for secrecy, organisation and 
coordination seek to exploit the factors inherent to the target government that cause surprise – 
above all, the known psychological predispositions of its political leadership. Besides the 
mental predisposition to exploit, the success of deception depends on the ability to purvey the 
deception to the target – the channels. Unfortunately for the researcher interested in deception 
in a historic case, the number of channels is almost unlimited – a point also raised by earlier 
research on the annexation of Crimea. Even in hindsight, considering all these channels as well 
as identifying the channel which was decisive for the success of deception appears an 
impossible task for the individual researcher. The same holds true when asking how Russia 
went about confirming if its deceptive plot is working or requires adaptation.  
3.5.4. Measuring success 
The difficulty of “controlling” deception, that is measuring its impact, however, as research 
points out, it not limited to the researcher – it also holds true for the deceiver. Measuring success 
means “to sort out the impact of deception on the target from other influences affecting [it] “383. 
This may be measured in a variety of ways, but as research point out, none of them precise. 
One problem of measuring the impact of deception is that most deceptions build on something 
 
383 Daniel, Donald C.; Katherine, Herbig L.: ‘Propositions on Military Deception’, p. 166. 





that already exists. Thus, “would the target have continued undisturbed in his (false) 
expectations without the deceiver’s reinforcement? Would his existing ambiguity have been 
enough to cause delay and confusion without the deceiver adding more?”384. A second related 
problem with measuring deception’s impact is that they tend to build on mental predispositions 
of select individuals. Both in hindsight and in foresight however it is “usually impossible to 
precisely recover the weight deception had in tipping the scale of decision. As in most problems 
of historical evaluation, evidence on the priorities assigned in a decision is often lacking”385.  
3.6. Summary: Deception as the means to surprise  
Unlike the phenomenon of strategic surprise, which has received widespread interest from 
several perspectives, deception, as the means to surprise has enjoyed a wallflower’s life. Even 
though dedicated research has been undertaken, which greatly contributed to a better and more 
systematic understanding of the process of deception, it was short lived, and its findings never 
made into mainstream discourse. Although some researchers undertook efforts to develop a 
theory of deception, just as in relation to surprise, so far these efforts have remained fruitless. 
This does not mean to imply that the subject did not receive heightened interest amongst 
practitioners in military or intelligence, as the U.S. Doctrine on Deception, or the NATO 
Military Committee’s resolution on military deception go to show.  
 
Lastly, the findings on the process of deception – very much like those made on surprise from 
the victim’s perspective during the Cold War – were not considered in relation to their effect 
on the overall outcome of a war, conflict or crisis. However, this decoupling of deception from 
its strategic effect has the same consequence that was observed by Richard Betts in relation to 
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4. Discussion of the findings about the relationship between surprise and deception 
in strategy and the findings on the annexation of Crimea 
How does the previously discussed discourse on the utility of surprise and deception to strategy, 
whether it can be prevented and how the conditions for it are created relate to the diametrical 
conclusions on the role of surprise for the annexation of Crimea identified in this research?  
 
Firstly, the competing hypotheses on the role of surprise for the annexation of Crimea, 
especially for Germany identified in the previous chapters can be related to the two notions on 
the role of surprise for strategy offered by the direct (Clausewitz) and the indirect strategy 
approach (Liddell-Hart). It allows to conclude that the works scrutinizing the annexation of 
Crimea that have been reviewed for this undertaking unanimously assume the notion of the 
direct approach in strategy: that the strategic role of surprise is negligible or coincidental for 
the overall outcome. On the hand, the conclusions reached by this research following the 
analyses of ARD’s reporting on Ukraine and Crimea echo the notion of the indirect approach 
in strategy, as it was found that surprise was decisive for the annexation of Crimea, and the 
conditions for it created by Russian deception, which specifically targeted the German political 
leadership directly involved in the situation.  
 
Secondly, the previous discussion allows for a more nuanced understanding of the factors that 
contributed to surprise, including deception, that were observed by this and other works on the 
annexation of Crimea. It further qualifies the conclusions drawn from the analysis of ARD’s 
reporting, as it would allow to postulate that to annex Crimea, Russia employed strategic 
deception of the more complex M-type and increased the attractiveness of the wrong of two 
alternatives by using the military and military manoeuvres to increase the perception that Russia 
would seek to repeat what it did in Georgia in 2008, and lure Ukraine into firing the first shot. 
It also provides an explanation as to why Russia – and Putin – may have resorted to adopt a 
strategy of deception: because it was available and known to him. And lastly, it would even 
allow to put the Russian president and his strategic ability squarely into the notion on surprise 
and strategy promoted by the indirect approach. Not only did he use physical manoeuvre and 
sought psychological dislocation by a series of unexpected developments and the use of 
distractions, but also did Putin secure his strategic objective – the annexation of Crimea – 
without firing a single shot.  






Likewise, the previous theoretical exploration of the interrelationship between surprise, 
deception and strategy further qualifies the findings of those arguing that the role of surprise 
and deception for the annexation of Crimea is negligible or coincidental: it could be argued 
based on the findings in this chapter that Russia and Putin resorted to deception because it was 
their last resort, and they had no moral quarrels with using it. That it was not considered by 
Russia’s victims may either be because of psychological-cognitive filters on the individual or 
organisational level. The question which filter was ultimately causal, is irrelevant (and 
insoluble) as especially the military aspect, the battlefield, was decisive with other, specific 
contextual factors like shared culture and history and the geographic location of the Crimea 
peninsula as additional contributing factors for success. For the overall outcome, surprise was 
a great force multiplier, but not decisive.  
 
Unfortunately, although the previous chapter has provided many dimensions to reconsider 
assumptions on the role of surprise for the annexation of Crimea identified in this effort, the 
previous recourse to the relationship between surprise, deception and strategy has also brought 
to the fore that the question which role surprise had for the Russian annexation of Crimea is 
intractable and will remain so for the foreseeable future: Where you sit on surprise, depends on 
where you stand in strategy.  
 
Academic rigour, however, would demand that where you could stand is identified before you 
take a stance. This, however, cannot be observed in any of the publications seeking to identify 
the decisive factor(s) that allowed Russia to annex Crimea the way it did reviewed for this 
research.  
 
This leads to an additional, more general observation, as by not giving surprise a chance to be 
of serious consequence, the literature about the annexation of Crimea considered for this effort 
continues a trend that was already discernible in the works on strategic surprise on the nuclear 
age:  The de-coupling from the debate the two grand schools of strategy. 
 
Interestingly even despite this apparent de-coupling, the premises assumed on the utility of 
surprise and deception for winning wars by classical strategist can be as readily identified in 
the hypothesis on the role of surprise in the annexation of Crimea, as they could be in the 





research into why governments fall victim to surprise during the Cold War. However, while the 
latter still paid reference to Carl von Clausewitz and overwhelmingly adopted his notion on the 
strategic utility of surprise, those concerned with the annexation of Crimea appear blind to the 
discourse on strategy.  
 
On the one hand, this may be considered strong argument for the continued relevance of 
strategy, and the added value of the principled reflection on the subject’s classical thinkers. But 
on the other hand it may also be seen as what is best described by the term strategy blindness. 
This is not so much evidenced in the lack of references to classical strategists, but by the fact 
that despite unanimously observing surprise in the context of the annexation of Crimea, it was 
never systematically scrutinized for its strategic value. De-coupling surprise from its strategic 
effect, however, as Richard K. Betts argued, trivializes the phenomenon of surprise. But 
disregarding the potential of surprise to have strategic effect, holding the phenomenon to be a 
co-incidence rather than the outcome of wilful adversarial act intended to surprise, as could be 
























V. Summary and Concluding Remarks 
 
This research set out to assess the role of surprise for the annexation of Crimea, especially for 
Germany. It showed that dealing with surprise is a humbling experience both in theory and in 
practice. In practice, because it temporarily suspends order and replaces it with chaos. A 
sensation that was mirrored by the German foreign minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier when he 
appeared for an interview after he learned about the referendum on the decision of the Crimean 
regional parliament to join the Russian Federation on the 6th of March and found a new division 
in Europe. The ground thought solid suddenly turns shaky, and it requires extra-efforts to 
recover balance and stability. Similarly, in theory, it temporarily suspends the validity of 
prevailing theoretical assumptions and academic wisdom, because what had happened was 
considered implausible before. That a Russian annexation of the Crimean Peninsula was 
considered implausible before it happened became apparent throughout this research.  
The review a selection of previously published works on Crimea and Germany’s role in the 
context of Crimea done at the onset of this research revealed that although surprise as a 
phenomenon was unanimously observed, no systematic examination of the phenomenon and 
its relationship to the overall outcome was undertaken. This notwithstanding, the review led to 
the identification of hypotheses on the role of surprise for the annexation of Crimea, as well as 
specifically for Germany in the context of Crimea. Despite the hypothesis differing in their 
specific explanations on why and how surprise occurred, the majority view considers surprise 
to be a co-incidence of the annexation of Crimea, an intervening variable for the overall 
outcome. None considered the strategic effect of surprise. This decoupling of surprise from its 
strategic effect can also be observed in the works of those that argue that Russia contributed to 
surprise by using deception. Furthermore, it was found that these works fail to provide the link 
between Russian deception and surprise in the context of the annexation of Crimea.   
Following the literature review, this research re-examines the annexation of Crimea with a data 
set collected specifically for this undertaking interested in the role of surprise for the annexation 
of Crimea, especially for Germany. This data set was identified based on the observation that 
neither had the question of data received much consideration by previous research, nor were 
data and sources consulted in previous efforts suitable for this research’s interest. To find out 
which role surprise had for the annexation, it is tantamount to first consider what had been 





expected before the unexpected occurred. Only then it is possible to draw conclusions what 
may have contributed to surprise, and its effects. However, the data and sources that had been 
considered by the works selected for this review all adopted a hindsight perspective, explaining 
the outcome that was previously unexpected, thereby neglecting the character of this outcome. 
Thus, the specific challenge for this research was to a identify a data set that would allow 
identify what had been expected before this outcome was known. Facing an overwhelming 
amount of data that could be considered, after careful reflection, this researcher decided to focus 
on a single source that is fully accessible and available to the researcher and promises the 
highest likelihood of finding out what had been expected before the surprise outcome was 
known: The reporting that was made available by one of Germany’s public broadcasting station, 
whose evening news have the highest reach among TV news in Germany. Rather than tracing 
developments from the view of what is known, thus, this research analysed the daily reporting 
of ARD on Ukraine and Crimea between the 29th of October 2013 and the 18th of April 2014, 
for what was expected by the German government to happen before the unknown event 
occurred.  
The conclusions drawn from this analysis on the role of surprise for the annexation of Crimea, 
especially for Germany, are diametrical to the those identified in the literature review. Whereas 
previous research that the role of surprise for the annexation of Crimea cannot be traced, the 
analysis undertaken for this research suggests that a specific surprise event, the announcement 
of the Crimean regional government to hold a referendum on the decision of the regional 
parliament to join the Russian Federation on the 6th of March, was decisive for the overall 
outcome. Furthermore, it finds that Russia used strategic deception to create the false 
expectations, and identifies the deceptive pattern Russia employed to create the conditions for 
the decisive – or strategic – surprise: The Russian military and its manoeuvres were Russia’s 
chief stratagem was to evoke the expectation that Russia would seek to repeat what it did in 
2008 in Georgia – lure the Ukrainian government into firing the first shot to be given a ‘legal’ 
excuse to claim the right of self-defence. In addition to the military’s manoeuvres, Putin was 
Russia’s chief ‘stratagematist’, and Germany’s political top-leadership his intended target. He 
used his phone-interactions with the German chancellor to create and confirm the wrong 
expectation. As the analyses of ARD suggests, due to Germany’s role as ‘the West’s’ chief 
interlocutor with Moscow and the new Ukrainian government, the surprise event that was 
decisive and caught Germany unaware was not only a strategic surprise for Germany, but also 





for the liberal-democratic countries: for the first time since the end of the Cold War, an 
alternative political solution to that favoured by ‘the West’ was brought about. After almost 25 
years, it was the first and most direct challenge of the liberal-democratic model of political 
crisis management. Thus, the analyses of ARD’s reporting leads to the conclusion that the 
political rather than the military character of the surprise event that shaped the outcome, as well 
as the simple fact that the event that shaped the outcome was a surprise, make the surprise event 
on the 6th of March a strategic surprise.  
The diametrical relationship of the conclusions on the role of surprise for the annexation of 
Crimea, especially for Germany, drawn by previous efforts and this undertaking led to a 
recourse to the theoretical discourse on the relationship between surprise and strategy, to assess 
which of the assumptions on the role of surprise for the annexation of Crimea – inscrutable or 
co-incidental vs. decisive – has more theoretical credit.  
It showed that surprise is all but a new problem for governments, and that the discussion about 
the relationship between surprise and strategy is as old as the thinking about war. In fact, it was 
found to be an essentially contested problem in the thinking about strategy, with two 
juxtaposing positions. One argues that a strategic effect of surprise is co-incidental, and 
deception both a waste of effort and a last resort, whereas the other holds surprise to be 
ultimately decisive to dislocate the adversary, and deception a smart and required means to 
achieve it. Whereas the first notion holds the battlefield engagement to be what is decisive in 
war, the second argues that it is wiser to evade the battlefield engagement. The two views on 
the role of surprise are mutually exclusive, rendering it either-or qualities and leaving open the 
question which role for surprise in strategy. Where you stand on surprise depends on where you 
stand in strategy. 
This is not a very satisfying outcome for this research’s aim, which was to assess the role of 
surprise for Russia’s annexation of Crimea, especially for Germany. Instead of contributing to 
more certainty about the role of surprise or helping to resolve the diametrical nature of the two 
assumptions on the role of surprise in the annexation of Crimea, by confirming or disconfirming 
one of the assumptions on surprise’s role for the annexation, the recourse to the theoretical 
argument about surprise’s strategic effect showed that there can be no clear-cut solution.  





However, while the theoretical recourse was not helpful to conclude on the role of surprise for 
the annexation of Crimea, especially for Germany, it has shown that over time, a de-coupling 
from the discourse on strategy can be observed. The review of the discourse on the relationship 
between surprise and strategy brought to the fore a strategy-blindness, above all because despite 
the universal observation of the phenomenon, no effort prior to this systematically considered 
the relationship between the phenomenon of surprise and the overall outcome, the annexation 
of Crimea by Russia. This de-coupling of surprise from its possible strategic effect that could 
be observed in the literature following the annexation of Crimea trivializes the phenomenon of 
surprise, as well as strategy and the discourse about strategy overall.  
Furthermore, this research has shown that surprise is not a new phenomenon or merely a 
temporary characteristic of a forever dynamic context. Especially when it happens to a 
government should not be mistaken with co-incidence, and merits reflection, as it may be the 
consequence of directed adversarial efforts. Or, as Thomas J. Schelling points out in his 
introduction to Roberta Wohlstetter’s seminal analyses of the Japanese surprise attack on Pearl 
Harbor:  
 
“Surprise, when it happens to a government, is likely to be a complicated, diffuse, 
bureaucratic thing. It includes neglect of responsibility but also responsibility so poorly 
defined or so ambiguously delegated that action gets lost. It includes gaps in 
intelligence, but also intelligence that, like a string of pearls too precious to wear, is too 
sensitive to give to those who need it. It includes the alarm that fails to work, but also 
the alarm that has gone off so often it has been disconnected. It includes the unalert 
watchman, but also the one who knows he’ll be chewed out by his superior if he gets 
higher authority out of bed. It includes the contingencies that occur to no one, but also 
those that everyone assumes somebody else is taking care of. It includes straightforward 
procrastination, but also decisions protracted by internal disagreement. It includes, in 
addition, the inability of individual human beings to rise to the occasion until they are 
sure it is the occasion–which is usually too late. (Unlike movies, real life provides no 
musical background to tip us off to the climax.) Finally, as at Pearl Harbor, surprise 





may include some measure of genuine novelty introduced by the enemy, and possibly 
some sheer bad luck.”386 
 
While the selection of literature and its origins suggest that disregard of surprises possible 
strategic effects should raise concern in all ‘Western’ countries, Germany especially seems to 
have some catching up to do, as the case of Crimea suggests that there may be a relationship 
between assuming ‘international responsibility’ and experiencing surprise. If Germany wants 
to assume more responsibility, as it claims since 2012, then it must also be prepared to be 
surprised more often. It furthermore became apparent that while the phenomenon of surprise 
did receive heightened attention in the wider discourse on strategy, there is no German 
contribution to this debate. Neither has Germany featured as a ‘victim’ of surprise, nor are there 
German language contributions systematically assessing why Germany fell victim to surprise. 
It would merit further research to uncover why this is the case, as it seems unlikely that 
Germany was not exposed to surprise in the past 80 years. Of particular interest would be the 
question whether systematic barriers to analysing adverse surprise events for the German 
government can be identified. Another aspect that seems worthwhile to further explore against 
the backdrop of this research would be to analyse how the German government dealt with such 
unexpected events in the aftermath. Was there an unbiased assessment of what went wrong, or 
are there efforts to translate lessons learned into government practice? These questions are well 
suited for academic reflection.  
For senior policymakers and those engaged in day-to-day foreign and security policy, these 
undertakings are too abstract. Ideally, they require a tool or method ruling out future surprise. 
This research has demonstrated that the hopes in such a silver-bullet may be ill-founded. 
Surprise is a fact of international politics, and that it may render strategic effects is, too. Rather 
than seeking a silver-bullet to prevent future surprise, this research suggested the maxims on 
strategic surprise developed by Leni and Kass provide a better guideline387. On the one hand, 
they provide a guideline helpful to minimise the likelihood of falling victim to surprise. And on 
the other it cautions those having to deal with the inherent uncertainty of the future to be mindful 
 
386 Schelling, Thomas: ‘Foreword’, in: Wohlstetter, Roberta: Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision, Stanford 
University Press, Stanford CA., 1962, p I.  
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of the factors making us vulnerable to surprise that are inherent to the human being, including 
oneself.  
However, the precondition to develop such a notion within governmental organisations and 
policy, which derives much of its legitimacy from creating certainties were uncertainty prevails, 
is the preparedness to accept that surprise, and failure to anticipate surprise are normal. 
Unpleasant, but normal.  
Such an understanding could be developed by a comprehensive review and reflection on the 
strategic shocks Germany has experienced since 2011 – Fukushima, Crimea, ISIS, the 
migration crisis, BREXIT, the election of Donald Trump, and the COVID-pandemic to better 
understand where Germany got it wrong, and why. Such a review of Germany’s performance 
in times of unexpected events and developments may well add to a body-politic much more 
self-aware, and create the Fingerspitzengefühl, a sensitivity on the fingertips of policy-makers 
and analysts alike about the perils of their own premises and assumptions. It may furthermore 
be a strong contribution to increasing Germany’s resilience to exogenous shocks. Above all, it 
may lead to the observation that in international relations, especially during crisis, surprise is 
always around the corner, and rarely is a solution without alternative. Such a process also 
requires a broad public debate and public parliamentary scrutiny.  
However, while such an approach will consider the phenomenon of surprise, it is unlikely that 
the exercise will help much to improve Germany’s ‘strategy blindness’ that was also observed 
in this research. Of course, much of this ‘blindness’ can be explained with Germany’s history: 
When it did consider strategy in the past, it was for the purpose of attacking other nations. It 
was a tool for Germany’s aggressive behaviour. Following the Second World War, the objective 
was to prevent Germany from repeating its pattern of aggressive behaviour again – and while 
the divided countries’ parts were integrated into the duelling ideological blocs, turning 
Germany into one of the Cold War’s front states, neither the Federal Republic nor the 
Democratic Republic were fully sovereign countries – and matters of strategy not to concern 
the Germans.  
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Cold War ended and Germany re-united. Soon 
after re-unification, Germany also regained its full sovereignty. At that time – and possible 
nowhere this sentiment was more strongly shared than in the peacefully re-united Germany – 





however, strategy was considered obsolete, as hopes ran high that the end of history also made 
thinking about war and how to win them redundant. Even though the impression of the end of 
organized violence was short-lived, the disregard of strategy as a field of study and research 
continued, either under the pretence of being anachronistic, or because it was morally judged 
as an effort to prepare for Germany’s next war. Consequently, 30 years after the end of the Cold 
War, and 76 years after the Second World War, Germany has no academic chair in strategy or 
strategic studies, and the subject plays no discernible role in the curriculum of diplomatic or 
military professionals.  
Hence, this work closes with a modest suggestion: The establishment of knowledge centre on 
strategy, for example through the creation of a chair of strategy or strategic studies in a German 
university. It is unlikely that the establishment of such a knowledge centre on strategy as it 
relates to governments will be outstandingly successful in preventing the next surprise – just 
like all other suggestion directed at that aim. But it may be a better and more concrete 
contribution to a more strategic debate about the future course of Germany’s foreign and 
security policy than the repeated pledge by policymakers and analysts alike that Germany needs 
to be a more strategic actor, requires a strategy or strategic capability. While all these demands 
may hold merit – without providing a clear understanding of what exactly is strategic, and a 
discourse about the meaning of strategy in the contemporary context, a strategy becomes a 
panacea, and strategic a hollow buzzword employed to catch attention. Not only does this not 
look good for a country that objectively is fully capable of acting strategically, but it also 
prevents a public discourse that would allow to consider whether dealing with strategy is a 
question exclusively concerned with waging and winning wars between states, and should be 
left to generals, or whether strategy holds lessons for governmental behaviour that transcends 
the state of war between states. This research has shown that while the principles of strategy 
remain, the face of war and conflict has changed. Having set out to fathom the role of surprise 
for the annexation of Crimea, the findings of this research may also be viewed as a testimony 
that circumnavigating a thorny issue based on assumptions no matter how well intentioned, 
carries the risk of being stuck in the past, and is the seedbed for future surprise. In a world 
characterized by surprise, doubting your own assessments and expectations about the future 
becomes a strategic imperative despite futures inherent uncertainty. Instead of ruling out or 
covering up inconsistencies, they should be embraced and exploited for a better, more resilient 
foreign and security policy.  
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VI. ANNEX: ARD reporting from the Ukraine crisis in late 2013 until Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 
March 2014 
Date Event Summary/Transcript 
29.10.2012 Yanukovych wins 
elections.388 
Yanukovych wins presidential elections despite massive domestic and international protests. Despite irrgeularities and protests, opposition 
achieves an estime, part.  Opposition Leader Klitschko achieves good results; Expert argues that EU strategy has failed to achieve desired end, 
as majority of population has voted for Yanukovych's course of action despite/against EU.  
06.09.2013 G20 Summit in St. 
Petersburg.389 
Syria Conflict main item on agenda; no agreement between Putin and Obama, key point of dispute: future of Assad Regime and Intervention; 





Ukraine in a changing 
world: Factors of 




High brow meeting sponsored by Victor Pinchuk, oligarch who is hit amongst the hardest by Russian sanctions; gathers very hiugh level 
supporters for the 'UE accession treaty. Participants are Bill and Hillary Clinton, Tony Blair, G. Schröder, Mario Monti, Petro Poroshenk o (hit 
by chocolate sanctions), Dominique Strauss Kahn, Stefan Füle; numerous ranking MEP, incl. Elmar Brok, spokeman external relations comittee 
EU Parliament; Large number of hiugh level media representatives, think tanks; civil society mainly represented by Timoshenkos political party; 
Sitting Ukrainian government represented in its entirety; only Russian participant is Sergei Glazyev, advisor of Putin on Regional Economic 
Integration. In the meeting, he threatens that if deal is signed, then Ukraine will go bankcrupt, and face chaos.  
 
388 http://www.tagesschau.de/ausland/ukraine-wahl100.html 
389 http://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/ts44088.html; Interview Stefan Meister: http://www.tagesschau.de/ausland/ukraine-wahl100.html 
390 List of participants: https://yes-ukraine.org/en/Yalta-annual-meeting/2013/spisok-uchasnikiv ; Program: https://yes-ukraine.org/en/Yalta-annual-meeting/2013/programa-zustrichi ; backgrounder: 
https://www.economist.com/blogs/easternapproaches/2013/09/other-yalta-conference 





Date Event Summary/Transcript 
18.11.2013 EU Foreign Ministers 
meet on Eastern 
Partnership391  
Increasing doubts that Y will sign off the accession deal. Merkel: "We have been made aware that certain decision could fall very shortly before 
the [Eastern Partnership] summit [in Vilnius]"; EU increases pressure, EU official:"Deadline to fulfil requirements by 19.11.2013" . Key obstacle: 
allowing imprisoned T. to leave country for medical treatment [EU backed down from demanding the release of T, only freedom to travel for 
ailment in Germany]. Guido Westerwelle repeats German position, demands resolution prior to signing a deal. Rada to meet and discuss 
passing of law allowing to lift the travel ban on Timoshenko on 19.11.2013.  
18.11.2013 EU Foreign Ministers 





Interview with Sylvia 
Stoeber.392 
Q: On negotiations and context of Ukraine: EU step towards Ukraine by not demanding the release of T.; at the same time, Ukraine in a dire 
economic situation (Standard and Poor rated the likelihood of state bankruptcy at 44%); rather than implementing reforms, Y established a 
clan-like, authoritarian regime, fighting back all opposition. Q: Is Russia trying to undermine the EU Ukraine Deal? A: Russia opposed to deal 
because of own vision for economic integration; increased pressure on Ukraine, mostly through unfavourable gas deals, but also by sanctioning 
certain Ukrainian exports like chocolate or pipelines. Y tries tu balance through the dilemma of bowing to much to either Russia or EU; Q: Is a 
unilateral Ukrainian withdrawal from the EU deal, and turn to Russia likely? A: Y seeks to prevent both,too much proximity to Russia ("He is 
not a fan of the Eurasian Customs Union"), and too much influence of the EU - Y wants to win the elections in 2015, and "they can not be held 
too democratically, because otherwise the likelihood that he will win the elections would be too small". Q.: What do you expect from the 
summit today? A: No decision likely, as Rada only to decide on T question 19.11.2013; even if agreed, implementing it may well take until the 
very last minute before the Eastern Partnership Summit in Vilnius, 29.11.2013; also, "not set in stone that the agreement is signed, as domestic 
Ukrainian voices already demand moving the signing of the agreement for another year." [ see demands made by Putin in 09.11. meeting; 
which domestic voices...] 
21.11.2013, 
14:06 Uhr 
Parliament does not 
pass Timoshenko 
Law.393 
Timoshenko Law is rejected, after the decision on it had been postponed over and over again. According to Wolf Dieter Krause, "Wladimir 
Putin has threatened economic sanctions if Ukraine signs the treaty. Ukrainian industry representatives warned of the consequences, and 
demanded to delay the signing of the accord by a year".; EU inceasingly upset, Elmar Brok, Head of External Relations Committee, EU 
PArliament: "increasingly of the impression that Mr Y. is not interested in signing the deal", and sees "Russian pressure" as main reason. EU 










Date Event Summary/Transcript 
21.11.2013, 
15:14 Uhr 
Ukraine announces ist 
withdrawal from 
accession agreement.394 
Published shortly after the Timoshenko Law is rejected; freezes accord, and suggests a trilateral commission on trade issues made up of EU, 
UKR, and Russia. Names three reasons for withdrawal: 1. National Security must be ensured; 2. Ukrainian economic relations with Russia must 
be renewed; 3. Domestic UKR market requires further preparation to be prepared to enter relations with EU-market "on eye-level". Putin 
threatened earlier that Ukraine would loos all preferential trade agreements with Russia if the accord is signed, and offers at ahort notivce to 
hold trilateral talks with EU and UKR; have to take place before signing any accord.  
24.11.2013 Ongoing Mass 
Manifestations on 
Maidan.395               
"We belong to Europe" 




Emphasises the difficult position of J, who seeks to find a position between Russia and EU; faces dilemma: Russian sanctions, hitting particularly 
the east of Ukraine, and difficult conditions from both EU (politically (Timoshenko), and financially (the short term loan offer is to small). "Not 










Date Event Summary/Transcript 




Yanukovych: "Ukraine wants to continue on the European path".   
27.11.2013 Merkel signs new 
coalition treaty398. 
 





Yanukovych to meet 
van Rompuy and 
Barroso. 
EU heads of state meet to discuss EU Association Agreement and Ukraine's unexpected turning away from the offer of the EU. Merkel: Noit 
optimisitc about Ukraine re-joining; "We will demonstrate clearly  that the EU will keep an open door for Ukraine to sign the association 
agreement"; first critical voices, Martin Schulz: "I think as the European Union we need to ask ourseloves what we must do, economically, and 
financially [...]to support the Ukrainian state and people. Experts also critical about quick agreement,Tilman Brück, Director SIPRI: "maybe with 
next UKR Preisdent in 5  years"  EU in a dilemma: If they offer more money to Ukraine, then it will look as if they would buy Ukraines. So far 









Date Event Summary/Transcript 
28.11.2013 Interview on 
likelihood of UKR 
turn-around from 
turn-aroiund; EU 




Q.  Desirable/Likely to convince UKR to sign agreement despite ist surprise-turn on 22.11.? A, Christian Feld: Unlikely, no signals for that; J. 
clearly stated that for econmic reasons Ukr. Can not survive without Russia as a trading partner, and that the EU has not offered enough. 
Problem for the EU: if it were to put more money on the table, it would give in to blackmailing.  
29.11.2013 EU-Open Door Policy 
for  Kiev.400 
Strong lobbying of UKR opposition in Vilnius for EU support, msg " We want to siogn [the agrrement], but our president doesnt want to"; 
Timoshenko announces that she is wilkling to accept to remain under house arrest to stand in the way of Yanukovych signing the agreement; 
Elmar Brok, MEP, spokesman of foreign relation committe EUPARL, warns Ukraine about orientation towards Russia: "The standard of living 
for the people in Russia is catastophical, and if Ukraine clings itself to Russia, then it will get that [Russian] standard of living. " 
29.11.2013 Meeting between 
Yanukovych and 
Merkel.401 
J. emphasises close economic ties with Russia; Merkel underscores open door, offers gas deliveries, but also emphasises that there are limits 
to aid: "Within the EU we have conditions that apply to all member states - we can not just turn around and say: This does not apply to Ukraine, 
now". Francoise Hollande states that it is not only a question of money, but also about the will to implement democratic reforms, and that 
"an agreement will not be signed with governments [...] whose relationship with the people is not founded on the principles of democracy".  
29.11.2013 Press conference 
Yanukovych after 
meeting EU heads 
and Angela Merkel.402 
J demanded package deal with substantial financial and economic support; if his demands are met, he will sign very quickly; Two problems, 
a)the amount, and b) conditions; J. demands unconditional financial support; Merkel emphasises that even within EU, countries can not lend 
money without conditionalities. Christian Feld: "Handing out several billion Euros with no guarantees difficult to communicate a year before 











Date Event Summary/Transcript 




Agreement, and UKR 
turning away from it; 
with Torsten Hähn, 
Chief Economist and 
CEE Expert at WZG 
Bank.403 
The economic relationship between (economically huge) EU and (tiny) markets of the 6 countries of the EP is asymmetrical; taken together, 6 
countries have a GDP equivalent to that of Poland; within the group, Ukraine is the most important market (size of population), but currently 
in an economic downward spiral; dropping credit ratings, facing bankruptcy; Not signing the EP accord will have long-term negative 
consequences for Ukraine. The deal with Russia may be a short term compensation for the most burning economic problems, but not solve 
the structural problems. For the EU, on the other hand, the economic loss of UKR not signing the accord is "negligible". 
29.11.2013 EU warns Russia 
about 
interference.404 
EU warns Russia about its interference in the negotiations with UKR about an associated membership status of Ukraine to the EU. At the final 
press conference of the summit originally intended for the signing od the accord, EU President v. Rompuy: "We will not bow before Russia's 
pressure"; The way Russia deals with the fmr. Soviet republics "incompatible" with the norms how things should develop in Europe. President 
of Commission, Barroso: "We can not accept a veto-right of third parties"; time of limited sovereignty in Europe is over. EU wants to discuss 
differences with Putin at EU-RUS summit end of January 2014; towards UKR, EU continues to pursue open door policy. van Rompuy encourages 
UKR government to " withstand external pressure", now it is time for courage and decision; Lit. President Dalia Grybauskate ( Lithuania EU 
Presidency 2013) openly criticizes Yanukovych: Leadership in Kiev decided to "end progress in its country".  
29.11.2013 Police violence on 
Maidan escalates.405 
Shown in evening news of 30.11.2013; Police uses violence to fight back pro European protesters; opposition leader Wladimir Klitschko 
emphasises that Ukraine is at a crossroads, and encourages protesters to continue: Now is the time to decide whether you want to live in a 










Date Event Summary/Transcript 
01.12.2013 Ongoing protests; 
increasing use of 
violence by 




After some protesters use violence against police to gain access to government buildings, opposition leader Klitschko goes out to speak to 
them; Klitschko: "You do not belong to us". Q. to Ina Ruck on the unity of the opposition movement, whose traditional weakness has been 
fragmentation. A: There are three parties in the opposition: Timoshenko, the new party of Klitschko, and the extreme nationalist Swoboda 
("scanting "death to the enemies of Ukraine"). They have nothing in common, "which does not suggest a strong and unified coalition against 
Yanukovych". 
01.12.2013 Background Expert 
Interview on Protest 
Movement and 
Situation in Ukraine 
with Kyril Savin, Head 
of Office, Heinrich 
Böll Foundation, 
Kiev.407 
Q: Is the opposition united? A: No, disunited, can be shown when looking at support in wider population and how it differs geographically - in 
Kiev and Western Ukraine, entire population supports protests and deeper EU integration; about half the population in the east and southeast 
of Ukraine - however, in the East, there are no signs of protests, and attempts of Yanukovych to mobilize counter protest in his region have 
been "artificial and unsuccessful". Q.: Demands for J to step down: A.: Currently ignore protests, but won't be able to do so in the long run; Q: 
What can he offer the opposition [which demands deeper ties with the EU] after putting everything on the Russia card? A.: J still between the 
chairs: there is no real deal with Russia, as neither gas nor credit negotiations with Russia have been successful so far; Difficult to judge J's. 
intent, as he has remained silent on the protests and not commented on them so far. Q: After the 2010 elections, J. mobilized coal workers 
from Donezk to occupy central squares in Kiev to prevent protests against him. Will he mobilize a violent counter protest? A.: Can not be 
excluded. Already, attempts over the weekend to bring young and violent supporters to the capital. However, these were very few, and it was 
very unsuccessful. Q.: What or who is the face of the opposition? A.: Three movements with very different outlooks: 1) Klitschko's UDAR, 2) 
Arseniy Yatseniuk of Timoshenko's Baktiwschtschina (Fatherland) party, and 3) the ultra national/fascist Swoboda party. Key difference is the 
use of the nationalist card, the least nationalist is UDAR. Together, they have no coherent strategy, with many people asking what would be 
the next steps, and whether to trust the people leading the opposition parties; fear that a change of regime wont change much; know that J. 
is not the problem, but the UKR system is: "The political system is so lopsided and corrupt, that only a re-start with new structured, new faces, 
and new parties [will bring the necessary change]"; opposition parties seem to have no interest in that, but want J out to take over lucrative 
gov. positions. "The population wants a democratic, transparent, and fair political system". "Agreement with EU would increase chances of 









Date Event Summary/Transcript 
02.12.2013 Opposition hands in 
motion of censure 




negotiations with EU; 
Opposition adds 
Timoshenko back on 
list.408 
Ongoing protests, Government buildings now under control of opposition.; During the night, protesters used violence against police and 
security forces. "Most prominent" opposition leader Klitschko criticises J. on-going silence on protests on Maidan. Opposition establishes "joint 
headquarters" in occupied labour union building. Opposition now not only demands J to step down, but also freeing Timoshenko. 
02.12.2012 First statement of 
Yanukovych on 
Maidan protests.409 
Ukr evening news screen interview with J., in which he heavily criticises the protest movement; offers to discuss demands; announces he will 
pursue his planned trip to China, presumably for economic reasons. 
03.12.2013 Motion of censure 
unsuccessful.410 
Blow to opposition, looses vote of confidence in Rada. Prime Minister Azarow states the governments regret about the use of violence by 
police and security forces. "I will guarantee to hold those responsible accountable for their actions." Opposition leader Yatseniuk calls 
government a "government of thieves". Problem of Ukraine not only an economy, but a government that doesnt want to listen to the will of 
the people. Opposition leaders encourage protesters to keep on pressure; loosing the moption of confidence requires them to come up with 
a new strategy".   
04.12.2013 NATO Russia Council 
Summit.411 
At summit, Lawrow criticises statement by NATO condemning the use of violence against peaceful Maidan protesters as interference in 
domestic affairs; German FM travels to Kyiv to speak with government and opposition, meets with Yatseniuk and Klitschko, PM Azarow cancels 
meeting at last minute; PM Azarow announces that government will toughen its reactions to protests, and threatens to withhold wages for 
workers from Western Ukraine; UKR Foreign Minister Koschara announces that although his country is dependent on economic ties with 
Russia, it desires to continue talks with the EU about possible accession; emphasises that UKR does not come as a "beggar", but has to offer a 












Date Event Summary/Transcript 
04.12.2013 Ongoing 
demonstrations in 







Yatzeniuk, and with 
Wladimir Klitschko.412 
 
05.12.2013 OSCE Summit in Kyiv; 
Russian EU tensions 
rising; ultimatum to 
protesters.413 
First reports on counter protests in Kyiv, signs that not entire population supports pro EU course of opposition. OSCE Summit, UKR holds 
presidency of summit; Guido Westerwelle criticizes Russia's behaviour with unusually harsh words, calling Russian threats to Ukr "inacceptable 
behaviour". Russian FM Lawrow "We are a little surprised by some of the speeches we heard today. They did not match the agenda. It is 
unacceptable for the OSCE to finger-point at others", re-iterating a statement by Putin a few days earlier, when Putin stated his believe that 
the Maidan protests are orchestrated from abroad. The UKR constitutional court sets protesters on Maidan  ultimatum to clear square by Dec. 
10.  
07.12.2013 Speculations on 
signing agreement 
between UKR and 




protest march for 
next day.414 
J visited Putin 06.12.2013 for trade negotiations; PM Asarow confirmed 06.12.2013 "bilateral consultations of considerable importance to the 
strategic relationship between Ukraine and Russia"; talks about a roadmap to overcome obstacles for further integration; characterizes 
negotiations as difficult. On 07.12., J. denies that any agreement has been reached or signed; Opposition announces "March of the Millions" 










Date Event Summary/Transcript 
08.12.2012 March of Millions in 
Kyiv; protests move 
beyond question of 
EU integration, turn 
todomestic power 
struggle.415 
largest protests in Kyiv so far; protesters demand J to step down and re-elections; Ukrainian State Security Services announce investigations 
against opposition leaders for acts of subversion. J. remains in private residence outside Kyiv. 
08.12.2013 March of Millions in 
Kyiv; protests move 
beyond question of 
EU integration, turn 
to domestic power 
struggle.416 
Still no statement by J. on demands of opposition. Correspondent Ina Ruck: "Maybe the government hopes that the Cold Temperatures will 
eventually drive home the protesters. However, they occupy heated buildings, so this seems unlikely. To drive them out of the buildings would 
require violence, if not some form of mediation takes place." Announces visit of EU High Representative Catherine Ashton in Kyiv in the 
following week, but doubtful if she can offer any help to resolve this "deeply Ukrainian domestic crisis".  
09.12.2013 Berkut forces arrive in 
Kyiv, start taking 
down barricades, no 
violence so far. 
Ashton expected 
10.12. in an attempt 
ot mediate between 
the conflicting 
parties; Police evict 
HQ of Timoshenko's 
Fatherland party, 
Increased police presence all day, in the evening police starts taking down barricades; no violence so far; Klitschko speaks directly with police 
forces, appeals them to renunciate violence; announces that the regime will be changed, and they will be prosecuted under the new regime 
if they were to use violence. Police evict Timoshenko's Fatherland party's headquarters, take away computers, later announced as 
"investigation for business crime". J announces dialog, but not directly with opposition leaders, who are "investigated for subversion") but 



















Date Event Summary/Transcript 
09.12.2013 "The role of images in 
the Ukraine crisis": 
Background feature 
on Russian reporting 
on Ukraine crisis, 
Stephan Stuchlik.418 
Not only images in Internet, but also in television; in UKR itself so far, media coverage has been fairly realistic and open. In Russia, state 
controlled media sends completely different images to the ones seen in elsewhere - "almost impossible to recognize that the pictures are 
related to the same event [as reported elsewhere]; Russian state television airs "propaganda in the best Soviet tradition, from a time when 
the wall still stood in Berlin"; random example evening news 09.12.2013 show no pictures of the eviction of Timoshenko's party's (Fatherland) 
headquarters; instead images of blocked roads and heavy traffic in Kyiv, "as if the future of Ukraine was a traffic problem". "Opposition in UKR 
offers much space for critical reporting, for example their diverging interests or their ties to the private sector and the oligarchs. Instead, 
Russian TV aims at emotions"; shows helmet of Berkut trooper that has apparently been crushed by angry protesters. Another program shows 
a feature on the protesters on Maidan, showing only the red and black flags of the ultra-nationalist and radical Swoboda (Freedom) party 
"instead of hundreds of yellow-and-blue flags" , painting them as "the face of those in favour of Europe"; Shows interview with leader of 
Russian Communist party, who sees historic parallels with the era of fascism in Europe: "The situation in UKR does not develop towards 
[democratization like during the 90s], but more in the early 30s when fascism took over power in Europe". Anchorman on news program 
accuses Guido Westerwelle of favouring the Klitschko brothers "because he has been impressed by the hot bodies of the Klitschko brothers" 
, playing on Guido Westerwelle's sexual orientation. TV shows statement of Putin on 09.12.203, stating that he is "willing to accept whichever 
decision Ukraine takes".  
 
418 http://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/tt5146.html 





Date Event Summary/Transcript 
10.12.2013 Police starts removal 
of barricades; Ashton 
visits Kyiv, meets J.; J. 
announces that a 
delegation to 
negotiate specific 
points will travel to 
BXL on 11.12.; J. hold 
broadcast "round 
table" with fmr. 
Presidents.419 
In Round talk with fmr. Presidents, which now support opposition, J. announces willingness to consider amnesty for imprisoned opposition 
leaders; emphasises that re-establishing economic ties with Russia "without alternative; In meeting with Ashton no concrete results, but in 
press conference J. announces that a delegation will travel to BXL for further talks on "specific" points. Background Interview with ARD 
correspondent Ina Ruck on J. Q: What are the implications of J signalling willingness to re-enter negotiations with EU? A.: "Deja vu, a repetition 
of what he said 3 weeks ago, 2 weeks ago, 1 week ago: "Of course Ukraine continues on the European path, but it needs more money for it, 
and that it needs the economic relations with Russia and thus needs to revive them." EU delegation thus more of a "back to start" move; 
appears as if J still gambles on cutting the best deal for him and his country, but faces harsh realities: UKR almost bankrupt, and economically 
dependent on Russia - "and will remain so if it doesn't undergo deep reforms. Reforms, however, are not only painful for the population, but 
also for industry, who is largely supportive of J. Q.: Implications of high-ranking visits by Western politicians [V. Nuland, Catherine Ashton] on 
outlook for opposition? A.: Unified in resolve, staying in the streets despite extreme cold and threats of police storming the camps; 
international negotiators need to consider not only the demands of the opposition, but three options for J in their efforts to facilitate national 
dialogue. J. options: 1) Resigning - difficult to demand from a negotiator, would be considered as an interference in domestic affairs; 2) 
continue to deny opposition - J would lose further support from people; 3) Negotiate with opposition - "only solution, and solution 
international mediators should aim for".  
11.12.2013 J. offers national 
dialog; riot police 
attempts storming 
Maidan. J. meets C. 
Ashton and Victoria 
Nuland; Opposition 
rejects offer.420 
Riot police attempts to storm Maidan and occupied buildings, retreat after 10hrs of operations, largely peaceful. Most barricades removed, 
but Maidan and buildings still held by opposition. After meeting with C. Ashton (10.12.2013) and V. Nuland (11.12.2013), J. announces 
"national dialog" with "opposition, church leaders and all other social groups"; calls on opposition to end resistance. Opposition leader 










Date Event Summary/Transcript 
11.12.2013 News of the day on 
situation in UKR after 




Nuland meets J; J 
announces 
willingness for talks 
with opposition.421 
"Resolve of protesters drives back police". "Camouflage, trickery, deception" and to then strike unexpectedly, or at least attempt it appears 
to be the tactic of Yanukovych. First offers negotiations [after meeting Nuland], then sends out police at night "to restore public order in the 
streets of Kyiv". The "pro-European" people on the streets held out nonetheless; clashes remain non-violent, unlike two weeks earlier; Berkut 
Forces have been mobilized from Crimea and eastern UKR; Kyiv-orthodox priests demand Berkut forces to renunciate violence; Swoboda 
occupies Kyiv town hall, willing to use violence; police retreats after nine hours, meeting unified resistance [at town hall?]; take down 
barricades on streets to Maidan; Maidan and buildings still held by opposition. Victoria Nuland visits Kyiv, meets J., hands out food packs to 
people on Maidan:" I made it absolutely clear [to J.] that what happened last night is impermissible in a European and democratic state. I have 
no doubts that after our meeting [Mr. J] knows what he needs to do."; After meeting, J. offers talks with opposition, a "national dialogue",  on 
national television; Opposition leaders reject offer, unless central demands are met: resignation and re-elections. [no Europe...]. 
11.12.2013 Background Feature 
on Yanukovych.422 
Two factors move J.: a) pressure from Russia, and) the opposition's demand for closer association with Europe. Ad b) J remembers the Orange 
Revolution of 2006, where protests against forged elections cost him his office despite backing from Russia. Grip to power in UKR however 
not only a question of what the masses want, but also on the support of the oligarchs. J. for long enjoyed their support, e.g. Achemtov, owner 
of Schachtjor Donetsk, also Dmitri Firtasz. Oligarchs often own TV station's, snd so far their private channels have reported very openly about 
the protest movement. This can be seen as an indication that J looses his grip on media controlled by oligarchs. Reason may be that Ukraininan 
oligarchs like Achmetov, Firtasz [Poroshenko, Pinchuk] want to do business with Europe. Trying to seek their support and win them over may 
explain J. tactics of "two steps ahead, one back" towards Europe. J, "the Russia friend", remembers that Russian support only could not keep 









Date Event Summary/Transcript 
11.12.2013 Interview with Guido 
Westerwelle on the 
question whether the 
EU underestimated 
the complexity of 
UKR.423 
Q.: Has the UKR president J. been muscling around with the EU all along? A.: Hesitant to comment on recent manoeuvres [by UKR government 
to step away from signing agreement]. Our main interest is that the situation in Kyiv remains peaceful. "I call on all parties to renunciate 
violence. I expect the UKR government to protect the peaceful protester, and guarantee the freedom of assembly. I have seen the protesters 
personally, and they have one clear objective, which is Europe [the associated membership status with EU], and that must be possible."; Q.: 
Has the EU underestimated the role of Russia? Don't you think that the Russian president will try EVERYTHING [emphasis by speaker Th. Roth] 
to prevent Ukraine from drifting to close to Europe??" A.: "That is why the EU has offered an associated partnership status from the beginning". 
UKR requires profound deep reforms, and these reforms are possible only if UKR chooses the European path"; look at neighbouring countries 
shows that these countries are much better off than UKR. Therefore, the offer from the EU to UKR is very advantageous. Q.: Let me repeat my 
question: Has the EU misjudged Russia's resolve to prevent the associate member status of UKR in the EU?"; A.: "Since summer 2013, I have 
been to Kyiv three times. Before the summit in Vilnius [29.11.2013] everyone had to assume that UKR will sign [the association agreement 
with the EU].This [J. turnaround] has surprised some, but most of all the UKR people, as it clearly has been a fundamental change of direction. 
That is the reason for the Maidan movement, they demonstrate for Europe. I visited  Maidan, I spoke with the people, not only with the 
politicians: The people are peaceful, they represent European values, and, of course, as Europeans we stand with Europeans.   Q.: "UKR is 
short of bankruptcy, EU has offered around 1 bn in financial assistance; UKR government today stated that it requires 20bn. If EU wants to 
move closer to UKR or wants UKR to move closer to the EU, would the EU not have to offer substantially more to offer something that is 
attractive to the UKR government? A.: " We are ready to do a lot. The [association] agreement really is of great advantage to UKR.  There are 
additional and ongoing talks with UKR, for example with the European Investment Bank and the International Monetary Fund. But please 
understand that I cannot lead negotiations on the television screen. Rest assured that the material questions have been discussed and are 
being discussed. But I cannot accept that playing off the EU and Russia to reach a better deal. This is not in our interest, but it is especially not 
in the interest of the UKR people, because they want Europe."  
 
423 http://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/tt5150.html 





Date Event Summary/Transcript 
11.12.2013 Commentary Wolf 
Dieter Krause, ARD 
Correspondent BXL, 




Tough power struggle about future of Ukraine; OF COURSE the EU underestimated RUS resolve to maintain UKR in its sphere of influence by 
almost all means; "signals from Russia remained calm". Argues that EU, specifically NATO contributed greatly to the fact that it could get to 
this point: "Today, NATO troops are stationed much further to the east than once guaranteed [Paris Agreement; see Adomeit's uncovering of 
a myth"] to Russia. recently, under the pretence of protecting civilians, NATO massively took sides in the Libyan civil war. Now Russia is writing 
the bill, in Syria, and in Ukraine. Russia does feel respected. In Russia's eyes, NATO and the EU are the two sides of one coin." Recommends 
that Europe should acknowledge the Russian desire for respect. In relation to UKR, Krause suggests that the EU can trust that has the better 
offer for Ukraine. Putin seeks to blackmail Ukraine into enslavement. Europe offers partnership and long-term opportunities, and that explains 
why Ukrainian took to the streets, and why unlike in earlier domestic crises in Ukraine [Orange Revolution], the oligarchs are on the side of 
the opposition. Yanukovych feels the pressure of the people, but his wish to remain in power, and his fears about losing the personal wealth 
he has amassed in recent years; feels that only if siding with Russia this can be protected. Will not give in voluntarily. Outlook to 2015 elections 
in UKR: European Council, to which both RUS and UKR are members could observe if the elections are held democratic, free, and fair. EU and 
RUS have all reasons to clarify their relationship.   
13.12.2013 First meeting 
between opposition 
and Yanukovych.425 
Before meeting, J. announces possible amnesty for political prisoners; No results, Klitschko: "Government hasn’t moved a millimetre"; J. 
refuses to resign, or dismiss government; J. aggress top moratorium against the use of violence form both sides; Before meeting, opposition 
leaders appear on Maidan to receiver mandate for talks;  Klitschko announces running for president in 2015; most important demand from 
opposition: "dismiss the current government to end the political crisis"; Swobodo leader Oleg Tiagnibok warns of new police action during 
night: "Despite their promises [to remain peaceful], they don’t only use targeted provocations, but also the complete scenario of a violent 









Date Event Summary/Transcript 
14.12.2013 Counter 
demonstrations by 
supporters of J.426 
Mobilized from east and south of Ukraine; favfour closer ties wirth Russia over closer ties with EU. Rumours are that they are paid by 
government; anonymous source: "They are paid 2,50 Hrywnja per hour. The protests are organized by the local authorities"; suggests that 
many protesters do it for the money, not for the cause. Dismissal of mayor of Kyiv and unnamed hingh ranking security official for violent 
suppression of peaceful protests in November 
15.12.2013 Gauck announces to 
stay away from 
Winter Olympics in 
Sochi; McCain, 
Members of EU 
Parliament (Elmar 
Brok, Rebecca Harms) 
appear on Maidan, 
speak to protesters; 
support W. 
Klitschko.427 
According to Der Spiegel and Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Federal Chancellery was not informed about Gauck's step. If they had known, 
they would have advised against the move. Stefan Fule announces that EU may put talks with Ukraine about Association agreement "on ice". 
John MacCain visits Maidan, tells protesters about their inspirational protests, "to the world and to your country. America stands side-by-side 
with the Ukrainians". After McCain, Elmar Brok, conservative Member of the European Parliament, and Head of its Foreign Relations 
Committee, and Rebecca Harms, of the European Greens, speak to demonstrators; Brok: "The door to Europe remains open for Ukraine". 
Appearances of high-level politicians on Maidan are criticised by Russia as Western interference in domestic affairs. Announcement of trip by 
J. to Russia next week.   
15.12.2013 Fears rise that UKR 
question may cause 
international crisis 
between Russia and 
EU.428 
Additional reporting on visit of Elmar Brok; Brok to protesters on Maidan: "We, the European Parliament will help you to fulfil the conditions 
[to become an associate member of the European Union]. For this your don't need to go to Moscow to sell your country. The countries of 
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16.12.2013 Meeting between S. 
Lawrow and EU 
Foreign Ministers; no 
results, EU continues 
"open door policy" 
towards Ukraine; In 
Ukraine, first voices 
in government party 
demand dismissal of 
current government 
under PM Asarow.429 
Before meeting, Westerwelle, W. Hague announce that EU is keeping the door open for UKR to still sign the agreement "if it is willing to meet 
the conditions"; Stefan Fule, EU Commissioner for Enlargement announces on Twitter that the EU will only continue to negotiate if there is an 
obligation for Ukraine to sign the agreement. Russia offers credit to Ukraine, as, according to Andrej Belorussow, economic advisor to Putin, 
"without a credit from either side Ukraine cannot guarantee its economic stability".  
16.12.2013 Correspondent 
R.D.Krause on 
meeting between EU 
Foreign Ministers and 
Sergei Lawrow.430 
Q.: What will the EU ministers tell Lawrow? A.: The ministers will try to take away the Russian fear that the EU wants to drag Ukraine into the 
Western camp, and position Ukraine against Russia.; they will emphasise that they want a balanced relationship, and try to convince Russia 
that the EP Association Agreement with Ukraine wold be beneficial to all three, especially Ukraine; that Russia would profit from an 
economically stronger UKR economy. Two-pronged approach, 1. take away Russian fears, 2. refuse Russian pressure on Ukraine. Q.: What are 
the expectations in Brussels? Does anyone expect a U-turn of Yanukovych, so that he will after all sign the association agreement? A.: "I believe 
that the ministers are uncertain [about the prospect of J. signing after all]". Expectation not mentioned by FM, they say that it is up to the 
Ukrainian, not external actors to decide, and that it should occur in the absence of fear. C. Ashton stated that she expects that the short-term 
problems of J., the economic situation of Ukraine and Russian pressure, can be overcome.  
16.12.2013 EU FM Summit 
meeting with 
Lawrow.431 
Carl Bildt on Russian pressure on Ukraine and the impact on relations with Russia: "It [the Russian behaviour] has an impact on our relations. 
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16.12.2013 EU FM Summit 
meeting with 
Lawrow.432 
No results, G. Westerwelle: "Especially in times of differences of opinion it is important to talk more, not less. And before anything, there is 
the diplomacy of conversation, paying close attention, and of exchange". Appears unlikely that UKR is going to sign agreement with EU, 
Westerwelle: "We continue to want Ukraine [as associate member of the EU]. We still want to sign the agreement. No one can say that there 
was a lack of will on behalf of the European Union". Meanwhile, J on trip to Moscow, Westerwelle demands that lines of communication with 
Russia are not cut: "There is no peace and security in Europe against Russia, only with Russia." 






Russia calls appearances of Western politicians "shameless"; Lawrow after meeting EU FM: "It was our common agreement that everyone 
respects the sovereignty of every country, including Ukraine, and should allow all people to decide freely for themselves how they want to 
develop their country, their state." In eyes of EU, association agreement would be advantageous for Russia also, Ashton: "Our association and 
trade agreements are in full accordance with existing trade relations [between RUS and UKR] and fully respect the traditional economic ties 
between UKR, RUS and its neighbours. We are of the opinion that UKR can have good relations with all neighbours". Analysis by W.D. Krause, 
ARD correspondent BXL: Doubts among EU diplomats about value of Lawrow's statement, "Russia wants influence, and wants to keep Europe 
off its borders"; this also explains that there were no results to the meeting. 
17.12.2013 Yanukovych signs far 
reaching agreements 
with Russia to 
overcome UKR 
economic crisis; 
lowers gas prices by 
1/3 immediately.434  
Putin in joint press conference: "With the aim of supporting the Ukrainian state budget, the government of the Russian Federation has decided 
to grant Ukraine a credit of 15 bn US $ in loans."; No agreement on UKR joining the customs union; difficult for UKR position, because 
opposition in Kyiv prefers stronger links with EU; Klitschko: Why does he [J.] get large credits, why does he get much cheaper gas prices? We 
don't know, we hope he won't sell Ukrainian interests"; opposition leaders continue to demand re-elections. Commentary tagesschau (Bock): 
"Smart move by Russia". Signals to EU: We hold on to our promises to our UKR partner.  
17.12.2013 Putin announces 
amnesty for Russian 
prisoners.435 
Including Pussy Riot band members; majority of prisoners released served their sentence for "thuggery". Rumours that list of those released 




434 http://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/video/video1359986.html ; http://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/tt5164.html 
435 http://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/ts45928.html 
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19.12.2013 Backgrounder on why 
Ukraine shelved deal 
with EU.436 
Tells a story of Y first pushing his cadres towards EU, but then suddenly turining to Putin; main explanator: grip to power, and emotional 
dealing with Timoshenko; second order, economic offers made by EU / conditions imposed by IMF perceived as humiliation. EU source states 
that more was in the pipeline for Ukraine, but this was to be withheld from negotiations.  





backgrounder on fmr. 
Boxing heavy weight 
champion, as 
opposition leader and 
darling of western 
conservative support; 
includes insights into 
work of German 
political 
foundations.437 
Almost daily visits of high ranking western politicians and leaders to Klitschko.; Elmar Brok, MEP, leading member of the European conservative 
party, and spokesperson of the EU Parliament’s Foreign Affairs committee describes K. as "an extraordinarly smart and increasingly 
experienced politician", who is "clearly in favour of Western values" since he speaks of democracy and the rule of law as preconditions for 
economic success"; Brok visited K. twice already, also at Vilnius Summit (29.11.), Klitschko profits from having established contacts with 
western political foundations early on. In 2006, when he was leading the "Pora" political movement he established relations with the 
conservative German Konrad Adenauer Foundation (KAF). When founding his current party, Udar, "Vitali Klitschko approached us. He asked 
for informal contacts to CDU [German conservative party; Merkel's party]  and the European Conservative Party, as well as support through 
workshops and seminars" says Gabriele Baumann, then Head of KAF in Kyiv.Klitschko visited CDU party summits in 2011 and 2012, meets 
Chancellor Merkel; established good relationship with BILD Zeitung, in which he publishes regularly since the beginning of the protests in Kyiv. 
[In response to Russian criticism of Western interference, pat. financing of opposition movements] Baumann emphasises the limits of the 
work of political foundations: "We don't finance parties, and give no logistical or matrerial support, not even computers or other hardware. 
We don't support election campaigns, neither financially, nor otherwise". Success for Klitschko UDAr party in 2013: With support of KAF 
granted observatory status in European conservative party (European People's Party?), made possible as part of the Eastern PArtnership 
Intitiative; observatory status gives access to high-ranking European politicians; at Vilnius summit Klitschko meets with Barros and van Rompuy 
and other EU heads of state; "according to Elmar Brok, he left a good impression". Commentary adds that his competitor, J. made negative 
headlines among the participants in Vilnius by renting the most expensive apartment available, accroding to a Western diplomat; Klitschko 
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20.12.2013 Background 
Interview on EU 
summit on Ukraine 
with Christian Feld, 
ARD Correspondent, 
BXL.438 
Q.: Deoes the EU have a concept how to deal with UKR? A.: Not really apparent. It send out two message: 1) the door remains open for UKR, 
if it fulfills the conditions of the agreement; 2) We are not carpet dealers, we can not buy countries with a checkbook; all this shows that the 
opportunities [for the EU] are currently very limited. Q.: UKR appears very important for the EU; why? A.: It's not only about Ukraine, but also 
the other countries of the Eastern Partnership. The Eastern Partnership is also not only about economic issues, but also the export of EU 
values: democracy, freedom of opinion. The EU repeatedly stressed that signing the Agreement is not an either or decision between Russia 
and the EU, but a decision of not only but also. However, currently [signing of loan agreement between RUS and UKR on 17.12.2013] UKR has 
turned to RUS.  
22.12.2013 First press 
conference of M. 
Khodorkovsky after 
being released from 
custody; in Berlin.439 
Khodorkovsky gives first press conference 36hrs after being released from custody; in Berlin; Thanks Angela Merkel and Hans-Dietrich 
Genscher for their efforts; calls on J. to release Timoshenko, supports Maidan protests.  




Mass protests continue, 50.000 people on Maidan; sparked by brutal beating of critical journalist Tatjana Jornovil; opposition organized march 
on J. residence, where he is suspected, as he still refuses to enter talks with opposition 
29.12.2013 Terror attack on rail 
station in Volgograd, 
leaving 16 dead, 29 
wounded.441 
Unknown perpetrators; suspicions that attackers related to Muslim rebel groups from the North-Caucasus (Dagestan), as they had announced 
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29.12.2013 Volgograd 
Incident.442 
Fears that North Caucasus based Muslim rebel groups made their announcement about attacking prior and during the upcoming winter 
Olympics true; "Sochi is close to the Northern Caucasus Region, and Volgograd only 700km away from Sochi" [Th. Roth; how far is Dagestan 
away from Volgograd]; Russian TV shows pictures of rebels in the northern Caucasus region, where the self-proclaimed mujahedeen prepare 
themselves for attacks on secret training grounds. Commentary I Roth: "Muslim terror groups have long before announced their intent to 
attack prior and during the Sochi Winter Olympics; today's attack seems to a symbol that they also have the capability" 
01.01.2014 Putin visits 
Volgograd; ongoing 
protests in Kyiv.443 
"Putin made mark by visiting Volgograd [on Russian Christmas Day] two days after the attack"; P. denounces attacks, "nothing legitimizes this 
brutal act". P. re-emphasises his resolve to "annihilate" the terrorists; in his new year’s speech, screened just before he arrived in Volgograd, 
he already announced a "firm approach against terrorism, we will fight them until their total annihilation".  Commentary I. Ruck, ARD 
Correspondent Moscow: "Putin, as before, today announced his intention to "destroy" terrorism; however, the problem goes much deeper: 
the radical groups have announced their intentions to attack a long time ago - and now [despite Putin's repeat announcements of taking a 
tough stance] have shown their ability to do so." 
 
442 http://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/tt5182.html; http://tass.com/russia/713488 ; http://en.sledcom.ru/news/item/886689/?pdf=1 
443 http://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/ts46144.html 
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12.01.2014 First large 
demonstrations in 
2014; Renewed mass 
protests on Maidan 
after brutal beating of 
fmr. Minister of 
Interior; UKR gov. 
Announces 6 bn US$ 
loan from Russia for 
Following the brutal beating of former minister of the interior Lutsenko, renewed mass protests in Kyiv. Police starts using violence against 
protesters; Klitschko announces change of course, "protests must continue, but with new means. We will organise a country-wide strike"; 
Yatseniuk, of T. Fatherland party, demands Western governments to sanction individual members of UKR government; Commentary on 
introduction: ""Original trigger for the mass protests in Ukraine was the refusal [of the UKR president J] to sign a long planned agreement 
[about an associate partnership status] with the EU".  





Date Event Summary/Transcript 
its nuclear power 
plants.444 





Date Event Summary/Transcript 
20.01.2014 Increasing violence 
on Maidan after 
tightening laws of 
assembly; 200 
reported injured.445 
Violent clashes following the surprise move of J. to tighten the laws governing the right to assembly on 16.01.2014, including the permission 
to use live ammo against violent protesters that occupy government buildings. Clashes despite earlier announcement by J of mediation talks 
with opposition, but at the same time emphasising his willingness to use all legal means available to re-establish public order. Klitschko: 
currently, the government mobilizes special forces [Berkut] from all across the country. [to Ukrainians] Sit in your cars and buses, you are 









Date Event Summary/Transcript 
20.01.2014 Yanukovych offering 
talks with opposition; 
violence on Maidan; 
Interview with U. 
Lilischkies, by Thomas 
Roth; first mentioning 
of radical elements 
among Maidan 
Q: J. offers talks with the opposition - is this yet again a ruse to appease the opposition and play on time and the bitter cold, or is it an honest 
offer this time around?  Is there, after all, only a violent way out? A.: Appears as if the hopes in a peaceful solution that were kindled by J.s 
announcement to make concessions (including by me) are ill-fated. After the talks with J., Klitschko said that "one cannot trust this man", and 
today, many indicators point that way: 1. Since one hour, Berkut forces have started to arrest people, take out barricades and storm occupied 
buildings; 2., further Berkut forces are being mobilized from all across the country to move to Kyiv;  3. J announced in the morning that he will 
revise the controversial law on the right to assembly, and in the evening it becomes apparent that he has enacted it nonetheless, and it will 
be published tomorrow.   Q.: Surprisingly, the President yesterday announced his willingness to talk to the opposition directly - but this now 
appears more like a diversion tactic by J? A.: That is correct; but important to understand that the position of the two sides are very far apart. 
On the one hand, the protesters, who have been holding out on Maidan since November, have far reaching demands: They want J to step 
down, dismiss the government, and hold re-elections. To Yanukovych, this would be very large concessions to makes. There is also another 
problem: The people that protest on Maidan today are [different to those initially] but young man with a high propensity to resort to violence; 
they want to see results now; "a revolutionary fire has been ignited that will be hard to control now". Q.: From here [Hamburg] the images 
portray a united opposition; but is not one of the key problems of the opposition that they are disunited in central questions? A.: Yes, 
absolutely; there are for example large debates who legitimately speaks for the opposition - 1 person, several people, if yes, then who...there 
are very different wings, from ultra right and high propensity for use of violence, to nationalist-conservative like Fatherland and Udar. The 
disunity amongst the opposition have been a traditional UKR problem.  





Date Event Summary/Transcript 
protesters; "rogue 
protesters”.446 





Date Event Summary/Transcript 
22.01.2014 First fatalities on 
Maidan; protests 
escalates; crisis 
summit between J 
and opposition 
leaders; opposition 
sets ultimatum. 447 
First fatalities, opp. Claims five, government two killed. Video footage of the first victim taken just a few hours before show a young man who 
is willing to die for the cause. Violence takes over when Berkut forces start raiding the opposition barricades and occupied buildings; violent 
protesters ("thugs and hooligans") using Molotov-Cocktails enriched with chemicals; rumours that police uses live ammo, denied by police;  
Asarow denounces violent protesters as "criminal", doesn't rule out further use of police force against them; subsequent crisis meeting, the 
first face to face meeting between J and all three opposition leaders since beginning of protests, does not bring any ease of tensions on Maidan. 
Klitschko, sets ultimatum: "If tomorrow the President does not meet with us, then we assemble even more people tomorrow, and then we 
will attack", adds that he will do his best to prevent further bloodshed.  Live-Commentary from Kyiv by Udo Lilischkies: other opposition leaders 
joined up with Klitschko on ultimatum; Yatseniuk announces that J. promised that he will consider to dismiss the government, which would 
be a partial victory for the opposition; self-confident  opposition, large scale support, many women and old people on Maidan as well; very 
difficult to storm and clear the square for the amount of people.  
22.01.2014 Brennpunkt: Crisis in 
Ukraine.448 
10min on background of  crisis and surge of violence; contributions exclusively from ARD, Ina Ruck (Studio expert fmr head of ARD Moscow) 
and Udo Lilischkies, in Kyiv. Lilischkies emphasises pre-revolutionary atmosphere, speaks of united opposition with high morale, and from 
well-organized manoeuvres ("fighters"; hospital and first aid); stresses that there are many conflicting rumours, ie. tanks have been seen 
moving, but MoD stated that this is part of a regular rotation. Ina Ruck on likelihood of violence? Always expected, apparently now ignited by 
agents provocateurs paid by J; J now has to go all the way with RUS, as he needs their support not only for the short term economic crisis, but 










Date Event Summary/Transcript 
22.01.2014 tagesthemen on 
Maidan escalation; 
Interview Th. Roth 
Q.: Rumours that the protests turned violent because of agents provocateurs among the protesters? A.: Yes, this can be confirmed, they do 
exist, and they have been arrested by the opposition, and chased away from Maidan. But they are a smaller group, the large majority of those 
willing to fight against the police are young men, football supporters; and of course, they throw Molotov-cocktails, and for three days now 
have not shied away from throwing them at the Berkut Forces around Maidan. The hatred between the groups is on an upward spiral, chances 
for a negotiated agreement very small, and if, need to happen very fast. But whether J. is really finally considering living up to what he 
announced [taking back controversial assembly law; dismiss government] remains to be seen, many believe he plays on time [as he did before].  





Date Event Summary/Transcript 
with Udo Lilischkies, 
Kyiv.449 





Date Event Summary/Transcript 
22.01.2014 tagesthemen, 
commentary on 
Ukraine Crisis, Ina 
Ruck.450 
Starts off by reminiscing about the powerful images ("soup kitchen and winter camp romance") of the first days of the protests following J 
unexpected turning away from signing the association agreement in Nov. 2013. Now, instead of those peaceful pro-European protesters, 
"radical bomb-throwers, shooting police men, ugly images, violence" rule Maidan; helpless Klitschko accepts that "the opposition does not 
control Maidan anymore". This development could have been expected, considering the question how long people an hold out in the cold if 
the other side doesn’t move a millimetre, and instead of engaging in search for a solution adds salt to injury? This is what J did by tightening 
laws and going ahead with his Russia friendly course, and by letting every dialog with the opposition run into nowhere. In such a [polarized] 
context, provocateurs play an easy game. "Now, there are armoured personnel carriers in town, there are fatalities, and people wounded; 
images that do not belong to Europe. But this is where the Ukrainians want, and apparently, this also goes for the President". At least this last 
deception of J. should not be believed, "the deeply corrupt J. has made his choice: Moscow instead of Brussels."; choice not only because of 
economic crisis of UKR and financial aid by RUS, but also because he hopes that Moscow will support his re-election in 2015. "In the Kremlin, 
people know how to manipulate elections"; Certainly, J. also sought Moscow's backing for the recent escalation on Maidan. "This also means 









Date Event Summary/Transcript 
23.01.2013 background article on 
protest-movement, 
ist link with 
nationalism and the 
Maidan escalation; 
argues that the 
Maidan movement 
does not per se have 
a propensity for 
violence and 
extremism; radical 
right wingers loosely 




Increasingly, hooded thugs on Maidan, some belonging to nationalist right wing groups; atmosphere on Maidan suddenly changed when it 
became apparent that J. would not accept any deal; rushes through law tightening right to assembly, denounces protests as illegal, limits 
freedom of media and NGOs; parliamentarians belonging to opposition can lose immediately lose their immunity. Robbed of alternative 
peaceful means to achieve their objectives, Klitschko and other opposition leaders have little arguments to counter those calling for violence; 
the violent excesses discredit the opposition movement, allow J and UKR government to speak of "extremists" risking the stability of the 
country. Indeed, violence originates from groups like "Right Sector", an informal right wing association, that came together since the first days 
of the protests; organize themselves via Vkontakte (Russian facebook equivalent; check role of Vkontakte in Russian Foreign Policy); use 
vKontakte to "ask for donations in kind to prepare for the fighting"; have no fixed meeting point on Maidan like other movements; amongst 
them also Russian speaking hooligans "and others from different regions of UKR" ready to use violence; they are united in their hostility 
towards Russia; no interest in dialog with government, want removal of J and establish a new nation state; do not want to join the EU. 
Swoboda, the most radical nationalist party of the three main opposition parties also known for its right-wing extremist stance, and well 
connected amongst European nationalists, favours closer ties of UKR with EU; Nationalism widespread in UKR, T party also "quite nationalistic. 
Anyway, nationalism in UKR is often seen as an expression of pride and the willingness to defend sovereignty against Russia"; mentions 
differences between eastern and western Ukraine in this respect. Rumours, fanned by discovery of tortured, dead journalists in forest nearby 
Kyiv, of thugs recruited by J government to threaten journalists and members/supporters of the opposition movement.  
 
451 http://www.tagesschau.de/ausland/ukraine-nationalisten100.html 
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23.01.2013 Crisis meeting 
between J and 
opposition after night 
of violence; easing of 





J. meets with heads of Maidan-opposition; announces special parliamentary session to discuss opposition demands; K. demands truce until 
decision is taken to prevent further escalation of violence. Live commentary by Udo Lilischkies: people on Maidan increasingly impatient, as 
their leaders announced that today was "the day of decision" : either there concessions of J or attack (ultimatum set 22.01.2014); after J 
announcement, the protesters are confronted with the offer to hold on 5 more days [until plenary session in parliament] at temp. of -22 
degrees; video footage of protester tortured by police adds to impatience; currently, orthodox priests are standing between the lines of violent 
protesters and Berkut forces, try to mediate.  
 
452 http://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/video/video1367796.html 
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not limited to Kyiv 
anymore; 
tagesschau.453 
J. offers to dismiss government and take back controversial laws after meeting with S. Fule; however reiterates his intent to use all legal means 
to resolve situation; Protesters not satisfied, new demonstrations, occupation of government buildings outside Kyiv (Western Ukraine, 
especially Lwiw); Klitschko to protesters: a few weeks ago, dismissing the government would have been OK - but now only stepping down of 
J. can resolve the crisis; without alternative for opposition, outlook for peaceful resolution on new low.  
24.01.2014 Ambiguous, high-
tension situation on 
Maidan continues, 
conflict parties agree 
on truce.454  
Despite "truce" between sides, and efforts by Klitschko to de-escalate mistrust in J. leads protesters to fortify barricades further; occupy 
another government building, as rumours spreading that Berkut will storm Maidan during night. S. Füle meets with J, after meeting J. offers 
amnesty for political prisoner "that are not accused of criminal or violent acts". Peaceful resolution unlikely, as now only alternatives "step 
down" or "attack".  
24.01.2014 Feature on protests 
outside Kyiv.455 











Date Event Summary/Transcript 
25.01.2014 J. dismisses 
government; offers 
Yatseniuk and 
Klitschko positions in 
new government.456 
After meeting, J. announces that the Asarow government will be dismissed; Yatseniuk to take over as Prime Minister, and Klitschko as his 
deputy; J furthermore announces amnesty for political prisoners, strengthening of the legislative vis a vis the president; restructure central 
election committee of UKR. Prior to meeting, Yatseniuk's party sends out rumours that J will proclaim state of emergency; MOI publishes 
statement that it will treat all protesters occupying government buildings as extremists, and if necessary, employ force against them; 
apparently, sides agreed on how to retreat from Maidan, but unclear if protesters will follow the leadership decision; amnesty on prisoners 
will only be enacted when occupied government buildings are vacated; same condition for revision of controversial laws on right of assembly; 
all depends on whether deal can be sold to radical groups among opposition that want nothing but J to resign. Commentary: "Everything still 
very ambiguous, and challenging, but the recent steps by J. may have helped to resolve this crisis at the very last minute."   
 
456 http://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/ts46516.html 
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26.01.2014 opposition protests 
continue, situation 
calms. Opposition 
continues to demand 
stepping down of J 
and re-elections. 
Protests (and riots) 
spread across the 
entire country; 
Minister of Defence 
refuses involvement 
in Ukrainian crisis.457  
Relative calm in Kiev after violence of earlier days; protesters mourn protester killed earlier; coffin wrapped in colours of ultra-nationalists; 
police denies responsibility. Y interprets offers made by J as "a sign of weakness: the ruling elite shies away from being responsible for their 
country"; opposition refuses offer, remains relentless in their demands and objective; [on stage with Klitschko and Yatseniuk not Tiagnibok of 
Swoboda anymore, but Petro Poroshenko].; later during day hooligans and thugs storm congress centre in Kyiv, "with fire crackers and Molotov 
cocktails"; Klitschko mediated between protesters and police to prevent bloodshed, before police vacated building; Reports of riots in the 
meantime spreading across entire country, including east and south of Ukraine; e.g. Zaparoje in south-eastern Ukraine, thousands of people 
unsuccessfully  attempt to storm municipality, which was used to organize support for J. ; Commentary Golineh Atai: "It is getting close for 
president J. The minister of defence just announced that under no circumstance will he order the Ukrainian military to fire at Ukrainian people 
- without the militaries support, however, it will be difficult to implement a state of emergency." 




storm and occupy 
buildings of Ministry 
of Justice.458 
Reports that riots have now reache3d as far as Eastern UKR, which so far has been spared form protests; Opposition shows map spread of 
protests: only regions without protests are Donetsk and Crimea. back in Kyiv, a field hospital of the opposition is shown, which is all run by 
volunteers; interview with a doctors " I am a private doctors, and I am here to support the change of this government this government of 
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27.01.2014 Protesters vacate 
Ministry of Justice 
after ultimatum; 
opposition still 





rumours of state of 
emergency.459 
Ongoing crisis summit between opposition leaders and J.; Tiagnibok, leader of Swoboda, states that plans for a state of emergency are on the 
table of the President, and that the military would be part of it. L. Koschara, UKR FM denies plans to proclaim state of emergency, '"difficult 
to enact", however, after occupation of Ministry of Justice, the Minister sets ultimatum to protesters, otherwise, in her capacity as MoJ she 
will turn to the President and assess whether the conditions for a state of emergency are fulfilled; Klitschko intervenes, protesters leave 
building; Reports of riots in Dnepotrepowsk, clashes between opposition supporters, thugs, footbal hooligans and police. G. Atai, live: Ongoing 
war of nerves, as talks are still on going; maybe special plenary session in UKR parliament 28.01.2014 can bring solution; unlikely if dismissing 
the government only can satisfy the opposition. Events like today's occupation and freeing of the government building shows disunity among 
opposition, and that it is not always under the control of the leadership of the Maidan-Movement; Reports of a credible UKR newspaper of 
government plans to increase Berkut presence in Kyiv, equipped with "far ranging legal authorities". 
 
459 http://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/ts46550.html 
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27.01.2014 tagesthemen, 
interview Th. Roth, 
tagethemen anchor, 
with Elmar Brok on 
situation in Kyiv.460 
Q.: Ongoing talks between J and opposition. You are in close contact with Mr. Klitschko, - are there signals of a peaceful solution to the crisis in Ukriane? A.: I 
believe that the negotiation position of the opposition is realisitic. If good willed, if willing to prevent further violence and cahos, J. should show a real interest 
in their position. The longevity of the talks [talking place at the time of interview] gives me some hope, but the outcome is all but certain. Q.: Why should J 
accept demands of the opposition now? So far, he showed little willingness to compromise, but played on time insteat - why should this be different now? A.: 
Firstly, I believe he now understands that the deal with the Russians isn't that good after all, and that the Russians are blackmailing him. Secondly, because the 
protests have now spread across the entire country, showing him that his policies have no future. Of course, he can now use stalinisitc methods, brutal force, 
and clobbere everything and everyone, but if he does that he will soon thereafter go to prison - because you can not deal with your population like this anymore. 
That's why he needs to find a way out, so that he has a future for himself. I hope that this understanding has reached J in recent days. Q.: From the UE, there 
have been repeated talks about sanctions, to support J in his thinking process - vbut nothing happened. Why not? A.: Because that would be too early. We are 
currently here to lead talks with both sides. Commissioner Fule arrived tonight, C. Ashotn is about to arrive; tomorrow evening a delegation of 12 MEP will arrive 
for an official visit: We are still trying to convince the two sides of a peacful solution; only if that doesn't work, then we will move to punish all those prosecutors 
and judges, bureaucrats and ministers that send people to prison and have helped to sign off the laws of 16.01. It would mean travel bans to Europe; oligarch's 
accounts to be frozen. If we employ sanctions, then to hurt and punish those individuals, not the people of Ukraine. Q.: Mr. Brok, let us summarize briefly: what 
is the poosition of the opposition, what is theri model that will be discussed in parliemant tomorrow? A.: First thing to be discussed is the stepping down; the 
annullation of the laws from 16.01; Amnesty for those imprisoned as consequence of law; and then, very importantly, the re-introduction of the constitution 
from 2004, which would strengthen the parliament vis a vis the President, and make Ukraine a parliamentarian democracy. This second part would also entail 
re-elections for October 2014. Q.: Mr. Brok, let me ask you agin: so far J's tactics was to deceipt and play on time. Do you honestly believe that the opposition 
stance a chance to change this with what they demand from J.? A.: People here say that the chance is there, they even speak of 50/50. I am not so optimistic. 
But it is a real window of opportunity now, but also a real threat if J doesnt accept, and things dont work out in the Rada tomorrow, the situation may detriorate 
dramatically. It is not acceptable to leave the people in such a situation of insecurity for two months. People feel insecure, they have seen snipers on the rooftops 
above them, have seen incredible kidnappings and torture, and many of them are by now filled with hatred. If J doesn't accpet now, then the situation is likely 
to explode, and would be of truely revolutionary character. I believe that J is conscious of this situation, and that should lead him to be willing to compromise, 
truely compromise this time, not only promise and then do nothing like he did before. Q.: Tomorrow, the EU-Commission is to meet Mr. Putin, who is also a 
player in Ukraine somehow. What do you have to offer him that he would be willing to drop J.? A.: I think Putin must understand that he can not incorporate 
UKR like before: the people here have developed a much stronger sense for freedom. It will be very expensive for him; Ukraine is an expensive country. We 
expect the cost for Russia's plans with UKR to be around 30bn US $ in the coming years. But that will not keep Ukraine unter control. He must therefore ask 
himself whether this operation is worth it, or whether he has not already suffered a defeat. And we must make clear that no country has the right to interfere 
in another country's trade negotiations by blackmailing the victim by increasing commodity prices. It must be made clear to Putin that every country has the 
right to choose for itself, the decision does not take place in Moscow, nor in Brussels. The UKR population must be given the right to decide for itself.  
27.01.2014 tagesthemen: 
breakthrough for 
opposition in UKR; 
"night of decision"; 
Opposition leaders (Yatseniuk, Klitschko, Tiagnibok) meet with J for talks again; crisis summit in preparation of special parliamentary session 
28.01.; session could decide whether the severe crisis of the UKR state can be resolved, "if J doesnt play on time"; report shows companion of 
recently killed journalist (corpse found nearby in Kyiv forest) accusing UKR government of targeting individuals, and beating them up; 
systematically spread fear and ditrust among opposition; perpetrators accuse later victim of "questioning the unity of the slavs", hinting at the 
Russian or Esastern Ukrainian descent of the torturers; new alölegations of torutre and killing leads to increased hatred and resolve amongst 
protesters, expects President to step down and snap elections. Protester: "The crossroads have been reached".  
 
460 http://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/video/video1368668.html 
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situation remaining 
dicey.461 
27.01.2013 Commentary on 
situation in UKR, 
Michael Strempel, 
WDR: "Klitschko's 
hardest battle"; on 
disunity of 
opposition.462 
only common denominator of opposition is to demand J to step down; very different nature of opposition parties, ultra-nation Swoboda, 
Timoshenko and Yanteseniuk's ambiguous Fatherland party (which had joined in an election-coalition with the ultra right in previous elections); 
Udar, lacking the punch to lead the opposition uncontested. "Klitschko's allies are no coalition for the futre of the country". J could capitalize 
on the differences and play on time until now, but he overestimated the patience of the people; the country is now on the brink of a revolution; 
only snap-elections can possibly prevent a further worsening of the situation; "If J supports the way to snap elections himself - the better. If 
not, Europe's top-policy makers should emphatically engage with J on this point. The EU is far more attractive to the UKR population that it is 
to many people of EU member states. The EU should not completely disappoint this hope of the UKR people". EU must unambiguously prompt 
Putin not to not torpedo democratic snap elections. UKR may not be allowed to turn into the front state of a renewed East-West conflict. "The 
country only has one future: if it reconciles its Russian and Western roots - and maybe a former boxing world champion is one day soon the 















Foundation Kyiv since 
2012; collaborates 




"ease of people to take and hold government buildings in 10 other Ukrainian cities could confirm the rumour that security forces are being 
concentrated in and around Kyiv. It is also a sign that J. has lost the monopoly of violence"; J.'s step to offer the prime minister post to 
opposition (surprised everyone"; but opposition declines unambiguously, and makes acceptance of offer dependent of further concessions; 
the offer is also deceptive, as in the UKR constitution, only president suggests and dismisses PM.  
28.01.2014 tagesschau: Asarow 
resigns; laws of 16.01. 
taken back.464  
PM Asarow resigns; parliament takes back law of 16.01. Asarow will continue to act as PM, until a new compromise candidate is found; decision 
is up to president; Report introduces Pedro Poroshenko as potential candidate; Klitschko on resignation: "This resignation should have 
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28.01.2014 tagesschau, EU 
Commission-Russia 
summit.465 
Crisis in UKR overshadows summit; News Anchor: "Putin to discuss contentious issues like the Eastern Partnership Agreement between EU 
and UKR; "The protests in UKR were caused by a decision to freeze long-lasting talks between UKR and EU about closer ties in favour of Russia 
[by J.]". News report: Open and honest discourse announced; EU commission sees RUS responsibility for situation in UKR. Putin on association 
agreement and Russian behaviour: "Our worry with this association agreement is not the sovereign decision of UKR, but the economic 
consequences [of signing an Association Agreement]." Report states that "Putin fears economic disadvantages". van Rompuy: "we have 
emphasised that the agreement is economically advantageous for all sides, including Russia"; Summit agrees to joint expert commission to 
further analyse the economic effects. Putin on question whether he would take back bilateral agreement signed with J. on if government 
changes in Kyiv: "No, we will not do such a thing". Commentary W.D. Krause, ARD correspondent BXL: Summit supposed to clarify how Europe 
and Russia wish to live up "to their so-called strategic partnership". This has not been achieved, but it became apparent during the summit 
that both sides have an interest in trying to prevent a further deterioration of their relations.  
28.01.2014 tagesthemen: pyrrhic 
victory for 
opposition? NOT day 
of decision in UKR; 
Protests ongoing; 
report from Charkiv, 
stronghold for J.; 
Interview with 
Golineh Atai, ARD 
Kyiv.466 
Caren Miosga, intro: Resignation of Asarow and taking back of laws just a pyrrhic victory for opposition? Asarow continues to act as PM, until 
a new compromise candidate is found; introduction of Poroshenko as potential candidate; Interview on situation in Kyiv: Q. Is J playing on 
time again? A.: Some observers speculate that J could only be moved to change his course of (non)-action because some oligarchs now 
threatened to stop supporting him. It should also be kept in mind that despite Asarow resignation, J announced that 1. the change of the 
constitution back to the 2004 constitution is a very long and complex, therefore neither snap elections nor re-elections will happen soon. 2., 
on the amnesty for political prisoners, this will only be granted if the protesters leave all occupied government buildings and leave the streets 
and Maidan. The opposition will not accept this. Q.: Which options are left for the opposition after their united refusal to take the PM post as 
offered by J. to them over the weekend? A.: Klitschko said earlier "step by step negotiations" - if they had joined the government of J, they 
would have lost all credibility and sympathy of the streets. Therefore, [in addition to talks], the only option now is to keep the pressure of the 
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28.01.2014 tagesthemen: EU 








Putin meets with heads of EU, van Rompuy and Barroso; meeting on EU-Russia strategic partnership set to last two days, changed to 3hrs; 
joint press conference on UKR after meeting; Caren Miosga: "Vladimir Putin is responsible for the situation in Kyiv. By urging J. to step away 
from the association agreement, he set the stone in motion that led to mass protests". Report: Joint Press conference shows little agreement 
between EU and RUS, Barroso complains about fundamental disagreements in the areas of trade and energy.  Putin signals "room for 
compromise" [citation report], states that it is not important who rules UKR, and that in case of change of government stay true to the aid 
agreement signed with Yanukovych, "we always had a good dialogue with UKR government, and we will continue to have that"; MEP 
(Lambsdorff) sees "Ice Age" in EU Russia relations, and demands that the EU needs to find a way out of the deadlock, as the economic 




"Putin doesn’t take 
the EU serious".468 
EU regarded differences with Russia as case of "Sonderpädagogik" (special education): patiently educate the behaviourally difficult Russia into 
a strategic partnership: "a visa-carrot here, a Bundestag debate stick there: This recipe failed miserably. Putin simply does not take the EU 
seriously"; in addition, doesn’t fear confrontation, in fact on the look-out, seemingly needs it: "Backing Assad, offering exile to Snowden, 
breaking free trade-rules - the self confident discourse with the wests attaches greater value to the country, and greater value to him. EU has 
no effective means to exude pressure on Russia; depends on RUS gas, and EU billions for Russian gas are received by Gazprom "even if we 
don’t smile on handover". Conclusion: "A rather impotent EU meets a rather mighty Putin". EU seems doomed to wait until the "Putin System" 
"disassembles itself" in an unagitated way - despite oil and gas income, Russia has serious domestic problems, which threatens Putin's power 
base. Therefore, only new realities can change Putin's behaviour, not reminders from BXL. The pressure on UKR government for siding with 
RUS has now led to a possible change of government, Putin stated this won’t change anything as he supports the country, not government. 
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28.01.2014 tagesschau.de; Sylvia 
Stöber: Tsar Attitude 
and KGB methods; 
Backgrounder in 
Putin before EU-RUS 
Summit.469 
Dealing with Putin splits Germany in two camps a) Russia understanders (SPD: Steinmeier, Erler) and b)Russia critics (CDU; A. Schockenhoff): 
a) Understanders argue that Russian behaviour can be explained with R disappointment about how the West dealt with Russia in the past 20 
years; point to common economic interests; plead to not pillory the Russian society. b) Critics argue that Putin is behaving increasingly 
authoritarian and shows neo-imperial behaviour towards the former Soviet Republics. Debate in Germany surged with return of FWS as FM 
and G.Erler as Federal Coordinator for the relations with Russia. Steinmeier, based on change through rapprochement (Brandt Ostpolitik 
slogan) , in his first term as FM initiated a Modernisation-Partnership with Russia, hooping that economic reforms would pave the way for 
political reforms in Russia. A. Schockenhoff, initiated a Bundestag resolution, criticizing the Kremlin for its dealing with opposition 
(9.11.2012), leading to discord between Merkel and Putin in their subsequent meeting (Nov. 2012).  Putin getting increasingly conservative: 
searches proximity of RUS orthodox church; Fjodor Ljukanow describes Putin as "most conservative politician in the world"; according to 
Fiona Hill, Putin secures his power with KGB methods.: collects incriminating material about oligarchs, to secure their loyalty; Putin claims 
fmr. Soviet Republics as privileged spheres of influence and extended security zone, but doesn’t do anything to convince the people in 
these republics to cooperate; instead uses pressure and money, but gets mistrust and resistance in return. Steinmeier, in his inaugural 
speech for his second term ((December 2013) clear on Russia: "appalling" how Russia exploits the economic emergency of UKR to prevent 
the association agreement with EU; claims that he views the [ongoing!] modernisation partnership "sober and without any romanticism.", 
as the project requires investments from both sides, but currently Russia lacks "courage, creativity and willingness".  
29.01.2014 tagesschau: Rada 
discusses further 
steps to defuse 
power struggle; 
decision on amnesty 
expected.470 
Protesters continue to stay on Maidan despite earlier government concessions (dismissal of PM, taking back laws from 16.01.); For an amnesty, 
government demands opposition to leave Maidan and occupied buildings; "inacceptable" (Yatseniuk) for opposition; seems also unlikely 
because majority of opposition has further demands, ie stepping down of J, snap elections;  
29.01.2014 tagesschau: Putin 
shelves financial aid 
package from 
17.12.2013.471 
Russia shelves aid package due to "domestic instability of Ukraine". During a cabinet meeting, Putin declares that Russia "needs to know who 










Date Event Summary/Transcript 
30.01.2014 tagesschau: Amnesty 
Law passed in Rada; 
ongoing protests; J. 
Protests continue despite amnesty law passing Rada, due to conditions; increased rage on Maidan as protesters feel blackmailed; J appears in 
a surprise visit in parliament, rumours have it that he threatens to dissolve parliament; Klitschko to supporters on Maidan: "The recently 
passed law doesn't ease the tensions, but hardens the fronts further". Commentary G. Atai, Kyiv: First cracks on J. government party visible 
during Rada debate; J. announces that he is fallen ill (on sick leave); J declares in a written statement that he has fulfilled all demands by the 
opposition. "He just hasn't signed any of his concessions".  





Date Event Summary/Transcript 
announces illness, 
sick leave.472 





Date Event Summary/Transcript 
31.01.2014 tagesschau:President 
Gauck visits Munich 
Security Conference 
(MSC).473 
First German president to visit MSC; Keynote speech: "Germany should act earlier, more substantially, and more decisively"; Ursula von der 
Leyen and Frank-Walter Steinmeier announce more active German role in international security; commentary: appears as if Germany is about 
to undergo a fundamental change of its foreign and security policy. (Also known as Munich Consensus) 
31.01.2014 tagesschau: Kerry 
visits Berlin, meets 
Merkel, 
Steinmeier.474 
Focus on NSA bugging affair; Kerry doesn’t provide the hoped-for excuse, nor does he mention the German advance to sign a no-spy 
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of fear; UN demands 
investigation into 
Military declares that storming of occupied buildings would be "inacceptable"; demands steps from government to "bring peace and harmony 
in Ukraine". 





Date Event Summary/Transcript 
claims of human 
rights abuse.475 





Date Event Summary/Transcript 
31.01.2014 tagesthemen: 
Historic speech by 
President Gauck at 
Munich Security 
Conference (MSC).476 
Historic for two factors, a) first German president to visit conference, b) clear interference into domestic German policy [German president 
not supposed to interfere in policy]; key message: Germany should not shy away from taking on more international responsibility, if require 
and as last resort with military means. Minister of Defence von der Leyen added: "To sit and wait is not an option." Caren Miosga Interview 
with Sabine Rau, in Munich: Q.: How was the speech received? A.: Lead to widespread discussion amongst participants; NYT correspondent 
"Wow, we haven’t heard something like this from a German politician in the past ten years". A signal that Germany's allies have long been 
waiting for, but also domestically this was long awaited, as Germany wanted to "leave the passivity of the era Westerwelle [Libya]. But what 
does "more responsibility" mean exactly? Q.: Appears as if Germany and EU want to interfere in a very acute conflict - tomorrow's conference 
topic is the situation in Ukraine. Which signal can be expected from MSC?  A.: Conference sends out signal "the world is watching what the 
UKR government is doing to its people"; opposition leader Klitschko expected to arrive, fmr boxing world champion puts his country in the 
limelight; however, experts are very sceptical about MSC contributing anything substantial to the resolution of the current crisis in Ukraine. 
Everyone agrees that now a lot depends on Russia, and how Russia is going to behave towards Ukraine after the Winter Olympics.  
31.01.2014 Situation in UKR 
remaining dicey; 
opposition leader re-
appears with signs of 
torture.477 










Date Event Summary/Transcript 
01.02.2014 MSC discusses 
UKR.478 
Lines of conflict become openly apparent; Klitschko accuses UKR government of "choosing path of violence and terror", systematic spreading 
of fear, torture, and disregard of human rights; demands sanctions against UKR government; shows pictures of tortured protesters; claims 300 
imprisoned, 27 missing; demands amnesty and snap elections. UKR Foreign Minister Koschara defends course of the government, argues that 
government has fulfilled all opposition demands; "if the police is attacked with Molotov-cocktails, then the protests are not peaceful 
anymore.". Klitschkos meets many decision makers during conference, including Steinmeier. Steinmeier on Ukr. crisis: "If the fuse of the 
powder keg is already burning, you can't play with on time anymore. It doesn't cost any fantasy to imagine what is going to happen then." 
Kerry asks for Russia's cooperation in resolving the UKR crisis. Lawrow reacts with reservation, states on protests in Ukraine: " What does 
instigate mass riots or the occupation of government buildings have to do with democracy? Is that not prohibited also in your countries?". 
Commentary Sabine Rau: Russia stands firmly on the side of the J. regime; Experts at MSC expect Winter Olympics to be a reprieve for the 
opposition; after the games it remains to be seen whether Russia is willing to resort to more drastic means.  
01.02.2014 Steinmeier 
announces: Bulatov 





origin of protest.479 
Steinmeier announces that UKR FM Koschara has guaranteed that opposition leader Bulatov, who recently re-appeared showing signs of 
torture, and is in need for medical treatment, can leave the country. According to Koschara, Bulatov is "in good shape". UKR Ministy of Interior 
declares that it is currently examining computers taken from a raid on the headquarters of Timoshenko's Fatherland party on 9.12.2013; secret 
service investigates several individuals for treason; Deputy chief investigator announces that "there are indicators that the mass protests that 
began on 21. November were not spontaneous, but planned well in advance".  
03.02.2014 tagesschau.de: 
Ashton tells WSJ 
about EU-US financial 
aid plans for UKR.480 
On side-lines of MSC; according to Ashton, EU and US are preparing a joint short term financial aid package for UKR; doesn’t mention precise 
amount, but "amount won't be small"; unlike earlier aid packages, this package will not be tied to UKR fulfilling the IWF conditions set earlier; 
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03.02.2014 Interview Th. Roth 
with Frank Walter 
Steinmeier, German 
FM.481 
Intro Reports show Ukraine as a divided country, west=pro-European, East= pro Russia and Yanukovych. Interview: Q: You spoke of a powder 
keg with a burning fuse earlier - how do you want to prevent the keg from exploding? A.: Yes, this still holds true today, the situation remains 
highly ambiguous, despite ongoing talks between government and opposition. Maybe there could even be slight progress today, since for the 
first time the amnesty question will be discussed. However, we are not yet at the most difficult piece laying ahead of the conflicting parties: 
The re-introduction of the 2004 constitution, which would limit the presidential powers. So, without being overly optimistic, there are small 
movements that give reason for a little hope. Q.: Putin "lured" UKR with 15 bn $ to keep the, under Russian influence. Must the EU now put 
20bn on the table? A.: I don't think it can work like that. I hope the in Russia the situation is assessed correctly as highly charged, that the 
situation may devolve again to the violence of recent days with fatalities and wounded. This has calmed down a little now; it has even been 
achieved that the, likely tortured, hospitalized opposition leader Bulatow was allowed to leave UKR for medical treatment. But it remains a 
powder keg, which is why I hope that none of the sides plays with the fuse, neither domestically, nor external actors that have an interest in 
maintaining a state of chaos and violence. We should not enter a competition of who pays most. Rather, we should develop a common 
understanding to let UKR slowly recover, and that the direct talks between J. and the opposition create something that gives the country a 
political future. Q.: You met Klitschko in person during MSC; he demands sanctions - in favour or against? A.: I find that we must present 
ourselves very decisively before the UKR government. We have done so as Germany, but also as the EU, via Catherine Ashton, who as High 
Representative represents the common foreign and security policy of the EU vis a vis the UKR government. We have to reassess whether 
sanctions are in place after the talks and meetings. I hope that the UKR understands that we are not going to torpedo an ongoing political 
process [like this, with sanctions].Q: Herr Steinmeier , you said that the time when Germany practised a foreign and security culture of restraint 
("culture of restraint"), is over. Does this mean in relation to UKR that you will involve yourself directly? A.: The whole sentence went: "I find 
it good and right that we feel obliged by a culture of military restraint. But this must not be mistaken as a policy of staying out. Ukr. is such a 
case in which we must get actively involved, to help bring about what currently is so hard for the conflicting sides in Ukraine to reach, to help 
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09.02.2014 Ongoing protests in 
Ukraine.482 
Ongoing Protests against President Yanukovych in Ukraine 
 
482 http://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/ts46752.html 
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19.02.2014 Liveticker: Situation 
in Kyiv escalates.483 
situation escalates on night of 18.02., German Foreign Office publishes Twitter message that it is very worried about the situation in K.; C. 
Ashton: Events in Kyiv are "shocking"; in face of violence, during night, Pres. J. invites opposition for further talks on 20.02.; fatalities on both 
sides, number unclear at time of reporting, difficult to assess, as opposition treats victims in own field hospitals; Acting PM Asarow promises 
to Stefan Füle, EU enlargement commissioner, in a phone conversation, that police will not use live-rounds. Füle stated earlier at a meeting in 
BXL, that seeing Berkut Forces armed with AK 47 has "caused him to worry"; US condemns violence by both sides; FM Steinmeier announces 
that EU may consider sanctions, condemns both sides for violence, calls on Security Forces to contribute to de-escalation. Violence escalates 
in other UKR cities, particularly Lwiw. 2. Live Ticker: 18.02.2014: 22:17: Klitschko meets J, meeting was originally scheduled for 19.02.; shortly 
after meeting begins , signs that storming attempt has been aborted by Security Forces; 22:42: Gernot Erler demands OSCE observer mission 
to verify responsibilities; 23:30: Renewed effort to storm Maidan; rumours of police using live-ammo; 23:54: Confidante of Pres. J. announces 
state of the union address by J for next day on national television. 19.02.2014: (00:13) HQ of opposition on Maidan up in flames. (0016): US 
Vice President Joe Biden demands immeddiate retreat of Security Forces from Maidan. (0031): Carl Bildt, FM Sweden, demand J. to stop 
catastrophe via Twitter; (0114) Opposition leaders meet J. (0127)Crisis summit between J and opposition leaders ends without result 
[13minutes later!?] (0138) Klitscchko: J will continue storming efforts on Maidan. (0446) Pro-Eu opposition demands boycott of Winter 
Olympics; (0503): Yanukovych blames opposition leaders for violence, demands to "distance themselves from the radical forces".  
 
483 http://www.tagesschau.de/ausland/ukraine-ultimatum100.html 





Date Event Summary/Transcript 
19.02.2014 Brennpunkt 20:15 
"Ukraine on the brink 
of civil war?"484 
1. Report on current situation: UKR orthodox church (St. Michael cloister) hosts field hospital for wounded embers of the 
opposition (Udo Lilischkies); G. Atai reports of functioning logistics f opposition on Maidan despite encirclement by security 
forces.2. Backgrounder on EU policy towards UKR, "diplomatic egg dance": 17.02., Klitschko and Yatseniuk meet Merkel in Berlin; 
Martin Schulz: One thing is sure, if the Ukr. government does not tnd the violence, sanctions by the EU will be the next step. 
These sanctions should limit individual freedoms of those responsible for the violence in UKR"; Barrroso: "We expect that 
targeted measures against those responsible for the violence will be agreed by our member states"; only few critics of sanctions 
remaining, Kurt Fleckenstein MEP SPD: "Sanctions should remain an option, but I don’t think we are there yet. I think it is 
important now to - jointly with the Russian government - move the conflicting UKR sides to talk to each other"; concluding 
remarks journalist: "Either sanctions or negotiations jointly with Russia"; "Sanctions more likely". 3. Interview with Gernot Erler, 
Federal Coordinator for the Relations with Russia and the Eastern Partner Countries: Q.: Tomorrow FM Steinmeier will travel 
together with his colleagues from France and Poland to Kyiv, too mediate between the conflicting parties. Does that make sense, 
as from the perspective of the UKR government the EU is on the sides of the opposition? A.: IT sends a strong signal that the 
three FM of the so-called Weimar triangle travel to Kyiv to show that they are not blind to what is happening. We want to send 
out a signal that we are ready to support, but also - if desired - to mediate. The EU follows a double strategy, as at the same 
time sanctions against individuals will be imposed by the UE. That sends another important message: No one that bears 
responsibility for the unbelievable use of force in Kyiv [against the protesters on Maidan] should expect impunity. Q.: This 
appears more like a stick and carrot [GER original: sugar bread and whip] policy [Erler interruption: double strategy]. Fmr. 
Chancellor Schröder, a member of your party, the SPD, today announced that the EU cannot be a credible mediator, as it is party 
to the conflict. Is he wrong? A.: Well, I think in such a situation it is important to consider alternatives and options, that somehow 
may help. Against this backdrop I find the joint trip of the three FM the right signal about what can be done. Q.: You mentioned 
sanctions: which sanctions could actually develop leverage on Yanukovych? No one believes that sanctions like freezing accounts 
or not granting travel visa will have an immediate effect and change policies of the government in an instant. But it shows 
nonetheless that the EU is united, that it acts jointly, and that it is capable of action. Furthermore, it sends out the signal: no 
impunity for violence. All that may impact the overall developments, even if not immediately.4. Interview with Golineh Atai, 
ARD correspondent Kyiv, on domestic disunity in UKR: Intro: Large rift between eastern and western UKR population; West pro-
EU, East more pro-Russia: Q.: News today that secret service is preparing a large-scale terror operation. Is this a sign of J losing 
his grip on power within his own government?  A.: In a statement this morning, J appeared pale, like from a Wax-cabinet. There 
are many other signs that he is slowly losing control. The situation however, is ambiguous. Behind the scenes, there is a festering, 
evidences for this is that J. sacked the UKR militaries Chief of Staff, and that it was the Secret Service [Atai: Staatssicherheit], 
that informs [emphasis Atai] about plans for an anti-terror operation. If that were to happen it would mean that the military, 
the Berkut forces may kidnap protesters from the street, and keep them without legal reason for 72hrs in captivity, confiscate 
their belongings without a court verdict.  
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19.02.2014 tagesthemen, Chaos 
in UKR.485 
1. First report on support of German-Lutheran church also offering a field hospital for wounded members of opposition. 2. Interview Th. Roth 
with G. Atai, on situation on ground in K.: Q .: Do you have any news about the moratorium on violence announced by the president earlier? 
A.: I know that opposition leaders met, and that the meetings lasted for four and a half hours [emphasis Atai]until an offer for a moratorium 
was made; apparently the opposition downright begged the president to not implement the anti-terror measures set for tomorrow [which 
were announced by Secret Service, apparently a sign of J loosing grip on power, see above] Q.: Is there hope for a solution? A.: Very difficult 
to say, as there is no real progress ever since the protests began. 3. Interview Th. Roth with Udo Lilischikies, ARD correspondent Moscow, on 
role of Russia Q.: In a phone conversation [today, 19.02.2014], Merkel and the Russian president agreed that an escalation of further violence 
in UKR must be prevented. On the other hand, it seems safe to assume that J would not be in power anymore without Russian backing; thirdly, 
now apparently a truce has been agreed which most likely would also not have happened without Putin. Can you explain Putin's tactics? A.: 
Unfortunately, neither of us could listen into the conversation between Merkel and Putin. However, the more interesting phone call probably 
was the one between the RUS and the UKR president. J, most observers believe, is servile to Putin, who also safes him of the looming state 
bankruptcy. What we experienced yesterday was the attempt to solve the problem at a single blow, just like Putin managed it to do a year 
ago on Volotnaya Square [in Moscow]. But maybe the two presidents felt that the anxiety in the West was getting very high, and comparative 
terms like Tiananmen Square were revoked; that the EU is considering painful sanctions, and that the "Putin Games" in Sochi are under serious 
threat, so that both sides felt a need to defuse the situation. Today’s events may be interpreted in such a way. I do not think this means that 
Putin will bid farewell to his attempt to keep Ukraine on a pro-Moscow course. UKR is too important for him and his dream of the [Eurasian] 
customs union is not complete without the UKR. But maybe in the meantime, Putin increasingly feels that with the much-hated J. still in power, 
Maidan will never calm down. Some believe that RUS already has a Plan B, to install a less hated, but nonetheless pro-Russian president. But 
under no circumstance will Putin let UKR freely to Europe. Lastly, many believe that the dynamics of the current crisis are very fragile, meaning 
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19.02.2014 tagesthemen, F, POL, 
GER FM to travel to 
Kyiv.486 
Th. Roth: "the EU has every now and again commented on Ukraine, without any clear direction, less action to it. The UKR state crisis and its 
effects were simply underestimated by Brussels. Now, under the impression of the bloody violence in Kyiv last night, this seems to have 
change: Three foreign ministers, amongst them FWS, will travel to Kyiv tonight to mediate between the conflicting parties. The EU, after all, 
like the US is considering imposing sanctions against individuals amongst UKR circles of power.  
19.02.2014 German-French 
Council of Ministers 
Meeting.487 
Event used to find common position on UKR.. Merkel: Concerning the political dialogue in UKR, it is a question of establishing an interim 
government, hold free and fair elections. Wherever France and Germany can participate, and the EU can participate, we will do so."; 
Announces sanctions: "Must be sanctions that start with those that are responsible for the escalation of violence". Commentary: "With this 
"stick" the the FM will travel to Kyiv tomorrow. 




"Known since yesterday that the EU would announce sanctions: travel bans and freezing of bank assets will hit all those that are immediately 
responsible for the recent escalation of violence - when the sanctions are being imposed. IT is obvious that the EU believes that their three 
colleagues (FRA, GER, POL FM) are able to reach something in Kyiv. That is why the sanctions are being prepared now, but not imposed, to not 
disturb the talks. According to a number f FM, the impact of the sanctions is likely to be limited. Thehy argue that the future of UKR will be 
decided in UKR. The fact that ever larger parts of the population are brealing with J's government has much stronger impact." 
20.02.2014 tagesthemen, 
Interview TH Roth mit 
W.D. Krause in BXL on 
EU-sanctions.489 
Q.: Was it difficult to agree amongst the EU to impose sanctions? A.: Not at all. It was completely clear that if there was an escalation of 
violence, particularly of such a scale, the the EU would announce sanctions against those that are responsible for the violence. They are not 
enforced yet, to not affect the ongoing talks, but the EU is serious. That [the situation in UKR] has been underestimated is a venial sin, but, 
until it got to the actual signing of the Association Agreement, no resistance was expected in Brussels neither from UKR nor form RUS That 
came about very surprising. Q: How much effect are the sanctions believed to have? Q.: Sanctions can only have a limited impact. But it is 
possible to target people that would like to spend their money in the West, at the Cote D'Azur or elsewhere, that do not have this enjoyment 
anymore. - the wealth becomes worthless. However, that this will have an impact on the developments in UKR no one here seriously believes. 
Everyone is aware that the decision must fall in UKR. We are currently witnessing how J. loses control over parts of his government. now he 
will start to need to manoeuvre, seek leeway’s, and maybe then he will agree to sit down with the opposition seriously. There is no other 
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20.02.2014 tagesschau, Merkel 
speaks with 
Yanukovych on 
phone, Russia gets 
involved officially 
diplomatically.490 
Merkel speaks with J on phone during morning. Advises the president "urgently" to build a new government and support a change of the 
constitution. Steffen Seibert, Merkel's speaker: "Mrs. Merkel made it clear in her conversation to Pres. J. that playing on time will only add 
fuel to the conflict and bears unforeseeable risks". On request of the UKR government, Russia Putin gets officially diplomatically involved in 
the crisis management. Putin sends mediator for upcoming talks, his parting human rights commissioner Wladimir Lukin. 
20.02.2014 tagesschau, EU 
announces sanctions; 
Troika of three EU-
FM presents 
roadmap for political 
resolution.491 
EU decides on sanctions to hit individuals Joint declaration of EU FM after crisis summit in BXL: "The extent of the application of the sanctions 
depends on the further developments in UKR"; C. Ashton makes clear the EU sees main responsibility for violence with the UKR government, 
but that protester also hold some responsibility. "The prime task of a government is to ensure the security of its people. We need an 
independent investigation on the question who is responsible for the escalation of violence. But the government should take its responsibilities 
very serious"; extent of sanctions to be decided depending on outcome of talks between opposition, the UKR government, and the troika of 
the three EU FM (FRA, GER, POL). Troika presents roadmap for political resolution: a) establish interim government; b) initiate constitutional 
reform; c) old early presidential and parliamentary elections; neither government nor opposition concurs with roadmap; according to POL PM, 
D. Tusk, J agreed to early elections; according to Klitschko, no tangible results during talks so far, to be resumed during the night of 20.02.2014; 










Date Event Summary/Transcript 
20.02.2014 tagesthemen, 
Commentary on 
Sanctions by Armin 
Stauth, compares 
violence on Maidan 
to Russian Anti Terror 
tactics used at 
Beslan.492 
2I remained sceptical about sanctions since there has been a truce. However, I changed my mind when I saw the images of brutal violence. 
Maybe it was J who ordered this bloodbath, but maybe it was hardliners in the military or the secret service., for whom J is just a wimp. In any 
case, there are actors at play that stand in sinister Soviet tradition: to them, every protester is a terrorist that must be liquidated. Almost 20 
years ago I was witness to Russian special forces opening fire at a school where hundreds of children were taken hostage [by Muslim extremists 
from Chechnya], and the kidnappers entrenched themselves. Also, then victims died. The Russian leadership took this into account [see Beslan 
incident, and how it changed Russian Anti-Terror Tactics and Doctrine!!!] Today on Maidan was exactly the same. I was there last week. It was 
obvious that the protesters were that well organized, that the government would not be able to win against them with sticks. Whoever ordered 
the storming of the Maidan knew this would only be possible with AK-47. He took the bloodbath into account or wanted it. That's why today 
was the correct time for sanctions. It was time to tell J: You are currently leaving the community of civilized states. The world has spun further 
since Soviet times, today political murderers stand trial at the ICC in The Hague. And who wants to move freely in Europe and enjoy his personal 
wealth cannot fire at his own people! Sanctions were required exactly today. At the same time, the EU was smart enough to keep the door 
open for further talks.  
20.02.2014 tagesthemen: snipers 
kill protesters; almost 
70 killed; Merkel 
speaks with Obama 
and Putin; EU sends 
Torika of FM.493 
Situation report, G. Atai: Reports of Berkut Forces using live ammo; firing of AK 47 is audible several times during the morning; protesters also 
armed, many lying on the ground wounded. Armoured Personnel Vehicles carrying sniper repeatedly drive to Presidential residence. Protesters 
take back lost space on Maidan during the day, "showing high morale and discipline, they are busy fortifying the newly gained ground with 
barricades." Atmosphere amongst opposition defiant and sense of "no return". J meets with EU FM, Rada in session during the day, votes with 
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20.02.2014 tagesthemen, 
Interview Th Roth 
with G. Atai, on 
situation on ground in 
Kyiv.494 
Q.: Has the situation on Maidan calmed down? A.: Yes, calmed down, cannot hear shots being fired or explosions. We just saw that the 
opposition used massive lights to search the rooftops for snipers.  Q.: How did you experience the day? A.: It was not pleasant, we experienced 
war like scenes, how people fell down dead. The lobby of the hotel in which we stay has been turned into a field hospital and mortuary. Pure 
chaos broke out: in our rooms, the window frames have been shot at, and the bullets went through the frame. Even inside the hotel we are 
wearing security vests, and we decided to not leave the hotel after dark. Q.: Politically, there seem to be two processes: On the one hand, 
parliament is in session. also, POL MP D Tusk stated J is prepared to hold early elections. How do you analyse this? Q.: Indeed, parliament has 
passed a declaration to take back the anti-terror operation. The decision was passed with 36 votes from J. governing party. They achieved a 
joint declaration that the Special Forces shall return to their barracks and drop their arms. In addition, we have just heard that Steinmeier is 
about to meet with J again tonight. Regarding D. Tusk announcement on J being prepared to hold early elections, insiders here respond just 
with a smile. They point at first signs of dissolution of the government apparatus, as apparently just recently J's. speaker to parliament has just 
left UKR with his family.  
20.02.2014 tagesthemen, scenes 
from Sochi.495 

















for J to step down.496  
After three days of bloody riots, government and opposition agree on return to constitution of 2004; hold early elections. Agreement signed 
by Klitschko, Yatseniuk and Tiagnibok, but radical opposition remains unwilling to accept the agreement, and continue to demand J to step 
down with immediate effect. Report on situation: "Without the negotiating skills of the French, Polish, and German FM, there would not have 
been a signature. Steinmeier: "We have reached an agreement that of course does not meet all expectations But, it maybe was the last chance 
to find a way out of this looming spiral of violence." Klitschko: "Most important aim was to stop the bloodshed. All those responsible for the 
escalation o violence now must face the consequences. By no means may UKR be allowed to fall apart [puts pressure also on radical protesters, 
that may be responsible for some of the escalation]". Ukrainian Orthodox Bishop calls the dead martyrs. During the day, the atmosphere 
changed from relatively calm in the morning - great hopes after Parliament decides on amnesty for all protesters; stepping down of much 
hated Minister of Interior; passing of law that could set Timoshenko free; in the evening situation becomes increasingly explosive again: 
opposition leaders booed by Maidan protesters, did not want to listen to their announcements; instead, protesters carried coffins on the 
stage; Klitschko and Yatseniuk get interrupted by one of the Maidan Defenders [wearing Balaclava, and is armed and guarded], saying: We 
don’t listen to you, you are playing on time. We demand Yanukovych to step down until 10am tomorrow morning, otherwise we will storm 
the parliament with armed force". Commentary reporter (G. Atai): "We almost expected this development, and do not expect the night to 





US: is relieved, and demands speedy implementation; Obama to call Putin on UKR; RUS: Lawrow, in a meeting with C. Ashton, repeats his 
opinion that radical protesters are responsible for the violence.EU: Ashton: "stop violence immediately. Implementation is important and that 
is going to be difficult. In all that we are doing now we must support the UKR people. It is an UKR agreement and must be implemented by 
them. We will support them in doing that"; announces possible financial aid, but leaves future of sanctions open; Elmar Brok did not expect 
the most recent developments, but "it will be a difficult path, the country is so dramatically divided, partly because of the events, the dead, 
the violence. To start a reconciliation process will be a difficult endeavour. I think that we must support the people in a way that this can 
become a sound political process"; D.Tusk warns about euphoria, as he sees no short term happy end in sight. Commentary: Too early to judge 
of the EU has achieved a negotiation success [did the EU negotiate?]; despite all happiness about progress, caution can be felt in BXL, as the 
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21.02.2014 tagesschau.de audio 
feature on the role of 
social meda in UKR 
crisis.498 
Social media strongly influences images of events on Maidan, also because often being there is "too dangerous" for normal journalist; Ole 
Wintermann, CEO of Future Challenges, Think Tank funded by Bertelsmann Foundation offering bloggers from crisis regions a platform) 
identifies two types of media and news recipients in Germany: a) "older people using traditional media: They get an image with less violence, 
and send highly stereotyped images on [UKR ] government and opposition. They are the larger part of the population, and b) younger people 
that are informed by a more direct image from Kyiv and surrounding cities. Journalist use social media to get informed, but also to inform, ie 
G. Atai of ARD uses Twitter; however, role of journalists changing due to social media, as journalists are no longer the exclusive source of 
information. Social media also changed the addresses of activists communications:’ no longer is it directed at the cause, but at rallying people 
to support the cause. Social media challenges the work of classical journalists, particularly a quantitative one: "What in the face of the masses 
of information can actually be confirmed?". Wintermann offers solution: " transport the principles of social media to classical media, be open 
and transparent, accept that journalists do not have superior knowledge. Aim for engaging people on the ground much mire and try to get 
more citations from them rather than interpretations by the journalist." Another problem is speed: social media makes news available 
instantly, thus losing the exclusivity for journalists. The requirement for exclusivity again increases pressure on journalists to filter which 
information is true, and which one is not.  
21.02.2014 tagesschau.de 
interview with Stefan 
Meuser, Head of 
Friedrich-Ebert-
Foundation in Kyiv on 
Agreement.499 
Opposition on the streets not enthusiastic about the agreement: "Politically, these people can be located in the West of the country. Here you 
find a pro-Ukrainian - unfortunately also meaning Anti-Russian - Nationalism. Curiously this matches with the sense of belonging to the EU, 
because here Anti-Russian is identical with pro-Western. If there is a transition government, the it will be very difficult for the opposition 
leaders to take these people along in the political process. On support of Yanukovych: Beginning to crumble, however, majority of gov still 
behind J; still has around 20% support in the east of the country. East economically and emotionally pro-Russian, and often favour a strong 
hand which was the core message of J. last election campaign. On Putin and J.: "Personally believe that Putin detests Yanukovych because he 
hasn't ended the protests early on in a hard and brutal fashion to end the situation that was not helpful for Putin. „Putin requires UKR for his 
Eurasian Customs Union, but not J; could also deal with other politicians, ie Timoshenko, whom he once described as "the only man in UKR 
politics" and collaborated well with on a practical level. On EU sanctions effects: no effect, "but the EU has held the sanctions stick up for too 









Date Event Summary/Transcript 
21.02.2014 tagesthemen: 
"Diplomatic success 
in Kyiv"; Snipers fire 
at Protesters during 
night 20.02. - 
21.02.2014; 
Timoshenko free; 




1. Situation in Kyiv, G. Atai: During night 20/21.02.2014 snipers "aim at heart, head, lung of protesters"; during night agreement reached 
between opposition and J.: re-introduction of 2004 constitution and early presidential elections in 2014; Rada passes re-introduction of 2004 
constitution, with many votes from J's party; members leave J's party, Rada Member Valery Khomotenik: "We are on the brink of civil war. We 
dont know if it hasn't started already. On Monday, we had a chance to prevent all this."; Rada also paves way for freeing of Timoshenko; 
Berkut forces leave parliament and presidential palace "after easing of tensions".  in the evening, Klitschko and Yatseniuk appear on Maidan, 
booed by protesters; ultra-nationalists announce ultimatum for J. to step down by 10am of 22.02.2014;  
21.02.2014 tagesthemen, 
Statement of Frank 
Walter Steinmeier on 
"Diplomatic success 
in Kyiv", in interview 
with Udo Lilischkies; 
during statement, 
Elmar Brok appears in 
background.501 
Intro Roth: "A key role was played by German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter-Steinmeier"; Udo Lilischkies spoke with him just before the 
minister returned to Berlin. FWS, (1) Of course I know that the opposition leaders speak not for the entire Maidan and have repeatedly said 
so during the negotiations. However, we should not underestimate today's agreement. The agreement meets four core demands of the 
opposition: (1) instalment of a government, (2) based on the constitution of 2004, (3) re-introduction of the 2004 constitution until September 
2014, and (4) early presidential elections. These were the key demands, and we have agreed on them after 30hrs of continuous negotiations. 
I hope that in the next days and weeks all parties turn this agreement into policy. This is now the frame and it must be filled by UKR itself now. 
We will keep an eye on that". 2)I think the UKR leadership has understood that what we have experienced in recent days is moving towards a 
Ukrainian tragedy, with the ongoing fighting, with fatalities and wounded in the last days. The real risk of splitting the country has led to a 









Date Event Summary/Transcript 
21.02.2014 tagesthemen, 
Interview Thomas 
Roth with Udi 
Lilischkies on 
Agreement and 
reactions to it.502 
Q.: Is the agreement a positive development for Ukraine? A.: Yes, it is celebrated almost like a historical breakthrough. We see images of 
voluntary road-block searching for tituschki, paid agent provocateurs; the mostly western Ukrainian police-forces, fully backs opposition now". 
Q: What do you expect in the coming hours? A.: The situation is very ambiguous, and it is hard to judge - there is the ultimatum set by the 
ultra-nationalists for tomorrow, there are news that neither parliament nor the presidential palace are protected by the BERKUT [presidential 
guard], but instead surrounded by protesters; credible journalists report that J is on his way to Kharkov, his last stronghold, and set to continue 





in Kyiv", by Jörg 
Schönenborn.503 
"It was a smart strategy of the three European Foreign Ministers to lodge themselves in Ukraine without an invitation and stay until 
something was put on the table. Respect. At least there was no bloodshed today. If the situation really has calmed down, or whether only 
time was gained, is impossible to predict. The problems have not disappeared, UKR is in a deep crisis. There are questions [about the 
agreement]: Can we ask the protesters to put up with a president that has dozens of them killed [to stay in power]? Can we trust J this time? 
And, if he really steps down, who should follow? Who has the power to keep the country together? None of the opposition leaders has the 
necessary backing. This, however, does not change anything about today's diplomatic success. It shows that Europe has influence, if it wants 
to use it. To be fair, in this case it is not the EU, but 3 national ministers of foreign affairs in the cloak of the EU. Three men that got along 
with each other and had a plan. Maybe [the agreement today] was the rescue at last-minute, maybe it was already too late. It is astonishing 
how little is understood about the dimension of the Ukrainian crisis. UKR is not a regional hotspot, it is like the former Yugoslavia a state-like 
construct that doesn't hold together anymore. With all conceivable consequences. 20 years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Europe 
still deals with the question about the demarcation of borders. In this, the EU is an important player that way too often remains on the 















article; hints at 
possibility of a repeat 
of Georgia (2008) in 
Crimea, large Russian 
population. Two 
types of power: Bad: 
RUS, US; Good: EU.504 
Warnings about the collapse of Ukraine are getting louder, as the crisis continues after or despite agreement. The struggle between Russia 
and the West will be decided in Ukraine, it is said [see: Mearsheimer, 1996]. There is disturbing news from Crimea, which belongs to Ukraine 
since 1954 only, and whose inhabitants are 60% Russian. [Recently] Russia accelerated the handing out of Russian passes, and the demands 
to protect the compatriots and return Crimea to Mother Russia are becoming increasingly popular. Russia acts according to geostrategic 
standards, also given the experience of NATO's eastward enlargement and the recognition of Kosovo by the West. Geostrategists and 
Hardliners in the West support this scenario. It is argued that it is about power, and its extension is desirable - at the cost of the other sides 
power. To them, it is a zero-sum game, in which only one side can win. The developments in UKR show parallels to the Georgia War in 2008, 
where a conflict about two secessionist regions almost led to a confrontation between Russia and the West. [Like in Ukraine, Georgia was] in 
the beginning a domestic conflict. Russia claims both UKR and Georgia as privileged spheres of influence and puts forward security interests. 
In both conflicts Russia did not play a constructive role. Before 2008, both Russia and Georgia contributed to the escalation, until it turned to 
open hostilities. Russia was als not constructive in UKR. It labelled the protesters as right-wing extremists and terrorists, and [the three Foreign 
Minister’s] mediation efforts as one-sided intervention. Russia pressured J to bring an end to protests with force. [There was, however, also] 
the failure of International Organisations: The UN and the OSCE stood by and watched, as conflicting parties bypassed agreements, and as 
violence slowly escalated. UN, European Council or OSCE are powerful enough today to resolve a crisis. The US is no peacemaker either. 
Despite many US diplomats conjuring that they had warned Saakaschwili thn, there were voices amongst the hardliners in Washington that 
made Saakaschwili believe that the U.S. would support him if there was to be a war with Russia. But the conflict then showed [to the world] 
that the U.S. was not prepared to step in and risk a direct confrontation with Russia. As for the Europeans and the EU, in both cases, they 
were the ones that successfully brokered peace: In 2008 it was French president Sarkozy. This time Steinmeier and his colleagues from 
Poland and France, with the backing of the EU, whose members then [2008] and today [UKR] only found a common position in the face of 
fatalities: Factors for success were assertiveness and authority with the conflicting parties.  There is no trust in RUS ord the US anymore. 
The US lost trust after the Iraq intervention [2003] and their mild treatment of dictators provided it suits their security or economic 
interests. RUS lost trust because the leadership forgets to get the buy-in of the people for its imperial dreams. The numerous conflicts and 









Date Event Summary/Transcript 
22.02.2014 tagesschau: J. left 
Kyiv, contests legality 
of decisions by Rada 
of previous day; 
J. left Kyiv, speaks on TV from Eastern UKR; contests legality of decisions by Rada; Timoshenko announces her running for President, says: 
"Best sons of our country have been lost to bullets. They have given their best. Now we only have one task: No more bloodshed"; New 
president of Rada, new Minister of Interior; Klitschko: "Our main task was to calm the heated atmosphere among the people. This is only 
possible if we meet their demands. The people want a functioning legal system, that corruption ends - all these deficiencies have turned them 
into protesters"; Yanukovych, "in probably his last TV appearance (G. Atai)", calls actions of Rada "coup d’état", declares all decisions taken by 
the Rada as "illegal"; J.: "I have not stepped down. "; reaction of protester to statement: " J appears estranged, as if he doesn't understand 
what is happening"; Summary of Report, G.: Atai: The changeover of power seems done and dusted". (2) G.Atai, Live from Kyiv: "The king is 
dead, long live the queen" commented many in Kyiv; Timoshenko announces her running for presidential elections, and is greeted with cheers 
by the Maidan crowd. J. apparently was kept from boarding a plane in Donetsk to fly to Russia; on Maidan, many people are proud to have 
participated in a historic moment, proud to "demonstrated after three months of continuous protests that they are not extremists, but able 
at all time to control those in power"; nonetheless sad atmosphere, burying of dead ongoing [orthodox priests singing heard in background, 
no other sounds but their singing].  





Date Event Summary/Transcript 
Timoshenko released 
from prison.505 





Date Event Summary/Transcript 
22.02.2014 Brennpunkt: Changes 
in Ukraine: Beginning 
of a new old order of 
the beginning of 
things getting worse? 
1., Situation Report 
Udo Lilischkies, ARD 
correspondent 
Kyiv.506 
Special Forces patrolling the city have been replaced by civilian patrols, the "Maidan-Defenders" using stolen military vehicles; entire UKR 
government left Kyiv hastily - the seat of the government, parliament and presidental administration; J. leaves his residence 25km outside the 
city centre, not without taking his personal belongings. Police backs protesters nationswide; the chief state-prosecuter was captured at an 
airport prior to leaving for Russia: "no one here still fears Yanukovych". 
22.02.2014 BrennpunktChanges 
in Ukraine: Beginning 
of a new old order of 
the beginning of 
things getting worse? 
2., Interview with 
Udo Lilischkies, ARD 
correspondent in 
Kyiv.507 
Intro, J. Schönenborn: "Revolution began exactly 3 months ago with student protests against Yanukovych's unilateral withdrawal from a closer 
EU-UKR partnership"; Q.: What can be expected tonight? A.: Very difficult to say, we have experienced so many surprises during the day, and 
ever more incredible news were confirmed eventually. Currently the possible arrival of Timoshenko captures the atmosphere, but no one 
knows what will happen after [T. appearance]. She is a good public speaker that can move tha masses, and she is much more radical than 
other opposition candidates. This will likely add to the tensions already present on Maidan. It is therefore very open / uncertain if a return to 
a political process will eventually happen. Q.: Does J. still play a role? A.: His appearance on TV was pathetic and not convincing. This man has 
no base anymore; in the entire country police now sides with the population; the military also stated that it won’t interfere, although J only 
recently had replaced the Chief of Staff with a personal friend of his [the fmr. CoS early on denied a role for the military]. J. has no power base 
left. Rumours, which cannot be confirmed have it that he is on his way to Russia. It is feared that J. could seek to build up a resistance movement 
in eastern UKR., but even there his backing is not as strong as we thought. This revolution has developed such a dynamic that I believe that J 
plays no role in this country anymore. Q.: Who is in power now? Military, police, opposition, no one? Q: I wish you had an easier question. It 
is the fighters of Maidan that forced this dramatic turn. - to get them to participate in the political process again will be the decisive question 











Date Event Summary/Transcript 
22.02.3014 Brennpunkt: Changes 
in Ukraine: Beginning 
of a new old order of 
the beginning of 
things getting worse? 
3. Timosshenko as 
new power in Kyiv 
(during breaking 
news appearance of T 
on Maidan is shown; 
CNN factor: Watching 
a revolution…):  
Compares Timoshenko to aother candidates of opposition. Her recent comeback almost like Orange Revolution in 2006. Klitschko negligible 
factor, lost much credibility with protesters, but much support of Europeans; Tiagnibook is a right-wing populist that is not as extreme as the 
newly established right wing groups. 508 
22.02.2014 Brennpunkt: Changes 
in Ukraine: Beginning 
of a new old order of 
the beginning of 
things getting 
worse?, pt 4, 
reactions in Eastern 
Ukraine.509 
Population remains doubtful of what happened, because unimaginable for them to disengage from Russia; In Kharkov, a stronghold of J (70% 
in last elections), they also favor close relationship with Russia; Governors of Eastern Ukraine assemble in an emergency meeting in Kharkov, 
and question the legality of the decisions taken by Rada. However, first pro-Maidan protests flare up in several Eastern UKR cities.  Reactions 
in Russian TV, which is widely viewed as prime news source in Eastern Ukraine, express consternation in Russia: Headlines are "Ukraine before 
the end" or "Yanukovych before the end" because Russia TV argues, the EU convinced him of not acting, and therfore also has blood on her 
hands. Shows Putin, who demands that the "situation must be stabilised". Report ends with: "People here felt closer to Russia than to Europe. 









Date Event Summary/Transcript 
22.02.2014 Brennpunkt: Changes 
in Ukraine: Beginning 
of a new old order of 
the beginning of 





Q.: How does Russia view the developments in Ukraine? A.: Russia wishes to end the Winter Olympics in Sochi and does not desire any 
problems with the West before the Olympic Games end. However, Russia will protect ethnic Russians in Eastern Ukraine against any harm, 
and step in if any harm is caused. Otherwise Russia hands out financial credits to Ukraine, while the West has not promised UKR any money 
in the negotiations preceding the Vilnius Summit [29.11.2013].  Furthermore, Russia lowered the gas price. Thus, Russia plays a big role on the 
UKR field and now will have to seriously engage the new UKR government about this. Q.: Timoshenko announced on her way to the airport 
that UKR should join the EU soon. Do you have any idea what she wants? does she maybe aim for splitting the country? A.: T. is able to speak 
with Russia. She has negotiated the gas deal five years ago. But first she needs to become UKR president. I will believe she will take over from 
Klitschko and others now and will become the strong political leader in the country. However, it remains to be seen if she is able to put the 
ultra-nationalists into their place, because it is them who today control Maidan and large parts of Western Ukraine. and they are, furthermore, 
armed! Of course, if T plays it diplomatically, a resolution is possible. Otherwise I fear a splitting off the country is likely because the east will 
never be subject to a government made up from people exclusively from the West of the country. Q.: Yesterday we witnessed a strong 
appearance of 3 EU foreign ministers. What do you expect in this situation from Berlin, what from the EU? What can and should they do? A.: 
From my point of view the Eastern Partnership Program ought to be reformed, to not lead to the interpretation that they do not want to 
revoke the countries [of the Eastern Partnership] from the Russian sphere of influence. The EU must, from my point of view, work closely with 
Russia. Russia is a larger financer of UKR. Eastern UKR is economically dependant from Russia, and that is a fact. German diplomacy has 
contributed greatly to bring the Russian government back in, but I think this should be the case anyway. I wish that Mrs. Merkel or Frank 
Walter Steinmeier take the opportunity to travel to the Olympics closing ceremony and in this permissive, friendly atmosphere seek direct 
talks with President Putin about a solution for UKR. Q.: Was today a good day in hindsight, or a critical one? A.: It remains to be seen if it was 
a peaceful protest that brought about the coup d’état, or other forces that may be much better organised than the Maidan opposition, and 
will take over power in the coming two or three days. If that happens, then it was not a good day for Ukraine.  
 
510 http://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/video/video1374514.html 





Date Event Summary/Transcript 
23.02.2014 Tagesthemen 
(youtube), Mod.: 
Thomas Roth, I. 
People's victory - 
Ukraine after 
Yanukovych; II. 
Russian reactions to 
UKR; III. End of 
Olympics/Putin and 
UKR.511 
I. Ukr. The day after: a) Intro Th Roth: Ukr. Wants to return to pro-European course, Interim President Turtschinow announced on evening of 22.02.; "In Ukraine, 
the dramatic, historic upheaval developed during the last 48hrs with enormous speed"; Merkel spoke with Timoshenko (free since 22.02.) and Putin on phone, 
indicates the fears about developments [in Ukr]; Looming UKR state bankruptcy one of the key threats. GER FM FWS and EU High Rep C. Ashton held out the 
prospect of financial aid, "which would be needed very fast". b) Report by Udo Lilischkies on day in UKR: Atmosphere on Maidan quiet, but still full of anger and 
feelings of revenge; Lenin statues torn down in many Western-UKR cities, as a symbol of protest against Russia/pro-Moscow course of J government; 
Simultaneously, on the Crimean peninsula violent clashes between supporters and opposers of the Maidan movement; extreme tension throughout country, 
in Eastern UKR cities J loyalists protested, some of them armed; J. left country, as recently released cctv video shows, from his presidential residence with two 
helicopters; Klitschko: "Nobody knows his whereabouts. We are trying to find him since yesterday. He simply disappeared".; In Rada, many parliamentarians 
demand to hold those responsible for outbreak of violence on Maidan accountable; [on 22.02.2014] Rada elects Alexander Turtschinow, confidant of 
Timoshenko, as interim president; T. demands a that Russia must accept a pro-European course of UKR; Further rumours that J is hiding on Crimea, and that he 
had been arrested there. c) live-Interview with U. Lilischkies on situation on the ground: Q.: Is it known for sure that J is on Crimea, and that he has been 
arrested? No, these rumours that have been circulated by the entourage of Klitschko, cannot be confirmed. The parliamentarian who claims this to be the case 
himself said that this is 80% the case - so we don't know for sure, but of course this would be a sensation. However, it does fit into the [wider] image we receive: 
we now know more about the escape if the fmr state-attorney general in Donetsk: border guards tried to keep him from leaving , and when this got noted, his 
bodyguards appeared armed and got him out of the airport like this. Also, the fmr Minister of Interior tried to escape to Russia and was hindered to do so 
yesterday: [the image, is that] the fmr clique around J, is trying to flee unsuccessfully, while the fmr. President himself is in hiding successfully, speaks for the 
fact that he had to expect something like this. Q.: Many people are on the run, it appears. Let's turn to Timoshenko, who now is an important figure again. Has 
it become clearer now which role she is going to play? A.: Well, this also is UKR. There are many confusing turns, and they often coincide to occur just before 
our live-talks... Timoshenko does not want to be head of government, but does she want to become president, as a press agency put on the wire today, and as 
was picked up by some? Now we hear that apparently, she never said this, but she still has neither denied saying it herself. Some irritation as a factor for 
excitement therefore remains. Fact is that it would be a problematic decision to take just now. The tensions, as we have just seen in the report are increasing. 
Further, we just heard from a demonstration in Sevastopol [Crimea] with 20000 protesters with not a single UKR flag, but countless RUS flags. The new 
regional governor, which has just been put in place, a very pro-Russian candidate, today announced that he will stop transferring tax money from the region 
to Kyiv. You realize, the tensions are rising, and it needs a government that is capable to somehow re-unite these two increasingly polarized camps at all cost. 
If T. id the right person for that is doubted by many observers.  
 
511 https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/tt5294.html 





Date Event Summary/Transcript 
 
Tagesthemen Mod.: 
Thomas Roth, I. 
People's victory - 
Ukraine after 
Yanukovych; II. 
Russian reactions to 
UKR; III. End of 
Olympics/Putin and 
UKR.512  
a) Intro, Roth: Re the situation in Crimea, one scenario that many fear is that Crimea will simply separates itself from Ukraine, and then 
regards itself Russian. While in the West, some reactions about the end of the protests and the new government, the reactions in Russia 
differed sharply: Russian FM Lawrow today stat that the opposition had seized power violently, and continues to use violence. The Russian 
ambassador to Kyiv has been ordered home "for consultations" - all this sounds anything but conciliatory. In Russian state-controlled media, 
the sentiments are expressed more drastically - and it is only that [one] image, that is being communicated to the population. Report, Birgit 
Virnich: In Russian state TV, consternation looms large tonight: "Blood and Chaos in UKR", "President J. on the run", "Parliament in the hand 
of opposition, passes one law after the other", says Russian Moderator [no precise source given: "Russian TV", no channel information - Fox 
or CNN?...]; [During] the entire ween, Russian medias denounced the protesters as terrorists, and held them responsible for the violence on  
Maidan. "However, in Moscow, many people view this differently, put down flowers in front of UKR embassy. Amongst them well known 
opposition leader Mikhail Kasianov: "Russian media is spreading evil propaganda about UKR - their account is completely one-sided, worse 
than the official statements from the Ministry of the Interior. If I see that, I feel sick". Many Russian support UKR, applaud on social media, 
and admire their bravery. Maybe this is the biggest worry of Russia today - that one day the revolutionary spark of the slavic brother nation 
may spill over."  
23.02.2014 Tagesthemen Mod.: 
Thomas Roth, I. 
People's victory - 
Ukraine after 
Yanukovych; II. 
Russian reactions to 
UKR; III. End of 
Olympics/Putin and 
UKR.513  
a)Report: Stupendously expensive closing ceremony of Sochi Olympics, but many question marks remain. Putin thanked for personally by 
German President of IOC Bach for his support of games. b) Interview with Ina Ruck, Sochi: Q.: How would you rate the political outcome of the 
games -could the developments in UKR be felt strongly [during the games]? A.: Had not an individual UKR athlete withdrawn her participation, 
nothing would have been felt in Sochi about the developments in UKR. They did not play a role, at least not a visible one. But - I assume - those 
extremely rapid developments in UKR will spoil Putin's victorious mood: Just imagine, two weeks ago, for the opening ceremony, a UKR 
President called Yanukovych was on stage here, wishing his team good luck. Now he has disappeared, a new [interim] president is already in 
place. That's how fast it can go. A few weeks earlier, it appeared as if Vladimir Putin had won the tug-of-war [with the EU] about UKR. That 
now also looks very differently. Furthermore, Putin's geostrategic dreams about the Eurasian Customs Union are wothless without UKR. 










Date Event Summary/Transcript 
23.02.2014 Tagesthemen Mod.: 
Thomas Roth, I. 
People's victory - 
Ukraine after 
Yanukovych; II. 
Russian reactions to 
UKR; III. End of 
Olympics/Putin and 
UKR ; Other News.514 
La Garde, during G20 Finance Minister Summit in Sydney announces that if consulting or financial aid is required, the IMF would stand ready. 
Prerequisite for this are economic reforms and legitimized dialogue partners.  
 
514 https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/tt5294.html 





Date Event Summary/Transcript 
24.02.2014 tagesschau: After 
Overthrow, UKR faces 
bankcruptcy.515 
a)Intro: Search for J [in UKR] continues; been issued with a arrest warrant for mass murder; Timoshenko to travel to Germany for medical 
treatment; According to new UKR gov, country on brink of bankruptcy, in urgent need of external assistance. B) Report, Demian von Osten: 
according to new gov, UKR needs a grand total of 25,5bn Euro; Ashton to visit Kyiv to assess if and how the EU can be of help; there are positive 
signals from the EU; EU Parliament President Schulz: "It is now important that the EU and the international community stands by the 
Ukrainians, to prevent the looming economic collapse of the country"; In addition to EU, IMF also considered as a potential donor: Klitschko: 
"[The] IMF said long ago that it is prepared to give us money, but only to support reforms. Just handing out money without a clearly determined 
use is without direction". Whether RUS continues to support UKR is an open question, although people in Sevastopol desire just that [images 
show pro-Russian protests of 23.02.2014 (see Interview Lilischkies)]. Russia not pleased by the coup d’état in Ukraine. Medwedew: There is 
no government, and we have strong doubts about the legitimacy of the current leadership". J, now issued with arrest warrant, remains on 
the run. Travels from Kyiv by Helicopter to Kharkov, continues to Donetsk; from there to Balaklava, a town on the Crimean Peninsula, where 
his trails are lost; people on Maidan want to see J. captured and put to trial. c) tagesschau anchor, on economic situation in Kyiv: "Already 
late last year UKR was on the brink of economic collapse. Russia offered financial aid , but in the meantime has put payments on hold. 
Furthermore, the two countries are economically closely linked through the gas-industry: particularly the heavy industry in Eastern Ukraine is 
dependent on Russian energy imports. d) report, on economic situation: Economically UKR still suffers from heavy recession in 2009, when 
the GDP dropped by 15%. Slow growth of 4-5% since, but this year (2014) has been almost entirely an economic shutdown of the country. At 
the same time, the government debt has increased dramatically; key problems: lack of businesses in growth areas, most important sectors 
still heavy industries, predominantly in the east / agriculture in the west. In addition, country grapples with endemic corruption, ranks very 
low on Transparency Corruption Index. d) Reactions on change of government in eastern UKR, Birgit Virnich, live from Kharkov: "While Maidan 
this morning appeared like a tranquil site of pilgrimage, in Kharkov the fronts are clashing. Kharkov, 500km east of Kyiv, is a stronghold of 
Russia supporters, and favours a strong relationship with Russia. But since the last couple of days, [even here] a Maidan-movement 
crystalizes. More and more people assemble on the Kharkov-Maidan and demand the stepping down of the governor and the mayor. Since of 
tonight, these protesters threaten to take down the Lenin statue [on the Kharkov Maidan]. Faced with this threat, J. supporters appear on the 
scene, to hold vigil at the statue. This shows how divided the country is.  
 
515 http://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/ts46984.html 





Date Event Summary/Transcript 
24.02.2014 tagesthemen: After 
coup d'etat, Russia 
reacts; report on 
situation on 
Crimea.516 
a) Intro, Carmen Miosga: News on J have it that he has hand signed the dismissals of his Bodyguards at a private residence on Crimea, 
whereupon he drops all communications EQUIPMENT AND DISAPPEARS: Since then no trace of his whereabouts./ b) On Russia: Miosga: All 
eyes are on Russia now, particularly on how Putin will react to the changes [in Ukraine]. Now, Ukraine has already been a divided country: The 
West, for centuries, has been oriented towards Europa. But the Russian speaking regions in Eastern UKR forever oriented themselves towards 
Russia. Crimea, which always has been Russian, may have once been gifted to Ukraine by Chruschtschow, but the current Russian 
government seems prepared to do everything to not entirely loos grip on this former present. c) Report on situation in Crimea by Golineh 
Atai: Intro images show Putin and J during joint UKR RUS military exercise on Crimea [in July 2013J], "celebrating Slavic brotherhood and blood-
ties. Crimea serves as base for Russian Black Sea Fleet, and is home to over 1 million ethnic Russians. [During the joint exercise in July 2013] J 
extended the bilateral lease-agreement about the Russian base in Sevastopol as a sign of brotherhood. Crimea a few days ago: Ethnic Russians 
attack Maidan sympathizers, moved by fear to lose their power status, or be chased away by the new leadership in Kyiv, or to be "ukrainized!. 
[Pro Russian protester says]: "A UKR nationality doesn't exist. It is an invention by Russia's enemies. We are all Russians". Russian TV shows 
how Berkut forces returning to Crimea are being welcomed like heroes, mourning for the fallen Berkut. Juri Abisov, fmr Berkut officer: They 
are our brothers. They are the best fighters"; [statement by pro Russian protester in Sevastopol]: "Currently Russia is waiting, but we hope 
Russia won't remain passive if war breaks out [here]". [Atai, ctd]: "Would Russia consider using military force to support the protests? Only 
in an extreme situation, says Kremlin expert Fjodor Ljukanow."; Ljukanow: "A military intervention would only be conceivable if ultra-
radical nationalists would take over power in Kyiv. Not Timoshenko, but people that want to "Ukrainize" Crimea".; [Atai ctd]: "Little by 
little, Russia lost her former spheres of influence to NATO after 1989. Which geopolitical implications do the changes in UKR have?" 
Lukjanow: "Russia will monitor very closely that Ukraine continues to remain outside NATO. Last time UKR desired this, out relationship 
deteriorated rapidly".; [Atai ctd.]: Russia doesn't accept the new government [in Kyiv]; Medwedew:"Cooperation [with the new 
government in UKR] will be very difficult for us, if men in balaclavas and AK-47s constitute the government [of Ukraine]. Closing Comment 
Atai: "Russia is waiting - still. But it is watching nervously.  
 
516 https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/tt5298.html 





Date Event Summary/Transcript 
25.02.2014 tagesschau: High Rep 
Ashton visits Kyiv to 
assess EU support in 
economic crisis; sets 
conditions, calls for 
cuts of subsidies to 
farmers and heavy 
industry.517  
Report by Udo Lilischkies: Ukraine is still without government, Rada announces 27.02.2014 for presentation of interim government. Rada 
pushes for trialling J. at the ICC in The Hague; C. Ashton, is expected to offer financial assistance, however with conditions attached, as she 
demands a lowering of subsidies to farmers and energy [Farmers=West; Energy: East!. Ashton in a statement after the meetings in Kyiv: "I 
would argue that in the areas of agriculture and heavy industries there is much to do for the government". Financial assistance furthermore 
depends on the instalment of a transitional government. Ashton's demands are in harmony with those of other international organisations. 
Udo Lilischkies, closing commentary: "Pressure of radical protesters prevents what the international community requests from the opposition 
leaders: reconciliatory gestures to the losers of this revolution. Ukraine remains far away from the preconditions for financial assistance 
mentioned by Ashton today: Rule of law, stability and order." 
 
517 https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/ts47004.html 





Date Event Summary/Transcript 
26.02.2014 tagesschau: Putin 
orders snap exercise 
in Rostow/Don; 
increasing tensions 






a) overview: Putin orders military snap exercise "to test the combat readiness of Russia’s troops at the border". US warns of interfering in 
UKR sovereign affairs; in Kyiv, interim president Alexander Turtschinow takes over supreme command over military. In Kyiv, Interim-president 
Turtschinow takes over supreme command of Ukr. forces.  b) Report, U. Lilischkies: Interim government presented to Maidan-protesters, first 
public appearance of commander of "Maidan-Defenders" [ultra-nationalist movement believed to be responsible for the outbreak of 
violence/split/rift within opposition]Andrej Porubij: "It is our square, it is our space to show the world that we are capable of forming a 
government, and take over responsibility for Ukraine"; extremist drive APV in front of Rada in the morning, to put on pressure to announce 
interim government; weld of fences around Rada, to make it an "accessible" parliament. Extremists among protesters don't trust Maidan 
opposition leaders; statement by [female] extremist: "Many of the opposition were in the old government. But we want a complete change 
of power"; In Crimea violent clashes between Tatars, who actively supported the Maidan-movement, and pro-Russian protesters break out 
before the regional parliament building; on Maidan, the official investigation begins on who fired the shots on protesters. Interim Minister of 
Interior, Arsen Awakow signs dissolution of Berkut. c) Udo Lilischkies, live from Kyiv on reception of Interim government: "Roughly 50% of the 
members of the interim government presented today , belong to the established parties, like the new prime minister A. Yatseniuk; the other 
50% are individuals that represent the Maidan protests, like the abducted and tortured activist Dimitrii Bulatov, new minister for Sport, or 
Andrej Porubij, leader of the "Maidan-Defender", to become Secretary of Ukraine's National Security Council. In this fashion, the suggested 
interim government mirrors more or less the balance of power in Kyiv. [The crowd received the new government] reluctantly but did not boo 
either. Therefore, the way is free to also formally install the interim government by a Rada decision. This is urgent, as today the Hrivna [UKR 
currency] dropped to a historic low. Forming the new government formally would fulfil at least on precondition UKR has to fulfil before 
receiving the first billions of assistance this country on the brink of bankruptcy needs so badly". 
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Date Event Summary/Transcript 
27.02.2014 tagesschau (1): 
Yatseniuk takes over 
government amidst 
heavy crisis; 
situation on Crimea 
continues to 
deteriorate; (2) J. 
announces press 
conference in Russia; 
(3) Russia continues 
military 
a) Intro: New prime minister for Ukraine, Yatseniuk, confidant of Timoshenko sworn in today, takes over government in "most difficult crisis 
in decades"; ongoing, massive tensions in south-eastern Ukraine, particularly the Crimean Peninsula; peninsula has long been contested 
between RUS&UKR. b) Report, Olaf Bock: [On Crimea] Members of the regional parliament decide on a referendum of the future status of 
Crimea, dismisses the regional government and installs a new regional prime minister. [What happened] Looking back [at the developments 
on Crimea]: "It was a surprise action: during the early morning [27.02.2014] armed, masked men entered the regional government seat, 
the regional parliament, and hoisted the Russian flag. It is said that they are to protect the rights of the ethnic-Russian majority on the 
Crimean Peninsula"; Eyewitness: " Around thirty armed men stormed the building, they took them and kicked out the police. Then buses 
followed, and further 30 men came out, they were heavily armed and carried weapons like anti-tank guns and sniper rifles"; Olaf Bock: "The 
dramatic aggravation of the situation [on Crimea] overshadows the developments in Kyiv. [There), A. Yatseniuk was elected as prime minister. 
The finance-expert must now not only resolve an economic crisis, but also a political conflict with Russia; Yatseniuk on Russia in Rada: "We 
hope that Russia keeps the situation in UKR stable, and does not support separatists or members of the fromer government"; [Bock]: "Ukraine 
looks back on a difficult recent past. It must now solve the problems of the future, and that is not possible without Russia".  
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Date Event Summary/Transcript 
27.02.2014 tagesschau (1): 
Yatseniuk takes over 
government amidst 
heavy crisis; situation 
on Crimea continues 
to deteriorate; (2) J. 
announces press 
conference in Russia; 
(3) Russia continues 
military 
manouvres/NATO 
meets on situation in 
Crimea.520 
Fmr. President Yanukovych appears in Russia, and in a televised written statement announces a press statement in Rostow/Don. Requests 









Date Event Summary/Transcript 
27.02.2014 tagesschau (1): 
Yatseniuk takes over 
government amidst 
heavy crisis; situation 
on Crimea continues 
to deteriorate; (2) J. 
announces press 
conference in Russia; 
(3) Russia continues 
military 
manouvres/NATO 
meets on situation in 
Crimea.521 
In addition to the Army, today Putin also put the Russian air force on high alert in the border region. Report by Ina Ruck: "The snap exercises 
are large scale military exercise - now, of all things. The exercises are conducted on the orders of President Putin, it is being said, to test the 
combat readiness of its troops in western Russia; more than a 150.000 troops participate; RUS Deputy Defence minister Anatoli Anatow states 
that "this [the exercise] has nothing to do with Ukraine. We are not required to announce such exercises to our international partners, but 
have chosen to do so nonetheless, as a sign of our transparency. This surprise inspection of our troops is routine, it is not directed against any 
other state"; meanwhile, first hints of whereabouts of toppled J, apparently in or close to Moscow. During evening news on Russian TV it was 
announced that J will stand before press in Southern Russia, Rostow/Don. Before he asked the Russian government for protection; Russian TV 
screens a letter of J to Russian government, stating that he still regards himself as legitimate president of Ukraine. Russia apparently has 
indicated its willingness to protect J. [Closing Commentary Ruck]: "Moscow's sabre-rattling, and exactly like this the military manoeuvres 
must be understood, is related to the fact that here in Moscow, UKR is still regarded as backyard. And if NATO now assures UKR of its support 
in democratisation efforts, then this annoys the Russian's. They want to play a role in the future of the country, and they know full well that 
without Russia, Kyiv will not be able to resolve the economic problems 
27.02.2014 tagesschau (1): 
Yatseniuk takes over 
government amidst 
heavy crisis; situation 
on Crimea continues 
to deteriorate; (2) J. 
announces press 
conference in Russia; 
Russia continues 
military manouvres; 
(3) NATO meets on 
situation in 
Crimea.522 
Situation on Crimea topic at NATO Defense Minister summit ion BXL; Nato SG Rasmussen demands Russia to do nothing that would lead to a 
further deterioration of the situation, or lead to a misunderstanding. According to Rasmussen, Nato has no indicators that Russia wants to 
interfere militarily. A similar statement was made by US Deputy Defense Secretary Hayden: "The US is watching the Russian military exercise 













(1)UKR crisis affects 
major indices; (2) 
situation in Crimea; 
Anja Kohl, reporting from Frankfurt Stock Exchange: [There are reasons for the drops of the major indices on the global stock markets today]: 
" One factor are fears about a war on the borders of Europa; the other the disastrous economic situation of Ukraine. The state is in danger of 
bankruptcy because it is not able to service its debt anymore. Russian banks demonstratively cut off all money supplies to UKR: They have put 
on hold all loans to UKR industry and banks. Already, Ukrainian savers plundered their accounts, fearing a collapse of the banking system. The 
Ukrainian Central Bank, in a reaction today, has imposed limits on cash withdrawals. European Banks, like Commerzbank or Austrian Erste 
Bank have withdrawn their activities form Ukraine months ago. Only few banking institutes are still active in UKR, like Deutsche Bank or the 
Dutch ING bank, both however with limited engagements. Both shares dropped slightly (-0.2%) today. Italian UniCredit and the Austrian 
Raiffeisen are far more engaged in UKR [shares drop by 1.7%]. furthermore, the UKR currency is free-falling, the foreign exchange reserves 
depleted. The federal budget is not big enough to service the current credits. Because Russia is so closely linked, today the Russian Rubel lost 
strongly, and the Russian stock exchanges major index dropped by 3%.  





Date Event Summary/Transcript 
(3) Interview U. 
Lilischkies.523 





Date Event Summary/Transcript 
27.02.2014 tagesthemen: 
Anchorwoman: Caren 
Miosga: (1)UKR crisis 
affects major indices; 
(2) situation in 
Crimea; (3) Interview 
U. Lilischkies.524 
Ina Ruck reports on development on Crimean Peninsula: Regional parliament occupied last night: pro-Russian armed men stormed the 
building, that do not want to bow their heads to the new government in Kyiv; regional parliament paves way for referendum on future of 
sovereignty of Crimea, Ruck': "Most people on Crimea are ethnic Russians"; Protester: " Of course, Crimea was and is Russian, and it will remain 
so!"; Protester: "[The] majority doesn't want to live under this new government. They are people that just recently stood with sticks on 









Date Event Summary/Transcript 
27.02.2014 tagesthemen: 
Anchorwoman: Caren 
Miosga: (1)UKR crisis 
affects major indices; 
(2) situation in 
Crimea; (3) Interview 
U. Lilischkies.525 
Q: [on Yanukovych, and the announcement oif a press statement in Rostow/Don]: J today announced he will give a press statement from Russia, and that he 
still regards himself as the legitimate president: What does this mean for the relationship between Moscow and Kyiv? A.: Well, that it currently not very 
harmonic. What I find particularly interesting is that apparently the Kremlin has not finally decided how far it is willing to go. Concerning the legitimacy of the 
new government in Kyiv, in the periphery of the Russian government much warlike language can be overheard. For example, that the new government is a 
government of fascists and extremists that have purged themselves to power with violence, that they are not legitimate. However, so far, we have not heard 
this being said from either Putin or Medwedew themselves. The same goes for the case, or mystery, of Yanukovych. Here in Kyiv, he is being searched for mass 
murder, while he asks Russia for protection - which Russia is likely to grant, it is being said. But so far, we haven't seen him [J in Russia], and we have only heard 
that Russia will grant his wish for protection by security circles. But it has not been confirmed by Putin or Medwedew. I think that only if Yanukovych would 
really appear tomorrow in Rostow/Don, then it will become clear how the Kremlin has positioned itself - and that it is willing to accept this dramatic new low 
point of relations with the West. Q.: What Putin says is not irrelevant to the new government in Kyiv, because they must resolve the most pressing issue, and 
that is: they need money. A.: How much money do you think is currently in the UKR household, according to the new Prime Minister? An absurd 316.00 Euros. 
That is what Yatseniuk said today in the UKR parliament. He also said that during the last three years, 50 bn US $ have been moved out of UKR to offshore 
accounts. Most interestingly, more than 50 % (25bn $) of this money stemmed from aid organisations from outside the country. We now understand much 
better why Yatseniuk yesterday stated that his post is a forlorn hope: Today he announced the hardest and most drastic austerity measures in the history of 
the country, and that his country requires 15bn US$ in immediate financial aid. Measured against this demand, the prospect of 1bn, the sum with which the 
EU could possibly help out held out German FM Steinmeier on the side-lines of his first official visit to Washington appear rather little. The US could also 
chip in about the same. The best news [for the new government] of today are from Berne, where the Swiss government today announced that it will lock 
the accounts of J. and his clique in Switzerland. We can only hope that there are some billions there, as this could really help the UKR government."  
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Date Event Summary/Transcript 
28.02.2014 Tagesschau, 10:00, 




Report Demian von Osten, a) On Yanukovych: Still regards himself as legitimate President of UKR; exact whereabouts despite TV 
announcement still unknown, rumours that he is in Moscow, but announces press conference in Rostow/Don. B) On Crimea: Ongoing tensions 
on peninsula, where the majority of the population is Russian speaking. Armed groups have stormed the regional parliament in Simferopol. 
Behind barricaded doors the regional parliament decided to let the population of Crimea vote on the autonomy of the peninsula in May, 
on the same day set for the early presidential elections in Ukraine. c) In Kyiv, the main topic in Rada was how to resolve the country's 
economic crisis. 
28.02.2014 Tagesschau, 16:00, 




a) Intro: First public appearance of J since he fled from Kyiv; announces that he will continue to fight for the future of Ukraine. Blames the 
West for the chaos in UKR; (b) Interview with Ina Ruck: What impression did you get of him, how did he appear? A.: "I just watched it on TV 
myself, and my impression is that there is someone living in a parallel world. J says he is still the legitimate President of UK, that - additionally 
- there are pro-fascists in power in Kyiv now, and that he feels fooled by the European negotiators of the EU [the three FM] . They negotiated 
and signed a compromise, in which it was decided that an interim government of national unity was to be put in place. This now, however, is 
a government of the victors [here the Maidan opposition], and a government that is made up exclusively by extremists. Interesting is what he 
says about money, prompted by a question a Russian journalist dared to ask. His response was that he had always paid pensions and welfare 
- if there is chaos now, then it is the responsibility of the new government. Q.: Can we assume that he will stay in Russia? A-: A very interesting 
question - yes, he says he is currently staying with a friend. He also said something to think about, that is, that he is quite surprised by the 
fact that Vladimir Putin, whom he knows personally, has kept his silence, and is yet to speak out on the situation in UKR. We can assume 
that J will stay in Russia for now, but eventually everything will depend on Putin, if he is willing to grant J protection - or not.  
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Report by Ina Ruck c) 
situation on Crimea, 
live commentary by 
Golineh Atai.527 
a) Steinmeier in Washington, Intro Jan Hofer: Crisis in Ukraine overshadowing the meeting of FWS on his first official visit as FM in Washington. 
Amongst other items, financial aid to Ukraine was discussed. Report: Frantic search for solution to the economic problem of UKR; Steinmeier 
also meets with LaGarde, LaGarde: "We will be sending a team to Kyiv early next week to assess the financial requirements of UKR. It is much 
too early to throw numbers into the room already. At the moment we see nothing that is worthy panicking about."; John Kerry welcomes 
Steinmeier cordially, publicly praises Germany for the newly revived foreign policy efforts - however, does not offer the spy-agreement [that 
had been suggested by the German government as a reaction to the NSA listening scandal]. Steinmeier therefore now urges a dialogue on 
privacy in the internet, which he does not regard as capitulation. Steinmeier announces that he will make sure that the US adheres to and 
respects German law in Germany: "We will have to continue the dialogue about the limits of spying on your neighbours and allies".  





Report by Ina Ruck c) 
situation on Crimea, 
live commentary 
Golineh Atai.528 
a) Intro, Jan Hofer, tagesschau anchor: First public appearance of J since he fled Kyiv; takes place in Rostow/Don, Southern Russia; still regards 
himself as legitimate president, denounces members of interim government as fascists and criminals; meanwhile, Swiss authorities have 
announced that they are investigating against J. and his son for money laundering, and froze their assets in Switzerland. b) Report, Ina Ruck: 
Statement happens in Rostow/Don, close to the UKR border; apparently Russia grants J. protection; J. appears before UKR flags, but speaks 
Russian during conference; emphasizes that he is still the legitimate head of state, and only left the country for fear of his life. "As you know, 
in Kyiv, fascists and thugs have taken control - but they are the absolute minority [in UKR]; regarding empty state household, and claims that 
he and his clique had managed to get the money out of the country: "we always paid wages, state pensions, everybody knows that. This year 
we even wanted to increase the social spending. The chaos that is now happening is the responsibility of this that started the crisis, and that 
are now in power". In Kyiv, new PM Yatseniuk announces that Central Bank of UKR will sharply control financial flows leaving the country, 
states: "Key task for our government is to fulfil all conditions set by the IMF. I am optimistic that we will pass the necessary hard laws, so that 
the credits held out to Ukraine can be granted"; the difficult economic situation is, however, just one of the problems the UKR government 
faces; another is Crimea. This morning, uniformed, armed men appeared on the airports of the Ukrainian peninsula. They did not wear any 
national symbols on their uniforms. It is unclear who they are. The UKR government accuses Russia for having sent troops, Russia denies 
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Report by Ina Ruck c) 
situation on Crimea, 
live commentary by 
Golineh Atai.529 
Live commentary by Golineh Atai from Simferopol, Crimea: "Swiftly facts are being established on Crimea. Unknown para-military units have 
occupied two airports and a TV-channel, as well as the regional parliamentary building [27.02.2014]. Meanwhile, eyewitnesses here report 
Russian troop movements, unusually large Russian troop movements on and around the peninsula. There are talks of a Russian guided missile 
cruiser patrolling the bays off southern Crimea, of considerably more helicopters, and of many APVs that are currently on the road. The access 
roads from the mainland to the peninsula are controlled by para-military units. We have just now witnessed how pro-Russian protesters 
chased a very famous local opposition politician [later Pres. Poroshenko], that had arrived from Kyiv by plane today, through the streets. The 
UKR Minister of Interior has called the events "an invasion and occupation of Crimea staged by Russia". 
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Date Event Summary/Transcript 
28.02.2014 Tagesthemen; C. 
Miosga: Increasing 
tensions on Crimea: 
(a) Summary of 
Events, Udo 
Lilischkies; UKR gov. 
Confirms Russian 
troop presence (b) 
Interview with G. 
Atai, Simferopol; ( c) 
Interview with I. 
Ruck, Moscow; (d) 
UN Security Council 
meets on Crimea.530 
a) Intro C. Miosga: "At first it was just a war of words and threats, but if it continues the way it goes currently on Crimea, then the country 
stands before a real, that is, military, conflict. First the Russian-speaking majority if the [Crimean] population protested against the pro-
European course of the new government in Kyiv. Then armed, masked men in uniform occupied first the [regional] parliament, then during 
the night both airports on Crimea. And now, apparently a minimum of 2000 troops landed on Crimea. b) Summary of Events by U. Lilischkies: 
"Earlier this evening, Interim President Turtschinow confirms the numerous witness reports, says: "Today, Russia moved troops to the 
autonomous region of Crimea. They have not only seized the regional parliament, but also the seat of the [region] government on Crimea. 
Furthermore, they tried to bring the communications infrastructure under their control, and tried to block the military installations of the UKR 
forces. Everything follows the scenario which Russia used when it occupied Abkhazia". [report continues] "In the early morning, there were 
already signs of increasing tensions. APVs under Russian flag were parked around the military airport close to Sevastopol. Roughly 400 troops, 
observers say, have blocked the runway during the [yesterday] evening. The airport in Simferopol is also under the control of armed men. 
They wear uniforms without insignia, one states: "We are only Crimean, we are the people's brigades. We want to prevent that fascists and 
radicals from other parts of Ukraine come to our Crimea. We do not want any provocation here"; Witnesses however claim that they [the 
armed men] are Russian troops, increasing reports coming in, first without confirmation: Russian troop carriers landed, APVs on the way to 
Simferopol, the headquarters of the Coast guard and other UKR military installations blocked. [Now they have been confirmed by 
Turtschninow]. Closing remarks Lilischkies: "In Rostow/Don today we saw what appears to be the confirmation that the Kremlin has opted for 
an open confrontation: [fmr. UKR Pres.] Yanukovych holds a press conference, states: "No one has dismissed me from office. Me and my family 
had to flee for fear for our lives", and still considers himself as the legitimate president and asks people to leave Maidan. He also says something 
very interesting: "I personally know President Putin, and I wonder why he is still so hesitant, or why he keeps his silence." 
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28.02.2014 Tagesthemen; C. 
Miosga: Increasing 
tensions on Crimea: 
(a) Summary of 
Events, Udo 
Lilischkies; UKR gov. 
Confirms Russian 
troop presence (b) 
Interview with G. 
Atai, Simferopol; ( c) 
Interview with I. 
Ruck, Moscow; (d) 
UN Security Council 
meets on Crimea.531 
Q.: Very unsettling news from [Crimea]. What have you seen, what have you experienced today? A.: I can definitely say that things develop 
very, very rapidly and with a noteworthily well executed choreography, it seems to me: Unknown paramilitary units today have occupied - I 
shall call them strategic - installations on this peninsula. Inhabitants tell us that on and around the peninsula there have been Russian troop 
movements - I can, at this point, however, say nothing more than this... [Atai looks down, pauses for split second, as if considering whether 
she should say more instead]. Furthermore, we have met Russian parliamentarians here today, that have been rallying the local sentiments, 
and claim that they want to initiate a decision in the Duma to the effect that the ethnic Russians here get Russian passports. Just before we 
witnessed how a very well-known opposition politician, Piotr Poroshenko [later UKR President], who owns a private TV station in Kyiv, was 
literally chased through the streets. And just now we have heard that the airspace over Crimea has been blocked - in a nutshell it really looks 
as if someone from the outside wants to isolate the peninsula from the mainland. Q: In light of this situation, is it possible at to say who is 
currently controlling Crimea politically? A.: Well, clearly not Kyiv - even though I stand here on UKR territory. All these troop movements here 
were preceded by a decision on the local parliament to hold a referendum about the future status of Crimea. The date was set for the same 
day as the presidential elections in UKR. I can say that my observation is that at the moment, the Russian ethnic majority of Crimea has 
nothing against belonging to Russia. This clearly is also related to the somehow strange image that the Russians have about what happened 
in Kyiv. An image that has been decisively orchestrated and directed by the Kremlin controlled media. During the last three days, Russian 
media has notably focussed on the developments here in Crimea. And we just heard from UKR Turtschinow that Russia want to provoke a 
UKR military reaction, to then annex Crimea - but that UKR will not let itself be provoked.  
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28.02.2014 Tagesthemen; C. 
Miosga: Increasing 
tensions on Crimea: 
(a) Summary of 
Events, Udo 
Lilischkies; UKR gov. 
Confirms Russian 
troop presence (b) 
Interview with G. 
Atai, Simferopol; ( c) 
Interview with I. 
Ruck, Moscow; (d) 
UN Security Council 
meets on Crimea.532 
Q: Can it really be that the Russians are seeking an open confrontation, that the aim of the Russians can be to interfere in this conflict militarily? 
A.: Everything we are hearing is very worrying and currently hints in this direction. 2000 additional Russian troops have landed, it is claimed 
by UKR. Russia does not confirm any numbers, however state that they have increased the protection of their Black See Fleet. The Russians 
have always claimed the opposite so far. Today, Putin spoke on the phone with Angela Merkel and urged de-escalation of the situation and 
repeated that Russia fully accepts the sovereignty of UKR.  What we are experiencing at the moment, however, is the exact opposite. The 
news are really not comforting at the moment. Q.: This suspiciously reminds us of known patterns from other Russian conflicts. A: Indeed, 
many people here are reminded of the "Abkhazian Scenario", that goes like this: handing out of passports - here, on Crimea, the first Russian 
passports handed out were apparently given to Berkut members - which requires a process so that the inhabitants of Crimea can quickly 
receive Russian passports. Once the passports are distributed more widely, then you have citizens you need to protect. This was similar before 
the Russian invasion to Abkhazia, similar also in South-Ossetia. Of course, one is reminded of this scenario. This notwithstanding, one asks 
what the Russians are willing to risk, if they are willing to go all the way this time. I ask myself that question because the price Russia would 
have to pay would be very high - further international isolation. I really ask myself whether Russia is prepared to take such a risk.  
 
532 http://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/tt5306.html 





Date Event Summary/Transcript 
28.02.2014 Tagesthemen; C. 
Miosga: Increasing 
tensions on Crimea: 
(a) Summary of 
Events, Udo 
Lilischkies; UKR gov. 
Confirms Russian 
troop presence (b) 
Interview with G. 
Atai, Simferopol; ( c) 
Interview with I. 
Ruck, Moscow; (d) 
UN Security Council 
meets on Crimea.533 
Joint statement by Foreign Ministers of GER, Frau, POL calling on all parties to refrain from all activities that risk the unity of the Ukrainian 
sovereign territory; UN Security Council meets on situation on Crimea.  
 
533 http://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/tt5306.html 
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empowers Putin to 
use troops; (b) live 
from Simerfopol, G. 
Atai (c) International 
reactions.534 
a) Intro: Russia threatens military intervention at height of crisis on Crimea; Duma ratified presidential empowerment to use troops in 
neighbouring country [Ukr].; Putin LET declare that whether he gives the movement order will depend on further developments. Autonomous 
Region Crimea belongs to UKR since given to UKR by Kruschtschow; majority of population are ethnic Russians; besides capital Simferopol, the 
harbour city of Sevastopol has strategic relevance [to Russia] as a Russian naval base. b) Report, U. Lilischkies: "Russian APVs on the streets of 
Crimea - tonight the situation escalated dramatically: In Sevastopol units of the Russian black sea fleet surrounded the base of the Ukrainian 
Border Guards; other Russian troops took the military airport Belbek, and set an ultimatum to the present UKR forces to surrender or switch 
side; other armed groups apparently tried to disarm further UKR army and navy units stationed on Crimea. In Simferopol, where yesterday 
[28.02.2014] a pro-Russian government was elected, the new prime minister today received the supreme command over military, police 
and intelligence [forces on Crimea], states [after his election: "I ask the Russian president Putin to come to our aide to re-establish security 
on Crimea." [Lilischkies continues]: "A plea, many believe, Moscow had long waited for. Today, Putin asked the parliament for permission 
to use the military in the neighbouring country, which voted with great majority in favour of his request. Valentina Matwijenko [NOT PUTIN], 
Head of the Council of the Russian Federation: "We hear that young hooligans commit all sorts of crimes in UKR"; [Lilischkies continues] "But 
it was more these [images show men in Balaklava, wearing uniforms with no insignia] pro-Russian hooded men that stormed a press centre in 
Simferopol today, that spread fear and insecurity. Or in Kharkov, [eastern UKR] where pro-Russian protesters re-conquered the town hall held 
by the European Maidan protesters - shots were fired, 97 reported wounded; in the moment of triumph, the Russian flag was hoisted"; after 
emergency meeting of UKR cabinet , PM Yatseniuk states that "all Russian attempts to provoke a UKR reaction have failed. We understand 
very well the plan was to create a new South-Ossetia on the territory of UKR, with victims, blood, and civil war"; [Lilischkies continues]in 
Kyiv, National Security Council meets; Klitschko demands general mobilization of the UKR forces.  
 
534 http://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/ts47078.html 





Date Event Summary/Transcript 
01.03.2014 tagesschau: (a) Russia 
threatens military 
intervention; Duma 
empowers Putin to 
use troops; (b) live 
from Simferopol, G. 
Atai (c) International 
reactions.535 
"Despite the threatening images and sounds, the situation in Simferopol has remained calm. We have not seen Russian tanks on the streets. 
We have also not heard any shots being fired. Despite the harsh rhetoric of the Kremlin, so far, we cannot bear witness that ethnic Russians 
are under threat here in any way. Even in front of UKR military barracks we have seen armed men without insignia, we talked to them, they 
told us that they are Russian navy troops, of the Black Sea fleet, and threat they have an amicable and relaxed relationship with the UKR troops 
inside the barracks. It appears therefore that Russian troops have long [before] arrived on Crimea, and that they cooperate very closely with 
the pro-Russian militia, and that they occupy strategic positions step-by-step, so far in a peaceful manner- or in their own word, to "protect" 
[ethnic Russians against threats to their security].  
01.03.2014 tagesschau: (a) Russia 
threatens military 
intervention; Duma 
empowers Putin to 
use troops; (b) live 
from Simerfopol, G. 
Atai (c) International 
reactions.536 
a) Intro: UNSC holds second emergency meeting within 24hrs, to no avail due to Russian position; FM of EU schedule an extraordinary summit 
for Monday, 03.03.2014; several EU politicians strongly warned of a splitting of UKR; b) Natalie Bachmayer, Report: Barroso in Berlin, meets 
with Merkel; Merkel: "Of course everything must be done in these days - and I do that with many others in many phone calls, including the 
Russian president, with those responsible in UKR, that the territorial integrity of UKR remains untouched. What we are experiencing on 
Crimea is worrying us."; Few hours later Merkel learns that Duma paved way to send Russian troops to Crimea - calls Yatseniuk again in the 
afternoon, again the word "worry" is being used. Obama already reached more drastic words, states unambiguously on 28.02.2014: "The US 
is in full agreement with the International Community: Every intervention has a price"; [Bachmayer continues]: "The rhetoric is getting 
harsher, while the Europeans are facing the ruins of their diplomatic efforts. It is just a week ago that the Foreign Ministers of FRA, GER, 
POL [on behalf and in the name of the EU; no invitation from UKR gov.] negotiated a compromise - and now that. R. Sikorski, Polish Foreign 
minister: "An armed intervention is an egregious violation of international norms and principles. We are in constant contact with our allies 
and partners, with Germany, with France, with the EU, and with NATO"; [closing commentary, Bachmayer]: "Federal Foreign Minister FWS 
cancelled his scheduled trip to Georgia and Moldowa, as for Monday EU Special Representative Catherine Ashton has invited to a special EU 









Date Event Summary/Transcript 
01.03.2014 Audio, WDR Studio 
Moscow, Sabine 
Stöhr: 2000 Russian 
troops landed on 
Crimea".537 
2000 troops landed close to Simferopol, according to member of UKR gov; UKR ambassador to UN: We regard this as an act of aggression. 11 
helicopters and military aircraft have landed on UKJR territory"; Interim President Turtschinow speaks of military intervention under the 
pretence of an exercise; calls on Russia to end provocation, and refrain from any act that may endanger the territorial integrity of UKR; Russian 
Ambassador to Ukraine claims that the military manoeuvres are all covered under the covenants of a Russian-UKR military agreement; Russia 
is worried about the security of its black sea fleet base in Simferopol. Airspace above Simferopol closed during evening (28.02.2014]; UKR 
telecommunications company announces on its webpage that there are hardly any landline, cell phone, or Internet service available between 
Crimea and other parts of the country; unknown men apparently have occupied several telecommunication centres. Yesterday,28.02. during 
evening local time, fmr. UKR president J. appears before press [at Rostow/Don]: "...The UKR Rad has no legitimacy...I still think that the 
agreement that had been negotiated between the opposition and myself, if it would be implemented as planned, the it could defuse the crisis 
of Ukraine."; on Crimea: " of course the inhabitants of Crimea will not bow before the nationalists from Kyiv.", warns of bloodshed. After 
phone conversations, amongst other with A. Merkel, Putin let declare that he does not wish any further escalation in UKR, and that to prevent 





eases foreign military 
assignment".538 
Since changes to its military doctrine in 2010, Russia can deploy its troops abroad more easily. Earlier Russian military doctrine stringently 
required a case of self-defence, anti-terror operations, or the fulfilment of international agreements for the use of the military, the case either 
through a declaration of war, or a decision by the Russian National Security Council. Changes as consequences of the RUS experience in Georgia 
in 2008, when Russia sought to legitimize its military offensive by claiming to protect Russian nationals in South-Ossetia. [When published in 
2010] the doctrine raised fears that Russia could use this argument now in other similar cases, too. Then-president Medewedew however 
declared, that the doctrine facilitates Russian participation on the fight against Piracy. "Many Russian citizens live on Crimea. Thanks to a 










Date Event Summary/Transcript 
01.03.2014 Brennpunkt: "Psycho 
War about Crimea", 
Jörg Schönborn [now 
ARD editor in chief] : 
(a) Situation Report 
from Crimea, G. Atai; 
(b) Live from 
Simferopol on 
Situation in Crimea, 
G. Atai; c) Historic 
background on 
Crimea as a contested 
territory; (d) Media 
Echo on Russian 
Duma decision to 
allow sending of 
troops to Ukraine, Ina 
Ruck; (e)Interview on 
Russian intentions 




German Institute for 
International Affairs 
and Security (SWP), 
on Russian intentions 
a) Intro, Schönenborn: "During the past hours, the situation deteriorated dramatically on the still Ukrainian peninsula. Putin's psycho-war 
against UKR today entered a new phase: The parliament ion Moscow officially decided to invade the neighbouring country. What so far has 
been a covert activity, is now official Kremlin-policy. This reminds us in fatal fashion of the times when the Soviet Union let itself be called 
for help against external aggression from its soviet brother peoples". b) Report, G.Atai: "Snipers in front of Crimean regional parliament; 
heavily armed men without insignia are here, have occupied the building; local protesters cheer masked men, old lady: "I am UKR myself, but 
I see the country is torn into the wrong direction, and that's why I want Crimea to be Russia". [Another protester]: "You see today there are 
not many people here. A few days earlier, far more people were here, and they were all in favour of the changes - and now that we have 
armed men here, it is even dangerous for me to come here with a [UKR] flag"; [Atai continues]: "Soon the representative of the minority gets 
abused [by the other people present at the square] and chased away"; next images show people shouting "Berkut" to "honour the recently 
disbanded Special Police forces as heroes, and to blame the West"; [young woman]: "We don't need America. We prefer to have a Black Sea 
Fleet and no NATO troops. We are closer to Russia."; [old woman]: "You journalists are not objective. I was in Kyiv myself; I saw what happened. 
- and what they showed on TV was a total lie. Our Berkut boys were unarmed and were burnt and killed!"; [Atai continues]: "The small Muslim 
minority of the Crimean Tatars are on alarm since days"; Tatars still recall terror of displacement under Stalin, and [Atai:] "can only imagine 
UKR as their homeland"; [Young men, Crimean Tatar:]: "We have lived side by side, and we remember the hard times we had in the beginning. 
We don’t want to have to go through this again!"; [another young men, Crimean Tatar]: "They show horrible things on Russian TV [about us], 
for example that the UKR Tatars here kill people, just to provoke the Russians. They di it so they can bring in their troops.". ['Atai continues]: 
"Pro Russian self defence forces assemble before the Ministry of Interior, and even set camp in front of the former base of the Berkut forces. 
[Fmr. Berkut officer, wearing uniform, insignia show Berkut badge, and an unidentifiable badge, showing the Berkut eagle against a blue white 
red colour code]: "Of course Russia understand very well that soon there will be no more army [military?] commanders, or monuments that 
were devoted to the Russian empire, or Russian churches - all this would be destroyed if nationalism spread here from Western Ukraine. Not 
Nationalism anymore, but real fascism."; [Atai closing remarks]:"Kyiv and Crimea - never were they so far apart".  
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Brennpunkt: "Psycho 
War about Crimea", 
Jörg Schönborn [now 
ARD editor in chief] : 
(a) Situation Report 
from Crimea, G. Atai; 
(b) Live from 
Simferopol on 
Situation in Crimea, 
G. Atai; c) Historic 
background on 
Crimea as a contested 
territory; (d) Media 
Echo on Russian 
Duma decision to 
allow sending of 
troops to Ukraine, Ina 
Ruck; (e)Interview on 
Russian intentions 




German Institute for 
International Affairs 
and Security (SWP), 
on Russian intentions 
a) Intro Schönenborn: "Officially, the Russian parliemant paved the way for Russian military operations on Crimea today - but G. Atai reported 
earlier today that since long Russian troops were present [on the peninsula] and on the move". B) Interview with G Atai, live, Simferopol: Q: 
Has Russia not taken control on Crimea since long? Does it really need new soldiers? A: Actually, no, it doesn't need any more troops. We have 
the impression that all strategic objectives have been achieved by these paramilitaries / unknown soldier4s without insignia. Yesterday I did 
not want to confirm that Russia is here, but today I have seen it with my own eyes, of all places, in front of Ukr. military barracks. There we 
talked to the soldiers, who told us that they are navy infantry, that they belong to the Black Sea Fleet, from the base in Sevastopol, and 
originate from Central Russia. [they said that] Within the barracks they have a relaxed relationship [with the UKR soldiers] and do many things 
together. UKR observers estimate an additional 6-8000 [Russian] troops to be present here in Crimea. The Kremlin's tactics for now appears 
to be to send soldiers without insignia, then go through the entire political process via the Duma, so that on paper everything appears 
perfect." Q: Is Crimea the only trouble-spot or are you aware of other regions in which the Russians might also let themselves be called for 
help? A: Well, we heard of demonstrations in the south-east of country, in Donetsk, from pro-Russian protest in Kharkov. It could well be that 
this turns into conflagration [Merkel statement at G20 summit Australia] and that other pro-Russian parts of the country take the 
developments in Crimea as an example. However, at the moment something completely different is causing me concern: That is the reaction 
of Crimean Tatars, who, from the outset, wanted to remain UKR nationals. They have very bad memories of the RUS past, and the trauma of 
deportation under Stalin. They only live in peace, more or less, with the Russian majority here since the last 20, 25 years. If they call on the 
help of the Turks, or possibly Muslim terrorists appear on the scene to support their Muslim brothers, then this conflict could take a 
completely different, more dramatic turn."  
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01.03.2014 Brennpunkt: "Psycho 
War about Crimea", 
Jörg Schönborn [now 
ARD editor in chief] : 
(a) Situation Report 
from Crimea, G. Atai; 
(b) Live from 
Simferopol on 
Situation in Crimea, 
G. Atai; c) Historic 
background on 
Crimea as a 
contested territory, 
Marion Kerstholt; (d) 
Media Echo on 
Russian Duma 
decision to allow 
sending of troops to 
Ukraine, Ina Ruck; 
(e)Interview on 
Russian intentions 




German Institute for 
International Affairs 
and Security (SWP), 
on Russian intentions 
a) Intro, Schönborn: "Maybe you [G. Atai] are mentioning what in the end will be the larger problem - not the military invasion of Crimea, that 
appears almost like a child-'s play - it is the historic roots that have led to the fact that this region has been a place of conflict between its 
neighbouring countries  throughout history". b) Historic background, Crimea - a contested piece of earth, Kerstholt, Marion: " Crimea, a Tatar 
word means something like rock or fort - a fort that was owned by different powers in history: the Venetians, the Osman Empire, or the 
Russians"; peninsula has a desirable [geo] strategic location, roughly 2 million inhabitants and is slightly larger than Mecklenburg-Vorpommern 
[larger German federal stat]; current ethnic diversity today, 58,5 ethnic Russians, 24,4% Ukrainians, 12,1 % Tatars, 5 % others; belonged to 
Russia since 1783, when Katherine the Great turned it into Russian territory [by military victory; see also: battle of the light charges, Brudenell], 
settles Russians there and displaces Crimean Tatars to the Russian hinterland. In 1954, Chruschtschow allocates Crimea to the Soviet Republic 
of Ukraine, therefore [today] Crimea belongs to UKR. However, since 1992 the peninsular has the status of an autonomous republic, with its 
own regional parliament in the capital Simferopol, a gesture to the Russian majority on Crimea by the UKR government [back then]; Harbour 
in Sevastopol still is, as it was during Soviet times, home to the Russian Black Sea Fleet; lease agreement between UKR and RUS until 2042 
(renewed between Putin and Yanukovych in July 2012].   
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Echo on Russian 
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German Institute for 
International Affairs 
and Security (SWP), 
on Russian intentions 
a) Intro Schönborn: " The collapse of the government in Kyiov last week, the escape of the then president Yanukovych was an ignominy for 
Russian president Putin - of all things during the last days of the Winter Olympics. Obviously, he has done his utmost to compensate for the 
loss, to demonstrate his power. He achieved this in only a few days. And today he even secured the support for his ambitions of the [RUS] 
parliament, which he only takes serious if it is serving his purpose." b) Report on Media Echo in RUS on DUMA decision to allow sending of 
troops to Ukraine, In Ruck, Moscow: "Troops to Ukraine" - "Russia's main evening news right away offered an explanation: [Russian TV news 
anchor; exact TV-station unknown] " "The countries leadership today has taken an important decision - they shall protect our Russian co-
nationals. The upper house of parliament has agreed to the presidential request to allow the sending of troops to Ukrain"; [Ruck cts]: "Images 
of Russian TV then show decision in parliament, followed immediately by further stirring of emotions: [anonymous member of Duma, 
credentials only in Cyrillic, no source given] " President Obama has said that Russia will have to pay dearly for her policy in Ukraine. That is an 
affront. We all know the West trained the fighters on Maidan. Obama crossed the red line, not Russia!"; [Ruck cts] "Another station shows a 
documentary from UKR, with images of Russian flags everywhere - in Luhansk, in Kharkov, and Donetsk, the same message everywhere: 
"Russia, come and help Crimea"; [Pro Russian protester, young woman] "The Russian forces are our absolute protection. To know that they 
exist, that they protect us, is our hope. They are our only chance for security!"; [closing remarks Ruck]: "Russia's TV viewers are keyed in for 
an invasion. Their president apparently has not decided yet. The marching order has not been given yet, it is being said. Putin still hopes 
that the situation stabilizes."  
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01.03.2014 Brennpunkt: "Psycho 
War about Crimea", 
Jörg Schönborn [now 
ARD editor in chief] : 
(a) Situation Report 
from Crimea, G. Atai; 
(b) Live from 
Simferopol on 
Situation in Crimea, 
G. Atai; c) Historic 
background on 
Crimea as a contested 
territory; (d) Media 
Echo on Russian 
Duma decision to 
allow sending of 
troops to Ukraine, Ina 
Ruck; (e)Interview on 
Russian intentions 




German Institute for 
International Affairs 
and Security (SWP), 
on Russian intentions 
Q: What does Wladimir Putin want - obviously, to demonstrate power, but, Ina Ruck in Moscow, what is his strategic aim, what do we have 
to expect? A.: Certainly, this is about influence on Ukraine, which is still regarded as a power-political backyard here. Whether for this 
influence an official invasion is required, besides the one we are witnessing, the creeping [invasion] one, is, I believe, not so important. 
Important is that now it is theoretically possible, and fast, the threat is out - Russia has asserted her claim to power, and that very, very 
clearly.[emphasized by Ina Ruck]. Q.: You showed us the images of Russian flags in Kharkov and other places in Eastern UKR. Does he want 
more than Crimea, does he want the east of UKR, will he maybe send troops to Kyiv - all under the pretence to bring back order? A.: He 
would have carte blanche even for Kyiv. The permission given by the parliament extends over the entire UKR territory, that is important. But 
in Kyiv there would certainly be a very bloody war, Russian tanks would appear - Putin also knows that. We have seen how the Ukrainians 
stand for their cause, if they want to. It is really about influence, that Russia wants to have a say in any case about the future of Ukraine. The 
weaker Ukraine becomes, be it through a Crimean secession or a split into a Western and Eastern Ukraine, the easier this will be. This is 
certainly the aim of Russia, that Russia in the future has a say about the future of Ukraine.  
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01.03.2014 Brennpunkt: "Psycho 
War about Crimea", 
Jörg Schönborn [now 
ARD editor in chief] : 
(a) Situation Report 
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background on 
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Russian intentions 




German Institute for 
International Affairs 
and Security (SWP), 
on Russian intentions 
a) Intro, Schönborn: As a matter of fact, the Cold War is over for decades. The Europeans, Russia, the Americans wanted to cooperate - but 
now we can watcfh how the Kremlin obviously unilaterally tries to shift the borders [in Europe]. Tonight, we want to understand what does 
this mean? Where does this lead? Could there be war in the region? Who may be able to find answer to these questions is Hans-Henning 
Schröder, one of the best Russia experts amongst Germany's historians." b) Interview with Hans Henning Schröder: q: Mr. Schröder, is there 
a threat of war in the region? A.: This cannot be excluded, but it is certainly nothing Putin would desire directly. He aspires to destabilize 
Ukraine, for example by occupying Crimea. For him it is to prevent Ukraine from slipping into the sphere of influence of the EU, but it is not 
about initiating a bloody war. Q: " What can, what should the West do - besides idle standing by and watching? We read news like: "President 
Hollande warns of violence" - this doesn't exactly sound harsh. A: " In the short term, the West can do very little. A military operation is off 
the list of things to be done; I think this must said clearly on the onset. Economic sanctions should be considered, but this also depends 
how the situation develops in the coming days. So far we see that Putin is behaving legalistically, that means that he stuck to the rules set 
by the [Russian] constitution: he sought parliamentary consent for the foreign military assignment, which covers, as Mrs. Ruck rightly 
pointed out, the entire territory of Ukraine. [Furthermore], he advances very cautiously in Crimea, so far avoiding bloodshed. If this flips 
over, for example the Ukrainian side starts to defend themselves, then we have a completely different situation. But, as I said, in the short 
term, I do not see that the West can step in there in any meaningful way. Q.: Is it conceivable for you tonight that UKR maintains its current 
territory, with Crimea, with the exact same borders today, or is the split already a fait accompli? A.: Well, if I hear what Putin and his politicians 
are saying [which statement of Putin, when; Putin has not commented personally on UKR or Crimea until 01.03.], this is not about splitting 
up Ukraine, but that Crimea should be secured temporarily, for the short-term. What Putin currently does, and he declared this publicly in 
2011, is a large scale geo-political project, namely to round off his sphere of influence through projects like the Eurasian Customs Union and 
others, in order to establish a stronger overall position for himself. Without Ukraine, this will never be possible. He almost got UKR into his 
sphere of influence - you remember the Vilnius Summit -, but this was thwarted by the Ukrainian population. Now he is trying to destabilize." 
c) Outro, J. Schönenborn: "For a brief moment last weekend, we had a feeling of hope, a feeling that now things can quiet down in this crisis 
region. Because the situation is so dramatic, the colleagues of tagesthemen are on duty all evening, and will provide you with updates. In case 
of breaking news, the following show "One side will win [Einer wird gewinnen] will be interrupted." 
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01.03.2014 Tagesthemen, Caren 
Miosga; a) Strong 
sabre-rattling: Is 
Crimea on the brink 
of war?, Report by 
Ina Ruck; b) Interview 
with Golineh Atai, 
Simferopol; c) 
Interview with Ina 
Ruck, Moscow; c) 
Interview with Tina 
Hassel, Washington, 
on US reactions.545 
Intro C. Miosga: "Important and ever more discomforting news from Ukraine. Strong sabre-rattling - is Crimea facing war now? Yesterday 
there was talks of 2000 troops that landed on Crimea - by now there appears to be 8.000. But such threatening gestures seem not enough for 
the Russian president Putin: Today, he let parliament empower him to send troops into the neighbouring country, and the whole territory 
of UKR at that. Since then, many heads of state speak on the phone with President Putin, President Obama as much as the chancellor; the 
UNSC held another meeting on the crisis today - because so far no one can really judge of Putin is just bluffing, or if he is indeed just before 
issuing the marching order. b) REPORT, Ina Ruck, Moscow: "New Russian passports for the notorious Berkut police. In their old homeland 
[UKR] they are generally hated by now, some of them report that they have received death threats. In their new homeland [RUS] they are 
welcome: [unnamed official, unsourced TV channel]: "I believe these boys deserve the highest orders - the time will come when UKR will also 
be proud of them. Today they are the pride of Russia". [Ruck ctd.] "From the UKR perspective, this is a provocation, and by no means the only 
one: Days ago already, men in uniform appeared - without insignia, but armed with machine guns - and ever more army vehicles, some of 
them clearly belonging to the Russian military. While UKR protested, spoke of a covert invasion, Russia kept silent, until today it decided 
openly to enable the invasion. Unanimously the upper house of the Russian parliament (Duma) waived a request from Putin, and gave green 
light to issuing a marching order. However, so far this has not been issued yet, the Kremlin let the public know during the evening. They 
[Kremlin] were still waiting and hoping for an improvement of the situation on Crimea. The Russian TV-audience has long been attuned to the 
possible invasion. Evening after evening the new UKR government was described as bandits or fascists - also today. [TV presenter from 
unsourced RUS TV station]: "In the entire UKR, pro Russian protests under the Motto of "no to fascism" took place". [Ruck ctd.]. In Kharkov, 
thousands protested against the new regional administration that had taken over since the change of government in Kyiv. The town hall has 
been occupied by the protesters; sympathizers with the new government were beaten up by pro-Russian protesters. Sergei Shagan, the 
novelist also known in Germany, was also hurt. At the end of the day, on top of the Kharkov regional administration building, the Russian flag 
was hoisted. In a hurriedly ordered meeting of the Cabinet, the new head of government Yatseniuk said that Ukraine will not let itself be 
provoked by Russia. However, a military operation would not be tolerated, and mean the beginning of a war. But on Crimea, it appears as if 
the Russian military operation is long a reality. Even though the soldiers wear no insignia on their uniforms; even though so far there has 
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01.03.2014 Tagesthemen, Caren 
Miosga; a) Strong 
sabre-rattling: Is 
Crimea on the brink 
of war?, Report by Ina 
Ruck; b) Interview 
with Golineh Atai, 
Simferopol; c) 
Interview with Ina 
Ruck, Moscow; c) 
Interview with Tina 
Hassel, Washington, 
on US reactions.546 
Q: How far is Crimea under Putin's control? A.: News we heard this evening that might have de-escalating effects is that the UKR ministry of 
defence has reached out to the paramilitary units that have occupied strategic locations here, and confirmed that there is no blockade or 
annexation, but that these units are simply marching before these buildings. If we look at the political process, then we observe that the new 
head of the [autonomous] Crimean regional government today took over control over the entire security apparatus. Furthermore, he 
confronted Kyiv with new facts, namely that he will move the referendum about the territorial affiliation of 'Crimea ahead to the 
30.03.[2014]. Q.: Now, the UKR government has put its military on high-alert - but what are the odds, could the UKR military defend itself 
against the powerful Russia? A.: Carin, I don’t even want to picture that! For UKR this would be a suicide mission, and I believe this would also 
be a nightmare for many Russian officers, to fight against UKR. No, I believe much more that this is a pure pressure scenario. We also heard 
today that there was unrest in Eastern UKR in which Russians participated. I believe it is simply about dictating something to Kyiv, and to try 
to return to the negotiating table, to in fact revive the deal that had been brokered between Yanukovych, the Maidan opposition and the 
three EU Foreign Ministers, with the intent to return to this agreement, and re-instate Yanukovych as president.  
01.03.2014 Tagesthemen, Caren 
Miosga; a) Strong 
sabre-rattling: Is 
Crimea on the brink 
of war? Report by Ina 
Ruck; b) Interview 
with Golineh Atai, 
Simferopol; c) 
Interview with Ina 
Ruck, Moscow; c) 
Interview with Tina 
Q: Is it indeed the case that Putin only wants to exert pressure? He has received free passage from the Russian parliament to invade not only 
Crimea, but into the entire territory of UKR. Which objective does he really pursue? A: I believe this is really about re-establishing [the fmr.] 
influence in UKR. Clearly, Putin thinks geopolitically, he wants to establish a counterweight to the European Union, his Eurasian Union, made 
up of former Soviet Republics. For this he very urgently needs Ukraine, for this objective he is using this much pressure. That is very clear from 
my perspective. Therefore, also the wrestling with the EU that we witnessed last November. It did look like a defeat for Putin at the beginning 
[see Ruck, Interview with Th. Roth at the closing ceremony of Sochi], but I think it is not yet too late for him to win back UKR - no matter the 
cost and repercussions. By the way, he is even willingly risking a split of the country - a weak UKR is easier to rule for him. Therefore, 
destabilisation clearly is one of the aims. Also, in this he is completely oblivious about his international perception, we have witnessed this in 
earlier actions of his. For him, it is important to rebuild a strong Russia that has a lot of influence in the world. What he doesn’t care about 
whether this is as friend or foe.  
 
546 http://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/tt5308.html 
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Hassel, Washington, 
on US reactions.547 
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Date Event Summary/Transcript 
01.03.2014 Tagesthemen, Caren 
Miosga; a) Strong 
sabre-rattling: Is 
Crimea on the brink 
of war?, Report by Ina 
Ruck; b) Interview 
with Golineh Atai, 
Simferopol; c) 
Interview with Ina 
Ruck, Moscow; c) 
Interview with Tina 
Hassel, Washington, 
on US reactions.548 
Intro, C Miosga: "During a phone conversation, Mdm Chancellor appealed to President Putin to observe the territorial integrity of UKR. Also, 
French president Hollande admonished that everything should be done to prevent an intervention. President Obama spoke with Putin on the 
phone, and in the White House there is a National Security Council meeting. Q: Obama stated before that a foreign invasion will come at a 
cost, and that he is considering withdrawing from the planned G8 summit. Tina Hassel in Washington - is this really everything the US can 
threaten now? A.: Well, there is not really much political leverage here, which is part of the problem. The [National Security Council] meeting 
that took place today has dissolved, and apparently the situation was very tense. Different options were discussed, including for example 
freezing negotiations about important trade agreements with Russia, possibly economic sanctions or punishments. But no one here thought 
about a military option, the transfer of US troops to the Polish UKR border or the deployment of the navy [in adjacent water]. Q. This will 
not be enough for the new UKR government, as it already called NATO for help. Tomorrow, NATO will hold an extraordinary meeting - what 
exactly can they decide with a currently reluctant U.S. president, at least regarding military options? A.: Well, in principle, realistically, not 
much can be expected without the most important member of the alliance. Tomorrow is firstly about the alignment of planning - and one 
must be clear about the fact that no NATO member wants a military escalation, this is much too dangerous. Essentially, everyone is clueless 
and impotent. Obama may be weak and incapable of upholding his red lines. But one must remember that his predecessor, George W. Bush, 
in 2008 did not react any differently when it was about Georgia. He also, despite massive pressure, did not interfere in this conflict. Russia is 
too much needed in solving all the other large conflicts of the world to risk such a move.  
 
548 http://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/tt5308.html 
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02.03.2014 Tagesschau, a) 
Situation in UKR, b) 
Live from Simferopol, 




a) Intro: The conflict between UKR and Russia results in growing international tensions. Western governments, lead by the USA, assess the 
Russian troop movements as an act of aggression. As a response, economic sanctions are being discusses. UKR has ordered its military to full 
readiness for action. The Crimean Peninsula is largely inhabited by Russians. For Russia, particularly the black sea harbour Sevastopol has 
strategic relevance as a base for the Russian navy. b) Report, I. Ruck: Military [transport] vehicles on the streets of the Crimean Peninsula. On 
most, the number plates are taken off or posted over. On others, no one cared about this anymore: This is the Russian military on its way! 
Moscow send ever more troops and hardware to Crimea. One of their objectives: Privolnaya, a base of the UKR border guards. Here, according 
to agencies, hundreds of armed men appeared and blocked the base. The UKR border guards entrenched themselves behind the gates. All day 
there was rumours that Ukrainian personnel was defecting to join forces with the pro-Russian forces. In the evening news, the bombshell was 
announced: The chief of the UKR navy who just recently had been appointed by the new government in Kyiv swore an oath to the pro-
Russian regional government of the [autonomous] Crimea before running cameras. Disorientation within the armed forces. It remains 
unclear whether they [armed forces] would really adhere to the command from Kyiv, warned Yatseniuk, the UKR head of government today: 
We are at the brink of a catastrophe. President Putin is on the best way to instigate war between two befriended nations."; announces that 
and invasion would mean "the end of all relations". In Moscow, today several smaller protests against the Russian military operation 
occurred. "Dont drag our children into war against their brothers" was seen on signs.  The protests were not approved, and police arrested 
dozens of the protesters. Soon later, a much larger protest, well organized AND [emph. I Ruck] approved by the authorities. In this case, they 
protested in favour of the invasion.  
02.03.2014 Tagesschau, a) 
Situation in UKR, b) 
Live from 




"The war of nerves before the UKR military barracks continues. Today, Russian troops, who mostly do not portray themselves as belonging to 
Russian forces, ostentatiously positioned themselves before UKR bases, and asked their UKR colleagues to drop their arms and put themselves 
under RUS protection. According to our knowledge, no UKR unit so far has given in to this demand. Most bases are put under heightened alert. 
We have just lea4rned that Chancellor Merkel has spoken on the phone with President Putin, in which he told her that the means that he 
employed on Crimea are proportionate, and that it is about the interest of the ethnic Russians, that life and limb of the ethnic Russians on 
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02.03.2014 Tagesschau, a) 
Situation in UKR, b) 
Live from Simferopol, 





a)Intro: Many Western politicians are outraged by the Russian behaviour. Consistently it is said that Moscow must not violate Ukraine's 
territorial integrity. The US, CAN, UK and FRA have stalled their preparations for the upcoming G8 summit in Sochi [June 2014]. Today, the 
NATO Council held a crisis meeting in BXL. b) Report, Arnim Stauth: "Military decorations and uniforms in the NATO-corridors - but no one 
seriously expects that the alliance is about to send tanks. NATO SG Rasmussen is now required as a diplomat, capable of finding clear words, 
but at the same time not spill oil into the UKR fire. Rasmussen: "What Russia is currently doing threatens peace and security in Europe. Russia 
must stop its military actions and threats." [Stauth ctd.] But also the UKR government needs to do its part towards de-escalation. Rasmussen: 
"We urge the UKR government to guarantee the democratic rights of all citizens, and also makes sure that minority rights are being protected." 
[Stauth ctd.] Thus, the world's most powerful military alliance strikes a low-keyed tune. However, from the other side of the Atlantic a rumbling 
foreign Secretary [John Kerry] could be heard, Kerry: "He is not going to have a G8 summit in Sochi, maybe Russia doesn't even stay in the G8". 
Frank Walter Steinmeier: "There is discussions about this [sanctions; excluding Russia from G8 summit] among the heads of state - the one 
group that says we now must send a strong signal and exclude Russia against the other group - and I am more inclined towards them - that 
argues that the G( Format is in fact the last format in which we from the West can talk with Russia directly. [this group asks] - should we really 









Date Event Summary/Transcript 
03.03.2014 audio, Hessischer 
Rundfunk, Andreas 
Horchler: "Kerry to 
travel to Kyiv", 
03:31am.552 
On Tuesday [04.03.]  US Secretary of State Kerry is to travel to Kyiv, to assure the new government in Kyiv about US support. Leading employees 
of the ministry (Department of State) argued at a conference late on Sunday [NSC meeting, 02.03.2014] that the Russian military took 
control of Crimea, and in doing so repeatedly violated international law. In a joint statement published by the White House, the G7 condemn 
the violation of Ukraine's sovereignty by Russia. None of the states continues to participate in the preparations for the G8 summit that is 
planned for June in Sochi. It is the first price of which Obama warned Russia would have to pay in case of an intervention.: "There will be costs 
for any military intervention into Ukraine". The US Secretary of State, John Kerry attacked the Russian president sharply. [According to Kerry], 
he is acting with the methods of the 19th century, but he still has the opportunity to return to the negotiating table. If the conflict would 
escalate, Kerry said on ABC, 'Russia could not only loose the Sochi-Summit, but also its membership of the G8. He added that it is possible that 
Russian assets in the US could be frozen, a visa-ban imposed, and economic relations could be disrupted; there could be a withdrawal from 
US investments in Russia. [Kerry]: "One simply doesn't invade into another country based on false assumptions." [Kerry furthermore 
demanded that ] as soon as possible, an international observer mission should monitor the situation on Crimea and Eastern UKR. [Horchler 
ctd]: A military response is not considered by the US, as the Department of Defence, and Secretary of Defence Chuck Hagel, emphasised. 
According to the Department of State, several meetings between Russian and US business delegations had been cancelled already. For Russia, 
the economic situation could soon become dicey, if further sanctions are to follow. The historian Aron David Miller of the renowned think tank 
Woodrow-Wilson-Centre told CNN: "Unfortunately this is a chess game. Putin is first host to the Winter Olympics, and not even a week later 
he invades a sovereign country." [Horchler ctd.] Miller is sure that at the end there will be a diplomatic solution. And Putin, the aggressor, will 
after joint efforts in the Iran Deal or the destruction of the Syrian chemical weapons arsenal portray himself as a peacemaker. The path to 
such a diplomatic solution - if so taken - appears to be long and littered with many uncertainties.   
 
552 https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/audio/audio118912.html 
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03.03.2014 audio, Radio Bremen, 
Robert Kiendl: 
Reactions from Berlin 
to the Ukraine crisis, 
09:59 am.553 
Also, in this country many have the unpleasant feeling that one can literally watch how in the south east of Europe a new war is being 
instigated. Between two states that until 1990 belonged to one, the Soviet Union. Back then already, all power was held in Moscow. And today 
it also appears as if the shots are being called about war and peace in Ukraine by the Kremlin only. Russian president Putin received a free 
hand from his parliament to order a military operation on Crimea. It is not too late yet, German Foreign Minister FWS emphasised in ARD 
"Bericht aus Berlin": [Steinmeier] "Putin has the authorisation to use troops, but he has not yet taken a decision to use this to the effect to, 
at least in larger numbers, send troops in the direction of Crimea. That is a very dangerous state of affairs that we are having there. But I also 
say: Reversal is still possible; we can still prevent further escalation. " [Kiendl ctd.] For this, [Steinmeier added], it is required at a minimum 
that RUS and UKR start direct talks, or in the case of this failing, with the help of the United Nations or the OSCE. At least, according to 
Steinmeier, the new UKR prime minister Yatseniuk and his Russian counterpart Medwedew spoke on the phone for the first time over the 
weekend. At the same time the Foreign Minister warns to singularly exert pressure on Russia. Much rather, unambiguous messages should 
be send to both sides, [Steinmeier:] "On the one hand to Russia, to observe the territorial integrity of UKR, on the other hand to Ukraine, to 
portray itself as the government of ALL Ukrainians."[Kiendl ctd.] Not least, Russia is worried about the security of the ethnic Russian Ukrainians, 
since the pro-Russian president Yanukovych has been overthrown in Kyiv. Claudia Roth of the Green Party, and vice-president of the Bundestag 
clearly favours a hard stance towards Russia: [Roth] " Putin's intervention is a violation of international law. By doing this, he positions himself 
outside the UN, outside the European Council, outside the OSCE. Therefore one must consider for example sanctions, a visa-ban or the freezing 
of Russian assets, but also the energy business, and the energy business relations." [Kiendl ctd]: The US Foreign Secretary [Kerry] even threatens 
that Russia could be kicked out of the G8. His German counterpart, at least so far, is not convinced: [Steinmeier]"One group favours sending 
a strong message to Russia now, while the other - and I am more inclined towards them - argues that the G8 format is in fact the only format 
in which we from the West can still speak with the Russian directly - and should we really sacrifice this only format?" [Kiendl ctd] In Brussels 
[on the EU Foreign Minister crisis summit on Ukraine], Steinmeier will now seek a way forward with his EU counterparts. To this end, he even 









Date Event Summary/Transcript 
03.03.2014 tagesschau, 1200 
noon, Ina Ruck.554 
"On Russian media, the top news was about the phone conversation between Merkel and Putin. [TV presenter on Russia 24] "Putin has told 
the chancellor the Russian reactions were fully proportionate, [as] the rights of Russians and Russian people are threatened by [Ukrainian] 
ultra-nationalists". [Ruck ctd.] Pictures shown in the news today also show images of several Ukrainian bureaucrats swearing an oath to the 
constitution of the autonomous Republic of Crimea. Russian TV claims they are high ranking officials from the UKR intelligence, the UKR 
ministry of interior, and UKR Border Guards. However, so far this has not yet been confirmed by Kyiv. Confirmed is the defection of the chief 
of the Ukrainian Navy, who yesterday placed himself under the command of the Crimean regional government. The [new] Ukrainian 
government fired him immediately. The British Foreign Minister William Hague travelled to Ukraine, and visited the Maidan square first thing 
in the morning. He called upon Russia to order back its troops, and on Ukraine to not let itself be provoked. The US Foreign Secretary is also 
expected in Kyiv.  
 
554 http://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/video/video1376460.html 





Date Event Summary/Transcript 
03.03.2014 audio MDR BXL, 
Martin Bohne: EU 
Foreign Minister 
Crisis meeting on 
Ukraine.555 
"Rarely have the EU Foreign Ministers gathered in such a dramatic situation. [German] Foreign Minister Frank Walter Steinmeier chooses a 
vigorous admonition to describe the seriousness of the situation. [Steinmeier]: "Europe, without any doubt, is experiencing its most serious 
crisis since the fall of the Berlin Wall. Twenty-five years after the end of the bloc confrontation, the risk of a renewed splitting of Europe is 
real". [Bohne, ctd.]: The French Foreign Minister, Laurent Fabuse, demands that Europe must speak with a unified voice in such a dramatic 
situation. That [Fabuse added] is of fundamental importance. For the Swedish Foreign Minister Carl Bildt, this begins with an unambiguous 
language. He himself is not shy of clear words: [Bildt] "It is of decisive importance that we condemn the Russian behaviour in Ukraine very 
sharply". [Bohne, ctd.] The Hungarian Foreign Minister, Martouj, is fully on that line. [According to him] The EU should stand fully behind the 
sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine. He drew a parallel to the intervention into his country in 1956. He even wants to consider 
sanctions against Russia: "What I can say no is that we will discuss these questions at depth in the next hours, and after that we will have an 
answer for you.".; US Foreign Secretary Kerry already threatened to kick Russia out of the G8 group of states, and all other members have 
stopped their efforts for the upcoming G8 summit in Sochi. However, this is not to the taste of all EU member states. The Foreign Minister of 
Luxembourg Jean Asselborn, explains why:[Asselborn] "We are also fully aware of the fact that 25% of all our energy originates from Russia, 
and that we also know that the economic relations between Russia and the EU are to be rated extremely important. " [Bohne ctd.] The 
German Foreign Minister also doesn't use the term sanctions. Frank Walter Steinmeier chooses diplomacy over strong words: [Steinmeier] " 
We will not be able to comment our way out of this, but we also have to keep ourselves able to do policy beyond this date. Therefore, I say 
that it is indeed also the hour of diplomacy. Crisis diplomacy is not weakness but will now be more important than ever" [Bohne, ctd.]: to 
prevent an outbreak of war. For Steinmeier, this means searching for formats in which the Russian and the Ukrainian side can re-start a 
dialogue. He highlights the positive experience with international contact groups. Furthermore, he spoke in favour of an OSCE observer 
mission to assess the situation on the ground on Crimea and Eastern Ukraine.  
 
555 http://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/audio/audio118938.html 
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03.03.2014 tagesschau, 1700, a) 
Crisis on Crimea, 
Report by Michael 
Heussen; b) Interview 
with Stefan Stuchlik, 
Simferopol; c) 
Interview with W.D. 
Krause, BXL, on EU 
Foreign Minister 
crisis summit; d) 
Interview Stefan 
Wolff, Frankfurt, on 
market response to 
Ukraine crisis.556  
"Flowers for the fallen of Maidan - the British Foreign Minister [William] Hague on the battlefield of the past weeks. Everything is still covered 
in soot [here], but the next conflict with much more serious consequences is impending. William Hague calls it the largest crisis in Europe in 
this century. The Ukrainian prime minister Yatseniuk hopes for political and economic support [to his country]: [Yatseniuk] "Every attempt by 
Russia to annex Crimea will not be successful - just give us some time". [Heussen ctd.] Former PResident Yuliya Timoshenko portrays herself 
more bellicose: [Timoshenko, on INTV] " Vladimir Putin should understand that if he attacks on us, he declares war on all those that 
guarantee our security, the United States and Great Britain. I am convinced that he will not cross this threshold, if nonetheless he does, he 
will definitely loose." [Heussen ctd] At a Human Rights Council of the United Nations meeting in Geneva, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei 
Lawrow defended Russian behaviour on Crimea, and sharply criticizes the West: [Lawrow]: "Those that speak of an [act of] aggression, and 
threaten sanctions and bankruptcies, are the same that have prevented dialogue. They have thereby supported the splitting of the country". 
[Heussen ctd]: Dialogue in Russian - on Crimea this means Russian soldiers encircle Ukrainian military installations and continue to arrest 
Ukrainian soldiers. Moscow has de facto taken over control."  
 
556 https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/video/video1376526.html 
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03.03.2014 tagesschau, 1700, a) 
Crisis on Crimea, 





Interview with W.D. 
Krause, BXL, on EU 
Foreign Minister 
crisis summit; d) 
Interview Stefan 
Wolff, Frankfurt, on 
market response to 
Ukraine crisis.557  
Q.: How do you experience the situation? A: Well, after such massive movements that we have seen on TV, one would imagine to be tanks 
or heavy equipment rolling here - but this isn't the case. There is nothing here, the streets are open, only a few roadblocks here and there. 
No, the entire re-enforcement of the Russians is organized by air - if one looks up, one can see military aircraft flying, we have seen two or 
three today. With them the Russians reinforced their troops and encircled the Ukrainian bases. IT is an afterwit of history that throughout the 
history of Crimea, there were always two types of bases here - Russian and Ukrainian. Therefore, if you allow the cynical remark, the way was 
not so far.... Q. How are the people of Crimea dealing with this situation? A.: Well we have heard a lot about the composition of the Crimean 
population - more than 60% are either ethnic Russians or speak Russian - and they actually believe that the Russian troops are truly establishing 
a line of defence, coherent with the [official Russian] motto "to defend Crimea against the annexation of [Ukrainian] nationalists. But we spoke 
today with the Crimean Tatars who represent one fifth (1/5; 20%) of the population, and are thus a minority. Only if one looks into their eyes, 
one truly sees their fear, only then one is able to grasp the size of the operation and what it means for the people who don’t necessarily 
belong to the Russian speaking majority" 
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03.03.2014 tagesschau, 1700, a) 
Crisis on Crimea, 
Report by Michael 
Heussen; b) Interview 
with Stefan Stuchlik, 
Simferopol; c) 
Interview with W.D. 
Krause, BXL, on EU 
Foreign Minister 
crisis summit; d) 
Interview Stefan 
Wolff, Frankfurt, on 
market response to 
Ukraine crisis.558  
Q: How much is the EU struggling with this crisis? A.: Europe is struggling - but this is also a consequence of the situation. On the one hand, 
the U.S: and Europe maintain close economic ties with Russia. More than a fourth [25%] of our energy supplies are from Russia. Russia is also 
an important export market. This creates a mutual linkage and creates dependencies and takes away some freedom to let the heavy words 
be followed by substantial action. From the perspective on many Europeans, it is also not too late yet to still try something with diplomacy, 
directed at both sides of the conflict. One foreign minister told me that the situation there was not black and white, that there is no simple 
evil on one, and the good on the other side, but one must influence both sides to moderate their behaviour in order to prevent a larger 
conflict here.  Q: Now Ukraine is factually bankrupt - will the EU help quickly and whole-heartedly with financial aid? A.: The EU is not in a 
position to do this. Ukraine needs money, and the correct institution for this is the IMF. IT is not possible to buy Ukraine, as Putin tried earlier 
[November 2013]. It is only possible to help Ukraine by for example temporarily taking over their debt, but there will be strings attached 
that won't be easy for the country either.  
 
558 http://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/video/video1376530.html 
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03.03.2014 tagesschau, 1700, a) 
Crisis on Crimea, 
Report by Michael 
Heussen; b) Interview 
with Stefan Stuchlik, 
Simferopol; c) 
Interview with W.D. 
Krause, BXL, on EU 
Foreign Minister 
crisis summit; d) 
Interview Stefan 
Wolff, Frankfurt, on 
market response to 
Ukraine crisis.559  
Q: The German stock market reacted concerend, but did not show any signs of panic. How is this on the other markets, in the United States, 
in Russia? A.: Well, the reaction of the financial markets indeed makes clear that this is a crisis in the heart of Europe, and that it is also a crisis 
for the trade relations, which of course are very strong with Russia. The Wall Street reacted cautiously, drops 1%, while European Indices 
averaged a drop by 2,7%, and the Russian market, alreadey closed now, suffered a mega-loss of 12%. Particularly those businesses that held 
close ties with the Russian marketlost: , for example the retail group METRO, who intends to list his Russian business on the stockmarket this 
year, down 5.5%; pharmaceuticals Stada, who is very active on the Russian market, down 5.2%; and ADIDAS, who regards Russia as a future 
market, down 2.1%. All this led to the fact that the DAX lost considerably, and closes down 3.2% - in a nutshell, the markets are very worried.  
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03.03.2014 tagesschau, 2015, a) 
Report  Michael 
Heussen, b) live from 
Moscow, Ina Ruck; c) 
live from Crimea, 
Stefan Stuchlik, 
Simferopol; d) 






a)Intro, Linda Zervakis: "Russia increases ist pressure despite international crisis diplomacy. Apparently further troops were sent to the 
Crimean Peninsula. Furthermore, the Russian Black Sea fleet appears to be blocking UKR vessels. However, according to the speaker of the 
Russian parliament, Sergei Narishkin, Russia currently sees no reason for a military intervention. There would still be the possibility of a political 
solution [Naryshkin said]. b) Report, Michael Heussen: [Images show Russian military official saluting President Putin on the occasion of a 
military exercise near St. Petersburg] "Commander in Chief, the troops stand ready at your orders". [Heussen ctd]: Today, Russian President 
Putin convinced himself of the effectiveness of troops in a military exercise near St. Petersburg, where counter-terrorist operations were 
shown, it was being said [images show a large-scale military exercise, including 8 battle helicopter]. Close combat on the other hand [could 
be seen] in the Ukrainian town of Donetsk, where hundreds of protesters occupied buildings of the local administrations. Ukraine is threatened 
as much from the inside as from the outside. [...statement Steinmeier of his favouring keeping the G8 format as last remaining negotiation 
format]. "The currencies of both UKR and Russia have lost already. [Ukrainian prime minister Yatseniuk] "This is a normal reaction of everyone 
who has money in the bank. If you see Russian troops and tanks mustering, businesspeople withdraw their money from the bank and change 
it into safe foreign currencies."[Heussen ctd.] In the meantime, the propaganda-war continues on Crimea: Hundreds of naval officers today 
publicly swore an oath of allegiance to the [autonomous] Republic of Crimea; their Commander swapped his allegiance already yesterday and 
put himself under Moscow's command." 
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03.03.2014 tagesschau, 2015, a) 
Report  Michael 
Heussen, b) live from 
Moscow, Ina Ruck; c) 
live from Crimea, 
Stefan Stuchlik, 
Simferopol; d) 






a) Intro, Linda Zervakis: "Additional irritations about the conflict were cause by reports of an alleged Russian ultimatum to the Ukrainian 
military - from Moscow, Ina Ruck. B) Ina Ruck, live from Moscow: "Indeed, a lot of fuss was made about this alleged Russian ultimatum: During 
the afternoon, the Ukrainian Ministry of Defence had said Russia had issued a deadline to the Ukrainian border guards on Crimea, to leave 
their barracks by 4am, otherwise the buildings will be stormed. Only during the evening Russia issued a denial, that said something that what 
the Ukrainians are claiming is complete nonsense. In times like these, it is very difficult to differentiate rumours from propaganda, and both 
from the truth. The nerves are showing, particularly on Crimea. However, at the moment, the Russians clearly appear to have the better 
nerves. They control large parts of Crimea; its troops control several bases of the Ukrainian border guards. If the Russians show nerves 
anywhere, then economically - the Rouble dropped to a record low this afternoon." 
03.03.2014 tagesschau, 2015, a) 
Report  Michael 
Heussen, b) live from 
Moscow, Ina Ruck; c) 
live from Crimea, 
Stefan Stuchlik, 
Simferopol; d) 






"The whole day Russia reinforced its troops here. However, not a single tank, not a single piece of heavy equipment was moved. The 
reinforcement was done exclusively by air. For good reasons the Russian air force has maintained bases here. In front of some Ukrainian 
bases, there still are Russian troops - they are standing eye to eye with their Ukrainian counterparts: a dangerous situation [that has been 
ongoing] for days. However, according to the information so far, there have been no provocations or incidents so far. On the political side, 
the new pro-Russian administration of Crimea has begun a discussion on the rights of minorities. This is of course particularly interesting, as 
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03.03.2014 tagesschau, 2015, a) 
Report  Michael 
Heussen, b) live from 
Moscow, Ina Ruck; c) 










a) Introduction, Linda Zervakis: "On the international scene, intense efforts are underway to defuse the situation. On request of Russia, the 
United Nations Security Council will convene tonight for another discussion on the situation on Crimea. Following an extraordinary meeting in 
Brussels, the EU foreign ministers demanded Russia to remain prudent. They will still focus on diplomacy, but also threatened sanctions. b) 
Report, Bettina Scharkus: "The cables are burning in the building of the EU Council, where the breaking news about the crisis in Ukraine are 
being received. [Today] the EU Foreign Ministers feverishly tried to find ways to defuse the conflict. However, in his press conference, the 
German foreign minister remained vague: [Steinmeier] "Today we also agreed to a decision which says that if there are no fast and credible 
contributions to a de-escalation by Russia, then we will have to take decisions that will touch upon the bilateral EU-Russia relationship". 
[Scharkus ctd.] Decisions yes, but the EU foreign ministers can not agree on sanctions. During the crisis summit, apparently it was particularly 
the Scandinavian and Eastern European member states that demanded to get tough on Russia - to no avail. [Radoslaw Sikorksi, Polish foreign 
minister] " We have the most serious crisis in Europe since the wars in Yugoslavia. How credible the International Community, and particularly 
the European Union is will have to be proven in this challenge."[Scharkus ctd]: Although the European Union does not want to exclude 
sanctions entirely, for now it limits its actions to appeals. [High Representative of the EU Catherine Ashton] "We need to see a return [ot the 
Russian] troops to their barracks, to the places where they are stationed according to the bilateral agreement on the stationing of Russian 
troops in Ukraine. We are very concerned about the fact that Russian troops are being mobilized". [Scharkus ctd.] Another crisis summit is 
being prepared for Thursday, this time the heads of state and government will meet. However, a grand solution is not to be expected from 
them either. The consequence the EU top-diplomats are threatening are for example a temporary visa-ban or the freezing of assets - that such 
threats impress the leadership in Moscow is believed by hardly anyone here in Brussels.  
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a) Intro, Linda Zervakis: " Lawrow defended the Russian behaviour in Ukraine during a meeting today of the UN Human Rights Council in 
Geneva. He accused the new government in Kyiv to neglect the fundamental rights of the Russian minority on Crimea, and that it had 
furthermore prepared provocations against the Russian Black Sea Fleet, [and that to counter this], the legitimate authorities on Crimea had 
[officially] pledged Russia for help." b) Report Daniel Hechler: For long, Sergei Lawrow, the Russian Foreign Minister had kept his silence. 
Today, of all places, he chose a meeting of the Human Rights Council in Geneva, to defend the use of troops on Crimea. With some 
astonishment diplomats from all over the world heard that Russia steps in particularly because of the human rights situation [on Crimea]. 
[Lawrow] "It is about defending the human rights of our fellow people, especially the right to life. Those that describe this as an act of 
aggression, and threaten sanctions, are the same partners that refused any dialog about this, and that are responsible for the splitting of 
Ukraine." [Hechler ctd.] At least Russia indicates readiness for dialog. During the afternoon Sergei Lawrow met with UN Secretary General [Ban 
Ki Moon] - with no concrete results. However, after the meeting, Ban Ki Moon strongly warned of further provocations: [ Moon] " I urge Russia 
to undertake nothing that could further escalate the situation, and to begin negotiations with Ukraine." [Hechler ctd.]: In these minutes, 
[German] foreign minister Steinmeier is meeting Lawrow for dinner. He doesn't want to cut the dialog with Russia. [To Steinmeier's mind] 
Russia should not be allowed to slip into complete diplomatic isolation, despite all verbal attacks. While on Crimea the sabre-rattling continues, 
in Geneva diplomacy is slowly taken up pace. No one, however, should expect a quick return to normalcy".  
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a) Intro, Th. Roth: "This is the worst crisis in Europe in the 21st century", British Foreign Minister [William] Hague said today about the crisis 
on Crimea. "It is the worst crisis since the fall of the wall", German foreign minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier said today. Both are right.[...] 
[Roth ctd.] A few weeks ago, no one could have imagined that a de-facto occupation of Crimea by Russia or troops collaboratiung with 
them, could happen. Today, we must assume that this is the case. Almost by the hour, this scenario is unravelling, seemingly following a well-
prepared Russian script, thereby increasing the risk of armed conflict, if not to say the threat of war. The Ukrainian government in Kyiv itself 
has no means at its disposal to stop the development. In the meantime, they [Kyiv government] are counting 16.000 additional [Russian] 
troops on Crimea. b) Report, M. Heussen: "The news are the most viewed program in Kyiv. What is happening in the South, on Crimea? How 
does the West react? [the people are asking]. Many want to remain on Maidan, until the crisis is over. But no one can imagine how long this 
might be. British foreign minister Hague put down flowers to commemorate the victims of the protest in Kyiv, just like thousands of others 
did before. The streets here [on Maidan] are still covered in soot, the smell of fire is still lingering in the air. Is this the day before the outbreak 
of a war? The war of words is surely fully being waged: [Yatseniuk, UKR PM]: Any attempt by Russia to annex Crimea will not succeed" [Heussen 
ctd] Even football star Timoschchuk speaks out: "We play for different supporters, and there are many differences between out cities - but let 
us stop the violence, let us be united in what we love, Ukraine!" [Heussen ctd]: But in many cities Timoschchuk mentions, the violence is not 
stopping. IT is unclear whether the protesters who have successfully stormed the local administrations headquarters are Russian Ukrainian or 
actually Russians. At least one partial success for the Kyiv government today: Naval officers publicly swore an oath of allegiance to Ukraine 
[check news during day, were reported as defectors first]. Yesterday, their commandant publicly changed sides, and put himself under the 
command of Moscow. Most soldiers stationed on Crimea have completely different worries. Their barracks are encircled by troops that adhere 
to the command of Russia.  
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Q: During the day there was news about a Russian ultimatum issued to the Ukrainian troops, that if they do not surrender their barracks, the 
barracks will be taken by force- What is that all about? A: We have of course all asked ourselves that question. This ultimatum really ruled our 
agenda here today, but up until this point we cannot confirm whether such an ultimatum really had been issued. The Russians [in the evening] 
vehemently denied it, and issued a statement saying that such an ultimatum doesnt exist. On the other hand, one must ask the question 
what could such an ultimatum really acieve? Because de facto the Russians already have taken control of Crimea. Whether the soldiers stay 
in their barracks or not doesn't play a big role for the question of who is in control on Crimea anymore. q.: Asked very soberly - is there any 
means at the disposal of the Ukrainian government to prevent the Russian annexation of Crimea [first time calling it Russian annexation!]? A.: 
Certainly not the military. On the contrary, the Ukrainian military can be expected to be fatally inferior to their Russian counterpart. And it 
doesn’t help either to be running out of money, or, to be more precise, on the brink of bankruptcy. The 1 million Euro immediate financial aid 
promised by the EU won’t change this much. The only means Ukraine has at its disposal is the support of the West. There is true shuttle 
diplomacy at work here [referring to the frequent visits of more or less important politicians in Kyiv]. Today, British foreign minister Hague 
was here, tomorrow US foreign secretary Kerry is expected. And of course, Ukraine is betting on this card to receive as much support as 
possible, and by this somehow making Russia give in at the end - because no one here can really have an interest in war.  
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a) Intro Roth: "News today about Russian troops crossing from the Russian mainland by ferry to the Crimean town of Kerch. The crossing is 
only 4 kilometres. What do you know about this? A.: We cannot conform this from here, but it would make sense, as thereby three neuralgic 
points on Crimea would be occupied. Kerch to the north [EAST???] of the island, with ferry access to the mainland, and in the south, as we 
already know, Belbek Airbase. The occupying forces here have been reinforced by several hundred additional troops today. And in the Centre 
of Crimea, Alpetre, where there is a node for radio reconnaissance. So, if one would conceive of an annexation of Crimea, strategically the 
occupation in the north [Kerch] wold make a lot of sense.  
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a) Intro, Roth: There is another potential conflict that we want to look at - because on Crimea, since centuries lives the Muslim Crimean Tatars, 
a Turkic people. Under the pretence of their collaboration with the Wehrmacht deported hundreds of thousands of them, and many of them 
died. It is the historical trauma of the Tatars. Only at the end of the 80s, under Gorbatschow, they were allowed to return to Crimea. This led 
to new conflicts with the Russian inhabitants of Crimea [that Stalin had placed there instead]. The Tatars already backed the Orange Revolution 
in 2004. And also, now, they feel well under the current central government in Kyiv. They oppose an occupation of Crimea by Russia. b) Report 
S. Stuchlik: "It is difficult to describe the sensation one gets when driving through Simferopol. "Everything is as usual", the new [regional] 
government of Crimea claims. One must look very closely to see that there are still ongoing protests - with Russian flags. But if one then turns 
at Karl-Marx-Street, it quickly becomes apparent that this pseudo-reality only lasts as long as the evidently Russian soldiers allow for it [images 
show heavily armed, masked men in uniform without insignia]. An hour outside of Simferopol the world is completely out of joint. Scatters 
small houses, a village of the Crimean Tatars. It is the first time we see the Ukrainian national flag on our entire trip. The muezzin calls for the 
prayer when we arrive. [unnamed male Crimean Tatar, mid aged]: "We are now fortifying our houses, mosques and graveyards, we protect 
our culture. We do not want the Russians to rob us. [Question Stuchlik] "What are you doing during the night, how do I have to imagine this? 
[Tatar ctd]: We make a fire here, and then we are 40 people - we all want that it stays peaceful". [Stucklik, ctd]: " The fear here can be sensed 
with bare hands. No one is on the streets, particularly the women are not leaving their houses anymore. The Muslim Tatars represent a sixth 
[16%; check with earlier figures, where 20% was commonly claimed] of Crimea's population. A people that were deported during the Soviet 
Union. Ukraine allowed them back in 1990. They are the only ones here that really fear Russia. [old female Crimean Tatar]: Who has allowed 
them to do this, how can you just invade another country? And now what? What about us, we are completely without protection. I am furious." 
[Young female Crimean Tatar]: "We want that all cultures on Crimea co-exist peacefully. Now dictatorship is beginning again, we have already 
been through this during the Soviet Union. Do you know how long it took us, here, on our soil, to get our rights back, peacefully, and before 
the eyes of the people of Crimea?". [Stuchlik ctd]: When driving back through the village hours later, we get an impression how quickly fear 
can turn into violence. Unarmed, the male Crimean Tatars stand at the village entry. The question is how long they will remain unarmed. [Old 
Men, Crimean Tatar]: We are ready to defend ourselves, even with our bare hands, if necessary. We don't have any other chance. The Russians 
say we are a minority here - which minority? We are the indigenous people of Crimea"" [Stuchlik ctd]: 300 000 Tatars live on Crimea. 300 000 
people that under no circumstances want to belong to a Russian empire. Currently they are protecting their villages unarmed. Whether 
this remains the case, is one of the big questions.  
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Q.: You have experienced the Tatars - can it be expected that the Tatars will truly defend themselves, as they are against the [Russian] 
occupation of Crimea? A.: Well, they are a negligible minority, as the Russians always claim. But really, it is not that small. But I believe [the 
numbers] this is besides the question, as one should not underestimate the resolve of these people. They are feeling with their back to the 
wall. They are saying they have no chance to survive other than staying in Ukraine. They have already suffered Russian occupation, as this is 
how they experienced the Soviet Rule, and they are not willing to go through this again. That the Russians are aware of this can be seen by a 
recent development here on Crimea, where the new regional government has started a discussion on the rights of minorities, particularly 
the right to indigenous language and free speech of the Crimean Tatars. Of course, the Tatars consider this discussion as an attack on them, 
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a) Intro Roth: "What is Putin's desired end-state? To understand him, one must be clear about three things. 1) He did not perceive of the 
disintegration of the Soviet Union as a step into freedom, but a personal trauma. As he said himself, to him it was the largest geopolitical 
catastrophe. As a consequence [of this perception], wherever possible, he is consequently trying to secure or re-establish the old sphere of 
influence [of the Soviet Union]. This is what is happening on Crimea and could well also entail the east of Ukraine. Out of this follows the 
second [aspect to consider when seeking to understand Putin], 2) Any unpredictable mass protest movement is suppressed by him, if necessary 
with force, within the Russian territory, or as we recently witnessed in Kyiv, beyond, if it affects his geopolitical or national interests. And 
thirdly 3) Over the years, he has grown more and more wary about the West. This also explains why Russia is acting so strongly in Ukraine." 
b) Report, Ina Ruck: "Today also, Russian news were dominated by the situation on Ukraine. "Chaos everywhere", the media echoed, "but on 
Crimea we have everything under control" [media continues; images show screenshot from RUS 24 evening news]. Roadblocks and 
adventurously masked men, as well as Cossacks control the access roads [to Crimea]. [RUS 24 news speaker]: "They prevent that the weapons 
from Maidan now reach Crimea" [Ruck ctd] "News claim that some cars could only be stopped by firing warning shots into the air. It all 
appeared more like scenes from an action movie, and quite likely they were just a mock-up. After the driver of the luxury SUV was finally taken 
out of his car, explosives are being presented. Apparently, half a tonne of TNT has been found already. Dmitirij Kisseljow, the West'*s sharpest 
critic on Russian TV, only knows of one topic in his show: "Russia must safe her Ukraine. We are not worried if President Obama doesn’t appear 
on the G8 summit, or of we are excluded from the G8. We worry about our own affairs, and Ukraine is a personal issue for every Russian" 
[Ruck ctd.] Russia is on collision-course, under full sail. Matching the comments, news also showed images of a large-scale military exercise 
in the west of the country [Russia]. Russia claims that these exercises are not related to the developments in Ukraine, they were merely 
about fighting terrorism. [images of attack-helicopters]. For the first time in days, Russian president Putin is seen, the commander in chief 
inspecting his troops. He let the manoeuvres explained to him personally. Such images are well received in times like these. Putin himself 
surprisingly ordered the snap exercise. Otherwise, he remains strangely silent since the beginning of the crisis on Crimea he has not said a 
single word. He lets others speak for him. For example, his foreign minister, who today explained the foreign policy of his boss [at the UN 
Human Rights Council Summit in Geneva]. [Lawrow]: " The president has emphasised that in Ukraine the life of our compatriots is under threat. 
That is why he requested the parliamentary approval for a military mission, until a normalisation of the political and social situation." [Ruck 
ctd] " The approval, by the way, is valid for the entire Ukraine. Russian TV shows images of pro-Russian protests in the south and east of 
Ukraine every day. Ehtnic Russians are not exclusive to Crimea. 
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a) Intro, Roith: [Today] former Ukrainian president Yuliya Timoshenko called upon the International Community to defend Ukraine resolutely 
against Russia. [Timoshenko said that] Parts of the International Community [Roth: Weltgemeinschaft] would be willing to do so. The question 
just is - how? A military interference, by NATO for example, is not an option - even though Poland has called for another NATO council meeting. 
With sanctions against Russia European politicians could soon painfully cut into their own fingers. And by kicking Russia out of the G8, pretty 
much the only possibility for dialog with Putin that is left would be blocked. So, what to do? b) Report Daniel Hechler: "Geneva this morning. 
The dawn of the crisis diplomacy on the Crimea crisis. Of all places, the UN Human Rights Council meeting in Geneva is chosen by Russia to 
legitimize its use of military forces. Sergei Lawrow is playing the strong man, and names human rights as the reason for the intervention. 
[Lawrow] " IT is about defending the rights of our compatriots, particularly the right to life. Those that call this an act of aggression, and 
threaten us with sanctions, are the same partners that have denied any dialog about this, and split Ukraine." [Hechler ctd, see tagesschau 
20:15 on statement Steinmeier] [...] Vienna this afternoon, seat of the OSCE. Her task: peace and stability in Europe. The organisation wants 
to send military observers to Ukraine, to assess the situation, establish facts instead of propaganda. An approach with perspective. Pal Dunai, 
of the Geneva Centre for Security Policy: " The OSCE is hardly visible, but important because both Russia and Ukraine are members. It has many 
soft power tools that can be helpful to establish trust [between UKR and Russia again], which may be particularly helpful in this situation. 
[Hechler ctd] " Geneva during the evening: Yet another meeting for Sergei Lawrow, this time with his colleague Steinmeier, who just arrived 
from Brussels. Once more, wrestling for a road map out of crisis.  
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Q.: Does Obama have any means to stop this crisis? A.: No, Obama also doesn't have a silver bullet how the U.S. should step up to an aggressive 
and assertive Russia either. A military interference was ruled out of question early on, no one here wants a return to the Cold War. Here in 
Washington, one gets the sensation of a frustrated superpower making a fist in the pocket. Just now Obama again heavily criticized Putin, 
and said that [Obama] "Russia is on the wrong side of history!". [Niemann] He then threatened sanctions, diplomatic and economic ones, 
[Obama] "to isolate Russia". [Niemann ctd] What could that mean? The Americans apparently consider whether they should blow the G8 
summit that ironically was planned to take place in Sochi this summer. Even preferred by the US would be to kick Russia out of the G8 entirely, 
and return to the G7 format, to rebuff Putin. Then, there are visa-restrictions, which would hurt the rich and travel-savvy Russians that have 
accustomed themselves to the jet-set lifestyle in the US. And thirdly, [the US is considering the] freezing of Russian assets and bank accounts 
in the US. That could in fact lower the exchange rate of the Rubel, and painfully disrupt lucrative Russian business-streams. These sanctions 
could be the US response. The problem - they would help Ukraine only indirectly. And only if all others participate. Finally, it takes time until 
the impact of the sanctions is actually felt.  
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Q.: Interestingly, Russia called for a meeting of the Security Council today. What is this all about? A.: Well, the session is over. It was the 
expected propaganda battles, just this time round fought over on the stage of the UN Security Council. The extraordinary meeting, as you said, 
had been called for by Russia, in order to present its view on the situation [on Crimea] According to [Russia] them, there has been no breach 
of international law. The Russian ambassador to the UN, Viktor Tschurkin, also said something we hadn't previously heard. [Tschurkin] "The 
Russian side followed a written appeal by [then] Ukrainian president Yanukovych, to re-establish law and order. Therefore, this intervention 
was a humanitarian intervention in the defence of human rights of Russian citizens in Ukraine." [Schmidt ctd]: This clearly means that the 
Russians still consider Yanukovych as the legitimate President of the country [UKR], despite the fact that he has been made redundant with 
the majority of parliament and his own party. Another new thing that was announced here today is that the observers of the OSCE are 
supposed to travel to Crimea tomorrow already, to start their fact-finding mission. However, it remains unclear if Russia is willing to grant 
them a landing permit [on Crimea]".  
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"Politics is not a picnic [Krause: Wunschkonzert/lit: musical request programme]. Foreign policy even less so. While the West, the EU and 
Ukraine way wish for a lot, these days they are being shown their limits. Putin, and the pro-Russian elements in Ukraine with lightning speed 
destabilized the country [UKR] in such a way that it is not able to tackle its real problems, particularly its economic situation. [Credit promise 
by Putin to Yanukovych, 09.11.2013]. The thought that Ukraine could ever shake off all Russian influence has moved far away. That was Putin's 
objective. He imposes it, brutally and effective. Who criticizes him for that is right, but should also not forget that the West also played its 
part. Russian interests have been too often neglected or pushed aside, for example in the question of NATO eastward expansion, or the war 
in Libya. [see comment W.D. Krause after Vilnius]. Also, the association of Ukraine to the EU was managed by the EU Masters of Diplomacy 
as if there was no Russia. That was, as we can see now, a delusion. One of the reasons but for sure not the only one why Europe must re-
consider its relationship with Russia. This Russia will never be our friend., It is not even a strategic partner [difference?]. It is a business partner. 
We need energy, Russia needs industrial goods. We can trade with it, like we do with China. End of story. We do not share the same values. 
Common policy is possible where there are common interests, like in the Iran-nuclear deal question, and not possible where this is not the 
case, like in Syria. A new cold war is not nice, but if Putin wants just that, one cannot just ignore it. What I am really sorry about is the people 
of Ukraine. Because they and their hopes are sinking in all this.  
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Crimea.575 
a) Steinmeier: " The risk that we already can see now is that someone [in this conflict] simply loses the head - not even because of a political 
decision - and that things then start developing by themselves. This must be prevented with the means that are at our disposal". b) Summary 
of international response to crisis in UKR: 1) Contact Group [Steinmeier's idea], made up of several international organisations (UN, OSCE, 
Council of Europe) and governments, with the objective to get the two conflicting parties, Ukraine and Russia, talking to each other again. 
German government emphasises the role of the Council of Europe. 2) OSCE fact finding mission to establish the facts on the situation on 
Crimea and prevent a further escalation. However, the mission requires unanimous consent of the OSCE members. So far, Russia vetoed such 
an initiative. However, in an extraordinary meeting yesterday, the OSCE decided to send a pre-deployed team promptly.  
04.03.2014 tagesschau, 20:15 Jan 
Hofer; a) Signs of de-
escalation: Putin's 
first statement on 
Crimea, Report B. 
Virnich b) Situation in 
Crimea/ Kerry in Kyiv, 
c) Live from Kyiv, 
Michael Heussen; d) 
Diplomatic efforts / 
Steinmeier's efforts, 
Report N.N.; e) 
Reactions in the US, 
Report Tina Hassel.576 
a) Intro, Hofer: " Russia keeps steady on its course, but indicates that it is open for discussions. With such signals the Russian President 
Putin spoke out [on the situation on Crimea] today. Before [hand-picked] journalists he made clear that he currently sees no reason for a 
military action in Ukraine. He also denied the accusation that Russian soldiers had occupied the Crimean Peninsula. Putin called the change 
of power [in Kyiv on 26.02.2016] an unconstitutional coup d’état. b) Report, B Virnich: Finally, the long waited for statement by Vladimir 
Putin was announced. Russian journalists waited for hours. Foreign journalists were explicitly not invited. As if the president was unwilling to 
face their questions. Something like [no foreign journalists] has not happened during Putin's rule before. He used the press-conference as a 
stage to portray his view on [Crimea]. [Putin] " The overthrow of the Ukrainian government [on 26.02.] was an armed coup d’état. And 
therefore unconstitutional. There is nothing to interpret about that.". [Virnich ctd] " For Putin, the agreement that the three foreign ministers 
of the EU from France, Poland and Germany negotiated with Yanukovych is binding. The current government is considered illegal by Putin. 
[Putin]: Yanukovych had already stepped down. He had no chance to be re-elected, I told him that personally already then. And everyone 
agreed to that. Why was there a need to override this, and act unconstitutionally?" [Virnich ctd]: In many places in Russia, Putin's words were 
seen as a sign for de-escalation. But at a demonstration before the ministry of defence, critical voices could be heard. Here, Putin's assertions 
are not believed. [Images show police arresting demonstrators]. [anonymous male protester] "I am against this madness Russian officers and 
soldiers are staging in Ukraine. That is violence against another country, a country that we should better support." [Female protester] "We are 
for peace! There are no reason at all for a military intervention. The army is in Ukraine for long already." [Virnich ctd] But words like these 
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tagesschau, 20:15 Jan 
Hofer; a) Putin's first 
statement on Crimea, 
b) Situation in 
Crimea/ Kerry in 
Kyiv, Report Michael 
Heussen c) Live from 
Kyiv, Michael 
Heussen; d) 
Diplomatic efforts / 
Steinmeier's efforts, 
Report N.N.; e) 
Reactions in the US, 
Report Tina Hassel.577 
a) Intro Hofer: On the Crimean peninsula, the situation remains tense, non-regarding Putin's de-escalating assertions. Ukraine military bases 
continue to be beleaguered by men in uniform. At an incident, several warning shots were fired [first incident, no casualties]. International 
crisis diplomacy was slowly gaining momentum today. Both in the European Union as well as in Kyiv, where U.S. Foreign Secretary John Kerry 
assured the government [in Kyiv] of U.S. support. b) Report Michael Hessen: John Kerry went directly from the airport to the place on Maidan, 
where the victims [of the demonstrations since November 2013] are being mourned for. Precisely here, two weeks ago snipers fired at 
protesters. He stays for thirty minutes, listens, asks questions, even those that are here [on Maidan] since weeks. [Kerry asking an elderly 
woman in the crowd]: "What do you think about President Putin saying that Russian people are discriminated against in Ukraine? [Heussen 
ctd] No, there are no threats, we are very tolerant, the lady responds. Kerry promises to the people in Kyiv that the US stands behind them. 
[Kerry] "We are going to do our best, and we hope that Russia will acknowledge your upcoming election" [Heussen ctd] The U.S. offered an 
immediate financial aid package of 1 billion US $ - money Ukraine bitterly needs, as the Russian energy giant will considerably increase gas 
prices as of April. Despite the threatening economic and military gestures, Ukrainian prime minister Yatseniuk today confirmed that Moscow 
and Kyiv are talking with each other directly again. [Yatseniuk: There are consultations between members of the Ukrainian cabinet and Russia. 
They have just started. This is not a lot, but it is a first step." [Heussen ctd.] The situation on Crimea remains tense. During the morning 
unarmed Ukrainian soldiers wanted to return to their barracks. Armed men in what appear to be Russian uniforms put themselves in their 
way and fired warning shots into the air. The power-poker over the hegemony of the Black Sea continues.  
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04.03.2014 tagesschau, 20:15 Jan 
Hofer; a) Signs of de-
escalation: Putin's 
first statement on 
Crimea, Report B. 
Virnich b) Situation in 
Crimea/ Kerry in Kyiv, 
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Michael Heussen; d) 
Diplomatic efforts / 
Steinmeier's efforts, 
Report N.N.; e) 
Reactions in the US, 
Report Tina Hassel.578 
[Heussen standing before an illuminated shrine for the dead of Maidan, someone in the back holding up a sign with Cyrillic letters, smoke 
wavering about - apocalyptic atmosphere] "The Ukrainians here in Kyiv shook their heads today when hearing Putin. Has he lost every sense 
of reality, is he believing his own propaganda now? many are asking. For example, the story about the soldiers on Crimea, that are supposedly 
not Russian - people here say that it is blatantly obvious that they are [Russian soldiers] even though they are not showing any insignia. In a 
nutshell, to the people here, there is something wrong with Putin. On the other hand, the press reads here from Putin's statement that he is 
portraying more amicable behaviour, and that of course is giving rise to the hope that a conflict can be prevented. The much larger problem 
for Ukraine at the moment, of course, is the financial situation. If Ukraine cannot find 35 billion Euros somewhere by the end of the year, 
then this country will go bankrupt. - that must be prevented at all cost, that is why people are so grateful here that the US foreign secretary 
arrived with a large financial aid package. 
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 Jan Hofer: "On several levels, international diplomatic efforts are seeking ways to solve the situation in Ukraine. Tomorrow, a meeting of the 
NATO-Russia Council is planned. Moscow is following an invitation by of NATO SG Rasmussen. NATO Council today met on request of Poland, 
because the alliance partner feels threatened as a neighbouring country of Ukraine. In addition, according to diplomatic circles in Vienna, the 
OSCE decided to send a military fact-finding mission to Crimea. Meanwhile, German foreign minister Steinmeier is assessing the possibilities 
of and international contact group that would be capable of defusing the conflict. Steinmeier said today in Berlin: "The establishment of 
such a group is uncertain yet, but it is worth the effort to continue the talks about this. „Before he said this, Steinmeier had met with key 
decision makers of the UN and OSCE. [Steinmeier, before the aeroplane] "Time is pressing. Not only because on Thursday, the European 
council of the heads of state and governments is convening. Who wants to have clarity about the prospect of such a contact group needs 
to know that primarily time is in short supply, because the risks in Ukraine are growing continuously." 
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a) Intro, Jan Hofer: The US is drawing consequences from the conflict between Russia and Ukraine. All contacts to the Russian military, like 
joint exercises, were put on hold with immediate effect. Tonight, President Obama said that President Putin could not lead anyone astray with 
his assertions. Russia isolates itself [Obama added]. In the meantime, Washington is preparing to bring sanctions against Moscow underway. 
b) Report Tina Hassel: Many in the White House ask themselves these days: Is it an ice-age again, does Russia really fall back into the politics 
of the Cold War? Or is a diplomatic solution still possible? [Obama]"We are calling for a de-escalation. There is widespread agreement that 
Russia has violated international law, although President Putin and his advisors have reached different conclusions." [Hassel ctd] " For two 
hours, Obama met with his National Security Council. Feverishly, sanctions that are to come into effect this week are being prepared. Russian 
assets shall be frozen, visa restrictions applied, and a trade agreement between the two countries put on ice. But for further reaching sanction, 
the closing of ranks with Berlin is required. "Germany exerts the largest influence on Russia" [CNN interview with Mrs. Amanapour], it is said 
openly here on TV. There is a widespread believe that the chancellor can achieve more than the US president. The opposition here holds 
Obama responsible for the crisis. [Lindsey Graham, Senator, R] "Obama's weakness and his inability to decide have made this crisis possible." 
[Hassel ctd]: "Domestically, the pressure is mounting on Obama. But for a power-play with Russia, he currently has few viable leverages. For 
a strong response, a common strategy with the partners is required. And this is precisely where the problem lies. Washington wants to isolate 
Russia, Berlin still emphasises dialogue. For example, kicking Russia out of the G8 could only be implemented jointly. In this, it doesnt help 
much that the relationship between Merkel and Obama is still suffering from the NSA listening scandal".  
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Intro, Michael Strempel: The events on Crimea have led to a new ice-age between the West und Russia. Today, again there were no signs of 
an easing of tensions. President Putin, in his first Press conference since the beginning of the crisis on Crimea [when exactly is the 
beginning?], sent re-assuring and unsettling signals alike. b) Situation in Eastern Ukraine, Report by Birgit Virnich: (a) Intro Strempel: "Not 
only on Crimea, but also in the Russian speaking towns of Eastern Ukraine the pro-Russian forces are more and more clearly gaining the upper 
hand. (b) Report, Virnich: "Still the Lenin-statue stands tall in Kharkov and reminds of the time when the city was the capital of the Soviet 
Republic of Ukraine. It is also the apple of discord between Maidan-supporters and those Ukrainians that favour a close relationship with 
Russia. The two sides stand face to face irreconcilable [here]. The 19-year-old Yuliya has been here for the last two weeks to protect the 
memorial. Because the Maidan-supporters want to tear it down. [Yuliya] "Lenin is part of our history, our inheritance. He meant a lot to my 
parents and grandparents - how dare I deny that?" [Virnich ctd] " They follow the political development in distant Kyiv with mistrust, and 
bitterly discuss the future of Ukraine. Splitting the country, no, but many could imagine a federation. [Young man]: But this wouldn't solve our 
problems. It cannot be that the parliament in Kyiv makes laws that forbid us to speak Russian". [Old men]:" Since Putin reassured us about his 
protection, we feel more secure, with Russia on our side. There is a power behind us to protect the Slavic peoples from interferences of the 
West and the USA. Because they are also responsible for this chaos." [Virnich ctd] And precisely in the close relationship with Russia, the 
Maidan-supporters in Kharkov, see the problem. At the beginning, Ukrainian novelist Sardan saw an opportunity in the manifold political 
discussions. The beginning of a civil society. He joined sides with the local Maidan -supporters that favour a closer relationship with Europe. 
But a few days ago, he was beaten up for that. [Sardan] "At times things get a little out of control here. The crisis has politicized the people. 
The power of the President must be curtailed, otherwise we will end up with a new dictatorship under the new president" [Virnich ctd] Here 
in Kharkov, the opinions are clashing more and more openly. The conflict showed how hard the people of Ukraine wrestle about their political 
future.  
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Q,: How apparent is it that the Russians really have taken control on Crimea? How does it become evident? A.: Well, since the Russian troop 
reinforcement yesterday, there is an irate atmosphere feasible everywhere. This morning, there were frictions at Belbek airbase, when 
Ukrainian soldiers tried to return to their barracks. They were stopped by Russian soldiers; shots were fired into the air. However, thank god 
the situation calmed down. Here in Sevastopol, Russian nationalists and protesters block the entry to the Ukrainian naval base, which is also 
here. This is to show that "we, the population stand behind Russia". Behind me, on the water, three Russian warships block the entry to the 
up until now jointly managed harbour for Russian and Ukrainian warships. Thus, there are plenty of signs, if one looks closely, that hint at the 
fact that Russia definitely is fully in charge here. 
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a) Intro Markus Strempel: "The most prominent visitor in Kyiv today was US foreign secretary John Kerry. After he visited Maidan to commemorate the victims 
and meet with representatives of the government first thing in the morning, he brought with him a financial aid package for the government in Kyiv of one 
billion dollars. For Russia, Kerry's visit to Ukraine possibly was yet another sign of the US interference in their own sphere of interest. Because during the past 
20 years [the Russians] they lost more and more of influence in their former sphere of influence to the West. During the times of the Cold War, Russia clearly 
was the hegemon in Eastern Europe. Not only the Soviet republics stood under Moscow's control, but also the members of the Warsaw Pact. In 1990 the Soviet 
Union dissolved itself, and the European Union’s became the cynosure for many countries formerly belonging to the Eastern Bloc. By now, nine of them are 
full members of the European Union. And the convergence is set to continue: Not only Ukraine currently fights for a closer association with the EU. The 
sphere of influence of Russia seems to shrink. Q: Has the West, have you may be underestimated how strongly Russia was hurt by losing it's influence over the 
past 20 years? A.: I think there are two components at play. The first is, of course, what you alluded to, that the communist system disintegrated, and in parallel 
the territorial power of the Soviet. I was, together with Jean Claude Juncker on Crimea for a day in 2005, excuse me, I mean the Kremlin. We have interviewed 
President Putin all day in our capacity has EU presidency. It was already evident then that his aim is to correct what from his view appears like a punishment 
by history. The second component of course also is, and maybe I can say this a little easier than a someone from Germany, but one must say that in relation to 
NATO, the appetite came during the meal. We have, I think as NATO, moved closer and more intensely towards Russia, in a way it was not agreed to, let's say 
directly after the wall came down. [see Adomeit, the non-expansion agreement].  That hurt the Russian soul, and I think the NATO-Russia council is a corrective, 
but of course it doesn't relax the Russians. Q: But there is deep, widespread mistrust. Today Putin said during his press conference that he feels side-lined, 
because even the mediator team of the EU, the three [France, Germany, Poland] foreign ministers have agreed to something else what happened. The 
agreement was to manage a peaceful and orderly transition. That didn't work out. Putin claims that this is a breach of words. Is he completely wrong with his 
argument? A.: I believe that this claim is, to my mind, exaggerated by the Russian side. You see, the paper that Frank-Walter Steinmeier, Sikorski, and also 
Fabuse helped negotiating wasn't even signed, but only initialled by the Russian side. And in all of a sudden this is supposed to be the entire reference. In 
this paper, the first, important point was to stop the violence - on this day, the 21st of February more than eighty people died in Ukraine - and that was stopped. 
That was a major aim, and it was achieved. Back then, it was talked about a transition, a debate about a new constitution, early presidential elections, and 
then, [lastly], to help Ukraine back on its feet economically. But that was during a revolution [violent uprising] and no one can entirely foresee or follow a 
revolution step by step. Therefore, to my mind, this is an argument [by Putin] that is a little far-fetched. I also want to say that the other side of the Russian 
argument, that in relation to foreign policy they always hold up the principle of non-interference like a flag, that the Russians are currently doing exactly the 
opposite. And the argument for doing so is to protect the Russian speaking people in Ukraine. However, it is not the case that all Russian speaking people in 
Ukraine are currently under having to fear for their life. In light of this, I believe that we must achieve this in dialog with Russia. Q: Mr Asselborn, at the moment 
it is not the time for dialog, but the time of crisis. The Russian intervention, as one is almost forced to say, on Crimea, has also raised call for sanctions. Before 
we talk about this, lets briefly look at an overview over the sanctions currently being discussed by EU: 1) Gas Boycott: The gas and oil export represents more 
than 50% of the Russian household. A boycott would hurt Russia badly. But who could renounce Russian gas? In Germany, almost 40% of the entire oil and gas 
imports are from Russia. Other states, for example in South Eastern Europe, are up to 100% dependant on Russian oil and gas imports. Therefore, an oil and gas 
boycott would also badly hit the European economies. 2) Travel restrictions: Russia and the EU have long been negotiating the lifting of the visa-requirements. 
These talks could be under threat now. However - the negotiations have been making slow progress for years. As sanctions, they would have little if any impact. 
3) freezing of assets and accounts: This could increase the pressure on Russia, as apparently Russian oligarchs have bunkered billions on European accounts. 
As a retaliation however, Putin could also punish European companies in Russia. [Interview Asselborn ctd.]: Q: If Russia cannot be moved to return to the 
negotiating table, which sanctions do you favour? A: I think sanctions are a very pejorative measure, to remain in the diplomatic tongue. There will be 
consequences, and we have already hinted at possible consequences, for example in relation to Sochi, or the freezing of negotiations about a new partnership 
agreement - if one uses the word sanctions, and then takes the mental journey and asks which individuals have been sanctioned by the EU recently: Lukchenko, 
Bashar Assad, then Yanukovych, who really was a man that had a lot to do with corruption - one would put Putin on the same level with them. That is really 
something where the impact could backfire. A debate about sanctions may not be allowed. That, the Russian side must also know. But also, it is very clear that 
if tomorrow, or the day after tomorrow sees Russian military in Ukraine that seeks to draw the monopoly of violence, then a debate will come up that I 
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believe can go in all directions. Then also the question comes, how should NATO expand into countries that are currently not members of NATO. But all this 
will come and will maybe destroy the relations between the EU and Russia for an entire decade. That must be stopped. In addition, Mr. Strempel, I believe 
that we maybe talk too much about Russia. We should talk more about Ukraine. Here the people wait for a ray of hope that the International Community, 
together with Russia, manages to bring this country back on another track". 
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a) Intro, Strempel:  The announcement that President Putin will host a press-conference came a surprise - notabene the Russian press, foreign 
media was not invited. That way Putin's first public statement on the crisis on Crimea became a true home-play. b) Report, Jens Eberl: "His 
legs apart, President Putin sat before the invited journalists. Self confident, and with no sign of guilt. Strongly gesticulating, he finds strong 
words. [Putin] " What happened in Ukraine was a coup d’état. A violent grip for power, there is no doubt about that". [Eberl ctd] He kept his 
silence for long, but today he gave the world his Putin show. He answers the questions of the journalists calmly and extensively, he wants to 
appear relaxed but fully determined to do what it takes. [Putin] "Listen to me carefully: We do not intend to fight against Ukrainian people. If 
we take such a decision, then only to protect the Ukrainian people. If the Ukrainian army fires at women and children, then we will stand 
before them and protect them." [Eberl ctd.] Hans-Henning Schröder, from SWP, today listened to Putin's word extremely carefully. He sees 
an act of desperation by Putin, for fear to totally lose control in Ukraine and on Crimea. [For Schröder], Russia secured Crimea as dead pledge. 
[Schröder] " It is of course a game of hazard he [Putin] played here. With this press conference he made clear that he does not want a war. 
He does not want to escalate further, there will be no violent conflict. Now the conflict will be continued on the negotiating table, and the 
question for him, of course, is whether he can win these negotiations." [Eberl ctd]: What is going on in Putin's head? Hans Henning Schröder 
has met the Russian president on several occasions. He is convinced that the public profile of Putin as a hard-liner is not matching reality. 
[Schröder] " He is actually someone who knows that one has to strike a compromise, but uf he does, he appears as a weakling before the 
Russian public. That he can not afford.". [Eberl ctd.] Lots of gestures - clear words. Putin has spoken, and presented his view of the world. At 
the end, the small hope remains that one of the sides will talking to each other in the coming days.  
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Intro Roth: "As of tomorrow, a fact-finding mission is to observe the situation on Crimea and in Eastern Ukraine. In the meantime, the Russian 
president today made his views public. Vladimir Putin, Chancellor Merkel apparently told President Obama in a phone conversation, lives 
in a world entirely of his own. She will know, as she spoke several times with Putin during this crisis, and she knows him for long. Who has 
been observing Putin over a longer period of time knows that he is very weary, and decidedly creates facts in his pursuit of Russian interests. 
Thereafter he understands it brilliantly to argue his case, but also to put up a smokescreen. Who underestimates these tactical abilities of Putin 
has lost already. All this also becomes apparent in the Ukraine crisis. In this context, the interview Putin gave to a few hand-picked Russian 
journalists has to be understood. Since the question of power on Crimea has now been solved, it apparently was time for Putin to present 
his view. b) Report Birgit Virnich, Intro as report tagesschau, 04.03. 20:15] [...] In a good mood, he particularly enlightened the younger 
journalists. [Putin]: "The toppling of the government in Ukraine was an armed coup d’état, and therefore unconstitutional." [Virnich ctd] There 
is nothing to interpret about this, Putin adds. He portrays himself sometimes as worried, sometimes as understanding, and sometimes as 
strict. He denies the Russian military presence. Even so, when a Russian journalist probes into this. [Putin] "Go into a shop, you can buy all 
sorts of uniforms there. On Crimea, there are no Russian units, but local self-defence forces." [Virnich ctd. ] [Putin] sees currently no need 
for troop movements on Crimea. But Russia will retain its right to protect Russians in Ukraine. The journalists watched with stern faces, as if 
they feared to draw the wrath of the president on them with a facial expression. On Russian TV, his statements were running as a continuous 
loop, particularly his understanding gestures and statements about Ukraine. [Putin] "The Ukrainians have suffered under their presidents, also 
under Yanukovych there was no improvement. Corruption there has grown to a scale that we cannot imagine here in Russia" [Virnich ctd] 
Despite all inconsistencies - many here believed Putin's word to be signalling de-escalation, particularly since he showed readiness for talks 
with the West. He furthermore supported the idea of building an international contact group. No matter, an easing of tensions on Crimea 
seems far away.  
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a) Intro Roth: "Therefore the question is if there will be any help for Ukraine, and if so, how? One thing is clear - if the country doesn’t receive 
a lot of money from somewhere very soon, the it will additionally fall into an economic abyss. The Russian energy giant GAZPROM urgently 
claims 1,3bn US $ for unsettled gas bills, and on top of that, as of April, GAZPROM will increase the prices. This means Ukraine needs billions. 
Beside financial aid, Kyiv is of course hoping for political support from the West against the Russian leadership. All these hopes were put into 
the visit of U.S. Foreign Secretary John Kerry in the [Ukrainian] capital. b) Report Michael Heusen: "Dignitaries of the large Ukrainian religious 
communities wait for the most important visitor of the last weeks. US Foreign Secretary John Kerry. They hadn't expected that John Kerry 
brought time [30 minutes, see tagesschau 04.03. 20:15]. He laid down flowers to commemorate the victims of Maidan, he pauses to think 
during the prayer - but of all things he listens [...see report tagesschau 20:15...] For interim prime-minister, shaking hands with John Kerry is 
like receiving knighthood. The U.S. leaves no doubt about its view of the legitimacy of the interim government. A strong signal of support, 
particularly in the direction of Moscow. [Kerry] "The Russian government is hiding behind falsehoods, intimidation, and provocations. If Russia 
is unwilling to de-escalate the situation, if it doesn’t want to cooperate with the Ukrainian government as we want them to, then our partners 
have no other choice then to stand by our side, and to participate in the measure we initiated in recent days with the objective to isolate 
Russia, politically as well as economically." A further Russian threatening gesture was learnt about today: The Russian energy giant GAZPROM 
wants to cancel the 30% discount on gas deliveries. This hits the country, which is at the brink of bankruptcy, especially hard. At least, Moscow 
and Kyiv are talking with each other again.  
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Q.: How did the people on Maidan perceive of the visit of John Kerry? What was the reaction to Putin's statements over there? A.: People here 
were just shaking their heads about Putin. They didn’t want to hear what they heard. Putin portraying himself as the peacemaker - he must 
have lost his sense of reality. People believe that Putin lost it. They were very happy with Kerry's visit. He took a lot of time for Maidan [30 
Minutes!], but more especially he brought with him a financial aid package worth 1billion US Dollars as short-term financial aid for Ukraine. 
Q.: That is of course a substantial amount of money. But measured against what the country need it is still too little. Are people hopeful that 
more will come? A.: There are calculations by the Ukrainian ministry of finance that until the end of next year [December 2015], the country 
needs35 billion US Dollars - 35 times the amount granted by the US today, which make it appear like a drop on a hot stone. But it is an 
important signal, nonetheless. Today, IWF representatives were present here in Kyiv, there will be talks in Brussels - thus, little by little there 
is something coming together. But it really is a lot of money, which cannot all come from outside - it also requires Ukrainian money to fix this 
financial hole.   
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a) Intro Roth: If anyone anywhere in Russia hears the name Sevastopol, then he sees a Russian city of heroes. This is ingrained into the collective 
Russian psyche - although today the city is on Ukrainian territory. The century old, legendary sea-bastion was, after long resistance against the 
Wehrmacht, almost completely destroyed. Therefore [the defence of the town] the title "glorious city of heroes". Most Russians would 
probably follow Putin if he was to reassign Sevastopol and Crimea to Russia - which could be the outcome of the current crisis. However, it 
[Crimea] still belongs to Ukraine, and is de-facto annexed by Russian troops, or elements collaborating with Moscow. Nonetheless, there are 
still bases with loyal Ukrainian soldiers, navy and army units. Therefore, the tensions are looming high. b) Report Stuchlik: "Marching songs 
against the nervousness. Ukrainian troops wanting to return to their base. In front of the base, there are Russian troops. They fire shots in the 
air. Wars have been started in this fashion. [images show video footage from Belbek Airbase incident; none of the pro-Russian side bear 
Russian insignia]. The armed men scream, but eventually rationality wins over. Images like this show how tense the situation is [on Crimea]. 
Military is the road, checkpoints oin the roads everywhere. Upon approaching Belbek airbase we are stopped by civilians. The so-called self-
defence forces are not at all in the mood for joking. Only when we ask for some hot tea, we enter a discussion. [Stuchlik asks older men]: 
Where do these people come from, why do civilians protect a military base? Tell us, who gave you the orders? [Men from Checkpoint] " No 
one. It was our own idea, we got together spontaneously, friends, relatives - we are standing here so that we are not overrun by the fascists." 
[Stuchlik ctd] The fascists are the Ukrainians. In all of a sudden, the enemy. Soldiers, that for decades have been sharing bases with the 
Russians. Inside [footage taken OUTSIDE] the Ukrainian base [Belbek], before shots were fired in the morning, an eerie silence. We meet with 
a completely intimidated commander [check characterization in ts 05.03., Stuchlik] of the base. [Andrej Kurlakow, Belbek Base Commander 
UKR Forces]: "You are with, we are brothers, these Russians and us. We know the soldiers from the other side. That is why they now put 
civilians out there. I will tell you something else: The Russian friends have even called us and said that we will be provoked and asked us to 
please not react to it" [Stuchlik ctd.] Crimea is an Absurdistan albeit a dangerous one. In Sevastopol, much to our surprise, we learn that the 
war-harbour isn't shut - boat owner offer round trips, for journalists instead of tourists. Again, the same situation - Russian and Ukrainian navy 
sharing the harbour. Again it takes more than just a glimpse to see that all the way out, Russian navy ships block the entry to the harbour. A 
demonstration of power, even if the boat owner views this differently [Alexander Ivanovich, boat owner Sevastopol]: "Yesterday it was calm, 
today it was calm, and it will remain calm". [Stuchlik asking] "But the Russians are blocking the entrance!" [Ivanovich] "What do you mean by 
blocking the entrance? You see, we can move about freely here. Today even, a Russian transport vessel entered the harbour. The fairway is 
open!". [Stuchlik ctd.] For ships of the right side, one must add. And as if to fit the thought, suddenly a Russian torpedo vessel passes, its Crew 
standing straight on deck, wearing high-viz wests. Crimea is somewhere between war and normalcy, where exactly however is the one-million-
dollar question.  
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Q: Putin said in his interview today that there is no Russian troops, that they are self-defence forces. Do you believe Putin, or is Crimea not 
lost for Ukraine anyway? A.: Well, maybe they are men from mars…What is currently happening on Crimea is something different to what it 
means. IT is a military intervention, but you can't call it an intervention. It is an occupation, but you cannot call it an occupation, because there 
are no Russian soldiers. With other words, this is a typical intelligence operation, and people from intelligence fear nothing more than using 
the right terms for the right things. They want that everything comes with a smokescreen and leads into uncertainty [das Ungefähre]. They 
want to prevent clarity about circumstances. Q.: Looked at it from the outside, what could the West, what could the EU do precisely against 
this Russian strategy in Eastern Ukraine and on Crimea, or will they simply remain helpless? A.: I don’t believe that to be the case, and I don’t 
think we should be defeatist. We should neither throw the towel before things even started. To the contrary! I am convinced that the 
enormous diplomatic activity of the last days has achieved much already. Possibly it is the reason why no tanks are rolling on Crimea, or 
through towns like Kharkov, Donetsk. By no means the Russian government is insensitive to the very real and high risk of international isolation. 
Q. This would then mean that the West already achieved something? Q: I am convinced that the West has already achieved something. Just 
the fact that there is permanent attention, that now China [see statement China, no real distancing] , even Kazakhstan are distancing 
themselves from Putin. This doesn't go unnoticed by the Kremlin. I interpret today's press conference [by Putin] not as a signal of de-escalation, 
as this appears too optimistic, but it was a signal that for now, a further escalation is not foreseen. Q.: From your view, where does the Russian 
scenario end? Will Putin also want to break the Eastern parts off Ukraine, and if yes, how? A.: Certainly, the maximum program of Putin is to 
prevent a drifting off to Europe by Ukraine. This is the basic notion of all the activities by intelligence, military and Russian politicians. We are 
hoping that he will not be successful in this. But it is clear that Putin will extensively, and relentlessly seek to further aggravate the Ukraine 
pathway to closer accession with the European Union, also with non-military means. For this, Putin has a large toolbox and he will open 
this box. It will be made very difficult for Ukraine to take the same path as the Baltic states or Poland twenty years ago. But it is also a fact the 
majority of the population want to take this road. The actual solution to the conflict would be that Russia also starts its journey to the West. 
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a) Intro Roth: A last question - must Russia’s behaviour be seen as simply outrageous, or, to an extent, understandable? B) Commentary Mikich: 
"Putin establishes facts. The troop movements on Crimea. The rhetoric. Is there someone turning back time? Like during the Cold War, Russia 
only seems to know vassal or foe at its borders. Black - and - White-thinking, to which of course the West contributed. We just wanted to view 
the utterly fearless heroes of democracy from Maidan. Not the ultra-nationalist. Accepted with lightning speed a dubious transitional coalition 
government, in which the Swoboda party is part. This party not only welcomes foreigners, but anti-Semites, and at time the German NPD 
[German right wing party, now banned]. We did not listen up when Putin said that the collapse of the Soviet Union was the biggest 
geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century. That is not only an autocrat’s ghost pain. It traumatizes millions of Russians. They relate respect, 
security and homeland with the Soviet Union; spending their summer holiday on Crimea; naturally not requiring a visa for the trip as much as 
it was not required for a trip to Tbilisi, or the Baltic states; In 1991, at one stroke, 25 million Russians in the Baltics, Central Asia, there 
Caucasus were made foreigners - sometimes even to stateless people, who were being discriminated against. The West, particularly the 
ahistorical United States, have never understood this loss of influence. Also, not how Moscow received the EU expansion further east, the 
wholehearted talks with Georgia and Moldova. To understand doesn't mean to accept. To accept does not mean top embrace - but a 
differentiated approach could be of help when the diplomats meet again tomorrow. Wondering how Putin marches forward into the 20th 
century won’t help. His actions were not smart. But where is the smart Russia strategy of the West? 
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I. On the legality of the change of government in Kyiv: Q.: Putin speaks of an illegal coup d’état in Kyiv, and therefore considers the treaties 
signed with Ukraine annulled. How is this to be seen from an international law perspective? A.: His arguments are far-fetched. Treaties are 
signed between countries, and binding beyond the duration of a particular government. If there is a change of government in one of the 
signatories, this has no consequence for the bilateral treaty. I therefore believe that Putin uses this argument of the illegal coup d’état to 
reinstall Yanukovych as the still legitimate president, and justify the military intervention. [see Putin and Yanukovych, tagesscha.de Sylvia 
Stoeber, Feb.2014; also, Putin on Yanukovych, press statement 04.03.2014: "told him that he cannot be re-elected as president"] Q. Is 
Yanukovych still the legitimate president of Ukraine, as Putin claims? A.: It is completely irrelevant if Yanukovych is the Ukrainian president 
according to the Ukrainian constitution. Because this is a case of the principle of effectiveness - meaning that under international law, what 
counts is whether the new government effectively exercises state power. This means, even if the coup was unconstitutional, then we are now 
at a point where the government represents the country externally. Yanukovych is certainly not doing that, as he is outside the country. 
Therefore, a toppled president can never invite a friendly nation to occupy the country to re-install him as legitimate sovereign. Q.: Then the 
letter that Putin allegedly received form Yanukovych asking for a Russian military intervention has no relevance? A: This letter, strategically 
speaking, is almost the act of a genius. In international legal terms, we call this intervention upon invitation. And of course, Russia invokes 
this and obviously claims that he still is the legitimate President. But we know little facts about this letter: When has it been sent? Because if 
Yanukovych wrote it while outside the country, it is irrelevant. And even if he wrote it while still in power, as at the very latest when he was 
toppled, Russia should have simply accepted the fact that there is a new government. II. On the legality of the intervention: Q.: Putin justifies 
the sending of troops to Crimea with the protection of ethnic Russians living in Ukraine, whose lives are put at risk by "radical nationalists 
[emphasis in original]. Is this action actually legal? A.: The use of force is clearly a breach of international law. If there would indeed be 
massive human rights violations on Crimea, one could consider whether Russia may intervene short-term. For example, GSG9 [German Federal 
Special Police Force] commandos to free hostages from planes were often agreed to by the states [in which the plane was located]. But you 
cannot compare this, because these are time-restricted missions, where troops very shortly enter into a country and then fly out again. Ukraine 
is a case of a long-term intervention. Additionally, currently there no risk to ethnic Russians can be identified. III. Relevance of agreement 
about stationing of troops: Q.: The agreement about the stationing of Russian troops on Crimea from 1997 allows for Russian troops to be 
based in Ukraine. What does this mean for Russia? A.: The government of Ukraine has agreed to the stationing of Russian troops on its territory 
in the "Neighbourhood and Friendship Treaty" of 1997, with a running time of 20 years [extended July 2013 for another 30 years, see 
tagesschau.de]. Such an agreement brings about the partial waiver of sovereignty. But it does not repeal it! If Russia uses its troops outside 
the narrow confines of the agreement, then this means a clear violation of sovereignty. That would be as if U.S. troops based in Ramstein 
would swarm out, occupy public roads and encircle the government buildings of Rhineland-Palatinate [Federal State in Germany]: None of this 
is covered in the agreement which underlies the treaty about the stationing of troops. The Crimean Peninsula clearly is a part of Ukraine, and 
only Kyiv can govern its external relations. IV. On the binding character of the agreement negotiated between Yanukovych and the three EU 
Foreign Ministers: Q.: How legally binding is the EU-agreement, which was negotiated by Steinmeier, Fabius and Sikorski with Yanukovych? 
A.: This is an agreement between the conflicting parties in Ukraine, and therefore only of limited relevance to international law. For the 
question what Russia may or may not do this is irrelevant. Russia must stick to the principles of international law. In addition to the general 
prohibition to the use of force, the UN charter also prohibits the threat to use force. And Putin is definitely threatening the use of violence at 
the moment.  
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With utter relaxation the news about the Russian test of an intercontinental ballistic missile were received [CNN]"Despite growing tensions, 
today Russia executed the planned test of an intercontinental ballistic missile today". To not add to the tensions between Moscow and 
Washington, the speaker of the White House, Kathlyn Hayden, immediately emphasised that the test was routine, and that Moscow had 
informed Washington about this test already before the crisis on Crimea began. This is in accordance with the so-called New Start Treaty 
between Russia and the U.S. The crisis on Crimea occupied the President until late at night. Again, he had a phone conversation with Angela 
Merkel. While Obama favours sanctions on Russia and want to isolate Putin, the German chancellor emphasises dialog with the Russian 
president. [CNN] "Merkel is almost acting like an intermediary between Obama and Putin“, [Sina ctd.] CNN reports, citing an anonymous 
high-ranking member of the Obama administration. [CNN]: "The German chancellor spoke with President Obama about her efforts to pave a 
way out of the crisis on Crimea". [Sina ctd] According to CNN information, Obama and Merkel discussed the possibilities of an international 
fact-finding mission that should establish whether human right of the Russian minority in Ukraine are guaranteed. Putin claims that the 
government in Kyiv suppresses the Russian population. With this argument the Russian president seeks to legitimize his intervention. 
Furthermore, he retains the right to invade anywhere into Ukrainian territory. Merkel wants to weaken this argument of Putin by sending 
international observers, and thereby enable the Russian president to withdraw his troops from Crimea without losing face [not appear 
weak before Russian public]. What the US president thinks about the prospect of a way out in which no one loses face? The White House 
remains silent on that question. The U.S. president will not, however, participate in the G8 summit with Putin in Sochi, a member of the 
White House told U.S. media. At least not if until then there still are Russian soldiers on Ukrainian soil. The Canadian Prime Minister suggested 
to Obama on the phone to demonstratively host a G7-summit, a meeting among the most powerful economies of the world, excluding Russia. 
[Obama]: "I actually don't think about Putin's behaviour on Crimea is a sign of strength. No, it rather stirs fears among Russia's neighbours, 
and pushes many countries further away from Russia. [Sina ctd] In principle, the Obama administration is positive about an international 
observer mission. U.S. Foreign Secretary John Kerry explicitly demands from Russia to not only tolerate the OSCE observer-team set to land 
on Crimea today, but to support it in its freedom of movement. Because currently it is unclear whether the 30 unarmed military observers will 
actually gain access to Crimea. Since Russia is a member of the OSCE, and the observer-mission has been requested by Ukraine, also a member 
of the OSCE, the US sees Putin under a compulsion to move [dt: Zugzwang]. The Russian president must allow the unarmed international 
military observes, amongst them two U.S. citizens, access to Crimea, Washington demands. John Kerry will voice this at the meeting with the 
Russian president in Paris [tomorrow]. 
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Q.: Today, the NATO-Russia Council is meeting. Beforehand, the NATO Ambassadors consulted with security-policy experts. What does this 
mean? A.: The committee that convened today was the political security committee, which meets only very rarely. THE NATO - Ambassadors 
[also] will meet with foreign and security policy experts of the European Union. That - to my knowledge - certainly has not happened in the last 
two years. The last such meeting was triggered by problems on the Balkans. I think this is a strong symbolic act done jointly by NATO and EU. 
They want to demonstrate that they will not be divided, we w talk to each other, and in the end, the West will speak with one voice. Q.: If 
NATO is consulted in these talks, does this mean that in the Ukraine-crisis, there remains - despite today's statements by the French President 
- a military option? A.: NATO is of course also a military and security alliance. That is correct. The NATO ambassadors are meeting almost daily 
currently. But - and this has also been made clear by NATO Secretary-General Rasmussen after a meeting yesterday: a military response is not 
really considered. There is talks about the problem, there are warnings to Russia to not continue to violate the sovereignty of Ukraine, 
according to Rasmussen. It can be expected that he will use today’s meeting to clearly convey this message to the Russian ambassador 
Gruschkow. However, I don't think that NATO sees a military option.  
05.03.2014 tagesschau, 12:00 
noon; a) a) Interview 
Bettina Scharkus on 
meeting of NATO 
Russia Council; b) 
Interview Ellis 
Fröder, EU-Foreign 
Minister Summit in 
Paris.593 
Q. Do you have any knowledge about what is happening just now at the EU Foreign Minister Summit in Paris? A.: At the moment it can be said 
that diplomacy is running on high revs. Until a few moments ago, President Hollande and the foreign minister of Russia, France, the United 
States and the UK sat together in Elysee palace. They have by now changed locations, and are currently at the Quai D'Orsay, the French foreign 
ministry, to continue negotiations. The key question here will be whether there will be an international contact group, which would mean 
that one could continue to bet on diplomacy. By the way, the U.S. foreign secretary and the Russian foreign minister talked to each other in 
a one to one meeting. At the moment, however, everyone is at Quai D' Orsay. Q.: The Western Foreign Ministers would like to have their 
Ukrainian colleague at the meeting. Will that happen? A. This is a big question.  The United Kingdom and the U.S. want this no matter what, 
but for Russia of course this is difficult, as this may lead to the interpretation that Russia is de facto acknowledging the Ukrainian interim 
government - despite that accepting the Ukrainian presence would not represent such an acknowledgment. That would be hard to swallow 
[German transl: A hard frog to swallow] for Russia. I therefore personally don’t think that this will happen. We know at the moment that the 
EU Foreign Ministers are meeting, whether that is with or without their Ukrainian colleague we don't know. Steinmeier will hold a press 
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Q. How important is this alleged incident? A.: Well, at first sight this all seems highly dramatic. According to our information, however, this 
was all quite unspectacular. One needs to understand that all the missile bases are from Soviet times. They were split artificially during the 
nineties, one side going to the Russians, the other side to the Ukrainians. Today the Russians simply stated in writing that the entire base is 
under their control. 20 soldiers were placed outside. We were told everything was peaceful. The second thing talked about on Crimea today 
is that the first representatives of the OSCE arrived. Before the hotel in which the observers are lodged, a crowd assembled shouting Russia, 
Russia. [Old woman] "The OSCE has nothing to look for here. They should better end the chaos in Kyiv.". [Stuchlik ctd.] Protesters suspect 
military observers amongst the OSCE team, despite only Dunja Mijatovic, the OSCE representative for the freedom of the press speaks out. 
"No one here thinks about prohibiting Ukrainian or Russian newspapers. Let's just stay calm and see how this situation will develop. Putin, 
Putin the protesters outside shout. If one day there would really be military observers, then the response should be expected to be even 
stronger. Q.: Why do you expect that? Because the Autonomous Government here, this Russian friendly government, has nothing to fear from 
letting the OSCE Spokesperson for the Freedom of the Press in. However, if military observers were to arrive, all barracks would have to open 
their doors. Then one could see how many Russian troops are really here, are they really Special Forces, and what type of equipment do they 
use? Of course, for understandable reasons, there is vehement resistance from both the Russian and the Crimean authorities. It will therefore 
still take a while until the first military observers arrive here." 
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Intro Zervakis: Western countries, on the highest diplomatic levels, today tried to defuse the conflict between Russia and Ukraine. In Paris, the 
Foreign Ministers if the United States, France, Germany and the United Kingdom tried to bring their colleagues from Russia and the U.S. for 
talks around the table. The EU and the U.S. are threatening to withdraw from the G8 summit and to impose sanctions. b) Report, Ellis Fröder: 
"Ukrainian flags waive outside the French foreign ministry, as if the protesters wanted to say "we [the people from Maidan] are real, and also 
here!" Inside, negotiations were ongoing all day, diplomacy on the highest levels. U.S. Foreign Secretary John Kerry, Germany, France, the 
United Kingdom - all are in search for a solution in the gravest crisis in Europe since the Cold War. And they are seeking dialogue with Sergei 
Lawrow, the Russian foreign minister. [Laurent Fabius, FRA foreign minister]: We want to be clear about and relentless vis a vis Putin, but also 
set the dialog in motion again. The solution in Ukraine must be political, not military." [Fröder ctd.] The Western foreign ministers want to 
establish an international contact group. In this way, the West could jointly with Russia discuss the future of Ukraine. In addition, the U.S. and 
the UK are undertaking efforts to sit Lawrow and the new Ukrainian foreign minister around the same table. [William Hague, UK foreign 
minister]: "This is the opportunity to engage Russia and Ukraine in direct talks and negotiations with each other". [Fröder ctd] "So far, to no 
avail. Russia is not prepared to enter unto direct talks with Ukraine. Hour-long discussions amongst the foreign ministers, then one-on-one 
talks continued. U.S. foreign secretary Kerry and Russian foreign minister Lawrow talked for so long, that at the end the negotiations had 
to be adjourned. This was judged here in Paris as a positive signal. As long as one stays engaged in talks, as long as the U.S. and Russia 
continue to talk to each other, there is reason for hope. Whether the talks will continue tonight is open, the foreign ministers will remain in 
Paris in any case. Meanwhile, the EU has promised billions to Ukraine today. [President of the Commission, Juan Manuel Barros]: "The 
package we have put together has a combined minimal value of 11 billion Euros." [Fröder ctd]Should there be no result in Paris tonight, the 
EU wants to impose economic sanctions on Russia.  
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"The heads of states and governments of the EU [that will be meeting tomorrow in Brussels] will highly likely confirm what has been said 
by the President of the Commission, Barroso, today already: That is the 11 billion Euros in financial aid for Ukraine. And with the same kind 
of likelihood they are going to condemn the Russian military operation on Crimea as a breach of international law. Not quite clear is the 
question of sanctions. Here, different opinions are to be expected. The suggestions to ban high-ranking Russian officials and members of the 
government from travelling into and inside the European Union or to freeze bank accounts have been tabled. In addition, NATO Secretary 
General Rasmussen said today that NATO will fundamentally reassess its relationship with Russia. However, if there are to be sanctions, no 
hard sanctions against Russia are expected. It is more likely, that the EU will start another high-level diplomatic initiative.  
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a) Intro Zervakis: The Ukrainian interim prime minister Yatseniuk will participate in the extraordinary EU Council meeting tomorrow. Before 
leaving for Brussels, he held a press conference on the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. He showed concern that Russia could occupy further territory 
in Ukraine in addition to Crimea. b) Report Stuchlik: It is like a game of chess. Today the Russian navy blocked the entry to Sevastopol harbour 
for the Ukrainian fleet. A little further back of the harbour, here the Russian navy, there the Ukrainian navy, facing each other on the harbour’s 
sides. Since yesterday as enemies. In Kyiv, interim prime minister showed concern about the further escalation: " [Yatseniuk] "What happened 
today in the autonomous Republic of Crimea not only threatens the security of Ukraine, but the entire world. The responsibility for this lies 
singularly with Russia."[Stuchlik ctd]. Western experts by now believe that some of the armed men without insignia, are indeed Russian 
special forces. Moscow denies this. In order to establish facts on this and other questions the West wants to send military observers. But 
already at the word OSCE, the public should get to a boil here on Crimea [old lady protesting]: "The OSCE has nothing to look for here, they 
should better end the chaos in Kyiv." The hatred is directed at the first OSCE representative on Crimean territory [note: news before: observer 
team] - who is only responsible for the freedom of the press. [Dunja Mijatovic] "There are worrying signs on Crimea, but I think we still have 
some time. Let us therefore remain calm and see how the situation will develop. "Putin, Putin" the masses shout - to them it is clear who took 
control on Crimea.  
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Crimea, Stephan 
Stuchlik; 597 





Date Event Summary/Transcript 
05.03.2014 Tagesthemen, 
Thomas Roth; a) 
Interview Stephan 
Stuchlik, on situation 
on Crimea; b) Report 
on "men in uniform", 
Stephan Stuchlik; c) 
Paris-Summit and 
Diplomatic Efforts, 
Report Ellis Fröder; d) 
Interview Bettina 
Scharkus, on NATO 
decision to re-asses 
entire collaboration 
with Russia.598 
Q.: The crisis on Crimea continues to simmer dangerously. The Special Envoy to Ukraine of the United Nations was allegedly threatened and 
chased away by a group of armed men. What is this about? A. This episode shows how nervousness increases day by day here on Crimea - by 
the way also the nervousness of the newsmakers, who reported earlier today that the men was kidnapped and taken to an unknown location. 
Fact is, Mr. Sarri [phonetically] has returned to his hotel. We know nothing of an armed attack, what could have happened? We witnessed 
three times before that the at the entry to the hotel there is an angry mob, whose anger appears to have been organized, that block the access 
to the main road for any black limousine. Because they suspect an emissary of the UN, OSCE, or EU inside a black limousine. Thus, on Crimea 









Date Event Summary/Transcript 
05.03.2014 Tagesthemen, 
Thomas Roth; a) 
Interview Stephan 
Stuchlik, on situation 
on Crimea; b) Report 
on "men in uniform", 
Stephan Stuchlik; c) 
Paris-Summit and 
Diplomatic Efforts, 
Report Ellis Fröder; d) 
Interview Bettina 
Scharkus, on NATO 
decision to re-asses 
entire collaboration 
with Russia.599 
a) Intro Roth: President Putin claims that the armed men without insignia are local self-defence forces, and not Russian soldiers. And because 
this is the case, he not possibly orders them to withdraw. b) Report Stuchlik: This is a short story about two brother nations that suddenly are 
supposed to be enemies, and don’t really know why. We are driving to Belbek airbase, an Ukrainian airbase. Out of the blue, Russian soldiers 
appear. At least this is what they look like. [Stuchlik approaching masked men, who turn their back to the camera, and continue walking, asks:] 
"Hello, we are from German TV, can we have a word with you? Who is the boss here?" The soldiers turn around, no one want to answer our 
question. Before his occupied base, a surprisingly relaxed [the same officer that yesterday was "completely overrun", see tagesschau 17:00, 
04.03.2014]. [Andreij Kulatow]: " When these guys arrived yesterday the head of the Russian soldiers, they are fine chaps, you know, asked 
me to hand over the base. I said no and that was it then. We understood each other. No, they are standing here peacefully, and for the 
other thing [demand], I don't blame them, it is just a standard operating procedure".  Says it and walks over to his occupiers. They had to 
camp outside under their trucks last night, he said, and that should not be requested from anyone. Maybe he can find a solution.  
 
599 https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/tt5316.html 
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05.03.2014 Tagesthemen, 
Thomas Roth; a) 
Interview Stephan 
Stuchlik, on situation 
on Crimea; b) Report 
on "men in uniform", 
Stephan Stuchlik; c) 
Paris-Summit and 
Diplomatic Efforts, 
Report Ellis Fröder; 
d) Interview Bettina 
Scharkus, on NATO 
decision to re-asses 
entire collaboration 
with Russia.600 
a) Intro Roth: Amongst others, Chancellor Merkel is undertaking efforts to solve the pwoer struggle in Ukraine. She spoke with Putin on the 
phone again. And also in Paris, a number of EU Foreign ministers are negotiating. Among them is Foreign Minister Steinmeier. b) Report Ellis 
Fröder: "All talks were to no avail. There is no agreement with Russia on the diplomatic level. All day the European foreign minister 
negotiated with their Russian counterpart. Diplomacy on its highest levels. They wanted to establish and International Contact Group, to 
enter into a continuous dialog with Russia. And they wanted that representatives of Russia and Ukraine sit together here in Paris. All that 
was denied by Russia. [Lawrow, on Russia 24]: "It is very difficult to reach an agreement in an atmosphere of threats and conditions." [Fröbe 
ctd] There were still hopes for a solution during the afternoon. Foreign Secretary Kerry and his Russian colleague Sergei Lawrow had several 
long one-to-one meetings. But in the evening Sergei Lawrow left the talks. [Steinmeier, appearing very tired]: "I am not happy about the 
overall result. I am at best content with the fact that all those we spoke to signalled that they will not contribute to a further escalation of 
the situation. But difficult days remain ahead of us." [Kerry]: "All participants agree that is is important to solve these problems through 
dialog. The United States and its partners are working intensively on a remedy." [Fröbe ctd] Now talks will continue in the French foreign 
ministry. Without Lawrow, but with the Ukrainian [interim] foreign minister.  
 
600 https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/tt5316.html 
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05.03.2014 Tagesthemen, 
Thomas Roth; a) 
Interview Stephan 
Stuchlik, on situation 
on Crimea; b) Report 
on "men in uniform", 
Stephan Stuchlik; c) 
Paris-Summit and 
Diplomatic Efforts, 
Report Ellis Fröder; d) 
Interview Bettina 
Scharkus, on NATO 
decision to re-asses 
entire collaboration 
with Russia. 601 
Q.: NATO decided today that it will re-assess its entire cooperation with Russia. Is this an alarm signal, that NATO takes such a radical measure? 
A.: I could just speak with someone from NATO Headquarters, and was told that the Russian NATO ambassador [Gruschkow] did not bring 
anything to the negotiation table that was aimed in any way at de-escalating the situation. Therefore, NATO had to react. Immediately, a 
joint naval operation was stalled, and further cooperative efforts will be re-assessed. Also, this has been decided by all 28 member states 
unanimously [principle of NATO]. Hence, the rows are closing here. Apparently, towards the end of the meeting [of NATO-Russia Council] said 
that these [what was being said in the meeting] were stereotypes against Russia like during the Cold War. Diplomatic efforts will continue in 
Brussels tomorrow with an extraordinary summit of the EU heads of state and government. Here, the key issue will be whether sanctions 
against Russia should be imposed or not.  
 
601 https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/tt5316.html 
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The European have tightened their lips, now they must whistle. [Jan Techau, Head of the Carnegie Endowment for Peace in Brussels] 
"Considering that all this has been played at the highest possible level, expectations have been created - something must follow now", [Bohne 
ctd.] describes Techau the difficult starting position of the EU before its meeting today. The Europeans have little to offer [Techau]: "The tools 
the EU has to exert pressure on Russia are very, very few, and very, very weak." [Bohnen ctd]: The strongest option is already of the table. 
[Techau]: "There is no military option for the West, not even for the Americans. IT is very clear that no one will go to war over Crimea. And 
that is equally clear to Putin, who was aware of this long before“. [Bohne ctd.] As far as punitive actions the EU foreign ministers mentioned 
so far only mentioned, two specifically, the freezing of negotiations on easing visa regulations, and about a partnership agreement. That this 
will hardly impress Moscow must also be clear to European politicians. Furthermore, so called targeted actions were hinted at. This usually 
refers top travel bans or freezing of accounts of important representatives and businesses of the country in question. The larger part of the 
Russian oil and gas wealth is assumed to be on European bank accounts. To cut the financial stream of the oligarchs could be more effective. 
Of course, a boycott of Russian gas would hit Russia badly. [Techau]: "This means that in theory, there is leverage. But if one would use it, it 
would possibly hurt ine's own banks and economic interests badly." [Bohne ctd.] Against this backdrop, politicians obviously weigh whether 
this is the best measure. All EU states have self-interests, says Techau. Involuntarily, the British government currently seems to confirm this 
thesis. In a leaked document, it demands a strong response to Russia. [Techau]: "But only as long as it doesn't threaten their financial market. 
This is a typical position, that you will find in almost all EU member states. The Italians have energy interests, the Germans emphasise that 
dialog must continue - the positions in Europe vary widely". [Bohne] Therefore, today's summit is about finding the minimal consensus. Much 
more important is the symbolic effect. [Techau] " This is more about unity, more about keeping the family together." [Bohne ctd]: In light of 
these apparent limitations [Schwaechen] in their short-term crisis management, the Europeans should try to bring back the conflict to channels 
on which they are able to play their strengths. [Techau]: What can be done now is to support the new government in Kyiv, so that the country 
doesn't go bankrupt, that it doesn't become a failed state, where police, firemen and doctors are not being paid.". [Bohne ctd] Beyond that, 
the country requires a long-term perspective. And here, the summit can send a signal and adopt the financial aid package with a volume of 11 
billion Euros presented by the Commission yesterday.   
 
602 https://www.tagesschau.de/ausland/eu-sanktionen100.html 





Date Event Summary/Transcript 
06.03.2014 tagesschau, 12:00 
noon; a)Interview 
Arnim Stauth on EU 
Council summit; b) 
Interview Michael 
Heussen on situation 
on Ukraine.603 
Q.: How likely are sanctions against Russia by the EU? A: I believe it is unlikely that today specific sanctions will be announced. I believe the EU 
is pursuing a two-track approach. One track is that they are trying with all available means to reach a diplomatic breakthrough and establish 
a mediation process. The other track is - and this is taken from a draft version of the final communique we received earlier - there is talks 
about serious consequences if Russia is not willing to step back from its hard line. However, until sanctions are decided, specified and imposed 
will still take a while. Q: Now the EU is prospecting a financial aid package for the Ukrainian government worth 11 billion Euros - however, 
only if the IMF also support Ukraine. What does this junktim mean? A.: The IWF has longstanding experience in the payment and the 
conditionalities for the payment of such loans. It also demands reforms - for example in Ukraine, heating for housing is heavily subsidized 
which leads to a massive waste of energy. That is a Soviet tradition. In this regard, the IWF and the EU expect that subsidies are being cut, 
so that the money isn't just literally blown out of the window.  
06.03.2014 tagesschau, 12:00 
noon; a)Interview 
Arnim Stauth on EU 
Council summit; b) 
Interview Michael 
Heussen on situation 
in Ukraine.604 
Q.: What is the situation in Ukraine at the moment? A.: Last night things remained calm. The two arrest warrants that had been issued last 
night, one against the head of the regional government, the other one against the Russian commander of the Black Sea fleet turn out to be 
blunt weapons. The Ukrainian government does not have the power or means to impose these arrest warrants on Crimea. Therefore, while 
the diplomatic tug of war continues, the situation here seems to remain calm. Q: In Brussels there currently are ongoping negotations about 
sanctions against Russia. What are the Urkainians saying about this? A: The Ukrainians are happy to see that pressure is building up, political, 
economic, and diplomatic pressure, which is of course an important signal to Ukraine. The hope here is that eventually Russia will give in. On 
the other hand, more concrete financial aid packages are being hoped for. An important Ukrainian newspaper today titled: "West, please help 
us to prevent collapse!" This shows how precarious the economic situation here really is. Ukraine needs help against Russia, but above all, 
financial aid. Q; Yanukovych's accounts in Europe have been frozen today. How hard will this hurt him? A. Badly, but surely he has taken 
precaution against such a step long before. Of course, this is now a very clear signal that the West is breakling with old leadership of Ukraine, 
that the old government had't done what it was supposed to, and instead of being there then need to protect, it terrorized its own population. 
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06.03.2014 audio, Martin Bohne, 
WDR Brussels, EU 
Heads of State 
Summit.605 
Among the members of the European Union sanctions are being disputed. The US already decided for punitive actions, and imposed travel 
bans. At the beginning of the conference, the participating Ukrainian prime minister reminded of the graveness of the seriousness of the 
situation. [Yatseniuk] "This is not a Russian-Ukrainian conflict, this is a European conflict, and we must urgently find a way to solve it." [Bohne 
ctd] There was no need to remind the EU heads of state, that have rushed together to show the flag and demonstrate unity. Particularly the 
eastern European member states are pushing. They feel threatened by Russia. [Dalia Grybauskaite, president of Lithuania] "First of all we must 
send a signal to ourselves: we are standing together and speak with one voice. Because the risk is obvious. Russia want to re-draw the post-
war borders [of Europe]. We must understand this and find an appropriate response." [Bohne ctd] Such harsh and concise words cannot be 
heard from the member states from further West. David Cameron summarizes the aims of the summit: [David Cameron, prime minister United 
Kingdom] "First, Russia and Ukraine need to talk to each other again. Then we must show to the Ukrainian people that we are helping them 
in their hour of despair. And thirdly, we must tell the Russian leadership clearly that what they did is inacceptable." [Bohne ctd] Chancellor 
Merkel is of the same view. She supports current efforts for an international contact group. But as long as Russia continues to refuse diplomatic 
talks, then it is not possible to return to business as usual. [Merkel] "This means we will also look at sanctions of different kinds. Whether 
these must be imposed now, or not, will be decided by us depending on the progress of our diplomatic efforts." [Bohne ctd] To impress 
Russia and push it to a political solution is one thing, said Merkel. At the same time, Ukraine needs support: „ We want that the people that 
have fought for freedom and democracy can now take a good development. I therefore wholeheartedly welcome the aid package that was 
presented by the Commission yesterday. Germany will support this intensively." 
 
605 https://www.tagesschau.de/ausland/eu-sanktionen100.html 
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06.03.2014 tagesschau, 14:00, 
German Defence 
Minister visits 
Poland, Report by 
Ulrich Adrian.606 
The visit was long planned. Federal Minister for Defence, Ursula von der Leyen (UvdL) was received with military honours by her Polish 
colleague Tomas Siemonjak. Under the impression of the crisis in Ukraine, however, the routine visit got a completely different meaning. The 
talks lasted much longer than initially planned, probably the breaking news that the parliament of Crimea wants to join the Russian 
Federation were leant about during the meeting. The Polish primordial fears about Russia played a visible role during the press conference. 
The Polish defence minister feels that there is a risk of conflagration in Europe, caused by the Ukraine crisis: [Tomas Siemonjak] "We have 
already asked the Americans for the air force, and larger manoeuvres in March. The U.S. has reacted quickly, this is very important to us in 
Poland."[UvdL] "We know that we are working together reliably in the background, in the alliance, and send clear signals of that. But the 
main thing, and what is decisive, is diplomacy, it the dialog that we must keep on-going. [Adrian ctd] UvdL emphasized on the side-lines that 
the International Contact Group is the most important objective for now. And that Poland, which is sharing a border with Ukraine may not be 
left alone with its concerns.  
06.03.2014 tagesschau, 16:00; a) 
Report on diplomatic 
efforts, Bettina 
Scharkus; b) 
Interview with Arnim 
Stauth, Brussels.607 
President Putin seems unwilling to give in. Also, not in a conversation with the [German] chancellor, they spoke on the phone just yesterday. 
On today's summit, Europe's top politicians want to increase the pressure. [see report Scharkus earlier that day] After the meeting with EU 
heads of state, Ukrainian prime minister Yatseniuk rejects the announced referendum on the future association of Crimea as illegal. His appeal 
to the Kremlin was highly emotional. [Yatseniuk]"Mr. Putin, tear down this wall. Tear down this wall of threats, this wall of the military. Let us 
build a new relationship between Ukraine and Russia. We are willing to cooperate but are unwilling to surrender." [Scharkus ctd] The EU heads 
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06.03.2014 tagesschau, 16:00; a) 
Report on diplomatic 
efforts, Bettina 
Scharkus; b) 
Interview with Arnim 
Stauth, Brussels; 608 
Q: Crimea wants to declare itself independent and associate itself with Russia via a referendum. How were this news received by the 
participants of the summit today? A.: This is seen in the same way as Ukraine sees it: as a breach of the Ukrainian constitution, a violation of 
Ukraine's territorial integrity and its sovereignty. It is very clear that Russia is blamed for this - no one believes that this only been thought 
of in Crimea, this earlier referendum, but that this has been arranged by Moscow. In this regard, the EU leaders are clearly on the side of the 
Ukrainian government. Q.: The Ukrainian government wants to sign the association agreement with the EU. Will the EU go along with this? 
I can not say anything about this yet, as everything here is being delayed. Thus, I have no results on this yet. So far the position of the EU was 
that specific short-term aspects [of the Association Agreement], particularly those that can help the Ukrainian economy quickly, may be moved 
ahead. But this highly symbolic act of signing the association agreement will be moved to a later date, ideally of the 25th of May when a 
new, freely elected government is in place.  
06.03.2014 tagesschau, 17:00 a) 
Meeting of Russian 
NSC; Putin considers 
admission of Crimea 
into Russian 
Federation, Report 
Birgit Virnich; b) 
Interview Stefan 
Stuchlik.609 
Report Virnich: "Sanctions and possible responses to sanctions were the topic of the day in Russia also. President Putin called the National 
Security Council. Laws are being prepared now in Moscow that will enable the confiscation of foreign assets. An answer therefore for possible 
targeted sanctions by the EU. Russian politicians themselves threaten drastic counter-measures if Europe decides to impose sanctions. Earlier 
today, Federal Minister for the Economy, Sigmar Gabriel, in a long scheduled meeting with the Russian president, warned about the 
consequences of a sanctions-spiral, and the real risk of further escalations. [Gabriel]: "The first thing is for Russia to understand and accept 
just how big its responsibilities are. I truly believe that we are in the middle of the worst crisis of the past decades and are just short of 
throwing Europe back to the times of the Cold War. For the people this would be a massive step back. I believe it is hard to imagine the 
possible consequences." [Virnich ctd]: In addition, further laws are now being prepared by [Russian prime minister] Medwedew. One is 
intended to make it easier for absorbing foreign territory into the Russian Federation, the other one concerns the handing out of Russian 
passports to foreigner. [Medwedew]: This is about individuals or their relatives that lived in Russia before the revolution, or in the Soviet 
Union." [Virnich ctd]:. That the West will regard these initiaitves as a provocation seem clear to everyone. Certainly, a day that did not make 
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06.03.2014 tagesschau, 17:00 a) 
Meeting of Russian 
NSC; Putin considers 
admission of Crimea 
into Russian 
Federation, Report 
Birgit Virnich; b) 
Interview Stefan 
Stuchlik.610 
Q: Will the referendum find a majority in favour of the association with Russia? A.: I am fully convinced it will! However, please allow me to 
state this again, this referendum is farcical, it will be a pseudo-democratic seeking of approval of a decision that has been taken already at 
the highest level. At the moment, the situation is that the political pressure is that high, that the small part of the Crimean population that 
3wishes to remain part of Ukraine, which is estimates to be around 20-30% according to surveys conducted over the past years - will have 
neither image nor voice in the referendum on 16th of March. Q.: OSCE observers were obstructed today. How has such a step to be taken? 
A.: I think this is reason for grave concern. It always follows the same pattern: if you ask [Crimean] officials here, then they say 'yes, of course 
the OSCE is welcome, the UNJ can send observers, we have nothing to hide'. And eyerytime  - yesterday the UN special envoy, today the OSCE 
observers, the following pattern develops.: An angry mobobstructs the entry to what the observers actually would like to see. When When 
charged with this, officials just raise their hands and say thart they have no influence on this. Whether this is truely the case, I dare to doubt. 
 
610 https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/video/video1377330.html 
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06.03.2014 tagesschau, 20:15, 
Susanne Daubner; a) 
Report on Decision of 
Crimean Parliament 
to join Russian 
Federation, 
Referendum by 
Stephan Stuchlik; b) 
live from Simferopol, 
Stefan Stuchlik; c) 
European Union 
imposes sanctions, 
Report by Bettina 
Scharkus; d) US heads 
the way in imposing 
sanctions, Report 
Tina Hassel; e) 
Russian reactions to 
sanctions, B. 
Virnich;611  
a) Intro Daubner: Despite all diplomatic efforts the fronts are hardening. On Crimea, the focal point of the crisis, facts were created today. The 
regional parliament paved the way for an accession to the Russian Federation. Already within ten days, the mostly ethnic-Russian inhabitants 
of Crimea are to cast their vote in a referendum. The government declared the referendum a charad, and that it will dissolve rthe regional 
parliament in Simferopol. b) Report Stefan Stuchlkik: [Protesters showing] solidarity before the Crimean Parliament. The pro-Russian 
government here has installed itself a few days ago, and took a far-reaching decision [Rustem Temirgalijew, deputy prime minister of the 
autnonomous REpublic of Crimea]: "Firstly, we announce our will that Crimea is to become a part of the Russian Federation. Secondly, in 
order to establish whether there is a majority in favour of this decision, we announce a referendum to be held at 16.03.2014." [Stuchlik 
asking during presse conference]: "You just decided already that you will join [the Russian Federation] - is the rerferendum then not just a 
charade? [Response Temirgalijew]: "The Crimean High Council has taken a historic decision, and the decision to join the Russian Federation 
will not be renounced." [Stuchlik ctd. ] Translates into: The direction is clear: Crimea is to be broken away from Ukrainian territory. If that 
was the case, then in all of a sudden the Ukrainian military would become an occupying force, with unforeseeable consequences. The 
spokesman for the Crimean Tatars, only minutes [ after the press conference with Temirgalijew] later, in an almost desperate statement to 
the press, declared the peaceful co-existence as ended: [Rifat Tschubarow, President of the National Assembly of the Crimean Tatars]: "You 
have seen for yourself the so called tactics employed by the Crimnean government. I see the Russification with great concern - because now, 
the mob, or the so called Russian self defence forces, has a blanko cheque to go after our Tatar people unpunished." [Stuchlik, ctd] And as if 
on request, self declared "Defenders of Russia" are marching on the streets. Russian looking military vehicles are on patrol - unsettling signals 
from Simferopol.  
 
611 https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/ts47126.html 
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06.03.2014 tagesschau, 20:15, 
Susanne Daubner; a) 
Report on Decision of 
Crimean Parliament 
to join Russian 
Federation, 
Referendum by 
Stephan Stuchlik; b) 
live from Simferopol, 
Stefan Stuchlik; c) 
European Union 
imposes sanctions, 
Report by Bettina 
Scharkus; d) US heads 
the way in imposing 
sanctions, Report 
Tina Hassel; e) 
Russian reactions to 
sanctions, B. Virnich; 
612 
“Today’s announcement of joining the Russian Federation tremendously adds to the tensions on Crimea. The nervousness between the 
different groups of the population here, the Ukrainians, the Russians, the Tatars, have clearly increased. Secondly, today's decision is a punch 
in the face of Western diplomacy. This is an escalation, not de-escalation. In the same vein fall the news that today OSCE-staff was denied 
access to Crimea. Allegedly, this was done by a group of people that spontaneously had come together for this purpose only. Thirdly, it shows 
the impuissance of the government in Kyiv. Interim PResident Turtschinow has announced to let the Crimean regional parliament be dissolved. 
How he wants top go about this in face of this stark Russian supremacy on Crimea, remains his secret. “ 
 
612 https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/ts47126.html 
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06.03.2014 tagesschau, 20:15, 
Susanne Daubner; a) 
Report on Decision of 
Crimean Parliament 
to join Russian 
Federation, 
Referendum by 
Stephan Stuchlik; b) 
live from Simferopol, 
Stefan Stuchlik; c) 
European Union 
imposes sanctions, 
Report by Bettina 
Scharkus; d) US heads 
the way in imposing 
sanctions, Report 
Tina Hassel; e) 
Russian reactions to 
sanctions, B. 
Virnich;613  
a) Intro Daubner: The European Union is imposing first sanctions against Russia, chancellor Merkel announced after a meeting with the EU 
heads of state in Brussels. As a first step, talks about easing visa regulations between the EU and Russia will be put on hold, later, further, 
possible punishing measures will be discussed. b) Report Scharkus: A difficult agreement to reach. The end of the EU-Summit was pushed 
aback several times. In the end, Europe imposes moderate sanctions against Russia. [H. van Rompuy, President EU Council]: " We will put our 
talks with Russia about the easing of visa regulations and about a partnership agreement on hold. We support the decision of the Europeans, 
to, until further notice, not participate in the prepatrions of a G8 summit". [Scharkus ctd] Angela Merkel long favoured a dialogue-course, 
now she also increases the pressure. She deems the referendum, which was announced today, illegal: [Angela Merkel] " If such a referendum 
is requested on a base that doesn't even exist, to assume that it is possible to bring about an opinion-building process within ten days, then 
this to my mind has not the least to do with any sound preparation of elections or referenda". The eastern European countries showed deep 
concern. The Lithuianian president spoke of brutal aggression. [She thinks] that Russia wants to re-draw the borders in the region. These fears 
were not shared by the Western Europeans. At the end, Europe did not speak with a single voice. The agreement reached is the smallest 
common denominator.  
 
613 https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/ts47126.html 
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06.03.2014 tagesschau, 20:15, 
Susanne Daubner; a) 
Report on Decision of 
Crimean Parliament 
to join Russian 
Federation, 
Referendum by 
Stephan Stuchlik; b) 
live from Simferopol, 
Stefan Stuchlik; c) 
European Union 
imposes sanctions, 
Report by Bettina 
Scharkus; d) US heads 
the way in imposing 
sanctions, Report 
Tina Hassel; e) 
Russian reactions to 
sanctions, B. Virnich; 
614 
a) Intro Dauber: Already earlier, the U.S. administration-imposed sanctions, and banned individuals responsible for the situation on Crimea 
and in Ukraine. Additionally, their assets in the U.S. will be frozenb. B) Repoort Hassel.The US head the way. President Obama imposed 
sanctions. Which individuals are on the sanction list remains secret. Allegedly, Putin is not affected, but members of the [former] Ukrainian 
and [current] Russian government that are held responsible for the escalation. With immediate effect the individuals of the target group are 
being banned from travelling to the U.S., and their assets here will be frozen. Completely unexpected, half an hour ago President Obama 
himself stood before the press, and showed his disappointment that Russia continued its uncooperative stance. [Obama] "If this violation of 
international law continues, us and our partners will remain firm. This afternoon the EU has adopted similiar measures against Russia. I am 
confident we will continue to act together to resolve this crisis". [Presidential press statement indicates important developments/only 
disappointed about Putin, or also about EU decision?] [Hassel ctd] Congress is pushing for even tougher sanctions. Today it wantes to pass a 
resolution demanding further reaching steps. Washington is increasing the pressure. In a few hours, six F15 fighter jets will make their way 
to the Baltics. The USS-Trexton, a state-of-the art warship with high-end cruise missiles was sent to the Balck Sea - allegedly for a long-
planned manoeuvre, emphasises the Pentagon. However, what if diplomacy fails? So far, the President and his administration have 
successfully evaded this.  
 
614 https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/ts47126.html 
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06.03.2014 tagesschau, 20:15, 
Susanne Daubner; a) 
Report on Decision of 
Crimean Parliament 
to join Russian 
Federation, 
Referendum by 
Stephan Stuchlik; b) 
live from Simferopol, 
Stefan Stuchlik; c) 
European Union 
imposes sanctions, 
Report by Bettina 
Scharkus; d) US heads 
the way in imposing 
sanctions, Report 
Tina Hassel; e) 
Russian reactions to 
sanctions, B. Virnich; 
615 
see report Birgit Virnich, tagesschau, 06.03.2014, 17:00 
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During the morning, there was some hope that the day could be ruled more by diplomacy than by escalations. Around 11 am CET, the times 
of hope were suddenly ended. At that time, the news of the day was received from the Crimean Regional Parliament. [Ruslem Temirgalijew]: 
"First, we announce our decision for Crimea to join the Russian Federation; Second, in order to establish whether there is a majority in favour 
of this decision, we announce a referendum to be held on the 16th of March."[Strempel ctd] Shamefacedness especially among the European 
politicians loomed large after this shock that was triggered by the speaker of the Crimean regional parliament. You will be able to see this 
in a moment if you look at the facial expression of the German Foreign Minister - a deeply upset Foreign Minister stood before the cameras 
just before this show: [Steinmeier] "We must make it clear to us - a new division in Europe, a speechlessness between the West and Russia, 
would make it impossible to lead any of the larger conflicts, in Iran, in Syria, to a resolution. Therefore, it is truly of historic proportions what 
is happening here."  
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a) Intro Strempel: Already next week, a new chapter in this historic drama will be written. The Crimeans are to cast their votes on the decision 
of the regional government to join the Russian federation. Pro-Russian activists on Crimea are cheering, but those that want to continue to 
belong to Ukraine are in naked fear. b) Report Stuchlik: Stroganovka - the Tatar settlement emptied; the fear can be grasped with bare hands. 
A few hours ago, the government announced its decision to join the Russian Federation. No one want to talk to us, not even look at us. When 
we were here three days ago, people still approached us - today, even the security post at the entry of the village is emptied. A bad sign. 
Someone is walking over there - what do you say about what happened today, we ask. […] Old man walking hurriedly to his car, facing away] 
"I have no nerves for that, ask someone else." [Stuchlik ctd]: The only other person that can be found is Zahir Mahmetovich in his dairy shop. 
There he stands and watches the press-conference that to his people may mean the end on Crimea. [Zahir Mahmetovich]: "In Ukraine we are 
better off. In 1942, Stalin tried to extinguish us, and now the Russians are going to return? The same all over again? No, I am for Ukraine. Here 
on Crimea, nowadays people are driving around in fantasy uniforms but wiuth military equipment. We know that they are Russians, and me 
and my people are afraid of them." [Stuchlik ctd] On the screen now the speaker of the Tatars. He announces that the times of peaceful co-
existence on Crimea are over. [Zahir Mahmetovich] "Today, guys with Russian arm wrists drove through the village, 16 to 18 adolescents in 
cars. They said they just wanted to look around - that was a clear threat against us. We told them to leave. But they want us out." [Stuchlik] 
"Are you afraid of being attacked now?" [ZM ctd] "I don't want this, honestly." [Stuchlik ctd] And then he even refuses to continue to talk to 
us. It is causing him too much suffering, he says. In the way back we learned from the Radio that some Tatars are apparently leaving Crimea. 
This doesn't seem implausible now anymore.  
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Q.: Does this possibly lead to violence between the population groups on Crimea? Can you already sense a change of atmosphere? A.: This 
afternoon there were hefty debates before the regional parliament. There were, unbelievable almost, people that spoke out in favour of 
Ukraine. It almost came to quarrels. However, by now the situation is one-sidedly Russian. Just behind from where I am standing, people with 
Russian wristbands appeared, and in Karl Marx Street there are more and more weapons that to me look as if they belong to the Russian army. 
It is therefore very clear that Russia has won control here. Q: Are you of the impression that the parliamentarians acted on free will? Or do 
you think there are directives from Moscow? A.: [Hesitates] Weeeelll, you know, we were present at the press conference. The first thing that 
was astonishing was that when we opened the door, the Russian journalists were standing inside already, although the press conference was 
announced for much later. And secondly, if one looks very carefully at the choice of words how this accession was announced, then one 
knows, I believe from the wording already that this comes from Russia, this is from Moscow. The choice of words is clear, and also it is hard 
to believe that the Crimean regional government would take a decision of such geopolitical scale entirely on its own.  
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a) Intro Strempel: We want to talk with Russia, but we will not surrender", said the Ukrainian Prime Minister today. He also announced that 
Ukraine will respond militarily to any further escalation. But is Ukraine really in a position to do so against a superior Russia? b) Report 
Norbert Hahn: [Image of tank manouvres, early 2000s] For long, there was much reason for taking pride in the Ukrainian Forces - many high 
end weapons were even produced in the country itself. Particularly well know is Antonow, who designed the world’s largest transport aircraft. 
When Roman Herzog [fmr. German President] visited Ukraine in 1997, the country would have liked to sell him an Antonow, which then was 
the world's most modern transport aircraft. But it never happened. More successful in recent years were [UKR] tanks. the T-34, a Ukrainian 
development, was sold to Thailand and Pakistan - there are many customers around the world. It didn't help the country's defence budget, 
however. The country is only able to spend 1/40 of the amount available to the Russian Forces. Russia has 845.000 soldiers, Ukraine only 
just around 130.000. In terms of battle tanks, 1.1100 UKR battle tanks are facing 2.800 Russian tanks; 1.462 Russian fighter-jets vs. 211 
Ukrainian fighter-jets. Even though the morale [Germ original: Motivation] of the Ukrainian forces to fight for their country can expected 
to be high, the superiority of the adversary appears overwhelming.  
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Q: Do you believe that now a situation can emerge in which the Ukrainian government sees itself respond militarily, despite the overwhelming 
Russian superiority? A.: The situation is tense. The Ukrainian government would be ill advised to respond militarily. On the one hand, it first 
requires legitimation. It has been empowered by a rump-parliament. This means we need elections; we need a true legitimation for the 
government. Secondly, it doesn't know which parts of the country will follow, nor which parts of the military. Therefore, it would be well 
advised to refrain from such a response. Q.: Does the decision by the regional parliament to secede have a constitutional base? Was the 
parliament entitled to decide on this? A.: No! In principle, of course it is possible, if a majority of the population wants to leave - then there is 
a legitimation by referendum. But that would first and foremost have to be negotiated with the government in Kyiv. And if that is not able to 
act, then within the framework of the OSCE or the UN [Catalunya?] But, as we know, representatives of both UN and OSCE have even been 
refused access to the peninsula. What we are witnessing at the moment is the coup d’état of a provincial parliament, obviously supported 
from Russia. Q.: Do you believe that the risk of a war on Crimea has increased? Because Russia is the guarantor of this parliament, as well as 
of the outcome of the referendum next week. A.: I would not assume a military confrontation first. There is no Russian troop mobilization on 
the Russian Ukrainian border., there are no tank divisions being moved there, no logistics are being put in place - no, so far this is all business 
as usual. On Crimea there is a re-enforcement of the Black Sea Fleet by soldiers without insignia - the way they look they are special or 
airborne-divisions, that were added to the 13.000 [already stationed] on Crimea. They control the region, and at the moment I do not see 
any fighting going on. A possible problem are ethnic tensions, you have already mentioned the problem of the Crimean Tatars.  
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[Michael Strempel] Actually, they only wanted to meet briefly. But then the meeting of the EU heads of states in Brussels today lasted much 
longer than anticipated. The crisis on Crimea leads to different reactions by the heads of states of the EU. Roughly speaking, the eastern 
members want a tougher stance towards Russia; the old EU in the West more strongly emphasises diplomacy. The minimum consensus that 
was reached: negotiations with Russia about the easing of visa regulations will be put on hold for the moment. This is unlikely to shock Putin. 
And how is the atmosphere in face of a reload of the Cold War? We asked some of out correspondents. 1) Poland, Ulrich Adrian, see report 
visit UvdL, tagesschau 06.03.2014, 14:00: Polish demand NATO to show military strength, immediately, on the Polish-Ukrainian border. 2) 
Baltic States, Claas-Oliver Richter: feel threatened by Russia again; President of Lithuania accuses EU of not acting decisively enough. Baltic 
states opted for EU and NATO early on, now demand protection. Today, NATO ordered further U.S. fighter jets to a base in Lithuania to 
conduct air policing the Baltic region. There are many discussions about the ethnic Russians living here, who traditionally seek a proximity 
with Russia. Unlike the Russians on Crimea, however, they do not want to renounce the economic opportunities provided by living in the 
EU. And as EU citizens they want to continue to travel freely and unhindered through Europe.  3) United Kingdom, Annette Dittert: BBC 
today reported that it is particularly Angela Merkel that is stepping in the breaks regarding sanctions against Russia, because of the strong 
German-Russian economic ties. This should be to David Cameron's liking. A member of the FCO has been photographed with a background 
paper that recommended that "The UK should not support, for now, trade sanctions". Cameron made clear today that he will not be in the 
way of common EU sanctions. But - the money from the Russian oligarchs is an important factor for the so important financial marketplace 
in in London. This way Cameron is unlikely to take a lead when it truly comes to imposing sanctions.  
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Q.: The West does not seem united in its approach to Russia. Does this make it easier for Putin? A.: I wouldn't say it [the West] is not united. 
We have, so to speak, now the possibility of an entire spectre of sanctions. Economic sanctions would hurt ourselves. Therefore, one would 
start-off with symbolic sanctions. Here, the EU member states are mostly in agreement. Of course, the threatening gestures of Russia, must 
be, so to speak, regarded as a problem - and one must be, as the Poles are demanding, able and willing to respond to such threats. But 
decisive for the solution of the problem is dialog. The problem is that at the moment, Russia is evading talks. And therefore, it leaves no 
other option then to begin with imposing sanctions. One can only hope, and that is what the chancellor and foreign minister are intensively 
pursuing, that eventually they [the Russians] agree to talks.  [Outro Strempel]: Good night, I fear that this won't be the last "brennpunkt" in 
this crisis.  
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a) Intro Roth: The crisis about Crimea virtually develops by the hour. However, not in the sense of a calming down, but the opposite. Russian 
president Putin's overt and covert manoeuvres, and the actions of the troops associated with the Russian government created  a 
threatening situation, that hardly anyone in Europe could have imagined a few days ago. Only yesterday, it was still uncertain whether the 
EU will impose sanctions against Russia. With today this has changed. And that is probably also because today way marked by yet another 
escalation, as the new Crimean [regional] parliament decided to join Russia. At the meeting of the EU heads of state, the usually so hesitant 
Chancellor saw no other way than to decide in favour of punitive actions against Russia. b) Report Stauth: Concern about the future of their 
country [images show Ukrainian protesters in Brussel] These Ukrainian demand simple solutions: 'We don't want war', 'Russia go home!', or 
'Putin keep your bloody hands of Ukraine'. 'Russia returns to the methods of the Cold War!' - that has also been said by a European head of 
state [Lithuania], but all those involved in the Brussels summit knew that it would be difficult to find a smart and constructive response. There 
was unity among the European leaders that they will strengthen the back of the new Ukrainian leadership, and safe the country from 
bankruptcy. The Ukrainian Prime Minister directed an emotional appeal at Russia: [Yatseniuk]: "Mr. Putin, tear down this wall of aggression 
and military threats. Let us establish a wholly new relationship between Ukraine and Russia. We are ready to cooperate, but not surrender 
and be the subordinates of Russia." [Stauth ctd]: The obvious plan of Russia to annex Crimea requires a tougher stance - but no one wants 
to end diplomacy either. Therefore, the summit decides on a three-step plan. Immediately, the stopping of the negotiations for visa-free travel 
for Russian citizens in Europe. And if Russia doesn't quickly agree to negotiations, level two of the sanctions. [Merkel]: "Therefore, if neither 
the [International] Contact Group is established, nor results are being made, then we will support travel restrictions for specific individuals 
and the freezing of accounts for specific people that are having a particular responsibility for the situation in Ukraine." [Stauth ctd]: The 
president of the EU council announced even tougher sanctions should Russia support the breaking away of additional parts of Ukraine. 
[Herman van Rompuy] "Any further step by Russia to destabilize the situation in Ukraine will lead to grave consequences in the relations 
between the EU and the Russian Federation." [Merkel]: We don't wish for that, we wish for a diplomatic process, and will direct all efforts in 
this direction. But it must also be clear that - we have now experienced many disappointments in this regard - we are also ready to act." 
[Stauth]: The EU tiger has presented itself not as wholly toothless. The Polish head of government, Donald Tusk, later said: [Donald Tusk] "We 
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Q: Obama also spoke about sanctions - what do they look like? A: What President Obama has achieved in a solo run by decree goes beyond 
what the EU has agreed to. With immediate effect, all people that have actively or passively to the escalation in Ukraine will be banned from 
travelling to the US, and their accounts in the U.S. will be frozen and blocked. To this group, it is held, belong high level members of the 
government and decision-makers. However, allegedly President Putin is excluded, although otherwise the names on the list remain secret. It 
shows that Washington is increasing pressure. Fitting this image is the fact that F15 fighter jets arrived in the region, and also a war ship, a 
state of the art ship equipped with Cruise Missiles arrived in the Black Sea, purportedly only as part of an exercise, but nonetheless this is 
sending a strong signal. Clearly, Washington prepares for a possible further escalation. [Thomas Roth]: "And it must be feared that this will 
really be the case". 
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a) Intro Roth: What contributed to the further deterioration of the situation today were the events on the Crimean Peninsula. In all of a 
sudden, the Moscow-leaning parliament announced in the regional capital Simferopol, that Crimea will join Russia, and become part of the 
Russian Federation. The second surprise: Within ten days already, a referendum is to be held about this decision. And what became apparent 
additionally today: whoever works on the choreography of this is exerting enormous time-pressure in a race with impending sanctions by 
EU and U.S.. This - to my mind - allows for only one conclusion: this is about creating facts. b) Report Stefan Stuchlik: Until this day, no one 
knew about Ruslem Temirgalijew. But it was him who today dropped the bombshell at 01:30pm local time.  [see report Stuchlik, 06.03.2014, 
20:15] On the streets, one can sense signs of relieve. [Young woman] "It is good, we are all in favour of Russia, we are happy." [Old Man] "For 
23 years we were suppressed by Kyiv. This is the bill for the non-sense from Kyiv."[Young woman] "Russia is good because nothing sensible 
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Q: Today the central government [Kyiv] announced it will dissolve the regional parliament. Can they actually enforce this decision? A.: I think 
this is absurd. First of all, behind this declaration of joining Russia is Russia itself - the style, the dictation of the announcement in many aspects 
are similar to that of the Russian Foreign Ministry. Secondly, the pro-Russian forces here have militarily alone an overwhelming superiority. If 
you add to that the fact that the majority of the population is Russian speaking or ethnically Russian, and in favour of joining Russia, then I ask 
myself where interim-president Alexander Turtschinow came up with the idea to be able to want the dissolution of the regional parliament. 
And I believe that his statement is nothing but the expression of utter political helplessness.  
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Q.: Was Putin aware of the reaction his grip would trigger? A.: I fear yes. He could not have believed that he would get away with it like 
before in South Ossetia or Abchasia in Georgia, when the West relatively soon after the incidents returned to business as usual. For this, 
the pictures going around the world from Maidan were too symbolic. There, protesters first peacefully, then violently have ousted a 
kleptocratic leader to free the way to Europe, to democracy, and freedom. That is the way it was perceived in the West, and that is [also] 
how it has been characterized. That to take away Crimea from them would be a massive provocation must have been known to Putin. I 
therefore believe that he has not expected to fly below the radar, but that this was a targeted challenge [Kampfansage] to the West. Q: Must 
Putin not fear that the isolation of Russia, and the sanctions that will become known to the public, cause public fear, and that he may lose the 
backing of the population? A.: I don't believe that. For this, Putin controls the mass-media too perfectly. I was shocked myself when I saw the 
images of Russian TV about Kyiv. Even my [Russian] colleagues fear travelling there, although I was there myself for months. This is a parallel 
world that is being established. 'In addition, as a constant of Putin's policy almost, Putin is portraying himself as a counter-pole to the West, a 
brave adversary of the West. And it works wonders here. And it is a Russian reflex to join up in the face of external threats. Not for nothing, 
Ukrainians are called fascists, because this creates a lot of relations to World War II. No, Putin controls this parallel world very perfectly, and 
the real consequences of economic or political sanctions are indeed limited. We have to pay for his oil and gas. I think we have to live with 
that. He is having a very strong position. Q.: I think the big worry in Ukraine, but also in the West, is that Putin will grab the East of Ukraine 
next. Are there any signs that he will not hesitate to do so? A.: I fear yes. If I observe how the media is reporting about what is happening in 
Donetsk, Kharkov, and other cities - that is really always the same story: the newly installed 'fascist' governor gets chased out by brave, Russia-
friendly Ukrainians. That is a sort of preparation for what could happen there. And the logic of Crimea works just as well in the East. One may 
ask - what does Putin have to fear, what would the West do if it were to happen there? An even louder outcry, but possible nothing else. 
And, the laws that were announced here today that is that the association of foreign territories will become easier, as will the handing-out 
of passports to ethnic-Russians, sound more as if Putin just announced the beginning.  
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Q.: Which course of action on Ukraine and Russia do the Germans favour? A.: The Germans favour a course that strengthens Ukraine vis-a-vis 
Russia - but that doesn't increase the risk of war. On top of the list is what the EU has planned anyway, 1) Financial Aid (72% support); Political 
pressure on Russia (62% in favour). Hardly any support receives the idea to exclude Russia from the G8 (only 19%) consider this the right 
response. Similarly, low is the support for a military response (12%). Most noteworthy, I find the number on top - almost three quarters of 
the population favour financial aid [to Ukraine]. I have looked up our archives for numbers that were supporting financial aid to Greece in 
2012. The highest value for supporting financial aid to Greece I found in January 2012, when 46% favoured such a step. Now, this is certainly 
not directly comparable, but still a measure how strong the German population feels solidarity with Ukraine. Q.: This is indeed remarkable, 
that Ukraine is so close to the heart of the Germans. Actually, if one is honest, it Ukraine not for the majority of the population it is a very 
distant, and also foreign country? A.: Yes, but if a country aims for democracy and to join Europe, this is always sympathetic. But I believe 
at the core it has to do with the fact that currently there is an enemy image building up, and the enemy is called Russia. We ask since years 
how much confidence Germans have in other countries, and our partnership with them. And the curve for Russia, which five years ago almost 
reached 40%, is going down, reaching an all-time low of 15 % in March. Behind this is one face, one politician, who is the personification of 
this enemy image: Vladimir Putin. The opinion of the German's about him tell a story: 81% say that politician is a politician that will use any 
available means to achieve his aims [Machiavellian]. 75% believe him to be a politician better not to be trusted. 8% say he is a democratic 
politician. These numbers are crying for a political solution with Russia, because such an enemy image is quickly established, but difficult 
to tear down.  
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That was a shot just short of across the bow today. An alarm-signal to Russia. The U.S. imposes sanctions, the EU follows hesitantly on side 
shows like visa-negotiations, common conferences, and trade talks - which all will be halted for now. Brussels also made clear that if Moscow 
continues its course on Crimea and in Ukraine, tougher measure will be taken. Then the community could quickly agree to a different pace. 
Poland, and the Baltic state are waiting for just that. Today, however, it was right not to impose painful sanctions. Still, all diplomatic options 
must be tested, because the consequences of tougher EU sanctions against Russia, comparable to the U.S. sanctions, would mean a massive 
step backwards for Europe. Back to a divided continent, back into a new Cold War. The U.S. is less worried, they are further away. Whether 
Europeans should be really happy about the fact that [the U.S] they send a destroyer to the Black See, and demonstratively sent arms to 
Poland, is an open question. Fact is - Russia is our direct neighbour. In the conflict about the Crimean Peninsula all sides are losing. Not only 
the West. Also, Putin, namely in reputation before the world community. The weaving of the negotiation-threads must continue, and they 
must - as bitter as this may be - consider Russian security concerns. Only after this has been tried in earnest, only when we find a way out 
of the black and white thinking on Ukraine, and Putin then still doesn't move - then the European Union should decide to fire a real shot 
across the bow.  
 
628 https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/tt5318.html 









solution in phone 
conversation with 
Putin.629 
President Barack Obama spoke on the phone with the Russian president Wladimir Putin on the Russian- Ukrainian conflict. In the conversation, he justified the 
sanction his administration imposed . 'President Obama emphasised that Russia's actions violate the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine, which led 
us to respond - in cooperation with our European partners -with several measures' a press release by the White House said after the conversation which last 
one hour. According to the press release, Obama made clear that a diplomatic solution to the conflict was still possible. Condition for that would be that Moscow 
accepts direct talks with the new government ion Kyiv, supported by international mediation. He called on Putin again to send his troops on Crimea back to 
their bases. According to the Kremlin, Putin emphasized the importance of the bilateral relations between Washington and Moscow. These [Putin/Kremlin] 
"are of utmost importance to global stability and security“ and should not be gambled with because of the conflict with Ukraine. Putin stressed again that 
he does not consider the current leadership in Kyiv to be legitimate.  
 
629 https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/video/video1377584.html 
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07.03.2014 tagesschau.de, 
Interview with Prof. 
Stefan Talmon, 
Professor for Public 
Law, International 
Law and European 
Law at Bonn 
University, on legal 
base for referendum; 
Russian military 
Q: The Crimean parliament voted with a large majority in favour of joining Russia. Does this decision have any legal validity? A.: The Parliament of course can 
decide this and that. The decision, however, to want to belong to Russia, does not have any legal effect, because it is not in accordance with the Ukrainian 
constitution. [Therefore] It is constitutionally, as well as in international law, completely irrelevant. Q.: How about the referendum that Crimea want to hold? 
Would its result be legally binding? A.: The Ukrainian constitution foresees the right for Crimea to hold local referenda on political issues. Changes of the 
territory, however, are the reserve of national referenda. A region, even the autonomous Republic of Crimea, cannot declare by referendum to not want to be 
part of a country, but another one. On this question the entire Ukrainian population would have to decide.  Hence, this local referendum is lacking a legal basis. 
Q: Can Crimea not call upon the right to self-determination? A.: Firstly, the right to self-determination is the right of all Ukrainians. The right to self-determination 
for parts of the population in the sense of a secession only exists under certain specific conditions which are not given on Crimea. And even if that would be the 
case, the right to secession is excluded from the outset if there is external interference, like in this case by Russia. Due to the fact that Russia has brought Crimea 
under its control by using military force of by irregular forces controlled by it, a rightful exercising of the right to self-determination is not possible on Crimea 
anymore. Q. Were Russia’s actions a breach of international law? A.: Yes, and it is important to say this loud and clear over and over again. Because of this, 
no declaration of intent by Crimea to join Russia is legitimate in terms of international law. There even is an international legal obligation of the non-
recognition of situations that have been created by the use of force by a third country. This is the case on Crimea. Q. The Ukrainian government declared it 
will not accept Crimea joining Russia, and now threatens a military response. However, it is not democratically legitimized. It is entitled to take this decision. A.: 
The government has come to power by a revolutionary act that was not in accordance with the constitution. It therefore indeed does not have a constitutional 
legitimacy in Ukraine. In International Law however, this is viewed differently, as it is based on the principle of effectiveness. For the International Community, 
the leadership on Kyiv is the government of Ukraine, because it emerged victoriously form a revolutionary process, and is capable of exercising state powers. 
After the escape of Yanukovych, it is the point of contact for the international community. We are thus faced with the somewhat bizarre situation that a 
government, that is illegal in its own constitution, is legitimate according to international law. Q. The government in Kyiv may also try to win back Crimea 
militarily? A.: A military response by Kyiv would be an attempt to re-establish the territorial integrity and would be covered by International Law. Q.: Why does 
Putin take such risks? He could try to indirectly control Crimea, why does he want the "Anschluss"? A.: Putin has three options. 1) He can try to indirectly 
control Crimea but leave it within Ukrainian territory; 2) Or he bets on a one-sided declaration of independence of Crimea - in other word, the establishment of 
a new state. 3) The third option is a joining with the Russian Federation. From Putin's perspective - also after his experience with the new "states" [emphasis 
original] by the grace of Russia, Georgia and Moldova - this last option appears to be the variant offering the least potential for locally limited sanctions b the 
International community. In the case of an admission, it is not about Crimea anymore, but about Russia. Q.: Could the situation on Crimea get out of control? 
A.: If there is armed conflict on Crimea, then the situation could quickly get out of control. If Ukraine and official Russian troops were to engage, then we 
have a war in the region. So far, Russia has tried to cover-up the intervention, by making uniforms and number plates unidentifiable, and speaks of Crimean 
"self-defence forces". Q.: The West is now imposing first sanctions. Is this the right weapon against violations of international law? A.: International law is 
difficult to impose [Orig.: durchsetzungsschwach]. You can impose sanctions. But their effect is highly questionable. At the end, they may hurt us more than 
them. Let us take a historic comparison. In 1940, the Soviet Union annexed the Baltic states. The international community never recognized this and considered 
the states to formally continue to exist. This was highly symbolic and made it a lot easier for the Baltic states to regain sovereignty. This is what could eventually 
happen in regard to Crimea. But before that, Russia will annex Crimea, force the Ukrainian troops to withdraw from the peninsula and establish its' border 
posts. . And the West will let this happen, because the global political implications of a military reaction would be way too serious. Q: How can Ukraine call 
for legal verdict about Russia's violation of international law? A.: At the moment there is no legal institution that Ukraine could call upon, as this institution 
would also have to be accepted as legitimate and responsible to resolve the issue by Russia. Q: International Law is thus a weak sword? A.: International Law is 
a weak sword - and a sword of the weak. If once upon a time there is a democratic government in power in Russia, then Ukraine can call for a settlement of 
the question on Crimea. A democratic government would have difficulties evading this concern. Q. Poland and the Baltic states fear further Russian aggression 
and requested NATO-support. Is there a risk of further escalation? A.: Russia will not be so careless to extend its grip for power into Poland or the Baltic states. 
These states are under NATO's umbrella. He [Putin] will not step beyond this red line, because this would indeed mean risking a new world war.  
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07.03.2014 tagesschau, 15:00; a) 
Sigmar Gabriel visits 
Kyiv, Report by 
Michael Heussen; b) 
Pro-Crimea 
Demonstrations on 
Red Square in 
Moscow, Interview 
with Udo Lilischkies; 
c) What can be done 
by Obama? Interview 
with Stefan 
Niemann.631 
Sigmar Gabriel on the Maidan in Kyiv. The street barricades are still up, the signs of fighting in the streets on Maidan are visible everywhere. 
The Minister for the economy is notably impressed. Yesterday he spoke with Putin in a one-on-one meeting. This morning, with the Ukrainian 
government. [Gabriel]: "The most sensible first step is to return to the negotiating table immediately. And to talk about how to return to 
an intact Ukraine, without pre-conditions, and without attacking its [Ukr] territory. And secondly, to end the extortive situation in which 
Ukraine is being caught". [Heussen ctd.] Still, soldiers loyal to Russia are besieging Ukrainian military bases on Crimea. And again, the military 
observers from international organisations were denied access to military installations. The Ukrainian prime minister chooses tough word. No 
one in the civilized world would recognize the outcome of the referendum, Yatseniuk said. However, he is willing to speak with the Russian 
government. [Yatseniuk]: Before that, our Russian neighbour must withdraw its army from Crimea, and declare that they will stick to the 
agreements signed [between UKR and RUS]. Furthermore, they must stop supporting terrorists and separatists that are on Crimea." [Heussen 
ctd]: Last night around 200 pro Russian activists tried to storm a government building in Donetsk. They sought to free the provincial 
governor, who was arrested [by Kyiv] two days ago. Ukraine charges him with separatism.   
07.03.2014 tagesschau, 15:00; a) 
Sigmar Gabriel visits 
Kyiv, Report by 
Michael Heussen; b) 
Pro-Crimea 
Demonstrations on 
Red Square in 
Moscow, Interview 
with Udo Lilischkies; 
c) What can be done 
by Obama? Interview 
Q:  Currently, in Moscow, thousands are assembling on the red square to participate in a concert in support of Crimea joining the Russian 
Federation. Songs like 'We belong together' are played. How must this event be rated? A.: Apparently, according to official figures, there are 
50.000 people now. Everything is shown live on TV. The extent of mobilization is not surprising, because Ukraine is very close the Russians, 
it is a brother nation. This is how many Russians feel, and for months now they have seen that Ukraine is in the hands of terrorists, fascists 
and other thugs. This means that there is a genuine feeling 'we must help them' and that is why everyone want Crimea to join the Russian 
Federation; also, as many people here on the square are saying today, much Russian blood has been spilled on the peninsula. Q.: Has the 
critique by the U.S. impressed Putin in any way? A. No, this does not appear to be the case at all. Today, again the OSCE observes on Crimea 
were pushed back by armed men, kept from entering the location of their interest. In the meantime, observers say that is is clearly apparent 
that there are efforts to cover the fact that this is Russian soldiers. Here, in the Kremlin today, a Crimean delegation was welcomed with a 
grand reception by both chambers of the parliament. The President of the Council of the Russian Federation assured the members [of the 
delegation] that if the outcome of the referendum is positive, Crimea will become a full member of the Russian Federation. Interestingly, a 
local station on Crimea did a snap survey about who would vote in favour, and who against the joining up with Russia. Caution: 12% were 
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07.03.2014 tagesschau, 15:00; a) 
Sigmar Gabriel visits 
Kyiv, Report by 
Michael Heussen; b) 
Pro-Crimea 
Demonstrations on 
Red Square in 
Moscow, Interview 
with Udo Lilischkies; 
c) What can be done 
by Obama? Interview 
Q.: We just heard that Putin remains unimpressed by the sanctions. What will, what can Obama do in this situation? A.: Well, that is the mother 
of all questions her in Washington. Indeed, there is not much left in the diplomatic toolbox, and apparently the hesitance to impose tougher 
sanctions on Russia in the White House. Maybe this hesitance can be explained by the consideration that it is better to wait and see if Putin 
will also go for Eastern Ukraine - because if that was to be the case, then the U.S. would have to find a response to that as well. No, Barack 
Obama has done a lot. He appealed, he warned, he spoke on the phone with the man in Moscow whom he doesn't like, as it is being held. 
All of this was to no avail, not much that can be done remains left. It is therefore now expected by many here that Obama will take himself 
aback now, and leave the negotiating to John Kerry, who is said to have an easier relationship with the Russians. He [Kerry] could, together 
with Sergei Lawrow, achieve more than Barack Obama did with Wladimir Putin. At the very least that the dialogue does not break off, and that 
OSCE and UN - observers are accepted on Crimea. That appears to be the hope in Washington.  
 
632 https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/video/video1377580.html 
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07.03.2014 tagesschau, 20:15; 
Linda Zervakis; a) 




Reactions, US Gen. 
Says there was prior 
warning about 
Russias intent, Report 
by Tina Hassel.634 
[see report Michael Heussen on visit of Sigmar Gabriel tagesschau, 07.03.2014, 1500]. [Added closing commentary]: "That the population of 
Crimea will vote in favour of joining Russia can not be taken for granted anymore, it seems. A survey from a source considered reliable 
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07.03.2014 tagesschau, 20:15; 
Linda Zervakis; a) 




Reactions, US Gen. 
Says there was prior 
warning about 
Russias intent, 
Report by Tina Hassel 
a) Intro Zervakis: Internationally, Russia's actions continue to be criticized. Poland and France today spoke favourable of tougher sanctions. In 
Paris, Hollande received the former boxing champion Vitali Klitschko, one of the leaders of the Maidan protests in Ukraine [image also shows 
Pedro Poroshenko and the Ukrainian oligarch that hosted the Yalta Conference in Nov. 2013] The U.S. re-emphasised that Russia's actions are 
violating the territorial integrity of Ukraine. b) Report Hassel: President and First Lady on their way to Florida. A welcome break from the 
telephone - marathon of the last hours. Extensively, Obama exchanged views with Putin. But except for the re-assuring fact that there are 
talks at all, Obama did achieve anything. Today, with a large majority, congress voted in favour of financial aid worth 1 billion U.S. Dollars 
for Ukraine. Compared to the almost 15billion the EU has agreed to, this is a drop of water on a hot stone. The Europeans are hoping for 
more, and there are compromising signs from the otherwise perpetually blocking opposition. [John Boehner, Majority Speaker, Rep.] " We 
welcome these first sanctions and support the President with all leverages he requires to keep Putin in check." [Hassel ctd.] Today, Lt. Gen. 
Michael Flynn surprises with a public statement that the military intelligence had evidence of an upcoming Russian invasion 7-10 days prior 
to the actual invasion. This warning had been handed to the government. [Hassel ctd.]: Meanwhile, a high-end destroyer armed with cruise 
missiles has passed the Bosporus, headed for the Black Sea. Both sides are increasing the pressure in this game of poker. That now even the 
EU has finally made up its' mind on sanctions, and is already considering tougher one, was received very positively her. American and 
Europeans are clear about the fact that an apparent split between them would only play to the favour of Russia.  
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07.03.2014 tagesthemen, Pinar 
Atalay, a) Report 
Stefan Stuchlik on 
situation on Crimea; 
b) Interview tih 
Stefan Stuchlik, 
Simferopol; c) 
Interview with Udo 
Intro Atalay: We might think whatever about Europe, we cannot get around it. Europe is part, present, and future […]. That the self-confident 
Putin gives in in the conflict about Crimea, after the West punished Russia with sanctions was not seriously expected by anyone. He still does 
not want to talk to the current Ukrainian government. Instead, Russia again stood by the side of the Crimean government, which is currently 
preparing to throw itself into the supposedly protecting arms of the big brother Russia. Self-confidently, armed men denied OSCE-staff access 
to Crimea. U.S. and European politicians can be as diplomatic as they want, even if equipped with stick and carrot now - they are not bringing 
about an easing of the tensions. b) Report Stuchlik: The road o Privalnaja [phonetically]. Here, one of Ukraine's largest military bases on Crimea 
is located. IT has been under siege for days now. A single cast of the eye over the area is enough, to see what has changed since yesterday.: 
The occupants besiegers have re-enforced tremendously overnight, including trucks and a field kitchen [images show a large amount of 
modern RUS made military trucks and patrol vehicles]. From their barracks, the Ukrainians view down on their allegedly Russian colleagues - 
a scene just like from a bad comedy, because all here claim that this is normal. Even those under siege. [Stuchlik asking Ukrainian Armed Forces 
guard of Prewalnaja base]: Hello, we are from German TV, can we speak with you? How is it inside there? [Guard]: "Everything is normal, all 
quiet." [Stuchlik} You call it normal that the Russians are at your doorstep?" [Guard]: No. I am not afraid" [images shows guard, and behind 
the gate a Ukrainian tank aimed at entry gate] [Stuchlik ctd.]:Also different to yesterday, today there is a group of women that has assembled 
before the base's gate. I suspect they are Russian teachers from the area, that came here to give moral support to the Russian side. [Woman]: 
"We want to have normalcy and not such a chaos like in Kyiv." [Stuchlik to Woman]: "You are saying this is normal?" [Woman]: "Look, there is 
a group of soldiers marching here; down there they are clearly Russians, they don't harm anyone". [Stuchlik ctd.] Really not? Two minutes 
later a Ukrainian woman appears before the base, and suddenly the peace is over. [Ukrainian woman to other women that have assembled 
before base]: " My son-in-law is in there. I have a right ot be here, I am a relative. And you are just standing around talking stupid." [Same UKR 
woman, now being interviewed by Stuchlik, other women still in the background]: "I just ask for one thing - that the spilling of blood is 
prevented." [Stuchlik ctd] However, this does not make it any quieter before the base. A bus arrives. The Russian side is bringing so-called self-
defenders. Men with orange-black signs, hardboiled, and ready to do anything it takes. That also has not happened a few days ago. The heated 
atmosphere does not even spare the representative of the holy church. [Stuchlik speaking to Kyiv-orthodox priest]: "Two brother-nations ae 
facing each other with arms her. What do you say? [Priest] "I think that definitely no one should invade foreign territory with arms, like here... 
[interrupted by someone shouting from behind, not visible, Stuchlik translates] "Don't believe a word he says, he is from the Ukrainian church, 
he is not a real priest." [priest to shouter] "Quiet, I am giving an interview. The most honest answer we got from one of the newly arrived 
soldiers. [Stuchlik]: " How do you feel about what you are doing?" [uniformed, masked, armed men]: "Bad." [pushes away micro, turns away]. 
[Stuchlik, ctd]: Yes, there is definitely no more precise description of the situation here on Crimea today.  
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07.03.2014 tagesthemen, Pinar 
Atalay, a) Report 
Stefan Stuchlik on 
situation on Crimea; 
b) Interview tih 
Stefan Stuchlik, 
Simferopol; c) 
Interview with Udo 
Lilischkies, Moscow. 
Q: About an hour ago, we received very unsettling news, that said that a Ukrainian military base was apparently literally run over by pro-
Russian fighters. What do you know about this incident? A.: This news are a good case in point to illustrate the level of nervousness on Crimea. 
Also, the nervousness of the newsmakers. The first news today was that regular Russians troops had stormed a missile base - which doesn’t 
make any sense as the missile base for 2 days is officially in Russian or pro-Russian hands. The, it was said that Cossacks [first time mentioning 
Cossacks since Pussy Riot arrest in Sochi], or self-organized Russian defenders had broken through the gate of a normal military base with a 
truck. Again, no one speaks about this anymore. According to our research and a couple of phone calls, could it, notabene, could it be that 100 
to 150 Cossacks drove before the base, and demanded in a loud chorus of voices the handing over - but unarmed. That, at least, pictures 
about the incident on the Internet are suggesting. An armed provocation would not make any sense, Russia want to maintain the semblance 
of legitimacy, and is likely to prevent any aggressive action until the day of the referendum, 16th of March.  
 
635 https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/tt5320.html 
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07.03.2014 tagesthemen, Pinar 
Atalay, a) Report 
Stefan Stuchlik on 
situation on Crimea; 
b) Interview tih 
Stefan Stuchlik, 
Simferopol; c) 
Interview with Udo 
Lilischkies, 
Moscow.636 
Q.: Are there any indications about the possible outcome of the referendum? A.: There is a new survey which I personally find very interesting. 
It was conducted by a highly regarded Institute based in Kyiv, the Institute for Sociology. They say that on Crimea, 40% would vote in favour 
of joining Russia, 60% against. This is very interesting. Also, there are numbers from Eastern Ukraine, which are even more drastic. In 
Donetsk, only a third (33%) of the population is in favour of joining Moscow; in Luhansk, close to the Russian border, it is only a fourth 
(25%). A small, local TV station on Crimea conducted a snap-survey amongst its viewers. The result here - only 12% favour the "Anschluss". 
Does this mean that we now have the chance that there is a different outcome to the referendum than desired by the Kremlin, that we can 
expect a de-escalation by public demand? I think it would be naive to assume that. This would be a tremendous ignominy for Putin, if the 
very people that he wants to protect and rescue from the evil Ukrainians, tell him in the face that they don't want that, they don't want to 
be saved by him. In a nutshell: Observers believe that of course the referendum will not be held freely and fairly, there will be no international 
observers allowed, all is happening under the gun-barrels of those that have a known, vested interest. Therefore, most observers believe that 
the outcome is already certain. It will be in favour of joining the Russian Federation. Q.: Obama spoke on the phone today with Putin. He does 
not seem really impressed by the sanctions. Are there nonetheless signs he might move? A.: No, to the contrary. You already showed images 
of the demonstrations on the red square [see ts. 07.03.2014, Interview U. Lilischkies] in front of Putin's doorstep, so to speak. Media continues 
to provide us with a barrage of the known kind and warn that Ukrainians want to leave their country because they are threatened by 
nationalists. An interesting figure about this, by the way: The same Institute for Sociology in Kyiv that did the survey on the referendum, asked 
who would have a chance to be Ukrainian president. The candidate of the 'Right Sector' the movement bedevilled by Russian state media, 
receives only 1,6% support. Thus, the real dangers are completely different to those shown here on TV. No, what we hear about are massive 
threats to impose countersanctions, if the Europeans would get serious. None of that leaves the impression that Putin is willing to give in. It 
seems much rather that two trains are driving towards each other with ever greater speed.  
 
636 https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/tt5320.html 
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Timoshenko arrives in 
Berlin for medical 
treatment, news by 
Judith Rakers.637 
a) Intro Rakers: In the conflict between Russia and Ukraine, the situation remains tense. According to Ukrainian information, Russia reinforced 
its troop presence on Crimea further. International military observers of the OSCE were denied entry again. On Crimea, supporters as well as 
adversaries to joining Russia took to the streets. b) Report, Michael Heussen: Crimea is our home, we are many. You cannot win against us - 
today, the Maidan in Kyiv was in the hand of women. Traditionally, flowers are gifted on international women's day. Many did not want to 
keep them today. They put them down to commemorate the victims shot by snipers. From different military bases across the country, military 
vehicles started to move out, for exercises only it is being said. These exercises were not announced. In Moscow, the government stressed 
again that it did not provoke the crisis on Crimea. Foreign Minister Lawrwo accused the government in Kyiv to be dependent on radical 
nationalists. [Lawrow] The so called 'Right Sector' decides what is happening in Ukraine. They work with the methods of threat and terror." 
[Heussen ctd] Today in Kyiv, the leader of 'Right Sector' Dmitrij Jarosch, confirmed that he will run for president. He is not expected to have 
any realistic chances. Just before, in the Ukraine Crisis Media Centre, the Ukrainian foreign minister reminded that lessons from history must 
be learnt, and bloody conflict like in earlier conflicts on Russian soil must be prevented, [Andrej Deschtschiza, interim foreign minister]: "In 
the case of South Ossetia, or Abkhazia, the agreements that stopped the conflict were only signed when there was people killed already - 
too late." [Heussen ctd.] To prevent this, the foreign minister said, steps had been taken to establish a international contact group. And 
indeed, a meeting between the sides has occurred already. In Moscow, the deputy foreign minister met with the Ukrainian ambassador. He 
on the other hand was put into this position by the old government, which was considered loyal to the Kremlin. 
 
637 http://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/ts47166.html 
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08.03.2014 tagesschau, 20:00, 
Judith Rakers; a) 
Report on the 
situation in the 
Russian-Ukrainian 
conflict, Michael 
Heussen; b) Situation 
on Crimea, live from 
Simferopol, Stefan 
Stuchlik; c) 
Timoshenko arrives in 
Berlin for medical 
treatment, nes by 
Judith Rakers638 
The situation remains tense her eon Crimea today. OSCE staff was again denied access to the peninsula-. Manifestly, Russia 
wants to prevent a detailed inspection of the military forces employed here. And then, almost by the hour, news is coming in 
about smaller and larger incidents. The last being that Crimean self-defence-forces, by firing into the air, forced a Ukrainian 
military aircraft to turn away. Still, by the way, on what de iure is Ukrainian territory. Everything here in Simferopol moves in 
the direction of Russia. Today we were told here that they are capable to hold a referendum that fulfils international standards 
[see statement by Merkel on legality of referendum, 06.03.2018]. Small, but not irrelevant: In parts of Simferopol, access to 
Ukrainian TV was switched off, and replaced with Russian programs. [no reporting about pro-Ukrainian protests on Crimea] 
08.03.2014 tagesschau, 20:00, 
Judith Rakers; a) 
Report on the 
situation in the 
Russian-Ukrainian 
conflict, Michael 
Heussen; b) Situation 
on Crimea, live from 
Simferopol, Stefan 
Stuchlik; c) 
Timoshenko arrives in 
Berlin for medical 
Yuliya Timoshenko has arrived in Berlin for medical treatment. She is suffering from back pain after several ruptured discs, her doctors from 
Berlin Charité hospital announced, who treated her in Ukraine even while under arrest. The ousted government did not allow her to leave the 
country for medical treatment despite an intervention by the EU.  
 
638 http://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/ts47166.html 
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08.03.2014 tagesthemen, Pinar 
Atalay, a) situation 
on Crimea, Report 
Stefan Stuchlik; b) 
Interview with  Stefan 
Stuchlik; 640 
Intro Atalay: To state that there is haggling about Crimea would be too positive. Because there are no negotiations, but only threats. While 
the U.S. and France are already speaking of imposing the next level of sanctions, Putin, unimpressed gambles for power. The Russian 
president plays roulette. He bets everything on Crimea, on the pro-Russian forces present on the peninsula that rather wants to be East 
than West. Again, armed men showed international observers that they are not welcome. Again, with warning shots. One almost gets the 
impression that Putin has long won this conflict. b) Report Stuchlik: Cossacks, come here - the Russian side mobilizes everything today that 
could impress the population of Simferopol - on the government seat, the Russian flag is waiving. On the Lenin Square - yes, it is still called 
that - out of the blue a stage is built, bands are playing marching tunes. 'Festival of friendship' the event is called - one can already guess who 
the friend is in this case. Only the police on the sides, with their blue-yellow badges on their uniform remind us about the fact that this is 
actually still Ukrainian territory. [Stuchlik asking policeman]: " How do you feel in your uniform if everyone is for Russia?" [Policeman] "Don't 
try to get me to talk because I don't talk while I am on duty." [Stuchlik ctd] Even World War II veterans are brought by the Russian propaganda 
machine - once against fascism, now against Kyiv, that was the message. [Stuchlik to WW2-veteran]: "Tell me, why are you here?" [Veteran] " 
I am one the last surviving Red Army officers. I know what you have to fight against. And when I was called today, and asked to come, I happily 
agreed to the request of our leadership." [Stuchlik ctd] On the stage, the moderator congratulates all women on international women's day. 
The girls dancing next to the stage of course would prefer to party, but they have to appear - also by higher orders. [Stuchlik asking young 
girls dancing next to stage] "You don't even know why you are here? [Girl]: "No. We were called and told we should dance as a present to 
the people" [Stuchlik ctd.] Every day, with pop-music and dance, unity and strength are to be demonstrated. Besides the Cossacks, the martial 
pro-Russian self-defence-forces [shows volunteers with orange-black arm wrists, stops for close up of old man with glasses amongst them]. 
Until the day of the referendum, there is only one message here. [Old lady in uniform] "I have learned German at school and want to tell the 
Germans that everything will be alright, and the right side will be triumphant." [Stuchlik ctd] The right side, however, feel like the winner 
already. In all of a sudden, we were attacked from bystanders, who told us that we were liars and should disappear [images show Stuchlik 
in an argument with bystanders]. Opinions differing from the official line are not in high demand on Crimea anymore.  
08.03.2014 tagesthemen, Pinar 
Atalay, a) situation on 
Crimea, Report 
Stefan Stuchlik; b) 
Q:: Despite all this, pro Ukrainian assembled in Crimea today - could they at all make their voices heard? A.: We all found this to be very brave. 
There was a small demonstration before the parliament, not many people, 20-40 maybe, with Ukrainian flags. Brave, as I said, but also brief, 
as the protest was over within 30 minutes, which speaks of itself. The only ones that dare to walk through town with Ukrainian national 
insignia are the police. One almost feels sorry for them, because they may not talk to anyone, they can't control anyone - which they don't 
do anyway. They know that they are doomed to a puppet-status. Q.: International Observers appear not particularly welcome. You seem to 
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Interview with  
Stefan Stuchlik; 641 
have experienced some of the aggression yourself today. A.: The OSCE observers are not allowed in. In my opinion, because Putin wants to 
prevent them from finding that there are indeed regular Russian troops on Crimea, despite him being in constant denial of this. Regarding 
the journalists, the climate simply is getting rougher. Yesterday an AP journalist was physically attacked. We are experiencing more and more 
problems to enter conversations with people here, because everyone thinks that this is over anyway - so why react to the questions of a 
critical, Western, journalist? 
09.03.2014 tagesschau, 20:00 Jan 
Hofer; a) Report on 
situation in Russian-
Ukrainian conflict, 




a) Intro Hofer: Diplomatic efforts to solve the conflict between Ukraine and Russia are treading water. Again, Chancellor Merkel spoke with 
Putin on the phone. According to her spokesman, Steffen Seibert, Merkel called the Referendum about the breaking off of Crimea from 
Ukrainian territory as illegal. Putin maintained that the referendum is in accordance with International Law. The Ukrainian government 
categorically ruled out a separation of Crimea b) Report Heussen: A leading figure in the fight for freedom and independence. Every Ukrainian 
schoolchild knows the poet Tarus Shevchenko. His 200th birthday falls exactly in the time in which Ukraine is facing a tensile test. Threatened 
from within and from the outside. [Yatseniuk speaking on the occasion of birthday commemoration, next to him Interim President Turtschinow 
behind him Ukrainian clerics. Ukrainian flags and red-black flags are being waved.] "Our forefathers spilled blood for this country. And we 
will give not away a centimetre of the Ukrainian earth. Russia and his President must know this!". Last night, Kremlin-critic Mikhail 
Khodorkovsky came to Kyiv [living in exile with personal support of Merkel, Dec. 2013]. 'You must defend your freedom' he told the fighters 
of Maidan. He spoke of Russian lies, of propaganda - but also that there is a different, peace-loving Russia. The old, Soviet Russia, was 
celebrated on Lenin-Square in Simferopol today. The Russian navy was playing patriotic songs, campaigning for the referendum next weekend. 
Military observers of the OSCE were denied access for the fourth day. They want to try every day anew, as long as the government in Kyiv so 
desires. A Ukrainian reconnaissance aircraft is targeted - the Ukrainian border guards publish a video that allegedly shows Russian soldiers in 
their position on Crimea [source give: "Internet video"]. The plane is being shot at but can turn without suffering damage. Russia sent out one 
of its largest war ships to Ukraine today, and the government in Kyiv decided to increase defence spending None of these signalling a de-
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09.03.2014 tagesschau, 20:00 Jan 
Hofer; a) Report on 
situation in Russian-
Ukrainian conflict, 




Despite heavy criticism from the West, the preparations here for the referendum are running on full steam. Today, the distribution of 
electorates was decided and announced. There are rumours that, once Crimea joins the Russian Federation, wages would rise threefold. it is 
unknown where these rumours are coming from, officially this was never claimed. Moscow today announced a financial aid package worth 
800 Mio. U.S. Dollars for Crimea, after yesterday Kyiv stopped all financial flows to Crimea. Small, but maybe interesting detail: the Ukrainian 
national railway stopped services to Crimea because travelling to Crimea is too dangerous for Ukraine, it was said.  
09.03.2014 tagesthemen, Pinar 
Atalay; reports from 
tagesschau, 20:15.643 
Intro Atalay: A common enemy unites. In attempts to make the best of a bad job, countries are uniting their efforts that are not necessarily 
best friends. Turkey and China are now siding with Germany in the diplomatic fight against Putin. Today, the phone wires around the globe 
turned red: On the one end - always chancellor Merkel.First, in the presence of British Prime Minister David Cameron, she spoke with Putin. 
Then, she dialled the number of the Turkish colleague Erdogan. After that she spoke with the Chinese president Xi Jinping. The closer the 
referendum is approaching, the more intense the diplomatic efforts are becoming. Putin, however, seems unimpressed by being more and 
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The pro-Russian government on Crimea is pushing the tempo. It wants to continue to pave the way to split Crimea as quickly as possible from 
Ukraine and join Russia. Against all protests from Kyiv, and threats of sanctions by the West. The chairman of the pro-Russian regional 
parliament, Wladimir Konstantinov, said that the change to a different legal system will be challenging, but that he is nonetheless sure that 
Crimea will be able to adopt it within a month. [Konstantinov]: "I believe the inhabitants of Crimea will, provided everything works out fine, 
after the referendum, towards the end of March, feel like citizens of a new country. Namely as citizens of their homeland. They are not 
travelling anywhere - they are coming home." [Sambale ctd.] The government in Simferopol has called for a referendum next Sunday. The 
inhabitants of Crimea are to decide whether they want to continue to belong to Crimea, or officially joining the Russian Federation. With its 
decision to join Russia, the parliament has already given a direction. Additionally, chairmen of the parliament Konstantinov is also luring with, 
a financial aspect. He promised that the wages of bureaucrats, soldiers, police, and doctors will quadruple after joining Russia. Indeed, a 
majority in favour is likely - 60% of the Crimean population are ethnic Russians, that do not feel represented by the new government in Kyiv. 
Many declare that they do not want to be governed by the 'fascist' and 'nationalist' in Kyiv and are worried about their rights. And the pro-
Russian head of government of Crimea, Sergei Aksionow is happy that Russia interfered as protecting power. [Aksionow]: "We want that no 
one is hurt, neither civilians nor soldiers. Today, we live in peace and tranquillity. The crime rate has gone down by a third". [Sambale ctd.] But 
the other inhabitants on Crimea, the minorities are alarmed. Especially the Crimean Tatars fear suppression, if Russia takes over full control. 
As a reaction to the plans to separate, the government in Kyiv has frozen the accounts of the members of the regional government. A military 
reaction was again excluded by Ukrainian [interim] foreign minister Andrij Detschizja in an interview with the Russian channel FO Moskvi 
[phonetically]. "In this question Ukraine maintains its peaceful position. We want to collaborate with our EU and U.S. colleagues to exert 
pressure on Russia in order to bring about talks about a settlement of the conflict. If we cannot lead direct talks, then we can at least voice 
our concern through our partners" [Sambale ctd.] Internationally, this week will also be marked by continued efforts to start talks. But so 
many facts have been created already that Crimea seems lost for Ukraine. 
10.03.2014 tagesschau 15:00, 
Report on domestic 
German debate on 
Russia - Ukraine 
conflict, Hans Jessen 
With decisive strides defence minister UvdL appeared before the camera. She believes targeted sanctions are possible, with political support 
also from the opposition. [UvdL]: " Sanctions, if they are chosen smartly, particularly target the rich, the oligarchs in Russia. They are the ones 
that will quickly feel it, if they are not able to travel for business anymore, if their accounts are frozen, if the purse is getting a bit tighter, if 
their business-continuity is interrupted - and they have influence on Putin." [Cem Özdemir, Chairmen, Alliance 90/Greens]: "Therefore there 
is a high degree of agreement with the course the government, especially of chancellor Merkel and foreign minister Steinmeier, in regard 
to the measures taken". [Jessen ctd] Before the Ukrainian embassy in Berlin, flowers and candles for the victims among the Kyiv-Maidan-
protesters. Also, the [Ukrainian] ambassador [in Berlin] demands targeted sanctions. [Pavlo Klimkin, Ukrainian ambassador to Berlin, later 
foreign minister of Ukraine]: "It is also important to note that such sanctions are not aimed at the Russian population. We need also the 
support of Russians. Russia also belongs to Europe. That is why we need effective sanctions targeting the Russian leadership." [Jessen ctd]: 
The solidarity with the victims is as high as the challenges are to identify sanctions that don't hurt the wrong ones.  
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10.03.2014 audio, Jens Borchers, 
HR: The hour for 
Talking, negotiating, fathoming agreements, striking compromises - federal foreign minister Frank Walter Steinmeier believes in these 
measures. This is how he is doing politics when the protests in Kyiv are running the danger of turning into a bloodbath. Together with his 
foreign minister colleagues from Poland and France he travels to Kyiv. The three want to talk, negotiate, fathom agreements, and strike 
compromises. Frank Walter Steinmeier knows of the risks associated with such a mission. [Steinmeier, before negotiations in Kyiv, 20/21.02] 
" I believe we are of course uncertain about what we can achieve here." [Borchers ctd] Then the three ministers disappear in negotiating 
rooms. 36 hours later, Frank Walter Steinmeier reappears at Hamburg Airport, saying that he is happy with the agreement reached. But first 
of all he warns caution. [Steinmeier]: "We do not want to cheer pre-maturely. This is a framework agreement that now must be filled with real 
politics." [Borchers ctd]. On the next day, the Ukrainian president Yanukovych has disappeared, the first troops without insignia appear on 
Crimea. In the following days, The Russian government claims that it is answering calls for help of the population from Crimea. The peninsula 
is de-facto annexed without open violence. The federal government, and its foreign minister fan out their diplomatic line. The aims are: 1. 
Prevent escalation; 2. if nothing helps, then at some point there could be sanctions against Russia; 3. a negotiated solution. We want a 
contact group for all parties affected, so there can be talks. Negotiations? Contact Groups? For Werner Schuly, Green MEP, this all sounds 
too dull, too weak, and too soft. [Schuly]: "Putin is a criminal - how many more contact groups do you want to establish? We have the Minsk 
Group to settle the conflict about Nagorno-Karabakh, we have the 5+2talks to bring the Transnistria conflict to a settlement, we have the 
Geneva talks for about South Ossetia and Abkhazia." [Borchers ctd] And all these are territories, Schulz reminds, that were illegally occupied 
by Russian forces. And now another talking circle about Crimea - Schulz expects Putin to just laugh at that. And while the government continues 
to push for negotiations, the debate on sanctions is picking up pace. Everyone knows that sanctions always have negative consequences for 
both sides. And in the case of punitive actions against Russia, Germany would also be affected. No other European country is so closely linked 
to Russia. Sanctions would hurt Germany badly. In addition, it also looks as if Germany would have to say goodbye to the modernisation-
partnership with Russia, for want of a partner willing to modernise, since Putin would need to be such a [willing] partner after all. Furthermore, 
there is a risk of a return of the Cold War to Europe. To top it all, the government's diplomatic efforts are side-lined by voices from the past. 
Horst Teltschik, former security advisor of chancellor Helmut Kohl, rants about the lack of creativity of the European Russia policy in general, 
and specifically the German policy. [Teltschik] " Two to three weeks ago, Putin was in Brussels and picked up on an old idea developed by 
Romano Prodi, to establish a pan-European free trade area. That means that would be an idea, if we want to sign an association agreement 
with Ukraine, and want to offer something to Russia in parallel, and thereby consider all parties' interest." [Borchers ctd] Former chancellor 
Gerhard Schröder, SPD, who now earns his income form the Russian Gazprom warns about sanctions. [Schröder]: Don't get yourself lured into 
a sanctioning spiral, because first of all it destroys a lot, which then eventually must be repaired again, and secondly, it hurts us more than 
others." [Borchers]: Thus, the critique, also on diplomacy of the European lead-state Germany: First you did the wrong Russia policy. And 
now you bet on punitive measures that will hurt yourself. Minister of Economics Sigmar Gabriel, last week on a diplomatic mission, responds 
to the criticism in the following way: [Gabriel] "None of what has happened here justifies the breaking of international law. That is why it is 
so important that Gerhard Schröder made clear that nothing justifies this breach. WE just must do anything to prevent our continent from 
being drawn back into terrible times. At some point, then the arms-race begins anew - that, I believe, is the largest worry we must have at 
the moment." [Borchers ctd] How to rid oneself of this worry quickly, not even Germany diplomacy has a smart response. Talking, negotiating, 
fathoming agreements, striking compromises - all that only works if the counterpart feels duly taken into consideration. And, if he is ready to 
talk.  
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10.03.2014 tagesschau, Linda 
Zervakis 20:00, a) 
NATO sends AWACS 
planes to Eastern 
a) Intro Zervakis: In response to the Crisis on Crimea, NATO sends AWACS reconnaissance plane to the two neighbouring countries of Ukraine, 
Poland and Romania. This was decided by the NATO-ambassadors in Brussels. The aircraft are to observe the crisis in Ukraine. Next Sunday 
the population on Crimea is asked to cast their vote about a joining with Russia. The government in Moscow today announced own steps to 
settle the crisis. a) Report Heussen: They want to take into consideration the interest of all Ukrainian, and resolve the crisis on the basis of 
international law - this was stressend in a [screened] one-to-one meeting between President Putin and his foreign minister Lawrow, in Sochi. 
But here on Crimea, this does not seem to count. Pro-Russian Berkut-militias strictly control the access to Crimea, at a border, that should 
not exist. In Kyiv, again the masses took to Maidan. Most had the day off due to a public holiday. Behind the walls of parliament, however, 
work continued: The secretary-seneral of the Council of Europe (SGCoE) visits the president. [Thorbjörn Jagland, SGCoE]: "I will try to send an 
observer mission to Crimea and the east of the Republic - to make sure that the rights of minorities are being guaranteed". [Heussen ctd] The 
U.S. ambassador to Kyiv speaks of a Russian invasion on Crimea. Washington moved ahead a military exercise on the Polish - Ukrainian border. 
NATO send AWACS planes to Poland and Romania. The U.S. ambassador, Geoffrey Pyatt, assuages: [Geoffrey Pyatt] "From a U.S. perspective, 
there can be no military solution. We must applaud the military forces of Ukraine that they did not let themselves be provoked." On Crimea, 
already despite all protests, the ballot boxes are standing ready. The electoral list for the referendum is being put together surprisingly 
quickly.  That the referendum is going to be called off is unlikely. Europe and the U.S. must expect that a majority of the Crimeans will vote 
in favour of joining Russia. But then what? More sanctions, more military on the borders? Now, a plan for the time after the referendum 
must be developed.  
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10.03.2014 tagesthemen; Pinar 
Atalay:  a) CoE 
Initiative; Ukraine 
Minister of Defence 
orders combat 
readiness, Report on 
developments of day, 
Golineh Atai; b) 
Crimea establishes 
army, Report Stefan 
Stuchlik c) Interview 
with Stefan Stuchlik, 
Simferopol; d) World 
Bank offers 3bn 
financial aid to 
Ukraine, Atalay647 
Intro Atalay: The image of a tensile test - it fits frighteningly well for the situation in Ukraine. And almost by the day, it becomes more plastic. 
Already split within, the country is torn back and forth. By powers of the West and in the East. The question is who wins this power-struggle 
at the end. Although NATO took a decision today to send AWACS reconnaissance plane to Poland and Romania, but Putin continues to remain 
unimpressed by the threatening gestures of the West. But Europe is not giving up yet. Again today, diplomatic strings were pulled. b) Report 
Atai: Preparations for the emergency. Full combat readiness was ordered by the [Ukrainian] minister of defence [see statement by Ukrainian 
foreign minister 09.03.2014, no military reaction] - part of the nationwide exercises are also these roadblocks by the border guards close to 
the Crimean Peninsula. In Kyiv, a new Western player appeared on the stage today. The Council of Europe, like the OSCE, belongs to the 
broad coalition that Berlin wants to mobilize tomorrow to increase the pressure on Moscow. Both sides, government and Council, agreed 
to establish a truth-commission to establish who fired the shots on Maidan. [Thorbjörn Jagland, SGCoE]: "One of the large problems here is 
that citizens distrust the public institutions. That's why we need such a commission". [Atai, ctd] The former president of the European Court 
on Human Rights will lead the investigation on who is responsible for the murder on Maidan. Kremlin speaks about snipers belonging to the 
opposition who wanted to escalate the situation; the Ukrainian say that intelligence services had positioned the snipers. The medic Maxim 
Popov wan on Maidan on the 22.02.2014, he only saw protesters dying, by shots through head, heart, lung. [Popov] "I don't think the 
perpetrators will ever be identified. You know, too much time has passed already. All evidence of what happened is covered up, destroyed by 
now. Such an investigation should have taken place the day after the killings. Now it is almost useless." [Atai ctd] Decision number 2 [of the 
agreement between CoE and Ukraine]: The Council of Europe will try to send observers to Crimea, to find out about the rights of minorities, 
Jews and Muslims, on Crimea. Recently a synagogue was smeared over with swastika graffities on Crimea. This is new and very strange, says 
the chief-rabbi of the Kyiv-Jews. For decades, the Jews lived unharmed on Crimea. His friend, a journalist, sees Russian propaganda at work 
on Crimea. After all, Russia need to justify its invasion, he says. [Schimon Briman, Ukrainian journalist] "I truly have the suspicion that there is 
a connection between the vandalism and the invasion. As if someone vandalized the buildings, to later on be able to say 'we came to protect 
and safe the Jews against pogroms'."[Atai ctd]: The Jewish Community in Kyiv is annoyed that Russian media speaks of a fascist power grab in 
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10.03.2014 tagesthemen; Pinar 
Atalay:  a) CoE 
Initiative; Ukraine 
Minister of Defence 
orders combat 
readiness, Report on 
developments of day, 
Golineh Atai; b) 
Crimea establishes 
army, Report Stefan 
Stuchlik c) Interview 
with Stefan Stuchlik, 
Simferopol; d) World 
Bank offers 3bn 
financial aid to 
Ukraine, Atalay.648 
Intro Zervakis: Although de iure Crimea still belongs to Ukraine - the closer the date of the referendum is approaching, the stronger grows the 
impression that Crimea is already Russian. A self-announced head of government [?] already exists, and, as our correspondent Stephan Stuchlik 
reports, also an army is being built up. b) Report Stuchlik: Even the Ukrainian national flag was quickly painted over with the Russian colours. 
Soldiers, in masses as if this was an action movie. Absurd is not strong enough a word to describe this event. It is supposed to be the official 
birth of the Crimean Army. Inside, military music is played from a cassette-deck, then quickly the text of the new oath glued on [unclear on 
what exactly, images show booklet, which is later handed to each new member]. And here, the pride of the Crimean forces is standing, 50 
volunteers that were recruited with lightning speed - men in woollen masks. The pro-Russian side directs the spectacle on the inner court of 
a Ukrainian administration building. [Stuchlik asking old man present at event]: "Can you actually do this? This is still Ukrainian territory... [Old 
men] "Well, still. You rightly pointed out still. I hope that these soldiers soon serve another great state. I believe in that." [Stuchlik ctd] But first 
of all they serve a friend of this other, great nation. Sergei Aksionow, self-proclaimed prime minister of Crimea, as of today is commander in 
chief [of the new Crimean Army]. The swearing the oath ceremony. and if one goes really close, you realize that the soldiers that are supposed 
to protect the entire peninsula are afraid of television. Allegedly, the new Crimean Army is already more than 1000 soldiers strong. But one 
question Sergei Aksionow must be asked: [Stuchlik asking Aksionow] " This is not legal; you are not the elected president" [Aksionow]: " I 
never claimed that. Eleven days ago, the Crimean Highest Council empowered me with the warrant to establish an army before the 
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10.03.2014 tagesthemen; Pinar 
Atalay:  a) CoE 
Initiative; Ukraine 
Minister of Defence 
orders combat 
readiness, Report on 
developments of day, 
Golineh Atai; b) 
Crimea establishes 
army, Report Stefan 
Stuchlik c) Interview 
with Stefan Stuchlik, 
Simferopol; d) World 
Bank offers 3bn 
financial aid to 
Ukraine, Atalay.649 
Q.: In your feature we just saw one of the separatist groups on Crimea. Is this a new state already, establishing itself? A.: Well, for that one 
would have to assume that the government of Crimea acts autonomously. And if you look at what happened over the past days: the 
establishment of the electoral commission; the distribution of the electorates; the handing out of the electoral lists; the distribution of the 
ballots; the establishment of a new army; and of course the massive propaganda snake that moves through Crimea and Simferopol - then 
I dare to doubt that the government of Crimea, with its limited resources, manages to get all this machinery rolling by itself. No, there must 
be a mastermind in-between, probably from Moscow. And then the direction is also clear, and that is Russia. Q.: How are the minorities 
between all these growing pro-Russian groups? A: At the moment there is a tug of war about the minorities, especially the Crimean Tatars 
representing 12-15% [earlier reporting Stuchlik: 20%] of Crimea's population. They refuse en bloc to even participate in the referendum. They 
do not recognize it. Apparently, and we also believe that, behind closed doors there are negotiations with the Tatars to change their mind. 
Not to vote in favour of Russia, but to participate in the referendum. Because the Crimean governments want to have a referendum that 
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10.03.2014 tagesthemen; Pinar 
Atalay:  a) CoE 
Initiative; Ukraine 
Minister of Defence 
orders combat 
readiness, Report on 
developments of day, 
Golineh Atai; b) 
Crimea establishes 
army, Report Stefan 
Stuchlik c) Interview 
with Stefan Stuchlik, 
Simferopol; d) World 
Bank offers 3bn 
financial aid to 
Ukraine, Atalay.650 
News announcement Atalay: World Bank will support the Ukrainian government with 3 billion U.S. $ - the Crimea crisis and its possible 
economic consequences increasingly affect the global financial marketplaces. For the first time, U.S. markets are also affected. However, the 
fear of a new Cold War faded and is increasingly replaced by hopes for a diplomatic crisis. This is the reason why the downward spiral on the 
markets is now slowing down. b) Markus Grüne, Frankfurt stock Exchange: The stock markets continue in crisis mode. Besides the crisis on 
Crimea, there are weak indicators from China and Japan that cause the markets to worry.  
 
650 https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/tt5326.html 
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10.03.2014 audio, Achim 
Wendler [no 
affiliation given]: The 
German 
governments art of 
suppression.651 
Where is actually Volker Kauder? It would be time now for the favourite sentence of the leader of the CDU faction in Bundestag. 'Politics starts 
with looking at the realities'. Because in the case of Ukraine, the government persistently denies looking at the realities. And, as a consequence, 
it is not doing policy. It really is a kind of suppression what is happening in Berlin. For days, the announcement from Berlin to Moscow is that 
'any further escalation will have consequences'. The reality is that Putin for days now does nothing else to de-stabilise; he broke international 
law; he threatens; he let's his soldiers annex Crimea little by little; he lies to the international community; he refuses serious communications; 
in a nutshell: Putin simply does his thing - undeterred, and without compromising on it. That is the reality that neither Merkel nor her foreign 
minister want to acknowledge. Accordingly, their policy: It is guided by two unrealistic premises: hope and fear. Hope, that Putin - at some 
point - will allow OSCE observers on to Crimea; that he will recall the so-called referendum planned for this Sunday - or at least postpones it; 
that Putin will stop threatening and call his troops back. Merkel and Steinmeier don’t want to let any of these hopes die. That is why they 
continue to keep the dialogue channels open, as they call it. Unrealistic. With someone who does not want to talk, you can't talk. And on the 
other hand there is, as said earlier, fear: Fear that Russia might close the gas-tap [war-threat? arms race? new Cold War? division of Europe? 
It is this fear that keeps Europe from imposing effective sanction. Thus, instead of policy, hope and fear. Two equally bad advisors in a situation 
like this. Angela Merkel has experienced it herself often enough. The only thing that impresses Putin is steadfastness. But steadfast can only 
be who is completely visionary, or who has both feet firmly on the ground - respectively, looks at the realities. Kauder''s favourite phrase has 
never been as important as now.  
 
651 https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/politikimradio/audio119190.html 
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11.03.2014 tagesschau, 20:00; 




Golineh Atai; b) EU 
lowers import tariffs 
for Ukraine, News, 
Rakers; c) Steinmeier 
a) Intro Rakers: The regional parliament    on Crimea increasingly pushes for a secession from Ukraine and joining Russia. With a large majority, 
the parliamentarians today voted in favour of a declaration of independence, which shall come into effect immediately after the 
referendum,, if the population votes in favour of joining Russia. The interim government in Kyiv responded with strong criticism, and again 
demanded that Russia withdraws its troops. b) Report Golineh Atai: Everything goes, according to plan. The parliamentarians that came to 
power by a coup d’état [when?] of the regional parliament of Crimea, today already are preparing a declaration of independence - for the day 
after the referendum. They are planning to confiscate Ukrainian state property. The parliamentarians in Ukraine are fighting against time. 
Many believe Crimea is lost already - today, the Prime Minister reminded of the Budapest Memorandum, in which the U.S., United Kingdom 
and Russia agreed to respect the borders of Ukraine 20years ago. [Yatseniuk] "Our country is the victim of a military aggression. Those that 
once guaranteed that there may be no such aggression must withdraw their troops. And the others should defend an independent and 
sovereign state". Meanwhile, in Russian exile, Victor Yanukovych stepped before the press again. He insisted that he still is the legitimate 
president of the country. Addressing the new leadership, he said: [Yanukovych] " Your actions have led to the secession of Crimea". [Atai ctd] 
The Russian parliament want to decide how [Russian] passports can be handed out in the fastest possible way - already next week, the 
peninsula could become part of the Russian Federation. Tomorrow the Ukrainian prime minister will visit Washington, and together with the 
support of the U.S. seek to halt the development on Crimea.  
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11.03.2014 tagesschau, 20:00; 




Golineh Atai; b) EU 
lowers import tariffs 
for Ukraine, News, 
Rakers; c) Steinmeier 
visits Baltic States, 
Report A. Henze.653 
Rakers: The European Union wants to support the Ukrainian economy by lowering import tariffs. The idea presented by the European 
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11.03.2014 tagesschau, 20:00; 




Golineh Atai; b) EU 
lowers import tariffs 
for Ukraine, News, 
Rakers; c) Steinmeier 
visits Baltic States, 
Report A. Henze.654 
a) Intro Rakers: Foreign minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier continued his diplomatic efforts today. Consecutively he held talks in the three Baltic 
states Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. The three states are EU members and share a border with Russia. Because of this, the conflict between 
Ukraine and Russia is watched with great concern. b) Report Henze: Today's spring weather contributed little to the joy of the foreign minister 
- the concern about a new ice-age with Russia is accompanying him to any of his steps through the three Baltic republics, which are also EU 
and NATO members. The fears he heard were large. [Edgars Rinkevics, foreign minister of Latvia] " The crisis on Crimea in many aspects 
reminds us of 1940, as the Soviet Union first threatened and destabilized us, and then occupied us with armed force". [Henze ctd] Frank-
Walter Steinmeier could only repeat in response what he already promised in the morning in Estonia: [FWS] " I am also here to say: We will 
not let Estonia and the Baltic states alone". [Henze]There are currently conflicts with the large Russian minorities in the Baltic states, for 
example in education policy. And only a few years ago, Moscow also fuelled the conflict about Russian memorials [2007] - with riots as a 
consequence. It is feared now that Russia could kindle with the population groups again. Germany's position towards tougher sanctions against 
Russia as response to the crisis on Crimea was of particular interest. [FWS]: " If the referendum takes place next Sunday, then at the very 
latest on Monday we will have reached the next decision-level" [Henze]This would include the freezing of accounts and travel restrictions. The 
hosts, however, were not satisfied with warm words of solidarity only. Over and over Steinmeier had to re-assure that Germany is willing to 
contribute to far-reaching sanctions, if there is no other way out of the crisis on Crimea. But in that, even the German foreign minister does 
not appear to believe anymore."  
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Date Event Summary/Transcript 
11.03.2014 tagesthemen, Pinar 
Atalay; a) Michael 
Heussen reports 
about propaganda 
war in Kyiv; b) 
Steinmeier visits 
Baltic states, Report 
Claas Oliver Richter; 
c) Commentary on 
Steinmeier's 
diplomatic efforts in 
the Baltics, Claudia 
Buchenmeier.655 
a) Intro Atalay: Putin sadly misses the Soviet Union - that is not a secret. He dreams of a USSR reloaded. A part of this would be Crimea, 
where the parliament today already declared its independence. This does not mean independence however - it means more dependency on 
Russia. Also, the referendum on Crimea is nothing more than farcical. The rift between the governments in Kyiv and on Crimea, however, is 
getting ever deeper. Day by day the danger increases that it could turn into a trench. There is enough inflammable matter, as Michael Heussen 
Reports. b) Report, Heussen: Just a few hundred meters away from the Maidan in Kyiv, are the headquarters of the Ukrainian interior secret 
service. Only rarely journalists are invited into this building. Therefore, many followed today's invitation. The new director, in office since only 
two weeks, wanted to announce a sensation. [Valentin Nalywaischenko, Director Secret Services Ukraine] "Last night we have arrested the 
leader of a radical youth-movement in Luhansk. This organisation has a radical, illegal character. It is a threat for the security of the citizens of 
Luhansk." [Heussen ctd] Then he leaves, and lets his speaker present the evidence. The alleged perpetrator, a gun and material to build a 
bomb can be seen on blurry pictures. Can we believe this alleged investigation success, or is this supposed to be anti-Russian propaganda? 
[Marina Ostapenko, spokeswoman, Secret Service Ukraine] " I do not understand your question - why should you not trust us? We work very 
correctly with very concrete evidence. If you love doubts, then you will have to wait until the investigation has been concluded". [Heussen 
ctd]: Propaganda also comes from Russia. The toppled president speaks from exile, insisting that he still is the legitimate president and 
commander-in-chief of Ukraine. [Yanukovych]: "A group of ultra-nationalists and neo-fascists have taken control in Kyiv. I want to ask the 
Western patrons of this government: Have you turned a blind? Have you forgotten what fascism is?" [Heussen ctd] So, apparently, they are 
fascists that came to power in a coup d'etat - tha parliamentarian in Kyiv. They demanded Russia to stop the aggression. The firing power of 
their own army is to be improved a quickly as possible. [Alexander Turtschinow, interim President Ukraine]: "We have decided to establish a 
Ukrainian national guard. We will not draft in 18 year olds but will sign on those that have already served. This guard is being established 
to protect the Ukrainian population against all enemies within, and all aggressions from abroad."  [Heussen ctd]. [Today] the Ukrainian 
ministry of defence published images of military exercises. It is, however, not clear when these images were taken. War-propaganda, here 
also. The parliamentarians in the Crimean regional parliament remained unimpressed by this. Kyiv threatens to resolve their parliament 
tomorrow. They, however declared the peninsula's independence already - before the referendum. 
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Date Event Summary/Transcript 
11.03.2014 tagesthemen, Pinar 
Atalay; a) Michael 
Heussen reports 
about propaganda 
war in Kyiv; b) 
Steinmeier visits 
Baltic states, Report 
Claas Oliver Richter; 
c) Commentary on 
Steinmeier's 
diplomatic efforts in 
the Baltics, Claudia 
Buchenmeier.656 
a) Intro Atalay: In face of these facts, deep inside, one or the other European politician may have wished farewell to diplomacy already. But 
the mills are steadily continuing to grind. Because a Cold War reloaded, and particularly something worse, nobody wants. Today, foreign 
minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier travelled to the three Baltic states to demonstrate that Europe is on their side. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, 
all three are NATO and EU members in the last 10 years. Well, and now, the Baltics worry that Putin's arm will also reach for their countries. 
b) Report Claas-Oliver Richter: [...] Frank Walter Steinmeier wants to calm down the Baltic States, take their fears about aggressive Russian 
policy. ['FWS] " I am also here to say: we don’t leave Estonia and the Baltic states alone with that". [Richter ctd] The fear of the Baltics cannot 
be taken away with this alone. 25% of the Estonian inhabitants are Russian, many feel deprived. So far, no one here is calling for Russian 
support, but many fear a further split between the Baltic and the Russian parts of the population. [...] Even Steinmeier, who is usually focussing 
on de-escalation, can now imagine tougher sanctions against Russia - after the planned referendum on Crimea. [FWS]: If the referendum is 
held on Sunday, at the very latest on Monday we will have reached the next decision -level."   
11.03.2014 tagesthemen, Pinar 
Atalay; a) Michael 
Heussen reports 
about propaganda 
war in Kyiv; b) 
Steinmeier visits 
Baltic states, Report 
Claas Oliver Richter; 
c) Commentary on 
Steinmeier's 
diplomatic efforts in 
Showing solidarity; building trust; the big hug. Were it just nice words of a cunning [gewiefter] diplomat, or did the trip really bring about 
something? Frank-Walter Steinmeier had one message for the Baltic states - we, the EU and NATO, we will not leave you alone. But in his 
luggage, the German foreign minister had nothing but expressions of solidarity. He couldn't, and did not want to, promise more. Because 
Steinmeier does not want to cut the dialogue channels with Russia. And therefore, he pointed to Monday, when the EU foreign ministers will 
discuss further sanctions. But this alone does not take the fears of the people in the Baltic countries. For this, they are too deeply rooted. 50 
years of Soviet rule define the self-perception of the small countries on the northern periphery of the EU today. And with that, their policy. 
Particularly in Estonia and Latvia, were a large Russian minority lives. For many Balts, the enemy within, whom they mistrust. What, if these 
want to be part of Russia. Will the EU and NATO then interfere? To this, the Germany foreign minister has not given an answer. Whether 
this is a realistic scenario or not does not play a role, the fears are there. The journey was important, the minister tried. But to take the fear 
away from the people in the Baltic states, he could not possibly achieve. Because to draw a clear red line for Russia, that many here desire, is 
not in the German interest.  
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Date Event Summary/Transcript 
12.03.2014 audio, Michael 
Götschenberg, MG 
[no affiliation given]: 
Cluelessness in the 
Ukraine Crisis.658 
Cluelessness is creeping in, ever more. And in the federal government, this is not kept secret. [Gernot Erler, Special Federal Envoy for Russia 
and the Eastern Partnership Countries]]: "The big question is what are actually the plans of the Kremlin for the time after the referendum - 
and that no one can really answer". [MG ctd] Erler is actually known as Russia-friendly - but in these days, even he has no better plan. [Erler] 
"There are people - and I am much more cautious - that speak of a new Cold War. But a further deterioration cannot be fully excluded, 
because we don't know how the Russian side will continue to act." [MG ctd] Yesterday evening, Angela Merkel had found clear words on the 
CDU parliamentary group meeting - it was permissible to speak of an annexation of Crimea by Russia, Merkel apparently said. The Russian 
actions, she said literally, must be answered "with a certain toughness" - whatever that is supposed to mean. This is the way it is seen in Poland 
also, which accuses the Germans of lacking just that [toughness]. Therefore, Angela Merkel today will meet the Polish prime minister Donald 
Tusk, to disperse the Polish concerns. Germany, the Polish accusation goes, is too timid towards Russia, because Berlin is worried about Russian 
gas deliveries. However, the German dependence on gas is not that strong, let alone that Russia is also dependent on this business. But - the 
government is taking the concerns of the neighbours by all means serious. Foreign minister Steinmeier flew to the Baltic states at the beginning 
of this week. Here, the concerns loom particularly large. After all, the three countries once belonged to the Soviet Union. [Erler] " They are 
closely watching the developments in Russia, and then in all of a sudden it is about the 25 million foreign Russians [Auslandsrussen]. People 
that can indeed not be considered radical are saying that Russia must do more to protect the foreign Russians - well and in Estonia or Latvia 
there are more than 25% of the population Russians. That they are worried can be fully understood, I believe" [MG ctd] That Russia is indeed 
planning on integrating Crimea fully into the Russian Federation is doubted by hardly anyone in the federal government. Laws are being 
prepared for it, the Crimean parliament has already voted for independence from Ukraine, and on the weekend, a referendum on joining the 
Russian Federation is being held. Therefore it is considered quite certain that the foreign ministers will decide in favour of the next, second 
phase of sanctions against Russia. They are about travel restrictions for individual high-ranking Russian politicians, and about freezing their 
bank accounts in the EU. Who exactly will be targeted is currently being discussed in Brussels. [Erler]: "What we don’t know is what comes 
next. Will it be the case that Russia then tries to do the same, using the same patterns, in Eastern Ukraine? And then also to prepare that 
parts are being cut from Ukraine to become Russian?"[MG ctd] But how far should one go to counter Russia? The cluelessness can be grasped 
with bare hands.  
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12.03.2014 tagesschau, 20:00, 
Jens Riewa; a) Merkel 
visits Poland, Report 
Ulrich Adrian; b) 
Germany treats 
Maidan casualties, 
News Jens Riewa.659 
a) Intro Riewa: In the conflict about the joining of Crimea with Russia, international pressure is mounting on Russia. Few days before the 
referendum on the peninsula, the finance ministers of the seven leading economic nations called on Russia to turn around. Moscow must 
observe the territorial integrity of Ukraine, otherwise massive sanctions will be imposed. Fully on this line were the Polish prime minister and 
chancellor Merkel after a meeting in Warsaw; b) Report Adrian: IT was like always. Merkel and the Polish PM meet, and after a short one-to-
one conversation they agree on all points - also today in Warsaw. For three hours Merkel visited the Polish capital - the topics: Ukraine crisis, 
the situation on Crimea, Energy dependence, sanctions on Russia, clear language. [Merkel] " If the Contact Group is not established, if the 
talks are not successful, then sanctions are inevitable. Therefore: Help for Ukraine, readiness for dialogue to resolve the conflict, and thirdly 
sanctions if this is not moving ahead". [Tusk] " This crisis is going to last for a while, we should not deceive ourselves about that. In addition 
of thinking about sanctions against Russia it is also important now that Europe is in agreement, if it turns out in the next months, or even 
years, that we do not find a political solution for this crisis." [Adrian ctd] The first stage of the Association Agreement with Ukraine - this was 
jointly announced by the two politicians in Warsaw - shall be signed already next Thursday on an EU-summit. Apparently, the EU also wants 
to establish facts. At the beginning of the week Tusk ranted on Polish TV that the German dependence on Russian gas threatens Europe's 
sovereignty. Of that, no more today - instead demonstrated unity in the next steps against Russia. Tusk hit the nail on the head. "Bad words 
don't help".  
12.03.2014 tagesschau, 20:00, 
Jens Riewa; a) Merkel 
visits Poland, Report 
Ulrich Adrian; b) 
Germany treats 
Maidan casualties, 
News Jens Riewa.660 
24 individuals heavily wounded on Kyiv Maidan arrived today aboard a Luftwaffe flying hospital for medical treatment in Berlin. The majority 
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Stuchlik; b) Merkel 
visits Poland, Report 
Ulrich Adrian.661 
a) Intro Atalay: What has the West got left in its arsenal against Russia in the crisis on Crimea? It appears almost desperate, how EU politicians 
are trying to not just stand on the side-lines while Crimea sees off to Russia. Today, the G7 states - the world's seven leading industrial nations 
- jointly warned Russia not to annex Crimea - but who is interested? Four days before the pro-forma referendum, again facts are being 
established on Crimea. The local minorities have almost no say anymore - in charge are the pro-Russian rebels, as Stephan Stuchlik experienced 
again today. b) Report Stuchlik: "Explain to us why we are not allowed in, we are invited to the press conference" - we are discussing with a 
pro-Russian Cossack before the main entry. In front, his colleagues in fur hats parading. We wanted to get a feeling on just how quickly the 
wheels are turning towards Russia only needed to try to enter the office of the prime minister today. We were invited by the spokeswoman 
with the black hair [shown on images] - she is still paid by the Ukrainian government. She is trying hard. But inside it is also clear who is calling 
the shots - the pro-Russian security guards. In the inner court of the building, there is, what is apparently Russian military technology [images 
show jeeps]. After we are allowed in, it quickly becomes apparent why the new masters were so resistant: another, secret view through the 
window [image shows close up of Russian military truck]. And then, behind the intimidated wardrobe-lady stand the infamous Berkut special 
units. No, there is no doubt about the balance of power here. Anyway, everything is different today. The Tatar-leader is in the room, we are 
being told. But instead of the cross-grained old man we knew, it is a young student. With astonishingly Russia friendly views. [Stuchlik] "Are 
you really the representative?" [Ruslan Balbek, "Tatar Representative for Ethnic Minorities on Crimea"; screened in inverted comma]"We have 
been given a guarantee that out interests will be respected; therefore we will also participate in the referendum. We were also offered the 
opportunity to participate in the future government." [Stuchlik ctd.] Sergei Aksionow, the self-proclaimed [Crimean] prime minister, excuses 
for the 'difficulties in the interim period' and welcomes the referendum next Sunday. [Stuchlik] "Where do you take the hope that anyone in 
the West is going to recognize this referendum?" [Aksionow] "We have prepared a declaration for all Western journalist that shows that this 
referendum is legally sound. And we will hold the referendum in all the required transparency. __In the afternoon, the presswork is fully re-
organized. Suddenly, a new centre is unveiled, with state-of-the-art technology. A new information minister appears, and all journalists must 
seek accreditation anew. In the future, there will be no more mistakes. The future began today, and it is Russian.  
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Stuchlik; b) Merkel 
visits Poland, Report 




a) Intro Atalay: Well, the crisis now requires a Plan B, a plan for the time after the referendum on Sunday. There are talks about tougher 
sanctions by the West against Russia. But there are wholly different scenarios likely also. Like a ghost, suddenly the term war goes around 
Europe. No one says it loud yet, but Belarus requested fighter-jets from Russia - safe is safe. On the other side, the states that have in earlier 
times already felt the cold breath of the Soviet Union, frantically re-assure themselves of their allies. After foreign minister FWS visit to the 
Baltic states yesterday, chancellor Merkel today visited Poland. A sign of solidarity with the European partner and NATO member. b) Report, 
Adrian: [Tusk, visiting a US-Polish military exercise earlier this week] "It is about the German energy and environmental policy: What Germany 
is doing there is a threat for the security and sovereignty of Europe as a whole. We cannot defend ourselves against Russian aggression if ever 
more countries are dependent of Russian gas and become ever more dependent." Unity between Poland and Germany [after this statement] 
should have bygone quickly. Already, Tusk has asked the Americans for help. Six f16 fighter jets including their crews arrived for an exercise in 
Poland today. Many Poles have primordial fears of Russia, as a consequence of the policies of Russia for centuries, when Poland vanished from 
the map completely twice. [...] Even Polish political scientists think Putin is capable of anything. [Marcin Zaborowski, Polish Institute for 
International Relations]: "The appetite comes while you are eating. If there is no reaction by the West to the annexation of Crimea, then 
Putin will perceive this as a signal that he can continue." [Adrian, ctd] -Polish primordial fears... 
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13.03.2014 audio, Jochen 
Zierhut, WDR, ARD 
Nariobi: In the end, 
the West is 
helpless.663 
Russian president Putin cannot be impressed by threatening sanctions and continues his plan to annex the Crimean peninsula. Sadly, the 
government declaration by the chancellor [today] will not change this either. Angela Merkel wants diplomatic recommendations for Russia, 
but now has considerably accentuated her tone, and threatens massive sanctions, because she cannot accept the law of the jungle; because 
Putin's actions are those of the Cold Warriors from past centuries. The clear words are good, even though Putin will remain unimpressed. 
That is why the EU countries must get serious with tougher sanctions, should Putin not give in. Who demands harsh economic sanctions must 
be willing to accept that we in the West may also suffer from them for a while? Putin, the Polit-Macho in Moscow is difficult to predict. It 
must be feared that he reacts only impulsively, because he has no real strategy in the Crimea Crisis, but wants to distract from domestic, 
also economic problems. The uneasy question is how unscrupulous Putin is really. The clear words of the chancellor are correct, as amongst 
the Western state only Merkel appears to still have access to Putin. The government declaration by the chancellor however also showed 
how powerless the West is. At the end, only the hope remains that economic sanctions by the EU render any effect. Because a military 
interference must remain excluded, absolutely. It may be annoying, but Merkel must continue to reach out to Putin. Doing so, she would, 
however, also have to acknowledge that the West has made mistakes in its Russia policy. Examples: The forced eastward-expansion of NATO, 
above all however the poker with Putin about Ukraine, or the obsession about luring Ukraine with billions into the EU. For years, the European 
community has ignored Russian interests. It is thus not very credible, if Merkel now wants to calm Moscow by stating that help for Ukraine is 
not directed against Russia, but neighbourhood-policy. Even if some rant Russia - understander. It doesn't help - to prevent worse the interests 
of Russia must be taken into better consideration in a more unagitated manner than hitherto. This does not mean to tolerate the interest in 
aggressive power expansion, of course it must be valid: ' no annexation of Crimea'. Yes, Angela Merkel is right - it will require a long diplomatic 
breath. There is simply no silver bullet.  
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13.03.2014 tagesschau, 20:00, 
Susanne Daubner; a) 
Merkel explains 
policy in Russia-
Ukraine crisis to 
Bundestag, Report 
Markus Spieker; b) 




In her government declaration on the government's position on the conflict about the Ukrainian peninsula Crimea in Bundestag, chancellor 
Merkel called Russia to show relent. She reaffirmed the threat of the EU to impose tougher sanctions. If Moscow would continue to refuse 
negotiations, on Monday travel restrictions and the freezing of accounts will be decided, Merkel said. On Sunday, Crimea will hold a 
referendum about joining Russia. Moscow wants to implement a yes as afast as possible. a) Report Markus Spieker: From the visitor stages, 
the Ukrainian ambassador to Berlin, grimly followed the debate in Bundestag today - despite the chancellor clearly taking the sides of his 
country in the conflict against Russia and threatens sanctions in the case that Crimea is annexed from Ukraine. [Merkel]: "If Russia continues 
its course of the last weeks, then this would not only be a catastrophe for Ukraine. Then we would perceive this, not only as neighbouring 
countries to Russia, as a threat. Then this would not only change the relationship of the EU as a whole with Russia; no, it would not least - and 
I am fully conviced about this - also massively hurt Russia." [Spieker ctd] Die Linke [German Socialist Party] also criticized Putin's course today. 
But Gregor Gysi [leader of the Linke parliamentary group] also sees part of the blame with the West, who promoted the expansion of EU and 
NATO without taking into account Russian sentiments. [Gysi] " Russian fears that after the EU, NATO will follow into Ukraine. It feels ever more 
surrounded. And it was only pulled on Ukraine. The EU and NATO foreign ministers have completely disregarded the Ukrainian and Russian 
history. They never understood the meaning of Crimea to Russia." The Alliance 90/Greens parliamentary group spokeswomen praises the 
governments and condemns the upcoming referendum as farcical. [Karin Göring Eckart]: "This is not a referendum about independence, but 
an illegal legitimation for an illegal annexation". [Spieker ctd] As sanctions, travel bans and freezing of accounts are being talked about. The 
special envoy of the government for Russia, Gernot Erler warns that [Erler]: [..."between every of these steps there is an open door with a sign 
'Exit', with the invitation for a common search for a political solution. And that it is never too late to walk through that door." [Spieker ctd] 
There is agreement among all parliamentary groups - a military interference is not an option.  
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13.03.2014 tagesschau, 20:00, 
Susanne Daubner; a) 
Merkel explains 
policy in Russia-
Ukraine crisis to 
Bundestag, Report 
Markus Spieker; b) 




Because of the situation on Crimea, the OECD suspended accession talks with Russia. Instead, the alliance wants to strengthen ist cooperation 
with Ukraine. Also, U.S. Foreign Secretary Kerry threatened tough sanctions if Russia remains relentless. Tomorrow, Kerry want to give it a last 
attempt to reach an agreement in a meeting with Sergei Lawrow in London.  
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13.03.2014 tagesthemen, Caren 
Miosga; a) Report on 
parliamentary 
debate on Ukraine-
Russia crisis, Report 
by Mathias Deiß; b) 
First casualty in riots 
in Eastern Ukraine, 
Report Michael 
Heussen666 
a) Intro Miosga: If Putin would have taken the time to listen to what Angela Merkel said in her government declaration in the Crimean crisis 
today, the he probably would have been interests in one sentence only: 'There is no military option for Germany' the Chancellor emphasised. 
For Putin, this must sound as if the West won't do much against Crimea joining Russia on Sunday. At the same time, it also doesn't mean that 
the Europeans are putting their heads in the sand. Astonishingly sharp, Angela Merkel threatened sanctions today - which certainly will have 
been greeted by someone in the audience, whose country has suffered before under Russian power-aspirations, then under the Soviet flag. 
b) Report Mathias Deiß: Military honours today at the Chancellery for the Czech prime minister - for decades his country was a Soviet satellite 
state - Crimea is now facing the same threat. For the chancellor, Putin's military invasion there is a falling back into the Cold War - instead of 
soldiers, diplomats are now in demand, Merkel declared today. [Merkel]Militarily, the conflict cannot be resolved. I am telling this to those 
people that have fears and worries. Military action is not an option." [Deiß ctd] Merkel's Crimea crisis concept for the coming weeks: 
continuous talks with all conflicting parties, financial aid for Ukraine, and additional painful sanctions against Russia if Putin sticks with his 
Cold War course. [Merkel]: "The clock cannot be turned back. Conflicts of interest in the centre of Europe, in the 21st century, can only be 
overcome successfully if we do not fall back to the patterns of the 19th and 20th century". [Deiß ctd] Merkel and Putin, despite regular 
meetings, never developed a close and cordial relationship. But they are talking with each other - also during the last days. That these talks 
remained without result, for Die Linke party also to with Putin's experience that Europe and the U.S. don't keep their promises for example to 
not expand NATO further after German re-unification [see Adomeit]. [Gregor Gysis]: "This promise was broken. There was a vehement 
expansion of NATO towards Russia. And Russia fears that after the EU, NATO will come to Ukraine. It feels ever more surrounded. But is was 
only pulled on Ukraine. The EU- and NATO foreign ministers have completely disregarded the Ukrainian-Russian history. They never 
understood the role of Crimea in Russian history." [Deiß ctd] The understanding for Putin's action on Crimea remains limited despites such 
arguments. The government declaration today was a clear warning in the direction of Moscow. Only one day after the referendum will the EU 
decide about new sanctions, says Merkel. The Greens agree with this approach: [Karin Göring-Eckart] "And if on the weekend the referendum 
on Crimea has the expected outcome that we are assuming at the moment, then it must be said clearly that it is not a referendum about 
independence, but an illegal legitimisation for an illegal annexation." [Deiß]Hardly anyone in Berlin still believes that Putin will change his 
course of action and calls off the referendum after all.  
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13.03.2014 tagesthemen, Caren 
Miosga; a) Report on 
parliamentary debate 
on Ukraine-Russia 
crisis, Report by 
Mathias Deiß; b) First 








a) Intro Susanne Daubner: Riots occuired during pro-Russian and pro-Ukrainian protests in Donetsk. Several hundred protesters clashed with 
each other, official sources say. B) Report Michael Heussen: Grievance now also in Donetsk. For the first time since the Crimean Crisis, there 
were deadly clashes during demonstrations. Supporters of the new government in Kyiv clashed with twice as many pro-Russian protesters. 
Stones were flying, fire-crackers lit, and ther was stabbings. The protests bagan peacefully in the lad afternoon. With loud paroles, but peaceful.  
'We want no EU, we don't want NATO, we ant to belong to Russia'. The police positioned itself between the groups. When the situation 
escalated later on, it was helpless. Almost 200 kilometers to the East, the Russian military is conducting exercises. Many in Donetsk fear that 
Moscow is just waiting for a reason to stand on the side of the Russian speaking inhabitants of Eastern Ukraine; that the soldiers are training 
for an invasion. Actually, the military observers of the OSCE wanted to drive to the eastern border of Ukraine today - but for security concerns 
the mission was aborted.  
14.03.2014 tagesschau, 20:00, 
Linda Zervakis; a) 
Kerry meets Lawrow 
in last attempt, 
Annette Dittert; b) 
Developments in 
a) Intro Zervakis: In the Crimea Crisis there are no signals for a détente. A meeting between the Russian foreign minister Lawrow and his U.S. 
colleague John Kerry in London did not bring about a rapprochement. Lawrow said that there is no common view of the issues. He also 
emphasised that his country does not want to interfere militarily. The U.S. Foreign Secretary showed disappointment. The result of the 
controversial referendum will not be recognized under any circumstances. b) Report Annette Dittert: Showing little signs of hope, a 
preoccupied John Kerry appeared this morning already before Downing Street. The meeting between these two foreign ministers is the last 
chance for a diplomatic solution, it was said before the meeting. And after Kerry and Lawrow remained long hours behind closed doors, while 
the embassy published garden picture of the two, there was some hope. It was disappointed afterwards, however, when Lawrow declared 
without Kerry 'The referendum on Crimea will take place as planned'. [Lawrow]: 'We could not find a common view on the situation - but 
talks are nonetheless always useful.". [Dittert ctd] An exhausted and visibly disappointed John Kerry declared later: [Kerry] " As I said to foreign 
minister Lawrow: that is a decision of enormous consequences, with respect to the global community." [Dittert ctd] The Russian foreign 
minister did not move a millimetre in the direction of his counterpart. With this, the last chance for a diplomatic solution appears lost. The EU 
will have to impose tougher sanctions on Monday. Russia and the West continue their collision course.  
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14.03.2014 tagesschau, 20:00, 
Linda Zervakis; a) 
Kerry meets Lawrow 
in last attempt, 
Annette Dittert; b) 
Developments in 
Russian-Ukrainian 
conflict, Olaf Bock 
a) Intro Zervakis: In light of the growing tensions in the crisis on Crimea, UN Secretary Ban called on Ukraine and Russia to remain cal. Both 
sides should refrain from provocations after the referendum. Meanwhile, the nervousness in Ukraine is growing. As a response to Russia's 
military activities, the parliament in Kyiv voted in favour of establishing a national guard with up to 60.000 men. b) Report Olaf Bock: Barricades 
on the Maidan. U.S. Senator John McCain is taking a picture for himself while Ukraine is threatened by a possible breaking up. Not only on 
Crimea, in Donetsk in Eastern Ukraine there were heavy clashes between pro-Ukrainian and pro-Russian groups as well. One person was killed, 
many wounded. [Man, Donetsk citizen: This is terrible. Someone will profit by bringing the two sides to clash - kept apart by only a few 
policemen. This happens on purpose!".[Bock ctd] On Russian TV, right-wing forces, who cause unrest in Donetsk are made responsible for the 
clashes, agents provocateurs of the so called 'Right Sector'. On the Internet, however, there are videos that show that also the pro-Russian 
protesters attack the buses of the Maidan-supporters. A battle is raging about public opinion - dissenting voices on Russian internet are muted. 
Just now, several homepages that reported critically about the Russian Ukraine-policy were shut down. Officially for illegally calling for 
unauthorized conventions. Also, there is military sabre-rattling: military exercises close to the Ukrainian border. After the riots on 
Wednesday night, Russia want to be able to protest its people, it was announced by the [Russian] Foreign Ministry today. And in Ukraine, 
at the moment a so-called National Guard of Volunteers of the Maidan-movement is being established. Right-wing forces, suspects Russia. 
The conflict about Ukraine is increasingly heating up. Beside military threatening gestures in both sides, now a battle about public opinion in 
Russia began. And the Russian parliament continued the preparation for the integration of Crimea into the Russian Federation.  





Date Event Summary/Transcript 
14.03.2014 Tagesthemn Caren 
Miosga; a) Kerry and 
Lawrow in London, 
Report Frank Jahn; c) 
short interview Frank 
Jahn; b) situation in 
Ukraine before the 
referendum, Stefan 
Stuchlik.669 
a) Intro Miosga: We now turn to world politics, and to two men on whose faces it is easy to read the current state of world affairs. Not even a 
wisp of an agreement was the result of today’s meeting between U.S. foreign secretary John Kerry and Russian foreign minister Sergei Lawrow. 
Most likely, thus, Crimea will vote in favour of joining Russia on Sunday. The West cannot prevent this anymore. John Kerry appeared as if 
he did not expect anything else. Much larger is the worry that Moscow, after Crimea, is going to grab for other regions in Eastern Ukraine. b) 
Report Frank Jahn: Last chance London. U.S. chief diplomat Kerry meets his Russian counterpart Lawrow, once more in a one-on-one, before 
the Crimea referendum, which the West deems unconstitutional. In the residence of the U.S. ambassador they meet and shake hands, but 
don't seal an agreement. 6 hours later they part, their press conferences are held in different locations in London. 'We have no common view 
of the situation' concludes Lawrow in the Russian embassy. [Lawrow] "Russia will recognize the outcome of the referendum on 16th of March". 
[Kerry] "Neither we nor the international community will recognize the referendum!" [Jahn ctd] Stalemate - the situation continues after the 
meeting. The West wants to protect Ukrainian sovereignty, Moscow continues to portray itself as the protector of the Russian minority [ethnic 
Russians are the majority of Crimea's population] on Crimea. Pictures taken in the garden suggest a relaxed atmosphere during the meeting, 
but Russia stubbornly refuses further negotiation on the framework of an international contact group and will decide about the next steps 
only after the referendum. An invasion, however, is not foreseen, said [Lawrow): "Russia is not planning an invasion in Eastern Ukraine" 
[Jahn]: Kerry is still seeing worrying signals. [Kerry]: Should Russia establish facts on the ground that increase tensions or threaten Ukrainians, 
this will have consequences. There will be costs." [Jahn ctd] The West threatens sanctions but wants to remain in dialogue. However, whoever 
was hoping for a last-minute solution of the crisis on Crimea was disappointed today.  
14.03.2014 Tagesthemn Caren 
Miosga; a) Kerry and 
Lawrow in London, 
Report Frank Jahn; c) 
short interview Frank 
Jahn; b) situation in 
Ukraine before the 
referendum, Stefan 
Stuchlik.670 
Q.: Today Russian foreign minister said no to a military invasion into Eastern Ukraine - but the Americans are nonetheless gravely concerned. 
Do they have reasons to be concerned? A.: Indeed, especially if one is looking at the increasing tensions in Eastern Ukraine. Yesterday during 
a demonstration in Donetsk there were clashes between pro-Ukrainian and pro-Russian forces. One person was killed, many wounded. Should 
there be further attacks in the Russian speaking population, it could well be that Russia will interfere, because today the Russian foreign 
ministry again emphasized that it is guaranteeing the protection of the Russian speakers. Also, militarily a lot is happening on the Ukrainian 
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14.03.2014 Tagesthemn Caren 
Miosga; a) Kerry and 
Lawrow in London, 
Report Frank Jahn; c) 
short interview Frank 
Jahn; b) situation in 
Ukraine before the 
referendum, Stefan 
Stuchlik.671 
a) Intro Miosga: While West and East are showing off their muscles, but no more, Russian's, Ukrainian's and Tatars today on Crimea truly got 
into it - namely in an arm-wrestling competition. Just that this competition was more like a hug. Our correspondent Stefan Stuchlik found men 
that are bursting with power but want anything than having to fight each other. b) Report Stuchlik: Time to reduce prejudices. These men 
belong to the 'Arm Wrestling Club Simferopol'. Of all people the musclemen have the bravery to stem themselves against the nervousness 
before the referendum. [Andrej Scharkow, Arm-wrestling Simferopol] "Here on Crimea so many people live together - Ukrainians, Russians, 
Tatars. So, we said: Let's do a friendship -competition. I fear that the referendum will divide us. That is a bad idea, only a few months ago we 
were all still friends. If one looks around in the gym, you realize that people sit together that during the last weeks we saw only separately. 
The Russians, the Ukrainians, the Tatars. [Young tatar woman] "We hope that everything stays the way it is. My friend is Russian, I am 
supporting him here, we all should live in friendship". [Stuchlik] Arm-wrestling is popular here - but this is a political event. You must to let 
Ruslan fight Sergei, while on the streets the battle for opinions escalates. Outside, the guest of honour [arrives]. Former Olympic champion 
Alexander Karelin equally is not overly happy about the referendum. [Stuchlik] Why did you come all the way from Moscow?" [Alexander 
Karelin, fmr. Olympic Champion in wrestling]: Well, there is the Olympic idea, where competition counts, but not where you are from. Here 
on Crimea we a seeing dangerous cleavages currently. Politics got involved. But we do not want a cut, we want that life on Crimea continues 
in freedom of fear and want." His appearance is ever more impressive, if one is aware that in his real life, he is parliamentarian for Putin's 
party. The organizer is not sparing with symbols. And at the end, not the national anthems with which the people are fighting each other on 
the streets, but the song of Crimea is played. There are few people with a sober mind on the peninsula. That they are, above all, arm-
wrestlers, is surprising. But as stated already, a day to reduce prejudices.  
 
671 https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/tt5334.html 
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15.03.2014 tagesschau, 20:00; 
Jens Riewa; a) 
Developments in 
Russia-Ukraine 
conflict, G. Atai; b) 
Situation in eastern 
Ukraine remains 
tense, Report M. 
Heussen; c)  Situation 
in Simferopol, Stefan 
Stuchlik.672 
a) Intro Riewa: Russia has vetoed a UN Security Council Resolution on the ciris on Crimea. In the vetoed draft resolution, all states were urged 
to not recognize tomorrow's referendum. The Moscow-leaning leadership of Crimea want the separation from Ukraine, to then join Russia. 
The West and the Ukrainian government believe the referendum to be breaching with international law. b) Report Golineh Atai: Special 
meeting of the Ukrainian parliament. With large majority the parliamentarians declare the regional parliament of Crimea dissolved. 
[Turtschinow, Interim President] "Now there is a real threat of a Russian invasion." [Atai ctd] 'Russia stand up', the parliamentarians shouted 
at the end, to show support to the anti-war protesters that took to the streets in Moscow today. 'Crimea belongs to Ukraine' these protesters 
are convinced. An occupation and annexation are not acceptable for a civilized state [the protesters hold]. [Woman, at protest]: " I am worried 
because the society is so polarized. And that so many here are under the influence of this terrible nationalist propaganda." [Atai ctd.] The 
Ukrainian border guard is on high-alert, here, in close proximity of the Crimean Peninsula, Russian soldiers allegedly took control of a gas 
plant - that would be the first Russian military action inside Ukrainian territory outside Crimea. The foreign minister demanded the 
immediate withdrawal of the Russian troops. He announced a conversation with NATO Secretary General Rasmussen he will have on Monday, 
to talk about military aid for Ukraine. On Maidan, citizens today demonstrated for the unity of the country and declared their solidarity with 
the inhabitants of Crimea - they let fly white balloons - against a war.  
 
672 https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/ts47296.html 
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15.03.2014 tagesschau, 20:00; 
Jens Riewa; a) 
Developments in 
Russia-Ukraine 
conflict, G. Atai; b) 
Situation in eastern 
Ukraine remains 
tense, Report M. 
Heussen; c)  Situation 
in Simferopol, Stefan 
Stuchlik.673 
a) Intro Jens Riewa: In the east of Ukraine there were again violent clashes between radical groups. In Kharkov, pro-Russian and radical 
nationalist groups allegedly clashed. In Donetsk, a building of the Interior Intelligence Service was stormed by pro-Russian forces. b) Report 
Michael Heussen: The police remain on the side-line as the pro-Russian protesters beleaguer the seat of the Ukrainian Interior Intelligence 
service in Donetsk. Even when the building is stormed, they don't interfere [image shows many cameras recording the staking of the building]. 
Other than broken windows nothing happens, the mob quickly disappears. On Lenin square in the city centre, long queues are building, men, 
women are waiting to sign a petition. They want a referendum, just like on Crimea - with two choices: shall the Donetsk basin remain 
Ukrainian, or should it join Russia. The protesters continue to the police headquarters. They demand the freeing of the men that are allegedly 
involved in the murder on Thursday night. The police officer shows empathy. He explains to us that the demands will be immediately checked. 
He wants to de-escalate. But as a precautionary measure, heavily armed security forces stand close by. Before the mourning hall of the Donetsk 
hospital, relatives say farewell to the 22-year-old who was stabbed to death on Thursday night [images of funeral, Ukrainian flag waiving]. He 
protested against Russia, and for Ukraine. Last night, again two men were killed, this time in Kharkov. According to media reports both victims 
were pro-Russian protesters. Russia accuses the Ukrainian government of not having the situation under control and declared readiness to 
protect fellow Russians in Ukraine.  
15.03.2014 tagesschau, 20:00; 
Jens Riewa; a) 
Developments in 
Russia-Ukraine 
conflict, G. Atai; b) 
Situation in eastern 
Ukraine remains 
tense, Report M. 
Heussen; c)  Situation 
in Simferopol, Stefan 
Stuchlik.674 
Despite massive international criticism, and the possibly far reaching consequences for global politics, here on Crimea the preparations for 
tomorrow's referendum continue undeterred. 1,5 million people are called to cast their vote, the ballots will be open between 8 am and 8 
pm. The question will be whether they want to belong to Russia, or a strengthened autonomy within Ukraine. We were already being 
presented the international election observers, amongst them two members of the European parliament - who, on request, said they were 
here in their private capacity. The self-proclaimed prime minister declared already yesterday that he expects a participation of more than 70 
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15.03.2014 tagesthemen, Caren 
Miosga; a) 
Developments in 
Russia - Ukraine 
conflict, Report G. 
Atai; b) Anti-war 
protests in Moscow, 
Ina Ruck.675  
a) Intro Caren Miosga: How long ago is it actually since the Ukrainians in Kyiv on Maidan square forced the toppling of President 
Yanukovych? Weeks? Months? Let me tell you - 21 days. Twenty-one days in which initial hope was replaced by fear of war. In that, it is 
apparent that even for the interim government in Kyiv, it is not about Crimea anymore. No, there is the fear of a domino-effect. In Donetsk in 
east-Ukraine there were pro-Russian demonstrations today. In Kharkov, close to the Russian border, two people died. This is clearly not the 
Ukraine that once was dreamed about on Maidan. And because of the, there were demonstrations there again. b) Report, Atai: A symbol of 
unity. Peace activists on 'Maidan unfold a flag stitched together from the Ukrainian, the Crimean, and the Crimean Tatars' flag. A present for 
the inhabitants of Crimea, ornamented with messages of solidarity - no matter the outcome of tomorrows referendum. With events like these, 
he wants to bring Ukrainians together - Wadim Kodochigov, mother Ukrainian, father Russian, his home - Crimea. There, his wife, a Crimean 
Tatar, and his child expect him. For three months he is on Maidan. Does he see a way that Crimea remains with Ukraine? [Vadim Kodachigov] 
"Not anymore, it is too late now. The people have changed. When the government here tried to prohibit the Russian language, I appeared 
everywhere and said don't do to Crimea what 'Yanukovych did to Western Ukraine. You need to talk to the people there, listen to them, 
understand them." [Atai, ctd]: Listening, understanding each other - a challenge for these men also. Many belonged to the self-defence units 
on 'Maidan; now they form the new national guard of Ukraine and are being trained by those they once faced on the other side of the 
barricades. A national guard is not enough says vice-admiral Igor Kabanenko. He fears a cynical scenario by the Russians [Igor Kabanenko, Vice 
Admiral UKR Navy]: "The Russians are concentrating on the east, on a special operation deep into Ukrainian territory, with the help of 
separatists and saboteurs - forces that are specifically trained to cause unrest, and make it look as if Russian speakers now need help." [Atai 
ctd] The admiral fears that until the men of the national guard learn how to handle weapons, Russia will long have won the propaganda war.  
 
675 https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/tt5336.html 
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15.03.2014 tagesthemen, Caren 
Miosga; a) 
Developments in 
Russia - Ukraine 
conflict, Report G. 
Atai; b) Anti-war 
protests in Moscow, 
Ina Ruck; 676 
a) Intro Miosga: Not only ion Kyiv, but also in Moscow people took to the streets and protested. And not only for, but also against Putin. This 
comes as a surprise, as during the last weeks, anyone who voiced dissent, very quickly disappeared in police vehicles. But by now, the 
president probably doesn't worry about a few dissenters anymore. Because - what are ten thousand, if you know you got millions behind you? 
b) report Ina Ruck: Ukrainian flags - and Russian ones. An officially authorized demonstration by the opposition. This has not happened for ling 
in Moscow. 20.000 apparently. Only twenty thousand - against Putin's course on Crimea, against Russian troops on Ukrainian soil, and against 
the looming war. 'Putin must face trial' this sign reads. [Protester, Man] "It leads to war if you break international law. I am a war-veteran 
myself; I was in Afghanistan which is why I am categorically against war". [Woman] "I am particularly worried that our society is split by force. 
That so many people are under the influence of this terrible propaganda." [Ruck ctd] Soviet nostalgia elsewhere in Moscow - the Putin-
supporters also had their demonstration today. Far less participants then the opposition, but that doesn't matter, because they are 
representing the silent majority. Since the beginning of the crisis on Crimea, Putin's polls have been skyrocketing. War-rhetoric is just as well 
received as war-memories. About the victory against fascism. that now is to be repeated. Because Ukraine, as it was said again on Russian TV 
today, is in the hand if fascists. [Old man, protesting for Putin]: "While we talk with each other, pogroms are taking place there, lawlessness 
rules - they are not only dictators, they are criminals, that keep the frightened population in check" [Ruck ctd] On a side-event of the 
demonstration, pictures of Nazi-concentration camps are shown. Like this, or in such fashion, Russian TV reports every evening. 'Russia without 
Putin', they shout. Not to be influenced by the all dominating propaganda, they are also saying, is becoming increasingly difficult. There are 
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16.03.2014 tagesschau, 20:00, 
Jan Hofer; a) 
Referendum on 
Crimea, Stefan 
Stuchlik; b) live from 
Simferopol, Stefan 
Stuchlik; c) Situation 
in Ukraine, Golineh 
Atai.677 
a) Intro Jan Hofer: In the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, the Crimeans today decided about the belonging of the peninsula in a referendum. 1.5 
million citizens were asked to cast their vote in the [internationally] criticized referendum. According to official statements, the minimum 
required participation of 50% was exceeded by far. So far, there are no results. First surveys amongst voters after voting however suggests, 
that the mainly Russian inhabitants voted in favour of joining Russia. b) Report Stuchlik: It was shortly after 8am local time when the self-
proclaimed prime minister, Sergei Aksionow, cast his vote, in the small school Nr. 10 in Simferopol. A step with far reaching consequences for 
world politics. [Stuchlik]: "You are aware of the fact that this could be the beginning of an international crisis?" [Aksionow] " There will be no 
world-crisis because of us, we care for our citizens, that is why we are holding this referendum, what are you talking about crisis?" [Stuchlik] 
"Are you aware of the consequences of what you did here?" [Aksionow]: Everything will remain calm and peaceful - here and on the entire 
world. There are no far reaching consequences." [Stuchlik ctd] Already during the early morning, people were queuing - more than 1,5 million 
Crimeans were eligible to vote. The question of the referendum was: Do you want to join Russia, or do you want an autonomous Republic of 
Crimea within Ukraine? Against the backdrop of a majority of Russians amongst the local population, the outcome appears foreseeable. [old 
woman] "I voted for Russia, I was born in Russia, I voted for my homeland." [Old man] "I was born in Russia, you see. I would also like to die 
in Russia". [Woman] "We only want to go to Russia; they will help us" [Stuchlik asking woman] "And the international conflict that is now 
starting?" [woman] "We are not interested in that!". [Stuchlik ctd.] In the roads of Simferopol, Russian built APVs are visible, in order to protect 
strategic points, is the official declaration. The autonomous government of Crimea already set some signals. In the inner court of the 
parliamentary building, a huge Russian flag is waiving.  
16.03.2014 tagesschau, 20:00, 
Jan Hofer; a) 
Referendum on 
Crimea, Stefan 
Stuchlik; b) live from 
Simferopol, Stefan 
Stuchlik; c) Situation 
in Ukraine, Golineh 
Atai.678 
40 minutes ago, the ballots closed, but the result appears to be clear already. According to a suirvey conducted by the Moscow-friendly 
Crimean government, 93% if the population n voted in favour of joining Russia. Behind me, the first car-corsos are celebrating. The Crimean 
government, however, is putting its foot down. The self-proclaimed prime minister Sergei Aksionow announced that already tomorrow, he 
will turn to the Russian government, and officially request accession to the Russian Federation. On Wednesday, he wants to introduce the 
Rubel on the peninsula; and at the end of the week, economic contracts shall be signed with Russia. Apparently, there is a desire to cement 
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tagesschau, 20:00, 
Jan Hofer; a) 
Referendum on 
Crimea, Stefan 
Stuchlik; b) live from 
Simferopol, Stefan 
Stuchlik; c) Situation 
in Ukraine, Golineh 
Atai.679 
a) Intro Jan Hofer: For the West, and for Ukraine the referendum is in breach with international law. The European Union, and the U.S. again 
made clear that they will not recognize the outcome. Tomorrow, the EU foreign ministers will discuss sanctions against Russia. Chancellor 
Merkel, in a phone conversation with Russian president Putin today, suggested to send OSCE-observers to Ukraine. Here, the security situation 
in the east of the country remains precarious. b) Report Atai: They are agitated, and not always friendly to Western journalists. Pro-Russian 
protesters in Donetsk, in the south-east of Ukraine. Around 3.000 people attacked several buildings today and demanded the instalment of a 
pro-Russian governor. [Old lady protesting] "Yanukovych was, is, and remains our president - he should turn to Putin and ask for help, because 
in Kyiv, fascists took power, that will try to control us". [Atai ctd] In Kharkov and Odessa, also several thousand took to the streets against the 
government in Kyiv. For the Ukrainian minister of interior, it is proven that the demonstrations are mainly directed from Russia. [Arsen 
Awakow, minister of home affairs, Ukraine]: "Our security forces have registered the particulars of members of Russian military intelligence 
[GRU], we have compromising evidence of their acts of sabotage." [Atai ctd.] Prime minister Yatseniuk announced a special budget for the 
armed forces. the Minister of Defence spoke of more than 21.000 Russian troops on Crimea. Responding to the question what this means for 
Ukrainian soldiers, he said [Igor Tenjuk, UKR minister of defence]: "Not one of our soldiers will leave Crimea. The situation around our bases 
there has normalized, and we have agreed with the Russian military leadership that our bases will not be blocked until the 21st of March. 
[Atai]: Politics must decide if, and when the Ukrainian forces must leave their bases.  
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The ballots were hardly closed, and already the head of government announced that he will swiftly implement the joining with Russia. Sergei 
Aksionow spoke of a historic decision. No exact accession date has been agreed upon so far. This notwithstand, however, the parliament 
announced to introduce the Ruble in parallel to the Ukrainian currency Hrvan next Wednesday. And also in Moscow, the parliament quickly 
wants to create the conditions to allow Crimea into the Russian Federation as soon as possible. As a response, the West threatens to sanction 
Russia. The European Union, and the U.S.A. call the referendum illegal. They accuse Russia of having forced the separation with a massive 
military operation, and by breaking international law. The Russian leadership denies this, and declares to only react to calls for help by the 
ethnic Russians living on Crimea. President Putin again reaffirmed his position in a phone conversation with Angela Merkel. In Simferopol, 
the Crimean capital, several thousand people gathered on a central square, waiving Russian flags and cheering to the result of the referendum. 
The majority of the population on Crimea is ethnically Russian. Unclear remains how many Crimean Tatars participated in the referendum. 
The leaders of the Muslim minority called for a boycott of the referendum. They fear repressions if Crimea becomes a part of Russia. The 
Ukrainian government in Kyiv continues to stem itself against the breaking off of Crimea - but it is not going to interfere militarily. Meanwhile, 
in the east of the country increasing clashes between pro-Russian and pro-Ukrainian protesters are being reported. In Donetsk, several 
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Stuchlik; b) Interview 
with Stefan Stuchlik; 
c) Reactions in Kyiv; 
Golineh Atai; d) 
Situation in east 
Ukraine, Michael 
Heussen; e) Interview 
with Frank-Walter 
Steinmeier.681 
a) Intro Caren Miosga: Everything worked out as planned by Wladimir Putin. The West, who wanted to prevent today’s referendum on 
Crimea, because it is not covered by any constitution of Ukraine, had to stand on the side-lines, helplessly. There still is no final result, but 
according to the election committee, after counting more than 50% of the votes, an overwhelming majority, namely 95% of the voters, voted 
in favour of joining Russia. Participation was in excess of 80%. This is, even in an illegitimate referendum, without independent international 
observers, an unambiguous vote. b) Report Stuchlik: It is looking strange, what Hans Johan Bäkman does. He has been invited by Russia as an 
observer of an election that is not even recognized by his own country. Not Finland, not the European Union, not the U.S.A. - no, actually by 
very few countries at all. [Stuchlik] "The Russians, one suspects, are using you as a puppet?" [Johan Bäkman, Finnish MEP] "I have duly noted 
an anti-Russian hysteria in the West - in the media, hence you - as well as by the politicians. As if the Russian speaking part of the population 
had not the same right to vote as a Western citizen." [Stuchlik ctd] Looking out of the window, APV's of Russian origin can be seen - something 
like this should not occur during an election. But Johan Bäkman calls them preventive forces. Not surprising to this view from a man wearing 
a pro-Russian tie [orange and black stripes]. Over there, in school No. 10, the self-proclaimed prime minister casts his vote. He is proud to have 
international observers, and he is not fearing Western sanctions, Aksionow said. Meanwhile, Johan Bäkman checks the ballot boxes and gives 
an interview to Russian TV. And there can really be no doubts that the referendum is held soundly. The Crimeans are queuing to vote for 
Russia. Already, in the polling station, there are celebrations. Actually, today is a public fair, and not a referendum. The Russian majority 
celebrates the return to the homeland. [Joihan Bäkman] "This is a huge event. I think it will change the foreign policy of the EU and the U.S., 
and Russia's influence in the world will grow massively." [Stuchlik ctd.] Bäkman comments like a political scientist. After that he is being 
photographed. It looks strange, but it somehow fits this strange referendum.  
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Stuchlik; b) Interview 
with Stefan Stuchlik; 
c) Reactions in Kyiv; 
Golineh Atai; d) 
Situation in east 
Ukraine, Michael 
Heussen; e) Interview 
with Frank-Walter 
Steinmeier.682 
Q.: What are the immediate consequences of the outcome for the Crimeans? A.: Beyond all political consequences, there are also practical 
ones: The banks are of course all in Ukrainian hands. - we have seen queues of people trying to get their money off the bank during the 
past days, because Kyiv is not sending any more money. Secondly, the electricity and water supply. 80% of the water is from Ukraine; 
thirdly, the problem of Ukrainian soldiers here on the peninsula, that from one day to the other turn from defenders of the nation to an 
occupying force. These three complexes are acute and require immediate resolution. Q.: How will Moscow react? Will Crimea, now very 
quickly be integrated into the Russian Federation, or will Putin, also because of the international outrage, take his time? A.: Well, theoretically, 
everything will go very quickly. The referendum was already scheduled and moved ahead with lightning speed. Aksionow, the self-
proclaimed prime minister, today announced he will apply for an integration into the Russian Federation tomorrow already. It could all go very 
quickly, because the Duma passed a law that enables such accessions. And if I then hear that it is planned to introduce the Rubel here, I can 
imagine that things will accelerate - but the final decision on this rests exclusively with Russia.  




Stuchlik; b) Interview 
with Stefan Stuchlik; 
c) Reactions in Kyiv; 
Golineh Atai; d) 
Situation in east 
Ukraine, Michael 
Heussen; e) Interview 
with Frank-Walter 
Steinmeier.683 
a) Intro Miosga: Even though the result was foreseeable, the question remains: how does the interim government in Kyiv react to this 
referendum? Today's result, certainly represents the biggest possible humiliation for those that took to the streets for months to protest 
against then president Yanukovych - because, and this explains why they perceive it as a humiliation, they protested against his Moscow-
friendly policies. b) Report, Golineh Atai: For the first time he walks over Kyiv Maidan. Until two weeks ago, Sergy Tichy was editor-in-chief of 
the Krimskaya newspaper, an 80-year-old, famous Crimean newspaper. Then the new masters arrived, and he had to leave the peninsula. 
Hurriedly, as he recalls. [Sergei Tichy]: "I had to take a decision and call the spade a spade. The Crimean head of government is a liar and 
extortionist, that the new speaker of parliament there disregarded Ukrainian law brutally and much more. I had no other choice than to leave". 
[Atai ctd] The first sacrifice Crimea made was the freedom of the press, he says. This was always larger in Ukraine than in Russia. Even though 
the government showed itself in bellicose fashion, it can hardly react to the loss of a province, or the riots in the east of the country. The 
adversary is too large. The minister of interior claims he has evidence for act of the Russian military intelligence [GRU], the prime ministers 
threatens that separatists and saboteurs will suffer. The minister of defence promises that his soldiers on Crimea are not threatened. [...] Then 
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Stuchlik; b) Interview 
with Stefan Stuchlik; 
c) Reactions in Kyiv; 
Golineh Atai; d) 
Situation in east 
Ukraine, Michael 
Heussen; e) Interview 
with Frank-Walter 
Steinmeier.684 
a) Intro Caren Miosga: Today, Crimea - and tomorrow the east. In Kyiv, the fear that the spark might jump from the peninsula in the South 
to eastern Ukraine looms large. Here also, if not quite as many as on Crimea, many ethnic Russians live. And the clashes between them and 
Ukrainian nationalists are turning ever more intense. Already, there were dead and wounded. Today, there were clashes again. b) Report 
Michael Heussen: At Lenin's feet, the march began. Protesters demand a referendum like the one on Crimea. The majority of the population 
in the Donetsk basin is Russian speaking, which is why many want to be governed from Moscow, and not from Kyiv. [Young man, protesting]: 
"It somehow happened that we became part of Ukraine - but historically, this was always Russia. This is deeply rooted in the conscience and 
memory of the people, and they now want to belong to their homeland again". [Heussen ctd]: 'Freedom for Pavel Gurajew' demand the 
protesters before the state-prosecutors office, The Moscow-leaning marketing manager declared himself governor of Donetsk a few days ago, 
he was arrested and since is held in custody. The police today is heavily armed, but hardly acts. One policeman is hurt in a quarrel. The mob 
destroys the inside of the building and replaces the Ukrainian with the Russian flag - like on many official buildings in the east. The Ukrainian 
army relocates ever more units into the east, there are news that trenches are being dug, and tank barriers put into position.  
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Stuchlik; b) Interview 
with Stefan Stuchlik; 
c) Reactions in Kyiv; 
Golineh Atai; d) 




Q: Mr. Steinmeier, you had warned Russia again emphatically, the chancellor spoke on the phone with Putin again today - all to no avail. 
Things developed as expected. Has your policy of dialog failed already? A.: It is not allowed to fail, also not for the future. Even if our efforts 
had no success so far to convince Russia to part from its current course. Therefore, a clear message tomorrow. What happened today, the 
referendum is not in accordance with the Ukrainian constitutions - neither the one that was valid until recently under Yanukovych, nor the 
newly re-instated constitution of 2004. And an annexation of Crimea would clearly be a breach of internationals law. This is exactly what we 
will say tomorrow. Q.: How concrete will your message be? According to the steps planned by the EU, now accounts will be frozen, and travel 
bans imposed - who will be targeted? A.: We have always said, from the beginning, that we are not the ones who are interest in confrontation 
with Russia. We have over and over offered ways out of this spiral of escalation, and therefore we will design our sanction exactly like this. 
Tomorrow we will agree a stepping up of sanctions, which are about freezing assets in the EU and travel bans to the EU. We will decide it in 
such a way that in the days thereafter making contact with the Russian side will remain possible, in order to return to the path of negotiations. 
Because today the future status of Crimea was decided, at least on behalf of these that participated in the election. So far, we don’t know 
which conclusions Russia will draw from this. I assume that the accession into Russian territory is prepared. When - if short term, or longer 
term - we do not know, but maybe we still have a timeframe to return to dialogue. Q.: There are at least some worrying indicators that 
Russia, after Crimea, may push for the breaking away of other Ukrainian regions. What will you do then? A.: This is exactly the reason why I 
am saying that today’s decision established facts - but this cannot mean that one can lean back disappointedly, but it is about not allowing 
the case of Crimea to lead to a division of Europe and unpeacefulness [Unfriedlichkeit] or even military conflict between Ukrainian and 
Russian military forces. Therefore, to my mind, it is now about sending an OSCE military observer mission as fast as possible, that gets active 
in great strength in eastern and southern Ukraine, to control the activities of Ukrainian, Russian, and Russian-backed forces. And if Russia 
really wants to give a signal, this would be the opportunity to say we will keep out of eastern and southern Ukraine. And then, Russia would - 
finally have to give such an observer mission the opportunity to enter Crimea to fulfil its duty. Q. Simultaneously, you are threatening 
sanctions. Do you seriously still have the impression that this makes any impression on Putin, or that this has long been taken into account 
by him? A.: I cannot find what we have undertaken so far was so unwise. We have over and over searched for ways to at least prevent 
further escalation, we have formulated ways out, we have presented suggestions to Russia. We will now tomorrow not take such an 
unreasonable decision, to endanger what - at least from my perspective - is required now: the international observer mission. I say it again - 
we did not look for the confrontation, we will continue to be interested to engage in talks with Russia. We will not ignore that what happened 
around Crimea is inacceptable in international law. But we want to prevent further escalation, and the division of Europe. We have no 
chouce, we must search for a way how to get there.  
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17.03.2014 tagesschau, 12:00 ; a) 
EU Foreign Ministers 
meet in BXL to 
discuss sanctions, 
report B. Scharkus; b) 
Berlin reacts 
sceptically to 
sanctions, report M. 
Spieker.686 
The referendum on Crimea left a mark - also in Brussels. The EU may not stand on the side-lines if borders are drawn newly in Europe, it is said 
here. [C. Ashton] "You can't simply lean back and let things just develop by themselves; we must think hard about the correct response. There 
should be a response". [Scharkus ctd] The foreign ministers plan to negate important actors’ entry into the ÄEÄU, and to freeze their assets. 
Hardly anyone believes that this can prevent the separation of Crimea from Ukraine. [Jean Asselborn, FM Lux] "I think even with the strongest 
sanctions in the world will we no re-establish the status quo. De iure and de facto are two different things, but un terms of realpolitik something 
has happened yesterday related to Crimea". [Scharkus]Germany urges to send observers to Ukraine, up to 1.000 men. The aim of the mission: 
[Steinmeier]" To watch very narrowly if Russia is active beyond Crimea and destabilizes Ukraine. We can prevent this with an observer 
mission". Behind closed doors the foreign ministers draft a sanction list with about 20 names on it. Putin's close cohorts, however, shall not 
be included.  
17.03.2014 tagesschau, 12:00 ; a) 
EU Foreign Ministers 
meet in BXL to discuss 
sanctions, report B. 
Scharkus; b) Berlin 
reacts sceptically to 
sanctions, report M. 
Spieker.687 
Before the CDU headquarters this morning, it was not the usual internal party issues that caused discussion, but the conflict with Russia. 
Should there be sanctions, and if so, which ones? [Günther Oettinger, EU Commissioner for Energy, and member of CDU]: "There are a lot of 
arguments that speak in favour of not allowing people close to Putin, both from politics and state-affiliated industry, to enter the EU". [Phillip 
Mißfelder, Member of CDU Presidium, Spokesman Foreign Policy]: "I am sceptical about trade sanctions, as they of course would also hurt the 
German economy and employment". [Spieker ctd] This is also exactly the fear of the Green party, who in principle are in favour of sanctions, 
but worry that [ Simone Peter, Chairwoman Alliance90/Greens] "we are highly dependent on Russian energy supplies, not only in relation to 
gas, but also in terms of coal, uranium - this means it is about finding ways to not sanction each other in a way that would lead to massive 
economic consequences". [Spieker ctd] And how is the federal government’s position on the crisis? Angela Merkel lets her speaker state that 
[Steffen Seibert, Spokesman Federal Chancellery] "This referendum is at odds with the Ukrainian constitution, and it is at odds with 
international law. From our view, it is illegal. Germany condemns the holding of this illegal referendum. We, and our European partners, not 
only contest the legality of the referendum, we will also not recognize its outcome". [Spieker ctd] The exact consequences are not talked about 
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a) Interview with 
Hans Jessen, 
Reactions in Berlin 
about Referendum; 
b) Interview with 
Arnim Stauth on 
sanctions from 
Brussels 
Q.: How are the reactions in political Berlin? A.: Berlin is fully in line with other European nations. This is congruent with the assessment we 
have just heard from Brussels. The result of the referendum is not accepted, while at the same time there is awareness that facts were 
established that are not reversible anymore. Therefore, even if no one says it loud here, the assessment here is no different to the one the 
foreign minister of Luxembourg, Jean Asselborn has made. Q.: Politcal observers warn to push Putin into a corner, the crisis on Crimea could 
escalate. From your view are sanctions the right response. A.: The question is what the alternative would be. If you just let this annexation - 
and that at least is the German view of what happened, an illegal annexation - happen, would that then not be a signal to Putin that he has a 
free hand, to pursue Russian interest robustly with violence. That would not be particularly conducive either. Therefore, I think the double 
offer of on the one hand - still limited - sanctions, that are being felt in Russia, and on the other hand readiness for dialogue, and the will to it. 
This simultaneity, I think, is a reasonable weighing - in such a package, sanctions are required and important. Q.: Germany until now appeared 
particularly well positioned for a mediator role, Merkel spoke on the phone with Putin only yesterday - but it did not achieve much. Is the 
German role in the conflict overstated? A: I don’t think it is. The fact alone that Angela Merkel keep the dialogue - channels open with Putin, 
that she over and over confronts him with the position - which of course is not only the German, but also the European and U.S. American 
position - that she confronts him with that, that he has to deal with that, shows how important that role is. And, importantly, another aspect 
that has been mentioned already: The vehement German urging for an OSCE observer mission to ensure that there is no further Russian 
aggression against Ukraine. That Putin at least notionally considers this idea, which he calls "support group" - maybe tomorrow we will hear 
more about that from him - if that happens, this would be a first step in the direction of a diplomatic solution, and a confirmation that 
Germany's role is not that marginal and ineffective.  
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Reactions in Berlin 
about Referendum; 
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sanctions from 
Brussels 
Q.: There seems to be an agreement about the requirement to respond to the referendum on Crimea - what could this look like? A.: As Mrs. 
Ashton said - the Europeans want to send a very clear signals that this referendum is considered illegal, and that words will be followed by 
deeds. On the other hand, it is actually a diplomatic balancing act. On the one hand showing teeth, on the other hand to keep the doors open 
for dialogue. The sanctions will have to fit this balancing act. They [the sanctions] are about travel restrictions and freezing of assets for certain 
individuals on Crimea, and in Russia. Currently, the signs are that this will not for example include the Russian foreign minister, also maybe 
not the heads of the symbolic energy business, but more the second tier of Russian business and politics. Q. Can the annexation of Crimea still 
be prevented? A.: Of course, no one has said anything to the effect that Crimea is lost. But if one looks how string the nationalist card is already 
being played on Crimea and in Russia. There are even talks about changing the clocks on Crimea to Russian time, there are talks about 
introducing the Rubel - I think ghosts have been called that even Putin is able to call back anymore. Also, the population on Crimea, after 
this unambiguous vote, and also many people in Russia that support the absorption of Crimea, this cannot be revoked. This has also been said 
today by one of the EU foreign ministers, Jean Asselborn: "Even the toughest sanctions will not re-establish the status quo". before the crisis. 
Q.: What are the remaining chances for a diplomatic solution? A.: My impression is that the diplomatic efforts are now more focused on the 
South and East of Ukraine. A diplomatic fire-service that has seen that one house, Crimea, is fully ablaze and most likely lost, logically turns to 
at least prevent new fires to break out. Steinmeier has very vehemently demanded an OSCE observer mission for the East and South of Ukraine. 
Allegedly, Putin has said he might agree to it, but if so, the situation in entire Ukraine must be observed.  
17.03.2014 Axel Dorloff: China 




China's position in the Ukraine conflict remains ambiguous. In his response to the question wether the referendum was legal, vice foreign 
minister Li Bao Dong remained vague. Before journalists in Beijing, Li did not want to specify whether China recognizes the referendum, or 
not. Even after being asked repeatedly, Li limited his statement to an urging of the conflicting parties to prevent further escalation of the 
conflict. He hopes that all sides keep a cool head, and search for dialogue. Before the visit of President Xi in Europe, the situation remains the 
same: In the Ukraine-conflict, China is confronted with a dilemma. On the one hand, China does not want to scare its strategic partner 
Russia. Therefore, the result of the referendum is not criticized or even called illegal, as the U.S. or Europe are. On the other hand, the principle 
of non-interference is the most important principle of Chinese foreign policy. Particularly in view of its own domestic conflicts in Tibet or 
Xinjang Province, China cannot support the notion that the people on Crimea secede from Ukraine by referendum.  
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a) Intro Schröder: In the referendum on Crimea an overwhelming majority of the voters cast their votes in favour of joining Russia. Today, 
Crimea declared itself independent, and applied for accession to the Russian Federation. Russia and Ukraine have been arguing about the 
peninsula in the Black Sea for ling. Of the roughly 2 million Crimeans, around 35% are Ukrainians, almost 60% are ethnic Russians. b) Report 
Stuchlik: Waking up in a different country. That was the feeling in Simferopol. In the day after the referendum, suddenly militiamen appear in 
the streets of the Crimean capital. In parliament, the election coordinator announced the 96,7% in favour if joining Russia. Immediately the 
next step followed. [Ruslan Temirgalijew, deputy prime minister of the regional government of Crimea]: "Today, after this overwhelming 
referendum, we officially went to Moscow with the request to integrate Crimea into the Russian Federation". [Stuchlik ctd] Behind closed 
doors, it continued blow on blow: Introduction of the Rubel, introduction of Moscow's time-zone, alignment of the social security systems. 
[Sergej Aksionow, Crimean prime minister] " The wages and pension system, as well as the unemployment support are much better in Moscow. 
We will introduce the Russian system in this respect as soon as possible. But on the other hand, with our specific abilities, we will also enrich 
the Russian Federation". [Stuchlkik ctd] Additionally, the Crimean government nationalized severely energy suppliers on the peninsula, which 
until then belonged to Ukraine. The news about Western sanctions just made the marginal notes, only the joining of Russia rules the 
proceedings here. A day after the referendum, the Crimean government has decided steps towards Russia at an almost breath-taking pace.  
The impression: The annexation shall be made irreversible practically also. This notwithstanding problems still persist - for example the future 
of several thousand Ukrainian soldiers on the peninsula. If this problem is not solved as soon as possible, the next conflict is looming.  
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Situation in Crimea, 
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R.D. Krause.690 
a) Intro Thorsten Schröder: Russian president Putin will give a statement about future steps in Crimea in the Russian parliament tomorrow. In 
the evening he ordered the recognition of Crimea as a sovereign country by decree. The Ukrainian government excluded the handing over of 
the peninsula. The parliament in Ukraine ordered the partial mobilisation of its armed forces. b) Report G. Atai: Arming a run down military, 
motivating a demoralized police-force: The parliamentarian [in Ukrain] are facing enormous challenges. The interim government is now 
investing around 500 million Euros in equipping its forces. Interim president Turtschinow defends his reluctant, passive politics [Turtschinow]: 
" Our soldiers have behaved heroically, so far they did not let themselves be provoked. Russia is internationally isolated. We are ready for 
talks, but we will not accept an annexation of Crimea". [Atai ctd] A majority [in Ukrainian parliament] today voted for partial mobilization of 
the army - particularly to draft in experienced soldiers. The Minister of Defence confirmed again that a truce [Stillhalteabkommen] has been 
arranged with the Russian military leadership, valid until Friday [Igor Tenjuk, defence minister UKR]: "This truce means that all provocations 
or attempts to storm Ukrainian bases by Russian soldiers must stop". [Atai ctd] Moscow says it is ready to negotiate with the West - but only 
under the condition that Ukraine changes its constitution, becomes a federal state, and recognizes the referendum. Kyiv rejected these 
conditions vehemently today and made Russia responsible for the riots in the east of the country.  
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Thorsten Schröder: a) 
Situation in Crimea, 
Report Stefan 
Stuchlik; b) reaction 
in Kyiv, Report G. 
Atai; c) Reactions in 
Brussels, report by 
R.D. Krause.691 
a) Intro Thorsten Schröder: Because of the Crimea Crisis, the EU and the U.S. imposed further sanctions. They want to prevent that after the 
referendum Russia annexes Crimea. The U.S. now froze the assets of seven high ranking Russian politicians. The EU foreign ministers-imposed 
travel restrictions. Amongst others, the president of the Crimean parliament and prime minister Aksopnow are targeted. b) Report W.D. 
Krause: It was no coincidence that Catherine Ashton's hand landed on the shoulders of her Polish colleague - solidarity with worried member 
states was as important to the foreign ministers as sending a clear message to Russia. The sanctions only target twenty people so far, but that 
because one wants to be able to enter into dialogue with Russia again. Simultaneously, preparations are being made to send observers to 
Ukraine, already within the next couple of days. [Frank-Walter Steinmeier] " Much will depend now that we get a precise overview if there 
are Russian activities beyond Crimea, to see whether the fears of some are justified, that the operation, the political operation, by Russia 
is not concluded yet with the decision about Crimea".  [Krause ctd] For Steinmeier, it equals a miracle that Ukraine and Russia have not 
engaged in fighting already. The fate of Crimea, however, appears decided. No one believes that the wheel can be turned back. [Jean 
Asselborn]: "Thus, in terms of realpolitik, one needs to acknowledge what happened, but also say 'stop!'". [Krause ctd]: Meanwhile, EU - 
diplomats believe to see new signs of readiness for dialog in Russia. However, they also experience the signals of detente, and their opposite, 
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/ East-Caucus of the 
German Economy; d) 
Global Challenges of 
Ice-Age.692 
a) Intro Strempel: It has become a reality what has been looming for the past two weeks - Crimea is breaking away from Ukraine. Again, today 
the apparent Russian militias dominated the streets on Crimea. The party-stages remained empty - the night before this looked very different, 
when Crimean prime-minister Aksionow was cheered by thousands for the referendum and its unsurprising outcome. of more than 97% in 
favour of seceding from Ukraine. The accession into the Russian Federation appears to be a mere formality now. The E.U. and the U.S.A. are 
responding with sanctions against Russia. But if they suffice to discourage Putin from his expansionist course - highly doubtful. The pro-Russian 
forces on Crimea feel strong today, knowing that the strong Russia is covering their back. But are they really [strong]? b) Report Stuchlik: That 
the issue of water supply is highly current we realize at least since we are trying to interview the Ukrainian official responsible for it. No one 
knows where they are, and if so, they would not give an interview, thank you. The large freshwater reservoir for Simferopol has a volume of 
almost 20 mio m³, theoretically. If you look at the watermarks you realize that the reservoir is running empty - the main feeding channel is 
closed until today, the water remains in Ukrainian hands. [Stuchlik, asking by passers on the streets] " There are plans, now that Crimea is 
Russian, to cut the water supply". [Men]: "Then we will live without water". [Woman] "I fear for the children, it will be hard for them, but 
me - I will take it". [Old woman] "We built this Dnepr-channel during the Soviet Union. The Ukrainian cannot simply cut off the water, it is our 
channel!"  [Stuchlik ctd] Meanwhile, we are making a third attempt to get the responsible Ukrainian official before the camera. The security-
guard is so impressed with out stubbornness, that he drives with us directly to his bosses. [Valerik Pantjuschkin. Director Crimea Water] "What 
will happen next week? Well, our government decides, and then we act". [Stuchlik] "But your government is in Kyiv?" [Pantjuschkin]: "Well, 
until today our institution is called Crimea Water, which means it is actually controlled by the Crimean government. The overall-control, you 
are indeed correct in this regard, is with the Ministry in Kyiv, which we are subordinated to". [Stuchlik] The water-levels on Crimea's Rivers are 
low - exactly like the North Crimea channel, who brings 85% of the peninsula’s freshwater directly from Ukraine. And should the channel not 
be opened like every year punctually on March 19, Sergei Aksionow will have a massive problem to deal with. [Stuchlik] "The people here on 
the street are afraid that now, with Crimea becoming part of Russia, Ukraine will stop the flow of freshwater!" [Aksionow:] "I had already 
explained to you that we have a Plan B. We know ourselves that the freshwater comes mainly from Ukraine. But the people tell me - and I also 
say that - they should go ahead and switch everything off. Then Russia will bring water to Crimea". [Stuchlik ctd.] This morning, the Crimean 
government nationalized several energy plants - it is not that easy with water supplies. 
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Q: What are the plans of the Ukrainian government - will they really cut the water? A.: Well, it was indeed talked about here. But at the 
moment I can hardly imagine this - because for the Ukrainian government Crimea remains Ukrainian - and why should they give up their very 
own territory? No, I cannot imagine this, it will not happen. But, one probably expects that if such a step is taken, Moscow will react, and 
possibly use the leverage of gas prices, and then for this action the strangulation of Crimea [from water-supplies], punish the entire Ukraine. 
I can not imagine this. Q.: Thus, the government in Kyiv is hesitant, maybe also because Ukrainian military is still stationed on Crimea. The 
minister of defence said that there is something of a truce with the Russians, or some sort of agreement to that effect, valid until Friday - and 
then what? What will happen with the Ukrainian forces on Crimea? A.: It is important to emphasize again that it was a verbal agreement, an 
agreement that has not been confirmed by the Russians, nor was it even mentioned by them. I could imagine that this agreement was struck 
between three men, generals, that back in the Soviet Union may have visited the same [military] academy. No, the Ukrainian soldiers will 
remain on their bases until Friday. Currently, there is a strong patriotic sentiment here, there is a hotline to support soldiers, money is being 
collected for the soldiers, recruits are being drafted - an unparalleled situation in the history of Ukraine , that in all of a sudden so many people 
want to serve in the forces. At some point the bases will be occupied by Russian soldiers again: they are likely to severe supplies, so that the 
Ukrainian soldiers will be forced to leave eventually. However, face-saving with the Ukrainian flag, to be received as heroes on the mainland.  
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a) Intro Strempel: Russia must understand the seriousness of the situation - this is the objective of the EU sanctions. 21 individuals from Russia 
and Crimea may not enter the EU territory anymore, and their accounts will be locked. The commander of the Russian Black Sea Fleet is 
affected, as is the prime minister of Crimea, and parliamentarians of the Russian Duma. If this is not enough to stop Russia, then the EU wants 
to impose economic sanctions, which of course affect some German companies badly. Germany earns well in dealing with Russia. It is buying 
around 36.1 bn €uros in resources like oils and gas from Russia but sells products worth more than 40 bn [40.4 shown on graph] to Russia. 
More than 6.000 German businesses are active in Russia, amongst them giants like Siemens, E-On, Metro Group and VW. Metro employs 
22.000 staff in Russia, VW produces 190.000 cars there annually. Thus, who will be hurt more by economic sanctions at the end of the day? 
and would the EU, particularly Germany have the breath, to wait for sanctions to take effect? b) Report Nikolas Steiner: It would be a billion 
€uro deal for RWE amidst the Ukraine crisis. Today, the German energy-company announced that it intends to sell its oil and gas subsidiary 
DEA to a Russian investor. Russia's market power in the German energy market would further grow with this deal. Already, experts warn 
Germany is much too dependent on Russian resources. [Claudia Kemfert, German Institute for Economic Research]: "Ever more than before, 
Russia uses energy as a political pressure tool. It is therefore problematic if Russian companies engage in the German market directly, because 
they may act strategically". [Steiner ctd] Particularly the former German chancellor Schröder favoured a strong relationship with Russia. Since 
then, both countries are closely linked. A result of this rapprochement is Nord Stream II, the pipeline which will bring gas directly from Russia 
to Germany. And also, from the south, gas is supposed to go from Russia directly to Europe. Like the Europeans are in dire need for the gas, 
the Russians are in dire need for cash. They are mutually dependent. But it is also the fact that Russian businesses are pushing into the German 
energy market. Recently, the German BASF announced that Russia's GAZPROM will take over 20% of Germany’s gas storage. That also means 
that Russia will be more dependent on Germany. Sanctions would likely hit both countries hard. [Kemfert] " I also think that with sanctions 
you cut yourself, although it must be said that the Russian companies are much more dependent on supplying gas to Germany, than German 
companies on access to the Russian market". [Steiner] Already at the beginning of this month, GAZPROM announced that shortages of gas are 
likely. With stopping supplies, however, Russia would mainly hurt itself, as it urgently need the income of the oil and gas business.  
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Q.: You warned to not isolate Russia further. You also warned about economic sanctions, which the EU wants to discuss as a next step. But 
is it not exactly what Putin is betting on, that the West is not decisive enough, that if in doubt they are not able to sustain economic 
sanctions? A.: Economic sanction can only be the very last resort, in the frame of politics. Furthermore, they can only be imagined when 
diplomacy has fully exploited its options. Secondly, I am convinced that Russia, Putin, will not give in if sanctions are imposed, quite to the 
contrary - we will evoke countermeasures. Thirdly, if we were to introduce sanctions, the country we want to protect, Ukraine, would suffer 
the most. Q. These words may sound very well tonight in Putin's ears. What do you suggest that if the now imposed sanctions, which are 
still limited, are not taking effect - when is the point reached when one has to resort to economic sanctions? A: I understand the recently 
announced sanctions as a signal that the diplomatic channels remain open, and there is room for further talks. I believe that I am convinced 
that in a situation that we are having now, only communication will help. All channels that we are having must be kept open. And I know that 
there is need for talks in Russia also. I also would like to add that in the framework of such a policy, such a strategy, German politics has a 
special responsibility, but also the private sector. Q: But the threat with economic sanctions is now in the room, therefore again - when 
would the acceptance limit be reached that you would say we have to accept this [risk] now? A.: I repeat: Economic sanctions can only be 
the very last resort. I trust that the diplomatic channels will remain open so that we can still find a political solution of the problem. Q.: A 
sensitive issue is the large (German) dependence from Russian gas and oil. Is it not the time now that the EU and Germany reorient 
themselves, as gas can be bought elsewhere in the world? A.: Russia has always been an exceptionally reliable deliverer of oil and gas, even 
during the coldest times of the Cold War. The exports of Russia to the West play a big role. From my view, we have no reason to fear that 
Russia will employ gas and oil as, or more simply put, will continue to deliver in the same fashion as it did in the previous decades. 
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a) Intro Strempel: It seems these days as if the clock of world politics is wheeled back - back into the early 80s, when the Cold War was still 
presence. What actually happens on the world stage if Russia and the West are facing each other so irreconcilably again? Our UN 
correspondent Markus Schmidt on what is at stake in a new ice-age. b) Report, Markus Schmidt: Veto-Russia; abstention - China. [Russian] 
ambassador Vitali Tschurkin prevents the resolution that would have declared the annexation of Crimea as a breach in international law. 
Visible for everyone, Russia is isolated in the United Nations Security Council. The U.S. reaction: 'This crisis has a heading: made in Moscow'. 
Fall back into the times long forgotten, when a Nikita Khrushchev ranted at the UN. Building the wall, arms race with the option to destroy the 
world a thousand times - and then the surprising turn in the Soviet Union. [Reagan] "Mr. Gorbachev, tear down this wall!" [Schmidt ctd]: The 
wall came down and a friendship developed in the course between Gorbachev and Kohl. It was based on a promise: The NATO allies agreed 
to not expand their territory further east after Germany was reunited. [Helmut Kohl] " A friendly relationship [with Gorbachev] developed in 
the course of many meetings in the context of German reunification" [Schmidt ctd] The peace dividend was high, the nuclear arsenals were 
massively reduced, the defence budgets melted down. The laughter of U.S. president Clinton with Yeltsin - it appeared as if a relieve. U.S. 
foreign secretary Albright hugs her colleagues from Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. Against the promise, the eastward expansion of 
NATO has occurred - next Ukraine? What for some appear as the path of victory of democracy, the others call encirclement. Russia admonished 
[Putin]: "Together we should develop a culture of crisis prevention - prescient crisis prevention". [Schmidt ctd] 14 years [after this statement] 
later, a new Ice Age looms in the Security Council. Block thinking in the Security Council, where important decisions are coming up soon: Syria, 
the Iran Nuclear Deal. [Simon Adams, Ralph-Bunch Institute for International Studies]: "That is the tragedy, that the crisis on Crimea has 
deprived the Security Council of oxygen". [Schmidt ctd] Blockade per constant veto? 3 years of civil war in Syria, 150.000 killed - and the 
Security Council is incapable of acting again. 
17.03.2014 Tagesthemen697 EU imposes sanctions on Russia. 











Annex 2: Deutschsprachige Zusammenfassung 
 
1. Forschungsinteresse und Relevanz 
 
Die vorliegende Untersuchung analysiert, welche Rolle die Überraschung für die russische 
Annexion der Krim 2014 im Allgemeinen und für Deutschland im Speziellen hatte.  
 
Das Interesse an dem Thema wurde durch Zufall geweckt, während einer Podiumsdiskussion 
über Deutschlands zukünftige Rolle in der Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik im Frühjahr 2014, 
kurz nachdem die Krim von Russland annektiert worden war. Thema der Diskussion war die 
Frage, wie Deutschland mehr internationale Verantwortung übernehmen und seinem 
wirtschaftlichen und politischen Gewicht in der Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik besser gerecht 
werden kann - ein Thema, das in der deutschen Debatte seit 2012 immer wieder auftaucht. 
Damals wurde mit Blick auf die anstehende Bundestagswahl 2013 ein Papier des damaligen 
Who-is-Who der deutschen Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik mit dem Titel Neue Macht, neue 
Verantwortung699 veröffentlicht und löste eine Debatte aus, die bis heute nicht abgeschlossen 
ist. Das Kernargument des Papiers: Das internationale Umfeld, in dem Deutschland agiert, hat 
sich verändert, und damit auch die Rolle Deutschlands in diesem Umfeld. Es hat neue Macht 
gewonnen, und damit geht, vor dem Hintergrund der eigenen Geschichte und den Triebfedern 
des Machtzuwachses eine neue internationale Verantwortung einher. Dazu müsse Deutschland 
auch strategischer agieren.  
 
Einer der Diskussionsteilnehmer, ein Mitglied des Planungsstabes des Auswärtigen Amtes, 
argumentierte in der Diskussion mit Blick auf die völkerrechtswidrige russische Annexion der 
Krim 2014, dass Deutschland dazu seine Fähigkeit verbessern müsse, mit Überraschungen 
umzugehen.  Diese Aussage war der Funke, der das Interesse für dieses Vorhaben entfachte. 
 
Es sind insbesondere die seither eingetretenen Entwicklungen, die die Relevanz für dieses 
Unterfangen unterstreichen. Denn, betrachtet man die unerwarteten Ereignisse, die der Krim-
Annexion folgten, erscheint der Diplomat fast wie die mythologische Pandora: Der unerwartete 
Aufstieg von ISIS im Juni 2014, die Migrationskrise in Europa im Sommer 2015, der BREXIT 
 
699 Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik; German Marshall Fund Berlin (Hrsg): Neu Macht, Neue Verantwortung – 
Elmente einer deutschen Außen-und Sicherheitspolitik in einer veränderten Welt, Berlin, Oktober 2013. 





und die Wahl von Donald Trump im Jahr 2016, und eine globale Pandemie, die die Welt im 
Jahr 2020 zum Stillstand bringt. Sie alle markieren Ereignisse, die unerwartet waren, aber 
gravierende Auswirkungen, nicht nur auf Deutschland, sondern auch auf das Geflecht der 
Beziehungen der Staaten untereinander hatten. Die Welt schien "aus den Fugen geraten"700, wie 
der deutsche Außenminister Frank-Walter Steinmeier im Februar 2016 beobachtete.  
 
Der Außenminister und der Diplomat waren nicht die einzigen Deutschen, die die zunehmende 
Häufigkeit von unerwarteten Ereignissen mit schwerwiegenden Folgen feststellten. So bemerkt 
beispielsweise der ehemalige Botschafter Wolfgang Ischinger, heute Vorsitzender der 
Münchner Sicherheitskonferenz: "In der Außenpolitik ist sie [die Überraschung] ein neues - 
und ein erhebliches - Problem ... wir können uns nicht auf das vorbereiten, was kommt, und 
müssen ständig auf das Unerwartete vorbereitet sein."701    
 
Aufbauend auf der Beobachtung der zunehmenden Prävalenz von Überraschungen, aber mit 
dem Optimismus, dass "neue Normal" "managen" zu können, wurden seit 2014 zahlreiche 
Anstrengungen unternommen, um zukünftigen Überraschungen zu begegnen - von der 
Etablierung spezieller Foresight-Institutionen und -Studiengänge702 über neue Methoden und 
Mittel zur Sensibilisierung für zukünftige Entwicklungen703 bis hin zum Versuch, Bereiche zu 
identifizieren, in denen Überraschungen wahrscheinlich sind704.  Auffallend ist dabei, dass im 
Gegensatz zu den Bemühungen, sich gegen zukünftige Überraschungen abzusichern, und trotz 
der allgemein geteilten Beobachtung unter deutschen Politikern, Experten und Akademikern 
über die zunehmende Häufigkeit von Überraschungen dem Phänomen selbst und der 
Untersuchung seiner Ursachen in der deutschen Debatte kaum systematische Aufmerksamkeit 
zuteilwurde - weder im Allgemeinen noch im Kontext eines der Überraschungsereignisse 
zwischen 2014 und 2020.  Die Frage, warum Deutschland überrascht wurde, schien weniger 
 
700 Steinmeier, Frank-Walter: „Die Welt aus den Fugen – was hält uns zusammen?“, speech held at the 
Bertelsmann Forum 2016, 15.02.2016, online available at: https://www.auswaertiges-
amt.de/de/newsroom/160215-bm-bertelsmann-forum/278660 , zuletzt besucht am 18.04.2021. 
701 Ischinger, Wolfgang: Welt in Gefahr, Econ, Berlin 2018, S. 37. 
702 So bietet die Freie Universität Berlin ein Masters Programm in Futurologie an, siehe: https://www.ewi-
psy.fu-berlin.de/v/master-zukunftsforschung/index.html , zuletzt besucht am 18.04.2021. 
703 So unternahm die Universität der Bundeswehr München ein umfangreiches Forschungsprogramm zu 
‚Methoden der Zukunftsanalyse‘, siehe: https://www.unibw.de/politikwissenschaft/professuren/lehrstuhl-
ip/projekte/weiterentwicklung-der-methoden-der-zukunftsanalyse , zuletzt besucht am 18.04.2021. 
704 Fischer, Sabine; Klein, Margarete (eds):  Denkbare Überraschungen: Elf Entwicklungen, die Russlands 
Außenpolitik nehmen könnte, SWP-Studie, 2016 S 15, Juli 2016, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Berlin, 2016.  
 





relevant als die Frage, wie zukünftige Überraschungen verhindert werden könnten. Während 
der zukunftsorientierte Fokus angesichts der oftmals gravierenden Folgen unerwarteter 
Ereignisse nachvollziehbar ist, bleibt es wichtig zu verstehen, ob sich generalisierbare Ursachen 
sich für das Phänomen identifizieren lassen und ob es spezifische Ursachen gibt, die dazu 
führen, dass insbesondere die deutsche Politik sich in jüngerer Vergangenheit immer wieder 
überrascht zeigen musste.  
 
Dies zeigt sich auch in der deutschen Debatte im Kontext der Krimannexion 2014. So stellt 
beispielsweise Hans Kundnani in Bezug auf die Krim fest, dass "die Annexion der Krim durch 
Russland im März 2014 ein strategischer Schock für Deutschland war"705. Doch, obwohl der 
Autor die Russlandpolitik Deutschlands bewertet und ob sie sich mit der Annexion der Krim 
verändert hat, zeigt Kudnani weder auf, was genau der Schock war, warum er für Deutschland 
strategisch war, noch diskutiert er, was das Schockereignis ausgelöst hat oder was Putin und 
Russland damit zu tun gehabt haben könnten. 
 
Hans Kudnani ist keine Ausnahme von einer allgemeinen Beobachtung: Das Phänomen der 
Überraschung spielt in der deutschen Debatte über internationale Beziehungen im Allgemeinen 
und in Untersuchungen von Krieg, internationalen Konflikten und Krisen im Besonderen kaum 
eine Rolle.  Zwischen Waldemar Erfurths 1938 erschienenem Werk Die Überraschung im 
Kriege706, das einen Großteil der Offensivoperationen der Wehrmacht in den ersten Tagen des 
Zweiten Weltkriegs prägte, und heute konnte nur ein einziger deutschsprachiger Artikel zum 
Thema Überraschung gefunden werden, der aus dem Jahr 1988 stammt: ein Zwei Seiter in der 
Zeitschrift Europäische Wehrkunde, verfasst vom ehemaligen Bundeswehr-Generalmajor 
Hanno Graf von Kielmannsegg707. Von Kielmannsegg argumentiert, dass selbst im Falle eines 
Endes des Kalten Krieges die Sowjetunion immer noch die Neigung hätte, mit einem 
konventionellen militärischen Angriff die Überraschung zu suchen. Von Kielmannseggs 
Befürchtungen wurden jedoch durch das überraschende Ende des Kalten Krieges schnell als 
obsolet bewertet: Der Kalte Krieg endete friedlich, ohne militärische Entscheidungsschlacht 
zwischen den Supermächten. In Abwesenheit ideologischer Rivalität herrschte das Gefühl vor, 
 
705 Kundnani, Hans: ‘Leaving the West behind: Germany looks East’, in: Foreign Affairs,Vol. 94 No. 2, S.175.   
März/April 2015.  
706 Erfurth, Waldemar: Die Überraschung im Kriege, Mittler & Sohn, Berlin, 1938. 
707 Kielmannsegg, Hanno von: ‚Die vergessene Gefahr der strategischen Überraschung‘, in: Europäische 
Wehrkunde, 4/ 87, Bonn, 1988, S. 211-212.  





dass es keinen Grund mehr gab, einen sowjetischen Überraschungsangriff zu fürchten, weder 
nuklear noch konventionell.  So spielen deutsche Beiträge in der Debatte über das Phänomen 
der Überraschung, die insbesondere während des Kalten Krieges sehr lebhaft war, keine Rolle. 
Vieles davon lässt sich aus der deutschen Geschichte heraus erklären, auch die Sprache ist hier 
ein Faktor708.  
 
Die Beobachtung der Überraschung einerseits, aber ihre Vernachlässigung als potenziell 
entscheidender Faktor für das Gesamtergebnis und der Erforschung ihrer verallgemeinerbaren 
Ursachen kann jedoch nicht nur im Kontext der deutschen Krim-Debatte beobachtet werden, 
sondern auch in der breiteren, ‚westlichen‘ Debatte über die Annexion der Krim. Obwohl die 
Überraschung ein häufig beobachteter Aspekt bei der Annexion der Krim ist, lag der Fokus, der 
die Debatte im Anschluss an die Annexion leitete, auf zwei anderen Aspekten: Zum einen auf 
der Frage nach der Rechtmäßigkeit des russischen Vorgehens709. Zum anderen spielte die 
Frage, ob es sich bei der Annexion der Krim um einen sorgfältig ausgeführten Plan handelte, 
oder ob es ein Schnellschuss war, dem ein russisches Durchwursteln folgte, eine zentrale Rolle.  
 
Schon am Tag, nachdem die Krim offiziell in die Russische Föderation aufgenommen wurde, 
kommt John Simpson von der BBC zu dem Schluss "Die gesamte Operation war sehr klug 
geplant und durchgeführt. Aber es gibt absolut keinen Zweifel daran, was es war - ein 
bemerkenswerter, schneller und größtenteils unblutiger Staatsstreich."710  Wenig später enthüllt 
Thomas Gutschker, der für die deutsche Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung schreibt, "Putins 
Schlachtplan", und verfolgt ihn bis ins Jahr 2013 zurück, als westliche Geheimdienste 
feststellten, dass kleine Gruppen russischer Spezialkräfte heimlich auf die Krim verlegt wurden, 
und vor einer möglichen russischen Invasion auf der Krim warnten711. Im Februar 2015 
berichtet die deutsche Wochenzeitung DieZeit, dass ein russisches Strategiedokument, das der 
Annexion der Krim vorausging, in der russischen Nowaja Gazeta veröffentlicht wurde, was die 
weit verbreitete Annahme bestätigte, dass die Annexion der Krim das Ergebnis eines 
 
708 Um im internationalen Diskurs wahrgenommen zu werden und anknüpfungsfähig zu sein, reichen 
deutschsprachige Beiträge nicht aus. Aus diesem Grund ist diese Arbeit in englischer Sprache verfasst, in der 
Hoffnung sowohl zum deutschen als auch zum internationalen Diskurs über strategische Fragestellungen 
beizutragen.  
709 Merkel, Reinhard: ‘Die Krim und das Völkerrecht: Kühle Ironie der Geschichte‘, in: Frankfurter Allgemeine 
Zeitung, 08.04.2014, Frankfurt, 2014.  
710 Simpson, John: ‘Russia's Crimea plan detailed, secret and successful’, in: BBC World Affairs, 19.03.2014, 
London, 2014. 
711 Gutschker, Thomas: ‚Putin’s Schlachtplan‘, in: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 07.09.2014, Frankfurt am 
Main, 2014.   





langfristigen Plans war712. Der Plan, so argumentiert der Artikel, wurde von einem Think Tank 
entwickelt, der den Kreml in Sachen Marketing und Strategie berät.   
 
Gleichzeitig gab es aber auch die gegenteilige Annahme - dass Putin und Russland spontan 
handelten und die Annexion der Krim eher durch russischen Ad-hocerismus als durch russische 
strategische und operative Kunst gekennzeichnet sei. Kurz nachdem die Krim in die Russische 
Föderation aufgenommen wurde, schreibt Shaun Walker für den Guardian, dass die Suche nach 
dem russischen Plan vergebliche Mühe sei. Die Entscheidung selbst, so argumentiert der 
Artikel, sei eine Schnellschuss-Entscheidung gewesen, die tiefere Wurzeln in Putins Biografie 
und der russischen Geschichte habe; eine "reflexartige Reaktion" auf die jüngsten Ereignisse in 
der Ukraine und das Gefühl, in einem ungerechten internationalen System zu leben. Dass es 
sich um eine kurzfristige Entscheidung handelte, die von einer sehr kleinen Anzahl von Leuten 
unter der Führung Putins getroffen wurde, zeige überdies die Tatsache, dass selbst russische 
Zeitungen zu dieser Zeit "berichteten, dass alle ihre Regierungsquellen völlig überrumpelt 
worden waren"713. Als weiteren Beleg für die Annahme, dass die Entscheidung, die Krim zu 
annektieren, an Ort und Stelle getroffen wurde, zitiert der Artikel einen mit dem Kreml 
verbundenen Analysten, Sergej Markow, der erklärt, dass "der ursprüngliche Plan nicht war, 
die Krim zu annektieren[...]".  Es sei daher zielführender, statt nach Putins Masterplan zu 
suchen, der Frage nachzugehen, warum Putin die Krim annektiert hat und warum "der russische 
Präsident einfach ausgerastet ist und entschieden hat, dass es an der Zeit war, unilateral zu 
handeln"714. Welche Rolle Überraschung für Russland spielte, sowohl als möglicher Auslöser 
für das Schnapp-Entscheidungs-Argument, als auch als mögliches Mittel, um das Gesamtziel, 
die Annexion der Krim, zu sichern, wurde jedoch von keinem der beiden Lager, die sich mit 
Russlands Plan für die Annexion der Krim befassten, berücksichtigt.   
 
Zusammenfassend lässt sich sagen, dass die Betrachtung, welche Rolle Überraschung für die 
Annexion der Krim 2014 im Allgemeinen und für Deutschland im Speziellen hatte, mehrere 
Lücken schließt: Erstens betrachtet sie ein Phänomen, dessen Häufigkeit steigt und dessen 
Auswirkungen negativ für Regierungen sind, und fragt nach generalisierbaren Ursachen; 
zweitens betrachtet sie es im Kontext der Annexion der Krim 2014, eines Falles von historischer 
 
712 Dobbert, Steffen; Grosev, Christo; Dülffer, Meike: ‚Putin und der geheime Ukraine-Plan‘, in: Die Zeit, 
26.02.2015, Hamburg, 2015. 
713 Walker, Shaun: ‘Ukraine and Crimea: what is Putin thinking?’, in: The Guardian, 23.03.2014, London, 2014. 
714 Walker, Shaun: ‘Ukraine and Crimea: what is Putin thinking?’, in: The Guardian, 23.03.2014, London, 2014. 





Bedeutung, bei dem das interessierende Phänomen zwar weithin beobachtet, aber keine zentrale 
Rolle in der Debatte spielte. Und drittens betrachtet sie das Phänomen mit besonderem 
Augenmerk auf Deutschland, dessen Anspruch, mehr internationale Verantwortung zu 
übernehmen in einer von Überraschungen geprägten Welt besonders herausfordernd scheint. 
Sie tut dies, viertens, in englischer Sprache, um so auch einen deutschen Beitrag zur 




Die vorliegende Untersuchung besteht aus fünf Teilen. Im Gegensatz zum üblichen Ansatz der 
theoretischen Antizipation, bei dem zunächst theoretische Erklärungen für das betreffende 
Phänomen in Betracht gezogen werden, um dann zu prüfen, welche Theorie die empirisch 
erfasste Realität am überzeugendsten erklärt, betrachtet diese Untersuchung zunächst die 
Empirie, bevor sie einen Rückgriff auf die Theorie vornimmt, um die Erkenntnisse über die 
Rolle der Überraschung für die Annexion der Krim besser zu erklären.  
 
3. Überraschung als Trivialität der Annexion der Krim? 
 
Zunächst wird eine Auswahl bisher veröffentlichter Arbeiten zur Annexion der Krim sowie zu 
Deutschland im Kontext der Krim-Annexion betrachtet, um zu beurteilen, welche Rolle der 
Überraschung für den Ausgang der Krim-Annexion in diesen bisherigen Arbeiten zugewiesen 
wurde. Es zeigt sich, dass Überraschung zwar einhellig beobachtet, aber nicht im Hinblick auf 
ihre Rolle für das Gesamtergebnis analysisert wurde715. Obwohl sich verschiedene Erklärungen 
für das Auftreten von Überraschungen im Zusammenhang mit der Annexion identifizieren 
lassen, ist für die meisten der untersuchten Arbeiten die Rolle von Überraschungen für die 
Annexion der Krim und für Deutschland für das Gesamtergebnis vernachlässigbar, und eher 
ein Nebeneffekt der Annexion als ein Schlüsselelement dafür. Ein Aspekt, der es in einem 
 
715 Trotz der Ähnlichkeit der Befunde in Bezug auf die Rolle des Überraschungsmoments bei der Annexion der 
Krim ist ein genereller Unterschied in der Literatur zur Annexion im Allgemeinen und zu den Bemühungen 
speziell in Bezug auf Deutschland in Bezug auf den Zeitrahmen der Analyse zu beobachten. Diejenigen, die sich 
mit der Annexion befassen, betrachten in der Regel den Zeitraum ab dem Verschwinden des ukrainischen 
Präsidenten Wiktor Janukowitsch in der Nacht zum 21. Februar als Beginn der Annexion der Krim. Diejenigen, 
die sich auf Deutschland konzentrieren, betrachten dagegen einen viel längeren Zeitraum, da sie die Annexion 
der Krim als untrennbar mit den vorangegangenen Monaten der Krise in und um die Ukraine verbunden sehen, 
beginnend mit dem Austritt von Viktor Janukowitsch aus einem Abkommen mit der Europäischen Union am 29. 
November. 





Filmlexikon in die Rubrik "Triviales" schaffen würde, wäre die Annexion der Krim ein Film 
und keine bittere Realität. Die Literaturübersicht zeigt, dass dies auch die Schlussfolgerung 
derjenigen ist, die die Annahme prüfen Russland habe durch gezielte Täuschung und 
Informationsoperationen dazu beigetragen, die Bedingungen für die Überraschung zu schaffen. 
Auch diese Ansätze können nicht erklären, wie genau die gezielte Täuschung zur Überraschung 
im Kontext der Annexion beigetragen hat, und was dies für den Ausgang der Annexion 
bedeutete. Somit bleibt die Rolle der Täuschung für die Annexion der Krim ebenso zufällig – 
und damit nicht nachvollziehbar.  
 
4. Die Herausforderung, Überraschung nachzuvollziehen. 
 
Nachdem aus der betrachteten Literatur einige Annahmen darüber, warum Überraschung 
auftrat und welche Rolle sie für den Ausgang hatte, identifiziert wurden, bestand die 
Herausforderung darin, wie man von hier aus weiter vorgehen sollte. Durch die Analyse, wie 
die überprüfte Literatur zu ihren Schlussfolgerungen gekommen war, konnten Anhaltspunkte 
für das weitere Vorgehen in diesem Forschungsvorhaben eruiert werden. Zum einen zeigte sich, 
dass die meisten der rezensierten Arbeiten methodologische Überlegungen und theoretischen 
Erwägungen wenig Aufmerksamkeit schenken. Zum anderen findet sich eine Gemeinsamkeit 
in dem Blickwinkel, von dem der Fall betrachtet wird: Der Fall wird aus der Rückschau 
betrachtet - das heißt, der Startpunkt der betrachteten Arbeiten ist der nur aus der Rückschau 
bekannte Ausgang. Diese Herangehensweise erscheint jedoch für das Forschungsinteresse, die 
Überraschung und ihre Rolle für die Annexion der Krim und für Deutschland im Speziellen zu 
untersuchen, wenig geeignet. Um die Rolle der Überraschung zu verstehen und besser 
nachvollziehen zu können, warum sie geschah, argumentiert diese Forschung, dass zunächst 
festgestellt werden muss, was man erwartete, bevor der unerwartete Ausgang bekannt wurde. 
Dies erfordert die Einnahme der Perspektive, die sich bot, als der Ausgang – die Annexion der 
Krim durch Russland – noch unbekannt war.  
 
Der Unterschied zwischen den beiden Perspektiven lässt sich am Beispiel eines Puzzles 
beschreiben. Die untersuchten Arbeiten betrachteten alle die Teile des Puzzles in Kenntnis des 
Bildes, das die richtig zusammengesetzten Puzzleteile ergeben. Anders gestaltet es sich bei der 
Frage, warum etwas überraschend wirkte, und welche Auswirkungen das unerwartete Ereignis 
auf den weiteren Verlauf hatte.  Hier muss der Forscher herausfinden, welches Bild bei der 





Betrachtung ausschließlich der Teile des Puzzles von den beteiligten Puzzlespielern erwartet 
wurde, ohne jedoch das richtige Bild zu kennen. Es geht also darum, zunächst die sich in der 
Rückschau als falsch herausgestellte Erwartungen zu betrachten, bevor Rückschlüsse darüber 
gezogen werden können, was genau überraschend war, warum es überraschend war und welche 
Rolle die Überraschung für den Ausgang der Annexion der Krim spielte. 
 
5. Welche Quellen, welche Daten? Wie viel Information ist genug? 
 
Eine weitere Frage, die sich nach der Literaturschau stellte, war, welche Quellen für Daten 
konsultiert werden sollten, um das zu finden, was vor dem Unerwarteten erwartet wurde. Hier 
war das erste zu überwindende Hindernis die Validität der Daten - ein Problem, das wie diese 
Arbeit feststellt allen Bemühungen, die Annexion der Krim zu untersuchen, innewohnt. Dies 
erklärt auch, warum bis heute vieles an der Annexion und wie sie vonstattenging, umstritten 
bleibt. Fakt ist, dass bis in den heutigen Tag Daten von hoher Qualität, wie beispielsweise 
Besprechungen von Regierungsprotokollen für den Forscher nicht zugänglich sind, und dies 
auch absehbar so bleiben wird.  Andererseits ist die Frage der Quellen und Daten besonders 
herausfordernd, da im Gegensatz zur mangelnden Verfügbarkeit zu Quellen und Daten hoher 
Qualität, das Universum verfügbarer Sekundärdaten unüberschaubar ist. Der Fall hat in den 
Medien und in der Wissenschaft große Aufmerksamkeit erregt, so dass die verfügbare 
Gesamtdatenmenge den einzelnen Forscher überfordert.  
 
Zusammengenommen stellen diese dem Fall innewohnenden Aspekte den Forscher vor ein 
Dilemma: Entweder man bricht die Untersuchung an diesem Punkt ab, da die Erfüllung 
akademischer Standards durch die verfügbaren Daten verunmöglicht wird; oder man geht 
Kompromisse bei den akademischen Standards ein, mit der Begründung, dass der Fall von 
historischer Bedeutung ist, und in der Hoffnung, dass, auch wenn akademische Standards 
kompromittiert werden müssen und akademisch bestenfalls eine spezifische Erklärung eines 
Einzelfalls zu erwarten ist, wertvolle Einblicke in den Fall und die Politikgestaltung gefunden 
werden können. Die vorliegende Untersuchung löst das Dilemma, in dem sie sich für zweiteres 
entscheidet. Sie unterscheidet sich jedoch von der diskutierten Literatur über Annexion der 
Krim, in dem sie das für die wissenschaftliche Betrachtung inhärente Problem des Falls 
benennt, es reflektiert, und einen nachvollziehbaren und falsifizierbaren Ausweg beschreibt. 
 





6. Eine kontinuierliche Analyse der täglichen Berichterstattung einer Medienquelle 
vom Beginn der Ukraine-Krise im Oktober 2013 bis zur Annexion der Krim im 
April 2014 
 
Anstatt sich auf mehrere Sekundärquellen ohne a priori definierte Auswahlkriterien zu stützen, 
wie dies in der betrachteten Literatur häufig zu beobachten war, beschränkt sich der dritte Teil 
dieser Untersuchung auf die eingehende Analyse einer einzigen Quelle: die Berichterstattung 
der Arbeitsgemeinschaft der öffentlich-rechtlichen Rundfunkanstalten der Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland (ARD). Um das Risiko einer Selektionsverzerrung der ausgewählten Beiträge und 
den darin enthaltenen Daten zu minimieren, wurde eine kontinuierliche, tagesaktuelle Analyse 
der Berichterstattung der ARD vom 29. Oktober 2013 bis zur offiziellen Begrüßung der 
Halbinsel durch die russische Duma als Mitglied der Russischen Föderation am 18. März 2014 
durchgeführt716. Insgesamt wurden für den dritten Teil dieser Untersuchung 349 Meldungen 
und Nachrichten der ARD berichtete, identifiziert, transkribiert, übersetzt und analysiert. Fokus 
der Untersuchung ist die Frage, welche Erwartungen über die weiteren Entwicklungen sich aus 
der Berichterstattung, insbesondere aus deutscher Regierungsperspektive, feststellen lassen, die 
sich, nachdem die Krim am 18. März durch Russland annektiert wurde, als falsch herausstellten.    
 
7. Eine diametrale Schlussfolgerung über die Rolle der Überraschung: Geschaffen 
durch die russische Täuschung, und entscheidend für den Ausgang. 
 
Die Ergebnisse dieser Analyse, die im vierten Teil dieser Untersuchung wiedergegeben und 
diskutiert werden, sind diametral zu den bisherigen Schlussfolgerungen über die Rolle der 
Überraschung für die russische Annexion der Krim, insbesondere aber für Deutschland. Sie 
kommt zu dem Schluss, dass ein unerwartetes Ereignis - das Verschwinden des ukrainischen 
Präsidenten Wiktor Janukowytsch in der Nacht zum 21. Februar - die Entwicklungen auslöste, 
die zur Annexion der Krim führten, und dass die Ankündigung während des Krisengipfels des 
EU-Rats am 06. März 2014 der Regionalregierung der Krim, ein Referendum über die 
Entscheidung des Regionalparlaments über den Beitritt der Krim zu russischen Föderation 
abzuhalten, den Ausgang bestimmte.  
 
 
716 Dies hat überdies den Vorteil, dass damit die beiden unterschiedlichen Beobachtungszeiträume, die in der 
deutschen und der breiteren Debatte über die Annexion der Krim festgestellt wurden, abgedeckt werden, s.a. 
Fn 17.   





Die beiden überraschenden Ereignisse sind unterschiedlicher Natur: Das Verschwinden von 
Janukowitsch kam wie ein Blitz aus heiterem Himmel und überraschte sowohl Deutschland als 
auch Russland. In Bezug auf die entscheidende Überraschung am 06. März 2014 kommt die 
Analyse der ARD-Berichterstattung jedoch zu dem Schluss, dass diese durch gezielte russische, 
insbesondere Putins, List herbeigeführt wurde: Anstatt die Bedingungen für die Überraschung 
durch die Erhöhung der Mehrdeutigkeit zu schaffen, wie in früheren Versuchen wenig konkret 
argumentiert wurde, stellt diese Untersuchung fest, dass Putin List darin lag, Gewissheit über 
die falsche Alternative zu kreieren.   
 
Putin wollte seine Gegner glauben lassen, dass ein weiterer Georgien-Krieg unmittelbar 
bevorstehe. Sein Stratagem, um diese Erwartung zu erreichen, war das Militär. Die Erwartung 
einer unmittelbar bevorstehenden Wiederholung der Entwicklungen in Georgien 2008, als 
Russland den neuen georgischen Präsidenten Michail Saakaschwili in der falschen Erwartung, 
die NATO werde ihm zu Hilfe kommen, zu einer Reaktion auf russische Militärmanöver nahe 
der georgischen Grenze köderte, schuf die Voraussetzungen für das überraschende Ereignis, 
das den Ausgang prägte: die Ankündigung der Regionalregierung der Krim während des EU-
Gipfels am 6. März.  Doch während Russlands militärische Manöver, die ein Georgien-
ähnliches Szenario widerspiegeln sollten, Putins zentrales Stratagem waren, war der russische 
Präsident selbst Russlands oberster "Stratagematist" - und Angela Merkel das Hauptziel seiner 
List. Die Analyse der ARD-Berichterstattung macht deutlich, dass Putin diese Anrufe nicht 
nutzte, um die Zweifel der deutschen Kanzlerin an den russischen Absichten zu zerstreuen, 
sondern um ihr bereits bestehendes Bild von Russland und seinem Präsidenten zu bestätigen 
und zu verstärken.  Das Prinzip galt sowohl in Bezug auf die Rolle des Militärs als auch bei der 
Telefondiplomatie mit der deutschen Kanzlerin: Putins Georgien-Strategem nutzte Vorurteile 
seiner Gegner aus, um die falsche Erwartung zu erzeugen, dass ein weiteres Georgien 
bevorstehe.  
 
Der Effekt der von Putin inszenierten Überraschung am 6. März 2014 war, dass sie den 
Ausgang bestimmte. Das am 06. März angekündigte Referendum über die vom 
Regionalparlament der Krim bereits beschlossenen Beitritt zur russischen Föderation konnte 
nicht mehr abgewendet werden, und wurde am 16. März 2014 abgehalten. Wenig überraschend 
fand die Entscheidung des Regionalparlaments überwältigenden Zuspruch, und am 18. März 





wurde die Halbinsel Krim, zuvor autonome Republik auf dem Staatsgebiet der Ukraine, Teil 
der Russischen Föderation.   
 
Die unterschiedliche Bewertung der Rolle der Überraschung für die Annexion der Krim, 
insbesondere für Deutschland im Vergleich zu den in der Literaturübersicht besprochenen 
Arbeiten könnten nicht größer sein. Sie ist diametral. In früheren Arbeiten war die 
Überraschung zufällig und ihr Effekt für das Gesamtergebnis vernachlässigbar. Ebenso die 
russische Täuschung. Die Analysen der ARD-Berichterstattung, die diese Untersuchung 
vorgenommen hat, gelangt jedoch zu dem Schluss, dass Überraschung für Ausgang 
entscheidend war, und durch russische List bewusst herbeigeführt wurde. Russlands 
strategische List war dabei, den Gegner der falschen Option gewiss zu machen. Statt die 
Ungewissheit zu erhöhen, erhöhte es die Gewissheit über diese falsche Option.  
 
8. Wie man zur Überraschung steht, hängt davon ab, wo man in der Strategie sitzt.  
 
Doch wie lässt sich diese unterschiedliche Bewertung der Rolle der Überraschung erklären? Im 
fünften Teil dieser Arbeit wird versucht, den Unterschied durch einen Rückgriff auf die Theorie 
besser zu verstehen und zu erklären717. Während die Annexion der Krim allgemein als ein Fall 
der Internationalen Beziehungen betrachtet werden kann, ist die Frage, die diese Arbeit 
aufwirft, zu spezifisch für die großen Theorien der Internationalen Beziehungen.  Sie fragt, ob 
Überraschung im Wettbewerb und Konflikt zwischen Staaten ausschlaggebend sein kann, und 
wie sie herbeigeführt werden kann. Anstatt also zu versuchen, die diametralen 
Schlussfolgerungen über die Rolle von Überraschung (und Täuschung) besser zu erklären, 
indem man sich der Rolle von Überraschung in den großen Theorien der Internationalen 
Beziehungen zuwendet, betrachtet diese Forschung die Rolle von Überraschung und Täuschung 
in den theoretischen Überlegungen über Strategie, da in diesem Zusammenhang die Frage, was 
für den Ausgang von Konflikt, Wettbewerb, Krise und Krieg zwischen Staaten entscheidend 
ist, axiomatisch ist.   
 
Dabei wird festgestellt, dass die Diskussion über das Verhältnis von Überraschung, Täuschung 
und Strategie so alt ist wie die intellektuellen Überlegungen zur Strategie, das Phänomen der 
 
717 Auch hier unterscheidet sich diese Untersuchung von den diskutierten Vorhaben, die fast gänzlich auf eine 
theoretische Diskussion beobachtbarer Phänomene im Kontext der Annexion der Krim verzichten.  





Überraschung also kein neues Problem ist. Während in der Debatte über die Rolle der 
Überraschung in der Strategie im vornuklearen Zeitalter Einigkeit darüber besteht, dass 
Überraschung ein temporärer psychologischer Effekt ist, der als großer Kraftmultiplikator 
dienen kann,  lassen sich zwei unvereinbare Positionen auf die Frage, ob Überraschung auch 
entscheidend für den Ausgang eines Krieges sein kann, identifizieren: der direkte Ansatz, 
dessen berühmtester Vertreter der preußische Kriegstheoretiker Carl von Clausewitz ist, und 
der indirekte Ansatz718, dessen wichtigster Vertreter im ‚westlichen‘ Kontext  der britische 
Kriegsberichterstatter Sir Basil H. Liddell-Hart ist719. Zwar erkennen Clausewitz und der von 
ihm vertretene direkte Ansatz in der Strategie den Nutzen von Überraschung auf der taktischen 
Ebene des Krieges an, den strategischen Nutzen der Überraschung jedoch zieht der preußische 
Pate der Strategie grundsätzlich in Zweifel. Für ihn ist die Überraschung im Krieg selten 
entscheidend, da im Krieg nur der Einsatz auf dem Schlachtfeld entscheidend sein kann. Die 
Fokussierung auf Entscheidungsschlacht ist auch der Grund, warum Clausewitz den Mitteln 
zum Erreichen von Überraschung, List und Täuschung, kritisch gegenübersteht. Für ihn sind 
sie eine Verschwendung von Zeit und Mühe, eine letzte Instanz in militärischer Notlage und 
sogar moralisch verwerflich. Für Sir Liddell-Hart und die Anhänger des indirekten Ansatzes 
hingegen bewirkt die Überraschung die Dislokation des Gegners, und ist somit entscheidend 
für den Ausgang. Folglich steht der indirekte Ansatz der Täuschung positiv gegenüber und hat 
wenig moralische Bedenken, sie einzusetzen. Der Grund dafür ist, dass im Gegensatz zu den 
Anhängern des direkten Ansatzes, die die Entscheidungsschlacht der Vernichtung suchen, die 
Anhänger des indirekten Ansatzes es als den Gipfel der Kunst ansehen, ohne Kampf zu 
gewinnen, und nach Mitteln und Wegen suchen, kostspielige Gefechte auf dem Schlachtfeld zu 
vermeiden.  
 
Die beiden Positionen machen die Beantwortung der Frage nach der Rolle der Überraschung 
für die Strategie unlösbar. Wie man zur Überraschung steht, hängt davon ab, wo man in der 
Strategie sitzt. 
 
Dies ändert sich auch nicht in der Diskussion über den Zusammenhang zwischen Strategie und 
Überraschung im nuklearen Zeitalter. Zwar bleibt sie ein zentrales Element der 
 
718 Clausewitz, Carl von: On War, edited and translated by Howard, Michael; Paret, Peter; Princeton University 
Press, Princeton, N.J, 1984. 
719 Liddell-Hart, Basil Henry Sir: Strategy, Praeger, New York, 1967. 
 





Strategiedebatte, allerdings stellt sich angesichts der Gefahr eines vernichtenden, unerwarteten 
nuklearen Erstschlags die Frage nach der Rolle von Überraschung für den Ausgang nicht mehr. 
Die technologische Entwicklung der Nuklearwaffe löste die Zweifel die Clausewitz und die 
Schüler des direkten Ansatzes an der Rolle der Überraschung für die Strategie hatten auf. Dies 
hatte Folgen für die Debatte über die Überraschung in der Strategie. Statt der Frage nach der 
strategischen Relevanz der Überraschung, das heißt ihrer Eignung den Ausgang des Krieges zu 
entscheiden, nachzugehen rücken zwei andere Fragen in den Mittelpunkt der Strategiedebatte 
im nuklearen Zeitalter des Kalten Krieges. Zum einen die Frage, warum Regierungen Opfer 
von Überraschungen werden; zum anderen, ob sich Überraschungen in der Zukunft verhindern 
lassen würden.  
 
Die Untersuchung der Strategiedebatte zum Phänomen der Überraschung im nuklearen 
Zeitalter zeigt, dass gegen Ende des Kalten Krieges weitestgehend Einigkeit über die Ursachen 
für das Entstehen von Überraschungen herrschte. Im Kern liegt die Erkenntnis, dass 
Überraschung entstehen, obwohl sich in der Rückschau feststellen lässt, dass Informationen 
vorlagen, die auf die spätere Überraschung hingewiesen haben könnten 720. Die Frage war also 
wieso vorhandene, korrekte Informationen keine Beachtung fanden. Von besonderer Relevanz 
wurde dabei der menschliche Faktor identifiziert, und die kognitiven Filter die das korrekte 
Interpretieren neuer Informationen erschweren. Als weiterer Faktor wurden die Gruppen und 
bürokratischen Strukturen innewohnenden Idiosynkrasien als Filter für die korrekte 
Interpretation von Informationen erkannt, wobei diese als von besonderer Bedeutung im 
Umfeld nachrichtendienstlicher Behörden beschrieben wurden. Und schließlich, wobei als von 
untergeordneter Rolle im Vergleich zu den einer von Überraschung betroffenen Regierung 
innewohnenden Ursachen dargestellt, wurde auch List und Täuschung des Gegners als 
potenzielle Ursache für Überraschungen beschrieben. Der Grund für diese Verdrängung des 
planmäßigen, gegnerischen Handelns als ursächlich für Überraschungen lässt sich mit der 
Beobachtung dieser Arbeit begründen, dass die Strategiedebatte im nuklearen Zeitalter einseitig 
auf den Axiomen über den strategischen Wert der Überraschung von Carl von Clausewitz und 
dem direkten Ansatz beruht721.  
 
720 S. insbesondere: Wohlstetter, Roberta: Warning and Decision, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1962. In 
diesem für die Studien der Überraschung grundlegenden Werk dass den japanischen Angriff auf Pearl Harbor 
1941 untersucht, wird erstmals auf das Paradox hingewiesen, dass Regierungen überrascht werden obwohl 
Informationen vorlagen die der späteren Überraschung hätten vorbauen können.  
721 Diese Ansicht vertritt insbesondere Barton Whaley, s. Whaley, Barton: Stratagem, Artech House, Boston 
London, 1969/2007 (reprint).  






Einigkeit herrschte in der umfangreichen Debatte über das Phänomen der Überraschung 
während des Kalten Krieges auch über die Frage nach der Abkehr zukünftiger Überraschungen: 
Zukünftige Überraschungen lassen sich nicht verhindern. Es ist dieser Punkt, an dem sich gegen 
Ende des Kalten Krieges, erneut unter dem Eindruck technologischer Entwicklungen, diesmal 
im Bereich der Informationsgewinnung und Datenverarbeitung, eine neue Haltung entwickelte. 
Im Gegensatz zu den pessimistischen Einschätzungen gelangen sie zu dem Schluss, dass die 
technologischen Fortschritte zumindest Anlass zur Hoffnung geben, Überraschungen in der 
Zukunft auszuschließen722. In der Debatte zwischen den beiden Schulen wird auch erstmals die 
Frage der Vorgehensweise bei der Untersuchung des Phänomens Überraschung debattiert. 
Bisherigen Ansätzen wird unsauberes wissenschaftliches Arbeiten vorgeworfen, so dass sich 
trotz der Einigkeit der Forschung nicht von einer Theorie über das Entstehen von 
Überraschungen für Regierungen sprechen lasse723. Dieser Kritik wurde entgegengehalten, dass 
das Phänomen der Überraschung den Forscher vor ein grundsätzliches Dilemma stelle, da seine 
Eigenschaften ein Erfassen durch ein Prokrustes‘ Bett wissenschaftlicher Strenge nicht 
zulassen, und damit die Entwicklung einer generalisierbaren Theorie im strengen 
wissenschaftlichen Sinne unmöglich wird724.  
 
Die Debatte über die Wissenschaftlichkeit der bisherigen Forschung markierte gleichermaßen 
das Ende der Strategiedebatte über das Phänomen der Überraschung. Mit dem Ende des Kalten 
Krieges, und der Wahrnehmung des Endes der nuklearen Bedrohung verlor sich auch das 
Interesse an Überraschungen, und rückte aus dem Zentrum der Strategiedebatte. Allerdings 
lässt sich feststellen, dass in der jüngeren Forschung bis zur Wiederentdeckung des Schwarzen 
Schwans durch Nassim Taleb725 in Folge des Zusammenbruchs der Weltfinanzmärkte im Jahr 
2008 die Erwartung, Überraschung ließe sich mittels verbesserter Technologie und 
Prozessoptimierung in den bürokratischen Abläufen, vorherrschte. Dies gilt auch im 
Zusammenhang mit den Ansätzen, die sich in der aktuellen Debatte zeigen. Erst neueste 
Veröffentlichungen insbesondere aus dem Bereich von Militärstudien in den USA nehmen 
 
722 Levite, Ariel: Intelligence and Strategic Surprise, Columbia University Press, Washington D.C., 1987. 
723 Levite, Ariel: ‘Intelligence and Strategic Surprises Revisited: A Response to Richard K. Betts's "Surprise, 
Scholasticism, and Strategy"’, in: International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 33, No. 3, 1989, New York, Columbia 
University Press, 345-349. 
724 Betts, Richard K.: ‘Surprise, Scholasticism, and Strategy: A Review of Ariel Levite's Intelligence and Strategic 
Surprises’, in:  International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 33, No. 3, 1989, New York, Columbia University Press, pp. 
329-343. 
725 Taleb, Nassim K: The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable, Random House, New York, 2007. 





wieder die Erwartungshaltung ein, Überraschungen werden auch in der Zukunft das 
internationale Umfeld dominieren. Statt sie zu verhindern, gelte es einen Umgang damit zu 
finden726.  
 
9. Kontinuierliche Relevanz von Strategie oder die alarmierenden Anzeichen von 
"Strategieblindheit"?  
 
Unabhängig von der Frage nach der Abwendbarkeit von Überraschungen in der Zukunft, fällt 
in der jüngeren Forschung mehr noch als in der Strategiedebatte über die Überraschung im 
Zeitalter des Kalten Krieges die Entkoppelung von der in der Strategiedebatte des vornuklearen 
Zeitalter grundsätzlichen Frage nach der Rolle der Überraschung für den Ausgang eines 
Krieges, vor allem aber die zwei grundverschiedenen Haltungen die sich hierzu in der Debatte 
finden lassen, immer mehr in den Hintergrund rücken.  
  
Dies zeigt sich auch in der Forschung und Debatte über die Annexion der Krim insgesamt, in 
der die Kernfrage: „was war entscheidend für den Ausgang“ losgelöst von früheren 
Erkenntnissen der Strategiedebatte zu dieser Fragestellung geführt wurde.  
 
Setzt man jedoch die beiden Annahmen über die Rolle von Überraschung für den Ausgang der 
russischen Annexion der Krim, die diese Arbeit in den vorigen Kapiteln herausgearbeitet hat in 
Zusammenhang, wird deutlich, dass diese durch die Strategiedebatte über das allgemeine 
Verhältnis von Überraschung und Strategie aus dem vornuklearen Zeitalter erklärt werden 
können. Diejenigen, die argumentieren, dass die Rolle von Überraschung und Täuschung für 
die Annexion der Krim vernachlässigbar und zufällig ist, finden ihre Bestätigung in Carl von 
Clausewitz und dem direkten Ansatz zur Strategie. Und die Schlussfolgerung, die aus der für 
diese Forschung durchgeführten Datenanalyse gezogen wurde, kann mit den von Basil H. 
Liddell Hart vertretenen Thesen über den strategischen Nutzen von Täuschung und 
Überraschung erklärt werden.  Beiden Perspektiven wird ein Bündel an möglichen, 
generalisierbaren Ursachen für die Überraschung im Kontext der Krim an die Hand gegeben, 
ohne jedoch mit Sicherheit feststellen zu können was genau ursächlich für die Überraschung, 
im allgemeinem wie speziell für Deutschland, war. 
 
726 Cancian, Mark F.: Avoiding Coping with Surprise in Great Power Conflicts, pp. 30 – 33, Centre for Strategic 
and International Studies (CSIS), Washington D.C., 2018.  
 






Dies bedeutet jedoch, dass es die Gegensätzlichkeit der Annahmen über die Rolle der 
Überraschung für die Annexion der Krim, insbesondere für Deutschland, nicht auflöst, sondern 
beide Ansichten bestätigt: wie man zur Rolle der Überraschung für die Annexion der Krim 
steht, hängt davon ab wo man in der Strategie sitzt.  
 
Wenngleich dieses Ergebnis eine klare Beantwortung der Frage, welche in dieser Arbeit 
herausgearbeitete Annahme über die Rolle der Überraschung für die Annexion der Krim eher 
von den theoretischen Einsichten über die Rolle der Überraschung in der Strategie gedeckt ist 
verhindert, und insofern nicht restlos zufriedenstellend ist, ergeben sich aus der Beobachtung 
der Entkoppelung der Debatte über die Annexion der Krim ebenso wie im Zusammenhang mit 
dem Phänomen der Überraschung von ihrer Kernfrage Schlussfolgerungen. Die erste ist, dass 
aus der Perspektive der Strategie die Überraschung, auch wenn ihr Wert für das Gesamtergebnis 
umstritten ist, ein Faktor ist, der, wenn er beobachtet wird, nicht vernachlässigt werden sollte. 
Überraschung ist wichtig. Und wenn keine Überraschung vorliegt, sollte stets damit gerechnet 
werden. Denn Überraschung liegt stets in der Zukunft. Zweitens hat diese Untersuchung 
gezeigt, dass das Nachdenken über die Rolle der Überraschung für die Strategie zwar so alt ist 
wie das Nachdenken über das Gewinnen von Kriegen, die Debatte aber erhebliche 
Schwerpunktverschiebungen erfahren hat - von der Untersuchung ihrer Rolle für das Gewinnen 
von Kriegen vor dem Aufkommen der Atomwaffe zu der Frage, was Regierungen dazu 
veranlasst, Opfer von Überraschungen zu werden, und ob und wie dies in Zukunft verhindert 
werden kann. Drittens wurde wie bereits im Kontext der Debatte über die Krimannexion 
beobachtet, dass die Debatte über die Rolle von Überraschung in der Strategie zunehmend von 
ihren theoretischen Grundlagen entkoppelt wurde. Noch wichtiger als eine Auseinandersetzung 
mit dem Phänomen der Überraschung, scheint daher vor dem Hintergrund des theoretischen 
Rückgriffs die Kenntnis über Strategie.   
 
Während die abnehmende Strategiekompetenz und ihre theoretischen Grundlagen in allen für 
diese Studie untersuchten Arbeiten zur Annexion der Krim festgestellt wurden und Anlass zur 
Sorge einer wachsenden ‚Strategieblindheit‘ geben, argumentiert diese Studie, dass 
Deutschland in besonderem Maße davon betroffen ist.  
 





Dies zeigt sich zum einen in Bezug auf das Phänomen der Überraschung. Die vorliegende 
Studie über die Rolle der Überraschung für Russlands Annexion der Krim liefert gute Gründe 
für Deutschland, sich im Rahmen seiner laufenden Bemühungen mehr internationale 
Verantwortung zu übernehmen näher mit dem Thema Überraschung zu beschäftigen. Erstens, 
weil die Erfahrung Deutschlands, wenn es, wie im Fall der Krim, internationale Verantwortung 
übernimmt, zeigt, dass die Wahrscheinlichkeit, überrascht zu werden steigt. Zweitens, weil 
entgegen der in Deutschland beobachteten Vorstellung, Überraschung sei neu und eine 
Begleiterscheinung einer aus den Fugen geratenen Welt, das Phänomen und die intellektuelle 
Auseinandersetzung damit so alt sind wie die Auseinandersetzung über die Beziehungen 
zwischen Staaten, insbesondere im Konfliktfall, selbst. Drittens zeigt sich diese 
‚Strategieblindheit‘ in der deutschen Debatte über die Annexion der Krim, da hier eine fast 
vollständige Entkoppelung beobachtet werden kann.  
 
10. Politik-Empfehlungen  
 
Vor diesem Hintergrund schließt diese Untersuchung mit zwei Empfehlungen für weitere 
Überlegungen im Kontext der deutschen Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik. Die erste besteht darin, 
eine gründliche, regierungsweite Untersuchung der wichtigsten Ereignisse vorzunehmen, die 
die deutsche Regierung seit dem Arabischen Frühling 2011 überrascht haben. Die Ergebnisse 
sollten einer breiten öffentlichen, insbesondere einer parlamentarischen Debatte zugeführt 
werden. Solche Untersuchungen und Debatten sind nicht ohne Präzedenzfall und wurden zum 
Beispiel in den Vereinigten Staaten nach den Anschlägen vom 11. September 2001 im Auftrag 
der Regierung durchgeführt727 oder als Teil großer und angemessen finanzierter 
Forschungsprojekte, die verschiedene Überraschungsereignisse und ihre Entstehung 
untersuchten728. Während keines der beiden Beispiele zukünftige Überraschungen verhindern 
konnte, haben beide Bemühungen zu einer besseren Selbstwahrnehmung beigetragen, die die 
Anfälligkeit für Überraschungen verringerte und strukturelle und prozedurale Veränderungen 
in der Politikgestaltung auslöste, die zu einer widerstandsfähigeren und anpassungsfähigeren 
Politik beitrugen.  
 
727 Zum Beispiel die Untersuchung über die Terroranschläge auf das World Trade Centre am 11. September 
2001,  online einsehbar unter: https://9-11commission.gov/report/911Report.pdf , zuletzt besucht am 
18.04.2021. 
728 Zum Beispiel: Nolan, Janne E.; MacEachin, Douglas; Trockman, Kristine: Discourse, Dissent, and Strategic 
Surprise: Formulating U.S. Security Policy in an Age of Uncertainty, Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, School 
of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, Washington, 2006. 






Die zweite Empfehlung zielt darauf ab, die Kompetenz in Fragen der Strategie in Deutschland 
durch die Einrichtung eines akademischen Lehrstuhls für Strategische Studien zu erhöhen - von 
denen es in Deutschland derzeit keinen gibt. Es gab zwar gute Gründe, warum Deutschland in 
der Vergangenheit nicht über Strategie nachgedacht hat, aber die Erfolgsbilanz der letzten 
dreißig Jahre als souveräne Nation legt nahe, dass das Öffnen der Strategiekiste wahrscheinlich 
nicht dazu führen wird, dass Deutschland den nächsten Angriffskrieg plant. Vielmehr könnte 
es dazu beitragen, dass Deutschland besser in der Lage ist, mehr internationale Verantwortung 
zu übernehmen, und dass die deutsche Debatte über strategische Fragen weniger von 
Annahmen geleitet wird, die von der Vergangenheit geprägt sind. Darüber hinaus wäre es eine 
Chance für Deutschland, ein eigenes, zeitgemäßes und zukunftsorientiertes 
Strategieverständnis zu entwickeln, das, wie diese Untersuchung zeigt, über das Engagement 
auf dem Schlachtfeld hinausgeht: Während die Prinzipien der Strategie nach wie vor Relevanz 
besitzen, hat sich das Gesicht ihres Gegenstandes, des Krieges, des Konflikts, der Krise und des 
Wettbewerbs zwischen und unter Staaten, ebenso grundlegend verändert wie der geopolitische 
Kontext, in dem sie stattfinden. Sich mit diesen Veränderungen des strategischen Umfeldes 
nicht auseinanderzusetzen, birgt stets das Risiko, überrascht zu werden. Und schließlich könnte 
ein solcher Lehrstuhl dazu beitragen, eine deutsche Perspektive in die breitere Strategiedebatte 
einzubringen.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
